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 This dissertation investigates through the lens of epistemology the topos of 
mind reading, which is frequent in the Commedia when Vergil and other souls 
perceive Dante pilgrim’s thoughts.  Challenging previous scholarship, this study 
argues for telepathy as a sign of epistemological crisis that historicizes the poem.  
The crisis emerges through attention to narrative and rhetorical complications in the 
text and their place in popular and learned narrative and philosophical contexts from 
antiquity through the Middle Ages.   
 Chapter 1 demonstrates that rather than enact a fantasy of perfect knowledge 
in heaven, telepathic rhetoric reveals inconsistencies in the mind reading of Vergil 
and of souls in heaven.  These ruptures suggest that we should not wholly accept or 
reject the ambiguous powers of Vergil or take for granted the telepathy of blessed 
souls.  In this way mind reading emerges as an unstable system of knowing 
throughout the poem.  Remaining chapters contextualize this pattern within relevant 
histories, emphasizing texts in cultural dialogue.  Chapter 2 explores epiphany 
scenes, showing that telepathy in the Commedia partly inherits the problems of 
recognizing divine figures in pagan epic and Christian popular narratives.  Chapter 3 
investigates philosophical and narrative sources of mind reading itself, which reflect 
deep theoretical and practical contradictions throughout the Middle Ages, 
ambiguities that inform Dantean telepathy as immanent.  Developing these 
conclusions, chapter 4 situates Dantean mind reading in the Aristotelian-
Neoplatonic framework but also in an epistemological debate that was moving 
 beyond this traditional model.  The final chapter mobilizes speech-act theory to 
advance the historical findings of previous chapters.  It concludes that the language 
of mind reading, as utterances bearing the force of action, urgently performs social 
conventions that bring to light further historical evidence, including the subjectivity 
implied by Dante’s experience of exile.   
 In powerful new ways the dissertation situates the Commedia in history, 
which has rarely been done in part due to Dante’s brilliant strategies of narrative and 
poetic transcendence.  By tracing the histories that make Dantean telepathy possible, 
this study challenges scholarly assumptions by showing how the poem’s language 
anticipates epistemological concerns that became increasingly urgent throughout the 
humanist fourteenth century.
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A NOTE ON TRANSLATIONS 
 
Throughout the dissertation I quote Latin, Italian, and French texts in the original 
language and have provided translations in footnotes.  In some cases the translations 
are mine when I have found no other satisfactory translation.  In other cases I have 
used translations of other scholars but have occasionally altered passages that 
deviate excessively from the original.  In these cases italics indicate my alterations.  
Greek texts are quoted in English translations only, none of which are mine. 
 1 
Introduction 
Mind Reading in Dante’s Commedia: 
From Topos to Historicizing Sign 
 
 In visions prior to Dante’s telepathy is rare and unremarkable, a fact that 
might lead us to presume the visionary tradition’s irrelevance to mind reading in the 
Commedia.  Both Carol Zaleski and Alison Morgan affirm that mind reading occurs 
in the eighth-century Vision of Drythelm and in the twelfth-century Vision of 
Gunthelm, while Zaleski also cites the tenth-century Vision of Laisrén.1 Drythelm’s 
vision contains only one instance, in which the protagonist believes he is in heaven 
and his anonymous guide corrects his thought with “This is not the kingdom of 
heaven, as you imagine” (60).2 The Irish Vision of Laisrén also contains one 
instance where “The man desired to know the difference of the torments.  The angel 
answered at once, in the way that the (guardian) angel has (always) answered 
thoughts and reflections” (118-19).3 The twelfth-century Vision of Gunthelm 
contains four examples, all relatively simple corrections by the guide when 
Gunthelm marvels at the things he sees, and in the final example, when he 
mistakenly believes he is in hell.4 To this short list I add the tenth-century St. 
                                                
1 Thus disproving Alison Morgan’s assertion that mind reading “occurs again only in the twelfth-
century texts and in the Comedy” (103).   
2 According to the translation in Eileen Gardner’s anthology. 
3 According to Kuno Meyer’s translation of the Irish.  The Vision of St. Paul and Tundale’s Vision 
also mention guardian angels who provide counsel and present the soul’s deeds to God, which 
implies mind reading but does not make an explicit connection.  The relationship of the guardian 
angel with mind reading is discussed in chapter 3. 
4 The guide repeats the phrase “Sed quid miraris?” [but why do you marvel?] in two of the first three 
instances. In the fourth he responds to Gunthelm’s mistaken orientation with “Non est infernus quod 
cernis…”  [This is not hell that you perceive].  Translations of the Latin are mine.  Morgan’s 
translation of this episode adds the phrase “Reading his mind” which the original Latin does not call 
for:  “Cui haec existimanti angelus inquit.” I translate the phrase as “The angel said to him as he was 
thinking these things” (103).  She also draws a similarity between this last episode, in which 
Gunthelm describes as towers what in fact turn out to be infernal chimneys, and Inf. 31.31 where 
Vergil tells the pilgrim that he does not see towers but giants.  This may or may not be an instance of 
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Brendan’s Voyage where the saint knows that a brother has hidden a silver bridle-bit 
in his clothes.  Also in this vision a group of monks communicate in what appears to 
be a combination of sign language and telepathy, and a hermit knows the brothers’ 
names without having previously met them (Gardiner 88-9, 99, 121).  The twelfth-
century Vision of Charles the Fat merely suggests telepathy when the guide sees 
that his soul is terrified by the sight of boiling casks (Gardiner 132).  These scattered 
appearances seem to tell us little beyond documenting telepathy as an occasional 
and not especially interesting feature of visionary narratives, some of which Dante 
more than likely was familiar.5 But if the visionary tradition overall does not present 
a forceful context for Dantean telepathy, the relative infrequency and unremarkable 
quality of mind reading in these earlier visions are in fact highly relevant, for they 
invite what turns out to be a crucial and revealing question:  why does the 
Commedia depart from earlier visions to include mind reading not only as a topos6 
but, as I will show, an elaborate one raising many interpretive problems?7  
                                                
mind reading; the poet says at line 20 that he seemed to see towers but the pilgrim explicitly asks at 
line 21 “«Maestro, dì, che terra è questa?»” [Master, tell me, what’s this city?], which might allow 
Vergil to assume that his charge sees the giants as towers. All citations from the Commedia are from 
the Petrocchi edition.  Translations are based on that of Mandelbaum with italics indicating my 
alterations. 
5 Morgan states that it is unknown the extent to which Dante knew any of the main visions but that 
the vision tradition was widespread during his lifetime (4).  She also notes, however, that several 
scholars agree that Dante had direct knowledge of the vision of Paul.  Cesare Segre writes that the 
latter vision is the only one Dante refers to, in Inf. 2.13.  Regarding the vision tradition generally, 
Segre believes that “volente or nolente, Dante non poteva ignorare tutta questa produzione 
visionistica” (20) [willingly or not, Dante could not ignore all of this visionary production]. 
6 I find Morgan’s list of mind-reading passages in the Commedia to be incomplete and in some cases 
questionable.  She says “Dante’s thoughts are read by Virgil eight times, by Beatrice eight times, and 
by Bernard once” (103).  She lists Inf. 13.25-30, 12.31-36, 17.90-96, 23.25-30. Purg. 4.58, 13.73-78, 
15.118-38, 25.10-21. Par. 1.85-93, 4.1-27, 7.10-24, 7.52-57, 7.121-29, 17.1-12, 21.49-51, 27.103-
105, 28.97-99, 29.10-12, 32.49-51.  She leaves out many passages from the first canticle that I would 
include, such as 10.18, 10.125, 13.83, 16.122, 19.39, 23.25, and 26.73.  From the second canticle, she 
omits 18.7, 19.58, 33.73, and from the Paradiso she omits passages such as 4.91-6 where there is no 
question that Beatrice reads the pilgrim’s thoughts.  As I discuss in chapter 1, some of these 
discrepancies may be attributed to differences of interpretation, and yet Morgan leaves out Purg. 
19.58 which I believe to be among the least questionable instances of Vergil’s mind reading.  On the 
other hand she includes dubious passages such as Inf. 12.31-36, in which Vergil merely suggests 
what the pilgrim might be thinking (“Tu pensi / forse in questa ruina…” [You wonder, / perhaps, 
about that fallen mass…].  Further, since Morgan is focused on guides, she excludes all telepathic 
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 This study attempts to answer that question by showing how the apparently 
superfluous topos of mind reading emerges as a historicizing sign of 
epistemological crisis in the Commedia.  This crisis emerges through attention to 
narrative and rhetorical complications in the poem, and the ways in which these 
complications point to relevant contexts of mind reading from antiquity through the 
Middle Ages.  As I describe in further detail below, these contexts are defined by 
pagan and Christian philosophical and narrative sources of telepathy specifically, 
but they are also related to other epistemological events that, while not sources in 
the traditional sense, nonetheless emerge as key forces for contextualizing telepathy 
in the poem.  These additional contexts include new philosophical debates during 
Dante’s lifetime as well as Dante’s personal political history.  From these 
contextualizations I arrive at two important conclusions.  The first is that the 
Commedia’s complicated inclusion of mind reading as a topos, despite suggesting 
the poem’s alienation from histories such as that of visionary narrative, in fact 
invites us to historicize the text because of the epistemological histories to which 
mind reading points and that in fact make the topos possible; unearthing these 
histories allows us to see general patterns in which the poem exists as part of history 
rather than outside of it.  Second, this reading gives us specific insight into what we 
                                                
passages in the Paradiso in which characters other than Beatrice and Bernard read the pilgrim’s 
mind, an omission that distorts the picture of the topos in the poem overall.   
7 My thinking about the Commedia’s relationship with the vision tradition regarding mind reading 
has been informed by The Undivine Comedy:  Detheologizing Dante, where in chapter 7 Teodolinda 
Barolini makes the case for taking seriously the Commedia’s visionary claims and therefore for the 
need to contextualize it within the visionary tradition, which dantisti have not done due to 
preoccupations with the debate on whether to view the Commedia primarily as poem or as vision:  
“While Dante scholars have been arguing among themselves as to whether the Commedia employs 
the allegory of poets or the allegory of theologians, elaborating a discourse that is not accessible even 
to other scholars of literature, historians of religion have gone ahead and calmly included Dante in 
their discussions of vision literature.  In other words, while we continue to debate whether or not to 
consider the Commedia a vision, scholars in other disciplines have been working to understand the 
common ground that underlies all vision literature, including the Commedia.  If we wish our more 
nuanced and complex sense of the Commedia to have any impact on such discussions, we must come 
to terms with the poem not only as a literary artifact but also as the record of a visionary experience” 
(144).  
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may call the poem’s performance of historical subjectivity, which I define in part by 
its performance of language as epistemologically ambiguous.  The best way to 
elaborate these conclusions and to lay out the reading supporting them is to begin 
with some of the relevant scholarship. 
 My reading of the Commedia’s language as philosophically complex is 
indebted to at least two groundbreaking studies of Dante’s poetics, and further 
motivating this dissertation is my belief that scholars have yet to absorb sufficiently 
the ramifications of these studies.  The first is by Giuseppe Mazzotta who, in his 
1979 monograph Dante, Poet of the Desert: History and Allegory in the Divine 
Comedy, recognized that there were unexamined assumptions in readers’ 
interpretations of the poem’s rhetoric: 
 
  …it has been a commonplace in Dante scholarship,  
  ever since Auerbach, to bracket the question of 
  rhetoric on the implicit assumption that in Dante’s 
   text literary language gives a happy and 
  unproblematical representation of the poet’s moral  
  vision.  Accordingly, the critic’s practice has been  
  to acknowledge the correspondences and harmony  
  that the text voices and to translate its rhetorical  
  complexities into explicit thematic and ideological  
  equivalents.  The neglect, however, is remarkable  
  since it is precisely Dante’s own sense of the  
  power of language which is thrown into doubt in  
  the canto of Ulysses (71). 
Mazzotta elaborates this last statement by showing how the Ulyssean episode 
historicizes philosophy in part by rejecting Ulysses’ traditional status as 
philosophical exemplum.  Instead Dante plunges the Greek hero into “the world of 
rhetoric and history, the ground where opinions are debated, where one 
continuously copes with the temptation of truth and falsehood” (81-82).  In doing 
so, the poet undermines the potential for philosophical discourse in order to show 
that abstract philosophy in and of itself is incapable of leading to truth.  Truth for 
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Dante, he says, is necessarily historical, “an involuntary event, part and parcel of the 
world of the probable and the contingent” (81-82), which is not to say that it is 
relative.  Connecting Ulysses and his rhetoric to Dante’s understanding of the 
dangers of his own spiritual and poetic journey, Mazzotta concludes that Dante 
explores and reveals in the Ulysses episode his keen awareness of the fraudulent 
potential inherent in language  (106).8 
 In her 1992 monograph The Undivine Comedy: Detheologizing Dante, 
Teodolinda Barolini, among other topics, takes up the task of systematically 
advancing our understanding of what the sustained link between Dante and Ulysses 
means for the Commedia’s poetics.  She does so first by demonstrating that Ulysses, 
unlike other sinners, is indeed a sustained presence since he is the only sinner other 
than Nimrod to be named in all three canticles,9 but he is also invoked “through 
surrogate figures like Phaeton and Icarus; through semantic tags, like folle, that 
                                                
8 One could argue that Mazzotta’s argument, which is elaborated more fully in chapter 2 of Dante, 
Poet of the Desert: History and Allegory in the Divine Comedy, lacks coherence as he repeatedly 
suggests the sustained ambiguities of both language and history in the Commedia but ultimately 
views them as final signs of God’s transcendent meaning.  It seems that for Mazzotta, there is a way 
in which allegory prevails, finally resolving the tensions he elucidates.  A subsequent study of the 
fraudulent possibilities of language is Richard Allen Shoaf’s attempt in 1983 to explore Dante’s 
anxiety from an economic perspective.  Shoaf draws on the analogy between language and money as 
media that are essentially reductive: “as money reduces everything to arbitrary exchange values, so 
language reduces experience to meaning” (12).  He claims that both Dante and Chaucer bore anxiety 
about the potential of language to signify in the face of this analogy, made ever more threatening by 
the rise of the money economy.  But his argument does not succeed mainly because he does not 
adequately contextualize his theory.  He mentions only Boethius’ second commentary on Peri 
Hermenias from the sixth century as a text that validates the analogy and then assumes it to be 
operative in the Commedia and the Canterbury Tales in the fourteenth century based on some fairly 
general social/historical observations about the period and some compelling links in the imagery of 
the respective poems.  Lee Patterson points out that the money economy was not in fact new as Shoaf 
assumes.  He says that since at least the twelfth century there was a “vigorous, monetized, and even 
credit-based peasant land market, a market for agricultural wage labor, and small-scale but essential 
rural industry and commodity production.  Similarly, both lay and ecclesiastical landlords were 
engaged in sophisticated techniques of estate management and in the calculative pursuit of profit 
maximization, many members of the seigneurial class were deeply involved in the world of 
international trade, and even the quintessentially noble activity of warfare was pervaded with the 
values of the cash nexus” (249).  Nevertheless, Shoaf’s work is important for its recognition of 
epistemological urgency in Dante’s language and it also makes important connections between the 
images of Narcissus and Dante’s journey to heal his spiritual vision. 
9 In Inf. 26, Purg. 19, and Par. 27. 
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Dante has taken care to associate with him; and, most encompassingly, through 
Ulyssean flight imagery” (51).  Building on Mazzotta’s earlier work,10 she argues 
that the Greek hero’s continued presence becomes a theme that signifies Dante’s 
conscious awareness of his self-appointed spiritual role: “Ulysses is the lightning 
rod Dante places in his poem to attract and defuse his own consciousness of the 
presumption involved in anointing oneself God’s scribe” (52).  The Ulysses theme 
demands that we distinguish more rigorously between the experience of the pilgrim 
and that of the poet; specifically it “forces us to challenge the theological grid with 
which we read the Commedia (following interpretative guidelines suggested by the 
text itself), whereby whatever happens in hell is “bad,” problematic, and whatever 
happens in heaven is “good, problem-free” (53).  Thus we should not assume that 
Dante’s poetics follow a trajectory of moral improvement that is parallel to the 
pilgrim’s spiritual advancement.  Indeed, Barolini argues that the very writing of the 
Paradiso is the most potent sign of Ulyssean transgression since the third canticle,  
 
  if it is to exist at all, cannot fail to be transgressive; its  
  poet cannot fail to be a Ulysses, since only a trapassar  
  del segno will be able to render the experience  
  of trasumanar” (54).  In a context where “significar per  
  verba / non si poria” (“signifying through words cannot  
  be done” [Par. 1.70-71]), and where “l’essemplo / e  
  l’essemplare non vanno d’un modo” (“the model and  
  the copy do not match” [Par. 28.55-56]), a representational  
  process that is avowedly based on the principles of mimesis,  
  on the seamless match of “essemplo” and “essemplare,”  
  becomes ever more arduous.  In such a context signs  
  must be trespassed, since only a trespass of the sign can  
  render an experience for which no signs are sufficient  (53-4). 
                                                
10 There are, however, important differences between Mazzotta’s and Barolini’s views of language 
in the poem overall, with the former at times emphasizing to a greater degree the potential for 
linguistic breakdown.  The reader should consult their works for full details of their arguments. 
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This larger awareness opens up the way for understanding and illustrating specific 
moments of poetic transgression throughout the Commedia, which Barolini carries 
out in several subsequent chapters.11 
 Yet more recent studies persist in the fundamentally problematic critical 
tenets broached by Mazzotta 30 years ago and overturned definitively by Barolini, 
now nearly 20 years ago.  These newer comparative studies assign Dante a place in 
both literary and intellectual history by means of reductive assumptions about the 
epistemology of language as it is reflected in the Commedia’s poetics.12 The 
unfortunate effect of these studies is to discourage precisely the sort of philosophical 
work that would greatly benefit Dante scholarship.  John Fyler’s 2007 monograph 
Language and the Declining World in Chaucer, Dante, and Jean de Meun 
drastically reduces Dante’s view of language in order to demonstrate Chaucer’s 
                                                
11 While I am aware of the large body of scholarship on the Dante-Ulysses link (see pages 49-52 of 
Undivine Comedy for a review), I focus on these two in particular because they discuss the issue 
specifically in terms of Dante’s poetics. 
12 It is worth noting that the philosophical view of the poem’s language in these studies strikingly 
resembles, and may be influenced by, the popular stereotype of Dante often found in non-academic 
settings. The media is full of allusions that tend to portray the Commedia as a model of 
epistemological certainty by fixating on the absolute condemnation of hell.  A New York Times 
editorial from the October 7, 2007 edition, for example, introduces the plight of veterans seeking 
disability care as follows:  “It’s more painfully clear that wounded soldiers who seek disability care 
and benefits face bureaucratic chaos worthy of an infernal ring from Dante.” As a strategy of pathos, 
use of the verse “Abandon all hope ye who enter here” from the gates of hell is especially popular.  
In the August 14, 2009 edition of the New York Times, an article on two deaths related to the robbery 
of a restaurant supply store noted that the store owner had posted a sign with the above words from 
the infernal gates.  The journalist, Jennifer S. Altman, draws a clear connection between the sign and 
the fate of the thieves, who ignored the command as they entered the quiet store:  “Four men broke 
the silence by pushing their way past the scrawled sign that states ‘Abandon all hope ye who enter 
here.’” Likewise, in the October 18, 2007 radio broadcast of Democracy Now Michael Ratner of the 
Center for Constitutional Rights lamented confirmation hearings for the then-new attorney general by 
saying that, for him, the hearings invoked the utter despair of Dante’s infernal gates: “Abandon all 
hope ye who enter here.”  Also common are lighter references such as a cartoon from the September 
27, 2007 edition of the New Yorker that imagines a tenth circle of hell as a ladies’ shoe department. 
The notion of perfect judgment (and hence seamless epistemology) behind these popular references 
is not surprising and does not deserve condemnation since the allusions themselves, while inevitably 
confined to the first canticle, in fact attest to the Commedia’s enduring fascination for a culture that 
generally marginalizes all things humanistic.   
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greater skepticism.13 The author concludes that Dante believes fallen language can 
be redeemed in poetry, and Fyler demonstrates this by simplistically linking hell 
with sinful language, purgatory with restorative language and paradise with 
redeemed language.  He reaches this conclusion because his methodology is to read 
Dante’s poetics (and consequently his view of language) as entirely determined by 
the narrative, precisely in the manner that Barolini’s work on the Ulysses theme 
shows to be untenable.  Thus he repeats the well-worn formula of Dante’s moral 
lessons about poetic language in the Commedia as corresponding predictably with 
the progress of the pilgrim’s conversion.14 With this approach, he can say that 
silence and invented words are signs of fallen language in hell (without accounting 
for their function in heaven), that Dante learns from Ulysses and adopts a humbler 
style in the Purgatorio (despite his displays of pride in Purg. 10 and 29) and so on.   
 In his study Poesia dopo la peste: Saggio su Boccaccio, philosopher Kurt 
Flasch similarly compares the linguistic philosophies of Dante and Boccaccio.  With 
a genuine sense of delight, the philosopher chronicles his discovery of Boccaccio’s 
deep interest in philosophy, most importantly Ockham and his challenges to 
thirteenth-century epistemological thought.  Flasch argues powerfully for the 
presence of moral philosophy in the Decameron, and attempts to historicize it by 
declaring that the role of the plague therein is to affirm the great moral breakdown 
of society.  He concludes that the plague makes possible a new type of poesia, one 
in which language is mobilized from a radically new perspective: the inability to 
know causes, specifically, the inability to know whether someone is truly damned or 
                                                
13 In referring to Dante’s “view of language” and his “philosophy of language” (below) I do not refer 
to the question of Dante’s conflicting views on the greater nobility of Latin versus the vernacular, but 
rather his practice of the signifying potential and character of language itself. 
14 In pages 53-54 of Undivine Comedy Barolini cites earlier scholars who make the same 
correspondences between the pilgrim’s progress and the poet’s writing. 
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saved, a perspective that Flasch calls the “non-verità del sapere (58).15 He rightly 
identifies the central moral crisis raised by the first novella of Ser Cepperello:  if no 
one really knows who ultimately ends up in heaven or hell, then one of the most 
important foundations of the medieval world collapses, the idea that men of God 
bear divine and therefore infallible authority in distinguishing good from evil. 
 A major problem with the argument is the way in which Dante is used as a 
foil against which Boccaccio’s new poesia is brought to light.  An understanding of 
Dante’s epistemological foundation is everywhere assumed but never articulated, as 
if Dante’s philosophy of language is so obvious that we already understand and 
agree upon it. The result is an astonishingly reductive view of Dante’s philosophy.  
Early on we read of the new writing Flasch encountered in Boccaccio as “poesia 
dopo Dante e dopo la peste,” and we hear of how the first novella would surely fail 
if, as in Dante, “tra il mondo terreno e quello dell’aldilà ci fosse ancora trasparenza” 
(6).16 But exactly what it means to be post-Dante is never defined, nor is the 
“trasparenza” between the earthly world and beyond.  We are told that an entire 
generation of thinkers between 1318 and 1348 had concluded that it was no longer 
possible to return to the “relazione univoca tra dimensione terrena e dimensione 
etterna, sulla quale poggiava la poesia universale di Dante,” but these vague terms 
are never elaborated (90).17 What is the nature of this “relazione univoca,” and does 
the “dimensione terrena” include institutions such as the church or is it confined to 
language? 
 If we were to ask questions such as these, we might better contextualize 
important features of the Commedia’s epistemology that Flasch ignores when he 
                                                
15 “the non-truth of knowledge.” 
16 “poetry after Dante and after the plague,” and “if there were still transparency between the earthly 
world and that of the beyond.” 
17 “univocal relationship between the earthly dimension and the eternal dimension, upon which 
Dante’s universal poetry is based.” 
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says that “Dante aveva dimostrato che la lingua umana, perfino il dialetto fiorentino, 
è efficace, e può parlare anche dell’inferno e del paradiso” (58).18 One is the 
prominence of the ineffability topos throughout the poem, which is not merely a 
rhetorical version of false modesty, but rather a key element of Dante’s moving 
exploration of the relationship between memory and writing, between profound 
spiritual vision and the recounting of it as gift to the world.  Dante repeatedly claims 
that his language is insufficient because ultimately, he knows that it can only be so.  
This is why, in the Paradiso, he departs from the first two canticles as he declares 
immediately in canto 1 that what he writes does not correspond absolutely to what 
he experienced,19 and in canto 4 we learn that what he experienced does not 
correspond to the ontology of paradise, which no human can comprehend.20 Once 
we acknowledge the topos as more than empty rhetoric, we can see that Dante’s 
language indeed speaks of these realms but not in the unproblematic way that Flasch 
                                                
18 “Dante had demonstrated that human language, even the Florentine dialect, is effective, and can 
speak also of hell and heaven.” 
19 In canto 1 the poet writes “Nel ciel che più de la sua luce prende / fu' io, e vidi cose che ridire / né 
sa né può chi di là sù discende; / perché appressando sé al suo disire, / nostro intelletto si profonda 
tanto, / che dietro la memoria non può ire. / Veramente quant' io del regno santo / ne la mia mente 
potei far tesoro, / sarà ora materia del mio canto.” (4-12) [I was within the heaven that receives / 
more of His light; and I saw things that he / who from that height descends, forgets or can / not 
speak; for nearing its desired end, / our intellect sinks into an abyss / so deep that memory fails to 
follow it. / Nevertheless, as much as I, within / my mind, could treasure of the holy kingdom / shall 
now become the matter of my song].  
20 This astonishing declaration by Beatrice comes in the context of answering the pilgrim’s question 
about the validity of the Platonic doctrine by which souls return to their stars.  She says “D'i Serafin 
colui che più s'india, / Moïsè, Samuel, e quel Giovanni / che prender vuoli, io dico, non Maria, / non 
hanno in altro cielo i loro scanni / che questi spirti che mo t'appariro, / né hanno a l'esser lor più o 
meno anni; / ma tutti fanno bello il primo giro, / e differentemente han dolce vita / per sentir più e 
men l'etterno spiro. / Qui si mostraro, non perché sortita / sia questa spera lor, ma per far segno 
de la celestïal c'ha men salita. / Così parlar conviensi al vostro ingegno, / però che solo da sensato 
apprende / ciò che fa poscia d'intelletto degno.” (29-42) [Neither the Seraph closest unto God, / nor 
Moses, Samuel, nor either John - / whichever one you will – nor Mary has, / I say, their place in any 
other heaven / than that which houses those souls you just saw, / nor will their blessedness last any 
longer. / But all those souls grace the Empyrean; / and each of them has gentle life – though some / 
sense the Eternal Spirit more, some less. / They showed themselves to you here not because / this is 
their sphere, but as a sign for you / that in the Empyrean their place is lowest. / Such signs are suited 
to your mind, since from / the senses only can it apprehend what then becomes fit for the intellect].  
See also Par. 30.76-78 where Beatrice describes the images that appear to the pilgrim as “umbriferi 
prefazi,” shadowy prefaces of the truth for Dante’s limited understanding. 
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assumes.  We become open to the poetic consequences of Dante’s declarations, as 
laid out by Barolini, and to their possible philosophical ramifications. 
 Indeed, one of Dante’s philosophically-rich declarations tells us that he 
operated in terms of his own version of “non-verità del sapere,” defined instead as 
“non falsi errori.”21 The poet introduces this phrase in Purgatorio 15 just after the 
pilgrim experiences his visions of mansuetudine, when he describes his 
reawakening thus:  “Quando l'anima mia tornò di fori / a le cose che son fuor di lei 
vere, / io riconobbi i miei non falsi errori” (115-17).22 As I argue more fully in 
chapter 1, “non falsi errori” does not refer only to the veracity of the pilgrim’s 
particular vision – it does not signify only his truthful dream.  Rather, the phrase 
appears in the context of a complex exchange between Vergil and the pilgrim that 
implies all truth and understanding as defined by ambiguity and occlusion.  
Epistemologically, “non-verità del sapere” and “non falsi errori” may seem to be 
opposed but in fact share key traits, for each claims belief in knowledge and each 
acknowledges the difficulty of accessing it.  Perhaps most important is that both 
expressions imply the reality of interpretation, which by nature is ambiguous.  For 
this reason the “non-verità del sapere” means more than simply “knowledge means 
knowing things may not be true,” just as Dante’s poetics go beyond a simple claim 
of veiled truth suggested by “errors that are not false.”   
 By attending to details such as these, we may begin to demonstrate Dantean 
epistemology and consequently define a more precise historical framework for the 
Commedia’s poetics, and therefore also for the ostensible novelty of the linguistic 
philosophies of later fourteenth-century texts.  With this goal in mind, I propose 
                                                
21 In chapter 7 of Undivine Comedy Barolini elaborates the centrality of this phrase for defining 
Dante’s visionary poetics. 
22 “And when my soul returned outside itself / and met the things outside it that are real, / I then 
could recognize my not false errors.” 
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mind reading as a complicating and historicizing feature of the Commedia’s poetic 
epistemology.  In the pages that follow I will attempt to show that mind reading, 
which may be regarded as a cousin of the ineffability topos, raises deep questions 
about the epistemological potential of language in the Commedia.  These questions 
were not immediately apparent but became clear to me over time, so that I begin 
here by laying out my initial approach of the topic as an undergraduate and how my 
reading evolved during graduate studies to become a worthwhile project with 
something to contribute to Dante scholarship.   
 In my initial study, limited to the Paradiso, I defined mind reading in the 
following way:  In the third canticle, Dante pilgrim discovers that heavenly souls 
know his thoughts; since all thoughts are reflected in God and the souls are able to 
perceive these reflections, they “see” the pilgrim’s thoughts mirrored through God.  
I identified 40 such passages in the canticle and divided them into three groups 
according to the following criteria: the main feature of group one, which includes 27 
passages, is the pilgrim’s silence.  Other characters speak for him and usually read 
the pilgrim’s mind without referring directly to their act.  We find the first example 
of this type in canto one when Beatrice reads the pilgrim’s mind as he enters heaven 
and becomes disoriented by light and sound. 
 
     La novità del suono e 'l grande lume 
   di lor cagion m'accesero un disio 
   mai non sentito di cotanto acume. 
     Ond' ella, che vedea me sì com' io, 
   a quïetarmi l'animo commosso, 
   pria ch'io a dimandar, la bocca aprio 
     e cominciò…  (Par. 1.82-88).23 
                                                
23 “The newness of the sound and the great light / incited me to learn their cause – I was / more keen 
than I had ever been before. / And she who saw me as I see myself / to quiet the commotion in my 
mind, / opened her lips before I could ask / and she began.” 
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As in this excerpt, most mind reading in heaven occurs in the context of the 
pilgrim’s theological or cosmological questions that Beatrice or another soul 
discerns and answers.  Group one episodes are most prevalent in the beginning and 
concluding cantos (see the list of mind-reading passages at the end of this 
introduction).   
 In the seven examples of group two passages, the pilgrim speaks and 
characters often refer to telepathy itself but also to the act of speaking, as well as 
desire for speech.  The first passage of this type appears in canto 8 when the pilgrim 
reaches the sphere of Venus and appreciates that Charles Martel can silently discern 
his thanks through God, thereby praising the fact that words are unnecessary: 
 
     «Però ch'i' credo che l'alta letizia 
   che 'l tuo parlar m'infonde, segnor mio, 
   là 've ogne ben si termina e s'inizia, 
     per te si veggia come la vegg' io, 
   grata m'è più; e anco quest' ho caro 
   perché 'l discerni rimirando in Dio. (Par. 8.85-90).24 
In canto 15 the first of six telepathic episodes of group three appears.  In these 
passages, the pilgrim does not speak in the terzine describing telepathy; other souls 
explicitly characterize speech as unnecessary but nonetheless desire to hear the 
pilgrim’s voice and usually elaborate on why this is so.  The first instance, also the 
crowning episode of group three passages, appears when Dante meets his ancestor 
Cacciaguida in the sphere of Mars.  The latter offers a lengthy address, 
acknowledging telepathy and the fact that his response is already decreed, yet 
commanding that Dante speak to satisfy his ancestor’s desire: 
 
     Tu credi che a me tuo pensier mei 
   da quel ch'è primo, così come raia 
                                                
24 “Because I believe that the deep joy / that your words infuse in me is, / even as I see it, seen by 
you, my lord, / there where every good begins and ends, / it (i.e. the joy) is more welcome to me, and 
I also hold this dear / because you discern it by gazing upon God.” 
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   da l'un, se si conosce, il cinque e 'l sei; 
     e però ch'io mi sia e perch' io paia 
   più gaudïoso a te, non mi domandi, 
   che alcun altro in questa turba gaia. 
     Tu credi 'l vero; ché i minori e ' grandi 
   di questa vita miran ne lo speglio 
   in che, prima che pensi, il pensier pandi; 
     ma perché 'l sacro amore in che io veglio 
   con perpetüa vista e che m'asseta 
   di dolce disïar, s'adempia meglio, 
     la voce tua sicura, balda e lieta 
   suoni la volontà, suoni 'l disio, 
   a che la mia risposta è già decreta!»   (Par. 15.55-69).25 
In this passage and others from group three, Dante dramatizes to an extraordinary 
degree the conflict between speech as superfluous and yet intensely desirable, 
showing that telepathic episodes in groups two and three draw particular attention to 
desire for the act of speaking, whether the pilgrim actually speaks or not during the 
episode. 
 The parameters outlined above for each of the three groups were stable but 
not necessarily rigid, since the theme of desire for language is also present, for 
example, in a group-one passage from canto 7.  Here, the pilgrim speaks, but only to 
himself because he is too overwhelmed by Beatrice (and specifically by the sound 
of her name) to speak to her.  Some speech is so desirable that it frustrates the 
pilgrim’s ability to voice it: 
 
     Io dubitava e dicea `Dille, dille!' 
   fra me, `dille' dicea, `a la mia donna 
   che mi diseta con le dolci stille'. 
     Ma quella reverenza che s'indonna 
 
                                                
25 “You think your thoughts flow into me from Him / who is the First – as from the number one, / the 
five and six derive, if one is known - / and so you do not ask me who I am / and why I seem more 
joyous to you than / all other spirits in this festive throng. / Your thought is true, for both the small 
and the great / of this life gave into that mirror where, / before you think, your thoughts have been 
displayed. / But that the sacred love I which I keep / my vigil with unending watchfulness, / the love 
that makes me thirst with sweet desire, / be better satisfied, let your voice bold, / assured, and glad – 
proclaim your will and longing, / to which my answer is decreed already.” 
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   di tutto me, pur per Be e per ice, 
   mi richinava come l'uom ch'assonna   (Par. 7.10-15).26 
Episodes from all three groups thus emphasize the idea of silence by suggesting that 
speech, and therefore language, are superfluous, and yet they glorify narrative 
speech and poetic language through techniques such as direct discourse and 
neologisms.  A particularly vivid example of these techniques from the second 
group appears in canto 9 when the pilgrim asks Folchetto why he waits to fulfill the 
pilgrim’s desire since the blessed soul already knows what it is.  Dante insists that if 
he were the mind reader, he would not delay his response: 
 
     «Dio vede tutto, e tuo veder s'inluia», 
   diss' io, «beato spirto, sì che nulla 
   voglia di sé a te puot' esser fuia. 
     Dunque la voce tua, che 'l ciel trastulla 
   sempre col canto di quei fuochi pii 
   che di sei ali facen la coculla, 
     perché non satisface a' miei disii? 
   Già non attendere' io tua dimanda, 
   s'io m'intuassi, come tu t'inmii». (Par. 9.73-81).27 
Here the pilgrim’s speech glorifies the very medium he posits as unnecessary, as the 
poet coins three neologisms, “s’inluia,” “m’intuassi,” and “t’immii,” thereby trying 
to literally represent the silent communication of Folchetto’s telepathy.  This 
episode is key as it enacts intense poetic desire for the sound of words and the 
satisfaction that sound can bear in creating meaning, while simultaneously 
thematizing the possibility of silence toward which the poet edges ever closer.  In 
canto 20, another group-two passage represents the act of keeping silent as 
suffering.  This occurs in the context of Dante’s outburst upon meeting the saved 
                                                
26 “I was perplexed, and to myself, I said: / ‘Tell her!  Tell her!  Tell her, the lady who / can slake my 
thirst with her sweet drops’; and yet / the reverence that possesses all of me, / even on hearing only 
Be and ice, / had bowed my head – I seemed a man asleep.” 
27 “’God sees all, I said, ‘and, blessed spirit, / your vision enters him, so that / no wish can ever hide 
itself from you. / Your voice has always made the heavens glad, / as has the singing of the pious fires 
/ that make themselves a cowl of their six wings: / I would not have to wait for your request / if I 
could enter you as you do me.” 
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pagans Trajan and Ripheus – a voicing of shock that comes in spite of his 
knowledge that souls discern his doubt:  “tempo aspettar tacendo non patio, / ma de 
la bocca, «Che cose son queste?»” (81-82).28  Passages such as these illustrate that 
hearing language is intimately connected to fulfilling desire for knowledge and 
show how narrative speech is increasingly justified for the poetic project. 
 Yet the paradox of writing that posits language as superfluous is obviously 
limited - if taken to its logical extreme it would necessarily mean the end of the 
poem.  Dramatizing desire for linguistic communion with the divine is therefore one 
way that Dante plays out the narrative implications of telepathy.  He develops the 
paradigm into a topos that he manipulates in order to dramatize the dialectics of 
insisting on the silence implied by union with God on the one hand, and on the other 
the glorification of his poetics.  Because this dialectical movement attempts to relay 
both the pilgrim’s great, extraterrestrial experience and the relative finality of great, 
terrestrial language, mind reading is also parallel to the Commedia’s theme of 
ineffability.  As Dante’s inexpressibility topos operates dialectically, with the poet’s 
claims of ineffability contradicted by poetics that formally insist on rendering the 
transcendent subject, so the mind reading topos implies silence while it glorifies 
human speech and the immanence of poetic language. 
 Telepathy further enacts another major theme in the Paradiso, which is the 
paradox of the one and the many, sameness and difference, with silence suggesting 
sameness, or the one, because all thoughts are contained and reflected through one 
God, while the difference inherent and necessary to language classifies speech and 
poetry as belonging to the manifold reflections of the one.  The implied silence of 
mind reading adumbrates the final silence of the pilgrim’s union with God to which 
                                                
28 “it could not wait to voice itself, but with / the thrust and weight of urgency it forced / ‘Can such 
things be?’ out from my lips, at which / I saw lights flash – a vast festivity.” 
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the poet’s representation must finally capitulate, but the poetic and narrative 
glorification of language shows us just how hard it is for Dante poet to relinquish 
desire for his earthly poetic medium, which is ostensibly another cosa terrena to be 
foregone.  
 The categorization into three groups revealed an interesting pattern in the 
exclusive presence of group one passages in the first and last cantos of the Paradiso.  
In cantos 1-7 and 27-33, I identified six and seven passages, respectively, all from 
group one with no examples at all from groups two and three.  This pattern creates 
the effect of an initial crescendo into groups two and three but ultimately an abrupt 
end to passages that refer directly to mind reading and in which the pilgrim either 
speaks or is requested to speak.  With respect to telepathy, the pilgrim once again is 
silent in the concluding cantos.  One way I accounted for this shift at the poem’s 
conclusion was by relating it to the pilgrim’s stage in the journey.  Before canto 27, 
we see a gradual increase in expressions of speech and language as narratively 
gratuitous and yet desirable, as well as poetically crucial.  These telepathic 
encounters especially underline the three-way correspondence between the pilgrim, 
the souls who read his mind, and God, through whom thoughts are said to be 
reflected.  This trinitarian structure implies theological unity yet narrative distance 
among the mindreader, the pilgrim, and God.  When the pilgrim reaches first the 
Primum Mobile and then the Empyrean, he more directly approaches the divine 
mind itself, creating new challenges for Dante poet, who must try to render the 
essence of transcendence, the one itself rather than merely its manifold immanent 
possibilities.  The marked return to group one passages may reflect a poetic attempt 
to bridge the conceptual gap between the pilgrim and God by eliminating the 
attention paid by group two and three episodes to the threefold differential.  There 
still remains, of course, a two-way differential relationship between the pilgrim and 
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God, which Dante attempts to collapse so memorably in the poem’s final terzine.  
The shift may also reflect a narrative development in which Dante can no longer 
indulge praise of earthly language as he approaches the moment of his full 
conversion, a moment that he knows will finally surround him with silence. 
 These observations argue for telepathy as more than simply another strategy 
for rendering the power of an ineffable God, or another formal technique of varietà 
for contradicting the poem’s determinism.  The mind reading topos deeply 
implicates both pilgrim and poet through dialectics that dramatize the pilgrim’s and 
other souls’ desire for speech, Dante the poet’s crisis of representation, but also his 
love of earthly language in the face of rendering a journey whose goal is precisely 
the purging of the profane will.  For both poet and pilgrim, telepathy enacts insistent 
love of difference while increasingly signaling its loss.  Both insist on speaking 
silence. 
 The study as described above worked well for an undergraduate project 
necessarily limited in scope, and it remains valid for how it clarifies thematic and 
poetic tensions expressed through a dialectical movement, and for linking telepathy 
in heaven with other major themes in the poem.  As we will see, this initial study 
also laid the foundation for other important observations.  For example, the 
simplicity in most of what I described as group one passages shows that Dante was 
entirely capable of making mind reading episodes straightforward and 
uncomplicated, not unlike his earlier visionary colleagues.  There is, in fact, little 
difference between mind reading in the earlier visions (described at the beginning of 
this chapter) and simple episodes such as Paradiso 28.97-99 when Beatrice discerns 
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the pilgrim’s confusion about the angelic hierarchies:  “E quella che vedëa i pensier 
dubi / ne la mia mente, disse: «I cerchi primi / t'hanno mostrato Serafi e Cherubi.”29 
 Upon revisiting mind reading passages as a graduate student, I encountered 
new questions and difficulties – complexities that are rhetorical, narrative, and 
philosophical in nature.  Closer reading revealed that some of the mind reading in 
the Paradiso is far more rhetorically complex than I had imagined, such that it is not 
always clear whether mind reading occurs because of the ways that various types of 
language, such as body language, scholastic rhetoric, or the rhetoric of authority 
inform episodes that I had previously read as unequivocally telepathic.  This finding 
is significant because it suggests ways in which the Commedia’s language may not 
always control the representation of epistemological phenomena in paradise.  The 
poetry may create epistemological problems for the reader at moments ostensibly 
dedicated to rendering celestial communication as pure and uncomplicated.  This 
new discovery challenges some of the assumptions of the three-group paradigm 
with its pat circumscribed categories. 
 There is also the issue of Vergil’s telepathic powers, which provokes even 
greater epistemological and authoritative problems when contextualized within 
telepathy in the poem as a whole.  As I demonstrate in chapter 1, scholars have 
either accepted without question Vergil’s abilities or have differentiated them too 
sharply from celestial mind reading.  They have done so in part because they follow 
the poem’s implicit instructions in interpreting Vergil only in terms of the two 
canticles in which he appears rather than recognizing and following mind reading as 
a continuous topos throughout the poem.  In some ways Vergil’s mind reading is 
cast in terms more immanent from the more prominent visually-oriented telepathy 
                                                
29 “And she who saw my mind’s perplexities / said: ‘The first circles have displayed to you / the 
Seraphim and Cherubim.” 
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of paradise, but the rhetorical and philosophical complexities in the language of 
Vergil’s telepathy are in fact quite similar to those of the Paradiso.  There are also 
narrative and theological justifications for taking seriously Vergil’s powers.  As I 
will demonstrate, Vergil’s telepathy reveals an unexpected path by which Dante 
dramatizes the theological conflict between grace and free will in terms reminiscent 
of the poetic dialectics of silence versus speech.   
 For these reasons I argue that Vergil’s powers are not so conceptually 
distinct from those of souls in heaven.  But as the guide whom Dante regarded as 
poet of history, Vergil invites us to contextualize the topic of mind reading precisely 
as a historical problem.  That is, Vergil’s abilities remind us that mind reading has a 
history not only in the poem but that it lives in many histories prior to the 
Commedia – histories in which Dante’s poetic performance can and should be 
contextualized.  With this approach, we will see that mind reading in the Commedia 
becomes far more than a generic tool for staging didactic exchange, a simplification 
that Carol Zaleski applies to the vision tradition overall.30 These observations, thus 
far not investigated in the scholarship, invite a larger study of mind reading as a 
significant contribution to Dante studies.  A contextualized approach allows us to 
situate Dante’s representation as one medieval voice among many others grappling 
with telepathy as a rhetorical, narrative, and philosophical problem.  Investigating 
                                                
30 Zaleski writes that in vision narratives “the guide often seems to be reading the mind, not of the 
visionary, but of his amanuensis, the author of the account.  As the guide identifies the souls of 
various sinners and reveals the rationale for their particular torments, his voice blends with that of the 
narrator.  The otherworld landscape is a text, and it is the guide’s responsibility to gloss this text, 
pointing out the lessons embedded in its strange features” (53-54).  Thus it may be tempting to 
characterize some telepathic exchanges not as characters reading the pilgrim’s mind but simply as a 
generalized strategy for introducing questions and beliefs that most Christians would share.  Yet I 
will show that Dante dramatizes mind-reading episodes in highly personal ways, for example by 
returning obsessively to the topic of predestination in telepathic encounters and by complicating the 
language of mind reading to create sustained epistemological tensions.  These characteristics, which I 
have not found in other vision narratives, show that the Commedia’s mind reading is deeply inflected 
by Dante’s personal intellectual and spiritual history and thus should not be understood in this case as 
a stock feature of vision narrative. 
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telepathy in these ways encourages us to conceive of the Commedia’s poetics in 
terms of ancient and medieval culture more thoroughly, as Dante scholars have 
recently begun to do in exciting ways with topics other than mind reading.31   
 In this dissertation, then, I investigate the problem of mind reading with 
three methodologies:  the first is primarily formal and textual, altering the approach 
used in the three-group paradigm outlined above, with some new results.  Chapter 1 
uses close reading of the text and of the commentary tradition to begin to show 
more fully how and why the Commedia goes beyond earlier visions.  It does so not 
only by viewing telepathy as a paradox that becomes a dialectical movement linking 
crucial themes, but by calling into question mind reading as a stable system of 
knowing.  The poem’s rhetoric of telepathy implicates discourses in a way that 
highlights linguistic differences and therefore inconsistencies in characters’ 
telepathic abilities.  These differences suggest that knowing occurs on a continuum 
not only for Vergil but for all characters, such that in practice mind reading is 
neither pure and uncomplicated, nor is it a mode of knowing granted exclusively to 
souls in paradise.  These initial findings begin to trace a history of epistemological 
uncertainty in the Commedia’s narrative and poetic practices of mind reading. 
 The second approach looks outside the poem in order to connect the textual 
history traced in chapter 1 with relevant narrative and philosophical contexts of 
mind reading.  Chapter 2 explores epiphany scenes as an anchor for a narrative 
history of mind reading, with findings that suggest the problem of knowing whether 
mind reading occurs in the Commedia is in part a manifestation of the problem of 
recognizing divine figures both in pagan epic and in Christian narratives.  Chapter 3 
more specifically investigates popular and learned philosophical and narrative 
                                                
31 See, for example, the 1993 volume Dante for the New Millenium, eds. Teodolinda Barolini and H. 
Wayne Storey. 
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sources of mind reading itself.  These sources demonstrate a history of deep 
theoretical and practical uncertainties throughout the Middle Ages, ambiguities that 
inform the Commedia’s performance of knowing via telepathy as immanent rather 
than transcendent.  As with many other philosophical problems in the poem, the 
results of chapter 3 are relevant to the ongoing debate on the influence of 
Aristotelianism versus Neoplatonism in the poem.  Chapter 4 characterizes these 
results in terms of the traditional paradigm and yet attempts to show that we may 
also contextualize the Commedia’s mind reading within other epistemological 
debates that do not precisely fit into the Aristotelian/Neoplatonic model.  Rather, 
these debates point toward radical philosophical problems of the later fourteenth 
century.  Methodologically chapter 4 is somewhat unconventional in that I do not 
examine another philosophical source of mind reading per se but rather what I see as 
a debate that is related by its raising of similar crucial questions to those in which 
Dante grounds the problems of mind reading.  This chapter suggests that mind 
reading in the poem is made possible not only by philosophical and narrative 
histories from antiquity through the Middle Ages, but also by some previously-
unknown aspects of epistemological history during Dante’s lifetime. 
 The final chapter returns to a close reading of the text and mobilizes speech-
act theory in order to deepen and expand upon the close readings of chapters 1 and 
3.  As I explain further in chapter 5, speech-act theory, with its insistent focus on the 
performative force of language rooted in social context, proves a powerful tool for 
further historicizing mind reading in the poem.  With the benefit of the research in 
preceding chapters, the emphases of speech-act theory achieves several results:  on 
the one hand by focusing on language as active performance, i.e. on the actions that 
language carries out, the theory demands that we distinguish forcefully between 
what the rhetoric of mind reading does and what it says it is doing at the narrative 
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level.  On the other hand, the theoretical insistence on social context provides new 
insight into telepathic episodes that had previously remained puzzling.  Even more 
important is that attention to social context allows us to see in new ways how mind 
reading insistently performs various histories and social conventions.  One of the 
most important conventions is that of speech itself, and here we begin to understand 
better Dante’s persistent dramatization of speech that my initial study had defined as 
characteristic of group-three passages.  Reading telepathy as speech acts shows us 
that Dante goes far beyond the drama of conflicting desires in these episodes.  Some 
of these passages in fact teach us about the social conventions driving the 
epistemological tensions in the episodes.  Many of these conventions connect to the 
histories explored in previous chapters; others go further as they powerfully call 
forth the poet’s history of exile to suggest mind reading as an urgent performance of 
social and historical subjectivity in the face of Dante’s personal epistemological 
crisis.   
 As suggested above, these observations offer new ways to see the Commedia 
as part of history, and they help us define with greater attention the poem’s 
linguistic practice and the place of this practice in epistemological history. This 
reading in turn suggests a response to the question with which I began this chapter, 
namely why the Commedia departs from the visionary tradition to include mind 
reading in the way that it does.  Besides suggesting further poetic justifications for 
the mind reading topos, my reading offers new historical insights.  Specifically, the 
poem’s historicized performance of mind reading suggests the inclusion of telepathy 
for reasons precisely opposed to the poem’s narrative claims.  Rather than 
communicating physical, linguistic, and social i.e. historical transcendence, the 
function of mind reading is to signal an intriguing interest in and engagement with 
historicity that may emphasize the Commedia’s humanist inclinations.  
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 In arguing for the poem’s engagement with historicity, I claim evidence that 
comes from outside the economy of Dante’s poetic declarations.  This sort of 
reading requires a bit more explanation of methodology.  To situate the poem in 
history is to attempt a sort of historical criticism only recently getting under way in 
Dante studies.  This is not to deny the importance of the many commentaries over 
the centuries supplying historical information about characters and events in the 
poem.  Nor is it to deny the valuable work of scholars such as Charles Davis, who 
has helped us to understand Dante’s view of history as well as thinkers who 
influenced Dante’s work.  Likewise part of Erich Auerbach’s seminal achievement 
was to advance our understanding of how Dante’s representations greatly 
contributed to the renewed idea of the historical individual. Yet these models 
approach historical criticism precisely from within the poem’s carefully constructed 
resistance to critical attempts to place it in historical context.32 As Barolini writes, 
the “success of the implicit hermeneutic guidelines structured by Dante into his 
text” have overdetermined our interpretations, and commentaries over time have 
                                                
32 Among earlier twentieth-century scholars Auerbach comes close to breaking out of this mold, 
especially since he posits a general link between the Commedia’s historicizing of the individual and 
subsequent artists:  “The perception of history and immanent reality arrived at in the Comedy through 
an eschatological vision, flowed back into real history, filling it with the blood of authentic truth, for 
an awareness had been born that a man’s concrete earthly life is encompassed in his ultimate fate and 
that the event in its authentic, concrete, complete uniqueness is important for the part it plays in 
God’s judgment.  From that center man’s earthly, historical reality derived new life and value, and 
even the Comedy where, not without difficulty, the turbulent new forces were confined within an 
eschatological frame, gives us an intimation of how quickly and violently they would break loose.  
With Petrarch and Boccaccio the historical world acquired a fully immanent autonomy, and this 
sense of the self-sufficiency of earthly life spread like a fructifying stream to the rest of Europe – 
seemingly quite estranged from its eschatological origin and yet secretly linked with it through man’s 
irrevocable bond with his concrete historical fate” (178).  While Auerbach hints at the difficulty with 
which historical forces are contained within the poem, he never considers such forces independent of 
Dante’s eschatological vision.  Consequently he writes that the Commedia’s structure grounds the 
“confusion of earthly affairs … in a plan which embraces it and raises it above all contingency” 
(133), that fantasy “the essential element of poetry…has lost its autonomy in the Comedy” (160), and 
that “Dante’s poetic genius was inseparably bound up with his doctrine” (175). 
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proven to be repetitive (1).33 One result has been that “lack of historicizing has been 
an abiding feature of Dante exegesis, an essentializing tradition in which the entry 
‘inferno’ in the Enciclopedia Dantesca does not even gesture toward the history of 
the idea of hell” (1).  In his 2008 monograph, Dante and the Making of a Modern 
Author, which represents an important new effort to historicize Dante’s career, 
Albert Ascoli agrees that the vast majority of scholars have attributed a degree of 
authority to Dante such that “the result is the interpretive assumption, at least 
heuristically, of ‘total coherence’ in the Commedia, which de facto removes the 
poem from historicizing scrutiny, and which does not concede the legitimacy of an 
analysis not fully encompassed by terms and informing principles that Dante 
himself provides” (45).  Despite the mass of Dante scholarship carried out over the 
centuries, in many ways the work of historicizing the poem remains. 
 Due to the poem’s deliberate resistance to historicizing, sanctioned by much 
of the scholarship, attempting to situate the poem in history requires readings that 
consciously work against Dante’s strategies of transcendence.  As the following 
chapters make clear, close readings attend carefully to language but are not 
necessarily dedicated to the idea of authorial intention and are not limited to 
traditional source work.  This is because many mind-reading passages demonstrate 
historical traces, social conventions, and patterns that sometimes appear incidental 
and/or challenge the poet’s textual claims.  A good example of this, as I explain 
further in chapter 1, is the way that mind reading as a pattern of epistemological 
crisis challenges the linear Augustinian model of time that underlies Dante’s 
Christian conversion.34 Likewise, as suggested above, when looking outside the 
                                                
33 Quotations from Barolini in this paragraph are from her forthcoming essay “’Only Historicize’”: 
History Material Culture, and the Future of Dante Studies,” which she was kind enough to share prior 
to publication. 
34 As elucidated by John Freccero in The Poetics of Conversion.  
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poem for historical connections, I have not focused solely on locating sources in the 
traditional sense, i.e. those that are explicitly about mind reading and demonstrably 
known to Dante, but I have sought above all contexts that may be shown to 
historicize the Commedia’s unusual performance with respect to the visionary 
tradition. 
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List A - Mind Reading Passages 
Listed below are the passages considered to be instances of mind reading in my 
initial study limited to the Paradiso.  In parenthesis are numbers corresponding to 
the group assignment of each episode, i.e. 1, 2, or 3, as described above in the 
introduction.  It should be noted that this list contains two instances (13.49 and 15.7) 
which I subsequently eliminated and therefore do not appear on list B (see next 
page). 
1.85 (1)      26.4, 95, 104 (3, 2, 1) 
2.27 (1)      27.103 (1) 
4.16, 91 (1, 1)      28.40, 97 (1, 1) 
7.19, 52, 121 (1, 1, 1)     29.11 (1) 
8.85 (2)      30.70 (1) 
9.17, 73, 112 (2, 2, 1)     32.49 (1) 
10.61, 91 (1, 1) 
11.21 (1) 
13.37, 49, 88 (1, 1, 1) 
14.10 (1) 
15.7, 55 (3, 3) 
17.4 (3) 
18.5 (1) 
19.32, 70 (2, 1) 
20.79 (2) 
21.45 (2) 
22.7, 33 (1, 1) 
24.7, 41 (1, 3) 
25.51 (3) 
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List B - Passages Suggesting Mind Reading 
Listed below are passages that may suggest mind reading in all three canticles, but 
as I argue in chapters 1 and 5, some of these examples raise issues that challenge 
definitive interpretations of mind reading.  Given these equivocations, any sort of 
list may run the risk of providing a misleading picture.  While I do not regard all of 
the passages below as clear examples of mind reading, I list them in order to outline 
the context of the discussion in this study. 
 
Inferno 
10.18 
10.125 
13.25, 83 
16.122 
19.39 
23.25 
26.73 
Purgatorio 
13.76 
15.127 
18.7 
19.58 
19.86 
25.17 
33.73 
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Paradiso 
1.85        27.103  
2.25        28.40, 97 
4.16, 91       29.11 
7.19, 52, 121      30.70 
8.85       32.49 
9.17, 73, 112  
10.61, 91 
11.21 
13.37, 88  
14.10 
15.55 
17.4  
18.5 
19.32, 70 
20.79 
21.45 
22.7, 33  
24.7, 41 
25.51 
26.4, 95, 104 
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Chapter 1 
Does Vergil Read the Pilgrim’s Mind? 
Trouble in the Epistemological Paradise of Dante’s Commedia 
 
 In narrative terms mind reading in the Commedia implies a fantasy of perfect 
communication, a way of knowing that is free of the contingencies of human 
expression which, by contrast, is rooted in the body and therefore in history.  This 
ideal is especially strong in the Paradiso, where telepathy seems to be an easily 
discernible phenomenon that marks heaven as a privileged realm.  Celestial souls 
know the pilgrim’s thoughts because, we are told in Par. 8.85-90, all thoughts are 
reflected in God and the souls perceive these reflections mirrored through the 
divine.1 Through this strategy the poet edges toward God’s ultimate silence by 
positing speech as superfluous, thus elaborating a tense and yet predictably neat 
poetic topos – a paradox of silence versus speech.  Telepathy seems to be yet 
another uncomplicated and impeccable sign of Dante’s mimetic prowess.   
 Yet the issue of Vergil’s telepathic ability reveals the seams in Dante’s 
apparently flawless system.  In hell and purgatory, Vergil often knows what the 
pilgrim is thinking as well, but because telepathy seems to belong primarily to 
heaven, critics have not adequately explored this oddity but have instead responded 
mainly in one of two ways.  Many have glossed over Vergil’s mind reading by 
acknowledging but never questioning this privilege.  Others deny Vergil’s mind 
reading as common-sense intuition rooted firmly in profane experience.  One reason 
for these reactions is that readers desire consistency, especially in a poem that 
                                                
1 This passage, quoted previously in the introduction, is the first point at which Dante actually 
suggests celestial mind reading as a process of reflection, although mind reading occurs from the 
very first canto of the Paradiso.  See chapter 3 for further discussion and interpretation of this 
delayed explanation.   
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appears to be crafted with such magnificent and unwavering order: either Vergil 
reads Dante pilgrim’s mind or he does not.  Careful analysis, however, shows that 
there is no consistency.  In fact, Vergil sometimes knows Dante’s thoughts, other 
times he does not.  When he does know, sometimes he perceives as an ordinary 
human and other times as a saved soul.  Frequently it is hard to distinguish how or 
even whether he knows the pilgrim’s thoughts at all.2 
 Readers are also drawn into believing the poet’s strategy of telepathy 
because of what Barolini defines as Dante’s astonishing and enduring ability to 
discourage readers from distinguishing between what he says and what he does.3  
What Dante does is to create the illusion of telepathy as a pure form of 
communication belonging exclusively to the celestial realm.  He achieves this in 
part through the frequency of mind reading and its distinction as a visual 
phenomenon in the Paradiso, characteristics that appear to divide its functioning 
sharply against the other two canticles.  In fact, telepathy in paradise cannot always 
be easily distinguished from Vergil’s powers in the Inferno and Purgatorio.  In part 
this is because it is implicated with various discourses – scholastic, mystical, body 
language, the rhetoric of authority – in ways that blur the boundaries among various 
types of rhetoric, and therefore among different epistemological systems as well.  
The result is that it is sometimes unclear whether mind reading versus intuition 
occurs in paradise but also in hell and purgatory, where the reader must 
consequently grapple more seriously with the extent to which Vergil possesses 
supernatural powers as well as the problem of why he should bear such authority in 
                                                
2 Marianne Shapiro very briefly mentions mind reading in her study of embodiment, asserting that 
Vergil’s mind reading abilities are inconsistent and linking such abilities to corresponding 
declarations on the interpretative value of the Aeneid for Dante’s poem.  Yet she does not 
demonstrate this link with a comprehensible argument, and she assumes (again without even 
exemplifying or arguing the point) that one can distinguish unproblematically when Vergil does and 
does not read the pilgrim’s mind (24, 93).  
3 See especially chapter 3 of The Undivine Comedy. 
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the face of his damnation.  Critics, then, have overlooked in all three canticles the 
ambiguous rhetoric that ostensibly does not seem to complicate mind reading, but 
nevertheless does precisely that.  Once we acknowledge the ambiguous nature of 
Vergil’s telepathy in hell and purgatory, it becomes easier to see that telepathy is 
also problematic in paradise.   
 Attention to Vergil’s curious powers is thus a point of departure for this 
study as a whole and for this chapter, which explores and introduces telepathy as an 
especially intriguing sign of epistemological uncertainty, not only in the canticles in 
which Vergil appears but throughout the poem.  The best place to begin making this 
case is by examining Vergil’s telepathic relationship with the pilgrim and the critical 
reactions to it.  The first thing to say is that this relationship should be not 
misunderstood or dismissed on the basis of its inconsistency.  To do so is to miss the 
profoundly complex web of understanding in which the Roman poet relates to his 
ward and consequently the meaning of Dante’s representation.  With this in mind, 
we may note that Vergil’s knowledge in the poem is flawed in a number of ways.  
Perhaps the most famous instance is his vulnerability to the devils’ trickery in lower 
hell, when Malacoda claims falsely in canto 21.109-11 that the travelers will find a 
suitable bridge over one of the ditches.4 Earlier in canto 9.7-9, Vergil likewise 
reveals uncertainty about the journey’s success when the gates of Dis are slammed 
in his face («Pur a noi converrà vincer la punga», / cominciò el, «se non . . . Tal ne 
s'offerse. / Oh quanto tarda a me ch'altri qui giunga!»).5 He also occasionally 
expresses ignorance of what Dante is thinking, as in Inferno 5 when the pilgrim 
lowers his head in thought following Francesca’s moving speech:  Quand' io intesi 
                                                
4 Vergil discovers the lie in canto 23.139-41: “Lo duca stette un poco a testa china; / poi disse: «Mal 
contava la bisogna / colui che i peccator di qua uncina»” [My leader stood a while with his head bent, 
/ then said: ‘He who hooks sinners over there / gave us a false account of this affair]. 
5 “’We have to win this battle,’ he began, / ‘if not…But one so great had offered aid. / O how slow it 
seems to me that someone comes.’” 
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quell' anime offense, / china' il viso, e tanto il tenni basso, / fin che 'l poeta mi disse: 
«Che pense?» (109-11).6 Remarkably, the fourteenth-century commentator 
Francesco da Buti (1385-95) as well as the sixteenth-century commentator 
Alessandro Vellutello (1544) suggest that Vergil in fact knows Dante’s thoughts in 
this passage.  These critics justify their belief by allegorizing Vergil’s role, implying 
that as the representation of reason he knows what the pilgrim is thinking and 
questions him only to guide him away from his vain thoughts.  Buti writes: 
 
  Qui può essere allegoria, che la sensualità significata 
  per Dante per le cose mundane si muove et attristasi; ma 
  la ragione significata per Virgilio la sveglia, a ciò che 
  di quel vano pensiere esca.  Dice adunque: Che ài tu 
  Dante, o vero, che pensi, che stai col capo chinato, 
  che è segno di pensamento?7 
Vellutello follows suit with “Adunque Dante, inteso per la parte sensitiva, ha 
compassione di questi afflitti; ma Virgilio, cioè, la parte ragionevole, considerando 
che giustamente sono puniti, lo rimove da tal consideratione.”8 These interpretations 
are significant, for they reflect a critical impulse to make Vergil’s knowledge, and 
thus his epistemology, consistent.  As we will see, it is an impulse that continues to 
this day. 
                                                
6 “When I had listened to those injured souls, / I bent my head and held it low until / the poet asked 
of me: ‘What are you thinking?’” 
7 “Here the allegory can be that sensuality, signified by Dante, is moved and saddened by worldly 
things; but reason, signified by Vergil, awakens it so that it departs from that vain thought.  He says 
therefore: ‘What is wrong with you, Dante, or rather, what are you thinking that you stand with head 
lowered, which is a sign of pensiveness.” Commentaries are cited from the online Dartmouth Dante 
project database online (see bibliography).  Commentaries not included in the database are listed in 
the bibliography and quoted in the text with page numbers.  Translations of all Latin and Italian 
commentaries are my own. 
8 “Therefore Dante, understood as the sensual aspect, has compassion for these afflicted (souls); but 
Vergil, that is the reasonable aspect, considering that they are punished justly, removes him from 
such consideration.”  Giorgio Padoan (1967) also suggests that Vergil understands the depth of 
Dante’s emotion and asks in order to help him overcome it.  Interestingly, several early twentieth-
century commentators such as Luigi Pietrobono (1946) suggest that Vergil may in fact participate in 
the pilgrim’s compassion. 
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 In episodes when it is clear that Vergil does indeed know the pilgrim’s 
thoughts, critics have also gotten caught up in the poem’s narrative drama and have 
thus overlooked the strange mechanism of the knowledge itself.  One of the most 
interesting cases appears in the Commedia’s first mind reading episode, at the 
beginning of Inferno 10 in the circle of the heretics.9 When the pilgrim asks whether 
the souls in the uncovered tombs can be seen, Vergil first responds that the tombs 
will be sealed after the Last Judgment, and that they contain the followers of 
Epicurus, i.e. those who believed that the soul dies with the body.  He then declares 
that Dante will soon know the answer to his question as well as to the one he has 
kept hidden:  “Però a la dimanda che mi faci / quinc' entro satisfatto sarà tosto, / e al 
disio ancor che tu mi taci».”10 Among the late medieval commentaries up to 1400, 
there is no critical consensus on how and even whether Vergil knows Dante’s desire 
in this episode.  Boccaccio (1373-75) considers but rejects the idea that the pilgrim’s 
doubt concerns why damned souls know the future but not the present, and he 
concludes that he does not know what the desire is: 
  Il quale disio taciuto dall’autore vogliono alcuni 
  che fosse di sapere perché l’anime dannate mostrano 
  di sapere le cose future, e le presenti non par che 
  sappiano; la qual cosa gli mostra appresso messer 
  Farinata.  Ma io non so perché questo disiderio gli 
  si dovesse esser venuto, con ciò sia cosa che niun 
  altro vaticinio per ancora avesse udito, se non quello 
  che detto gli fu da Ciacco; salvo se dir non volessimo 
  essergli nato da questo, che Ciacco gli disse le cose 
  future e Filippo Argenti nol conobbe, essendo egli 
  presente: ma questa non pare assai conveniente 
  cagione da doverlo aver fatto dubitare, con ciò  
                                                
9 There is a great deal to say about this episode in the context of an astonishingly rich canto.  In this 
chapter I am concerned with critical reception, but I return to this episode in chapter 5 to address the 
context (i.e. why it is the first mind reading episode in the poem) and other related philosophical 
issues, including the problem of the other damned souls’ knowledge/prophetic abilities. 
10 “And so the question you have asked of me / will soon find satisfaction while we’re here, / as will 
the desire that you do not express to me.” 
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  sia cosa che, come Ciacco il vide, il conoscesse, 
  come davanti apare; e però, che che altri si dica, 
  io non discerno assai bene qual si potesse essere 
  quel disio, il quale Virgilio dice qui che l’autore  
  gli tace.11 
Both Benvenuto da Imola (1373-80) and Francesco da Buti (1385-95) believe 
Vergil knows the pilgrim’s desire is to see Farinata based on the conversation with 
Ciacco in canto 6.79-84.  There Dante asks where Farinata, Tegghiaio, Iacopo 
Rusticucci, Arrigo and Mosca, as well as other souls may be found, and Ciacco 
responds that Dante will find them “tra l’anime più nere” (85), among the blackest 
souls in lower hell.  As with Inferno 5.111, Buti again allegorizes the mechanism of 
Vergil’s knowledge, assigning the roles of reason and sensuality to Vergil and the 
pilgrim, respectively.12 The Anonimo Fiorentino (1400) does not see this episode as 
a telepathic moment, believing that Vergil could not have known Dante’s desire 
except that when Dante asked about the souls among the graves, Vergil could 
understand that the pilgrim wanted to ask them something. 
 Nearly all the commentators after 1400 listed in the DDP abandon any 
explanation of how Vergil knows the hidden desire and instead simply affirm that 
                                                
11 “Some intend that the desire unexpressed by the author is to know why damned souls have 
knowledge of future things and they do not seem to know present things; which Farinata makes 
known to him presently.  But I do not know why this desire should have occurred to him, since he 
had not yet heard any other prophecy, except what was said to him by Ciacco; except if we wanted to 
say that it came to him from this, that Ciacco told him future things and Filippo Argenti didn’t know 
him (i.e. didn’t know who the pilgrim was), when he was present.  But this does not seem an 
appropriate enough reason to have caused him to doubt, since as Ciacco sees him (i.e. the pilgrim), 
he knows him, as appears before; and therefore despite what is said by others, I do not discern well 
enough what could be that desire which Vergil says that the author does not express to him.” 
12 “Potrebbesi qui dubitare dalla gente grossa, come indovinava Virgilio lo desiderio di Dante.  A 
che si può rispondere che la ragione sa che la sensualità cerca di sapere le cose particulari, com’ella 
l’universali per le particulari, e ch’ella non può comprendere l’universalità, sì che benchè Dante 
domandasse universalmente, quando disse: La gente, ec.; la intenzione sua era sapere 
particularmente, se vi erano de’ Fiorentini e chi erano quelli; e questa è fizione dell’autore.” [Here it 
could be asked by dull people how Vergil guessed Dante’s desire.  To which we can respond that 
reason knows that sensuality seeks to know particular things, as it (seeks) universals through 
particulars, and that it cannot understand universality, so that although Dante asked universally, when 
he said “La gente,”, etc., his intention was to know particularly, if there were Florentines there and 
who they were, and this is the fiction of the author]. 
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the pilgrim wants to speak with Farinata and that Vergil knows this from canto 6.13  
However, in his 1971 translation and commentary of the poem, Mark Musa accepts 
the possibility rejected by Boccaccio, i.e. that Dante’s desire indeed pertains to the 
shades’ mechanism of knowledge: 
  …many critics believe that it was the desire to know 
  whether Farinata is among the heretics.  But surely it is 
  preferable to assume that the silent wish is rather to know 
  the extent of the shades’ knowledge, i.e., how much 
  of the future they can foresee and whether they know 
  the present.  This “wish,” which must have begun 
  with Ciacco’s prophecy in Canto VI, will soon be the 
  cause of Dante’s silence before Cavalcante, and will be 
  satisfied by Farinata (163). 
Subsequently in a 1977 article, Musa changed his mind to agree with most other 
critics that Dante really wants to know Farinata’s fate, reminding us that “already in 
Canto VI the Pilgrim had told Ciacco of his great desire to know the eternal fate of 
Farinata and other great Florentines of his time, and Virgil must have heard him” 
(151).  Other modern commentators including Sapegno, Singleton, and Di Salvo 
agree that this is Dante’s wish, but as will be addressed below, Musa alone 
interprets the passage as evidence against telepathy. 
                                                
13 There are three exceptions:  Luigi Bennassuti (1964-68) addresses not only the issue of how 
Vergil knows Dante’s unspoken desire, but how he knows that they will meet two Florentines.  
Interestingly, he cites an unnamed authority (indicated by italics) regarding the knowledge of 
separated souls:  “Ma come sa Virgilio che poco più oltre giaceano nelle tombe spiriti fiorentini, e 
che questi si sarebbero levati all’appressarsi di Dante?  Per questa ragione che Dante attribuisce a 
Virgilio puro spirito la così detta introspicienza.  E tale infatti è la proprietà degli spiriti separati, 
che non sono impediti nel lor vedere dal velame e dall’ingombro dei sensi.  Per questa stessa 
ragione Virgilio vede anche nel cuor di Dante, onde dice: E al disio ancor che tu mi taci.” [But how 
does Vergil know that the Florentine spirits lie in the tombs a short way beyond and that these would 
be raised at Dante’s approach?  For this reason, Dante attributes to Vergil, a pure spirit, the so-called 
introspection.  And such in fact is the property of separated souls, which are not impeded in their 
vision by the veil and the obstruction of the senses.  For this same reason Vergil sees also in the heart 
of Dante, whence he says “E al disio ancor che tu mi taci].  It is not clear whether by 
“introspicienza,” Bennassuti means telepathy or a sort of intuition.  Giacomo Poletto (1894) also 
states that Vergil knows through “intuizione” without further explanation, while Giuseppe Giacalone 
(1968) attributes Vergil’s knowledge to the “tono affettuoso” with which he believes the pilgrim had 
spoken with Ciacco about the Florentines. 
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 Musa’s change of heart confirms that the hidden desire is not in fact obvious.  
Yet remarkably, most critics are more interested in pinning down the desire rather 
than recognizing the value of the uncertainty that Dante poet creates.14 Regardless 
of how easily Vergil may guess the pilgrim’s desire based on information from 
canto 6, he somehow knows exactly when this thought occurs to Dante.  Why does 
Dante poet lead us to believe that Virgil reads the pilgrim’s mind, and what does he 
gain from keeping the desire hidden from readers?  Critics have overlooked these 
questions in part because of the way the poet ingeniously collapses form and content 
in this episode.  Dante seduces the reader with Vergil’s mysterious knowledge by 
implicating us in not knowing the truth of the pilgrim’s desire precisely as we 
encounter the heretics, those who deviated from God’s truth.  Vergil knows 
something we do not but we feel that we should because we have somehow 
internalized the plight of the sinners who are damned precisely for not following the 
truth, one consequence of which is their ignorance of the present.  The critical 
reaction has been to define and “resolve” the problem of what the pilgrim wants to 
know by projecting onto the episode information that we learn only after the fact, 
i.e. the pilgrim does indeed speak with Farinata.  In this way, Dante’s poetics 
entangle readers into the moral drama of heresy, reflecting the power of the poem’s 
fiction to seduce readers into interpreting it within the boundaries of its 
verisimilitude.  The result is that content dominates the discussion and displaces 
questions of form. 
 In his gloss Boccaccio appears to have sensed this conflation of form and 
content, and his lack of resolution may have set in motion an analogous critical 
drama.  It is as if his confession of not knowing defines the problem that must be 
                                                
14 Di Salvo hints at the uncertainty when he says that the hidden desire is “di parlare con Farinata, se 
è vera l’ipotesi che deve essere in questo cerchio” (167) [to speak with Farinata, if the hypothesis is 
true that he must be in this circle]. 
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solved by subsequent commentators, who consequently miss the value of the issue 
framed as an epistemological one.  Boccaccio (and briefly Musa) interpret this 
problem, which is epistemological in form (i.e. how Vergil knows) as potentially 
epistemological in content as well:  they consider that the pilgrim may desire to 
know how the shades know.  Further, Boccaccio alone is willing to respond with 
epistemological uncertainty, concluding that in narrative terms there is no logical 
way to know what the pilgrim’s desire is.  He alone accepts that he cannot know it. 
 If we appreciate Boccaccio’s unresolved reading for its epistemological 
focus, we can perhaps also understand the value in shifting critical attention toward 
the problem of Vergil’s telepathy, which continues throughout hell and purgatory.  
Vergil claims to know his charge’s thoughts in canto 16.118-23 upon Geryon’s 
advent and again in canto 26.73 when he decides to speak for the pilgrim in 
addressing Ulysses and Diomedes, stating that he knows what the pilgrim wants.15 
Dante pilgrim’s language echoes the telepathic episode of Inferno 10 when he asks 
about a soul’s writhing legs that protrude from the vessels resembling baptismal 
fonts in Inferno 19.  Vergil offers to carry him down the bank so that he may speak 
with the sinner, and the pilgrim responds with “E io: «Tanto m'è bel, quanto a te 
piace: / tu se' segnore, e sai ch'i' non mi parto / dal tuo volere, e sai quel che si tace» 
(37-9).”16 In the strongest link between Vergil’s telepathy and the specular variety 
of heaven, the Roman poet compares himself to a mirror in canto 23 when he 
reassures the pilgrim as they escape from the Malebranche: 
                                                
15 In the first episode, the Roman guide says to the pilgrim “«Tosto verrà di sovra / ciò ch'io attendo 
e che il tuo pensier sogna; / tosto convien ch'al tuo viso si scovra»” [Now there will soon emerge / 
what I await and what your thought has conjured: / it soon must be discovered to your sight.”  In the 
second he says Lascia parlare a me, ch'i' ho concetto / ciò che tu vuoi” [Let me address them – I have 
understood what you desire of them].  In chapter 5 I discuss these episodes from cantos 16 and 26 in 
detail, analyzing them as speech acts.  In that chapter I also address an additional passage that 
suggests mind reading in canto 13.25. 
16 “And I: ‘What pleases you will please me too: / you are my lord; you know I do not swerve / from 
what you will; you know what is unspoken.’” 
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              «Maestro, se non celi 
     te e me tostamente, i' ho pavento 
   d'i Malebranche. Noi li avem già dietro; 
   io li 'magino sì, che già li sento». 
     E quei: «S'i' fossi di piombato vetro, 
   l'imagine di fuor tua non trarrei 
   più tosto a me, che quella dentro 'mpetro. 
     Pur mo venieno i tuo' pensier tra ' miei, 
   con simile atto e con simile faccia, 
   sì che d'intrambi un sol consiglio fei”  (Inf. 23.21-30).17 
 The vast majority of the early commentators and most modern commentators 
assume that Vergil does indeed know Dante pilgrim’s thoughts in all of these 
episodes, but they do not address the issue of how or why he should have these 
powers.18 Recent exceptions are Mark Musa and Robert Hollander.  Musa denies 
Vergil’s mind reading as supernatural in a brief 1977 article, which is limited to the 
Inferno and is the only critical study focused on telepathy of which I am aware.19 In 
the cases of Inferno 16.118 and 19.37, he believes that Vergil uses common sense to 
                                                
17 “’Master, if you don’t conceal / yourself and me at once – they terrify me, / those Malebranche; 
they are after us; / I so imagine them, I hear them now.’ / And he to me: ‘Were I a leaded mirror, / I 
could not gather in your outer image / more quickly than I have received your inner. / For even now 
your thoughts have joined my own; in both our acts and aspects we are kin – with both our minds 
I’ve come to one decision.’”  For discussion of this interesting passage, see chapter 3 where I 
contextualize it with the other examples of specular telepathy from the Paradiso.   
18 The following are exceptions:  Regarding Inferno 16, Attilio Momigliano (1946-51) suggests 
Vergil does not know the pilgrim’s thoughts when he says “Virgilio indovina il pensiero di Dante” 
[Vergil guesses Dante’s thought].  Lodovico Castelvetro (1570) argues more obviously against 
telepathy in canto 23.  Concerning canto 26, the commentaries are less uniform.  In this case, Guido 
da Pisa (1327-8?) says that Vergil knows the pilgrim’s thoughts through external signs: “Et quia 
Dantes ostendit per signa extrinseca magnum desiderium loquendi cum illis, ideo Virgilius statim fuit 
ymaginatus quid petere vellet illis” {And because Dante shows through external signs a great desire 
to speak with them, for that reason Vergil immediately had imagined what he wants to ask of them].  
Pisa thus supports a sort of intuition via body language, but his explanation does not account for how 
Vergil knows Dante’s specific desire.  Castelvetro (1570) believes that Vergil knows only that Dante 
is curious about something and approves of his desire only because wanting to know something 
about great and famous men is in and of itself praiseworthy.  Several twentieth-century 
commentators, including Francesco Torraca (1905), C.H. Grandgent (1909-13), Carlo Grabher 
(1934-6) and others gloss verse 73 “concetto” as suggesting intuition but do not make the case 
explicitly for or against telepathy. 
19 For the episodes of the Inferno, Hollander does not offer his own argument but refers to and 
supports Musa.  As noted above, other scholars such as Morgan and Shapiro briefly mention mind 
reading as part of their studies on other topics. 
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guess the pilgrim’s thoughts.  With regard to canto 26 he insists that Vergil knows 
only that the pilgrim desires a memorable encounter with the Greek heroes and so 
selects something appropriate, finding it “completely unpoetic” (152) that Vergil 
might know what Dante wants to hear.  Likewise, he believes that in the canto 23 
episode, Vergil merely claims to know what Dante pilgrim wants to say, and he 
links the Roman poet’s assertion of telepathic powers to his overconfidence vis-à-
vis the devils’ promise of assistance in canto 21, i.e. just as Vergil did not 
understand the devils’ deception, so he does not really know Dante’s thoughts but 
nevertheless claims to in order to bolster his authority as guide.  Musa therefore 
concludes that all of Vergil’s telepathic/intuitive episodes are strictly of an earthly 
variety, to be absolutely distinguished from celestial communication: 
  True, Virgil can read the pilgrim’s mind.  Sometimes 
  his inference is one that would inevitably occur to 
  any normal person, sometimes it is the result of true 
  discernment and sagacity – but always within the limits 
  of human intelligence.  And this is as it should be. 
  Virgil is the embodiment of Reason, but that means, 
  of course, human reason.  Let us restrict the gift of 
  god-like divination to the Pilgrim’s other guide  (152). 
 Yet to explain away Vergil’s telepathy is to ignore the important question of 
why Dante poet so conspicuously invites us to entertain the possibility, not only in 
the Inferno but in the Purgatorio, which Musa does not address.  There the evidence 
supporting Vergil’s power becomes stronger since Dante poet confirms it.  Even 
more noteworthy is that a striking pattern of epistemological urgency emerges in 
these episodes, as we notice that Vergil’s mind reading is implicated in moments of 
narrative and critical occlusion.  This pattern is present in the Inferno 10 episode, 
where the pilgrim’s question about souls hidden in tombs corresponds to Vergil’s 
discernment of his hidden desire, and the critical search to define it.  We also see it 
in the poet’s famous verse in Inferno 13.25-27 (which I discuss more fully in 
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chapter 5), “Cred' ïo ch'ei credette ch'io credesse / che tante voci uscisser, tra quei 
bronchi, / da gente che per noi si nascondesse,”20 which suggests that Vergil knows 
the pilgrim’s thought precisely regarding sounds that appear to issue from hidden 
souls.  In Inferno 16 (quoted above), Vergil claims to read the pilgrim’s mind 
regarding the mysterious new thing that is hidden from view when Vergil throws the 
cord into the abyss, which turns out to be the monster Geryon.  In the Inferno 23 
episode (also cited above), Dante pilgrim begs his guide to hide them from the 
devils (Maestro, se non celi / te e me tostamente…”) at which point Vergil claims to 
know his thoughts.  The poet underscores Vergil’s discernment in Purgatorio 13.76 
by enacting it in the context of the envious souls’ blindness:  the pilgrim remains 
silent because he is disturbed at seeing the envious souls while they cannot see him.   
Nonetheless Vergil knows what he wants to say:  “Ben sapev' ei che volea dir lo 
muto.”21 
 This paradox of revelation and concealment intensifies in Purgatorio 15 and 
19 as Dante experiences visions.  The first episode occurs on the terrace of the 
envious when the pilgrim undergoes visions of mansuetudine, following which 
Vergil asks why he appears so disoriented.  The exchange is particularly fascinating 
for the way it dramatizes at length the issue of both Dante’s and Vergil’s 
knowledge: 
 
     Quando l'anima mia tornò di fori 
   a le cose che son fuor di lei vere, 
   io riconobbi i miei non falsi errori. 
     Lo duca mio, che mi potea vedere 
   far sì com' om che dal sonno si slega, 
   disse: «Che hai che non ti puoi tenere, 
     ma se' venuto più che mezza lega 
   velando li occhi e con le gambe avvolte, 
                                                
20 “I believe that he believed that I believed / that so many voices came forth among those trunks / 
from people who had been concealed from us.” 
21 “He knew quite well what I, though mute, wanted to say.” 
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   a guisa di cui vino o sonno piega?». 
     «O dolce padre mio, se tu m'ascolte, 
   io ti dirò», diss' io, «ciò che m'apparve 
   quando le gambe mi furon sì tolte». 
     Ed ei: «Se tu avessi cento larve 
   sovra la faccia, non mi sarian chiuse 
   le tue cogitazion, quantunque parve. 
     Ciò che vedesti fu perché non scuse 
   d'aprir lo core a l'acque de la pace 
   che da l'etterno fonte son diffuse. 
     Non dimandai ``Che hai?" per quel che face 
   chi guarda pur con l'occhio che non vede, 
   quando disanimato il corpo giace; 
     ma dimandai per darti forza al piede: 
   così frugar conviensi i pigri, lenti 
   ad usar lor vigilia quando riede»  (Purg. 15.115-38).22 
Hollander believes that this scene represents “the tensions that exist here between 
the protagonist and his guide,” with Vergil attempting to cover his ignorance by 
insincerely asserting his telepathic abilities.  He argues that on the basis of Dante’s 
body language and his claim to have seen things not visible, Vergil is able to 
surmise that the pilgrim has undergone ecstatic visions that “present positive figures 
of the opposing virtue, precisely to ‘open your heart to the waters of peace,’ as he 
tells Dante.”  Thus Vergil comprehends the general meaning of the exemplars 
without knowing their specific content.23   
                                                
22 “And when my soul returned outside itself / and met the things outside it that are real, / I then 
could recognize my not false errors. / My guide, on seeing me behave as if / I were a man who’s free 
himself from sleep, / said: ‘What is wrong with you?  You can’t walk straight; / for more than half a 
league now you have moved / with clouded eyes and lurching legs, as if / you were a man whom 
wine or sleep has gripped!’ / ‘Oh, my kind father, if you hear me out, / I’ll tell you what appeared to 
me,’ I said, / ‘when I had lost the right use of my legs.’ / And he: ‘Although you had a hundred 
masks / upon your face, that still would not conceal / from me the thoughts you thought, however 
slight. / What you have seen was shown lest you refuse / to open up your heart unto the waters / of 
peace that pour from the eternal fountain. / I did not ask ‘What’s wrong with you?’ as one / who only 
sees with earthly eyes, which – once / the body, stripped of soul, lies dead – can’t see; / I asked so 
that your feet might find more force: / so must one urge the indolent, too slow / to use their waking 
time when it returns.”  See below for discussion of the difficult lines 128-29. 
23 Here again Hollander denies absolutely Vergil’s telepathy in the whole poem, referring again to 
Musa’s 1977 article on the first canticle, asserting that there is “no evidence” for Vergil’s telepathy 
in the poem: “As Musa has pointed out (see the notes to Inf. XVI.115 and XXIII.25), there is no 
evidence in the poem, despite Virgil’s claim in Inferno XXIII (repeated here), that he actually can 
read the protagonist’s mind – a capacity reserved for Beatrice and the other saved souls who 
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 In a 1991 article, Lauren Scancarelli Seem relates the episode to what she 
believes to be Vergil’s boasting assertion of telepathy in Inferno 23, concluding that 
Vergil’s misunderstanding of the pilgrim’s vision and the realm of purgatory 
explains why he admonishes the pilgrim inappropriately and claims knowledge he 
does not have:  his ignorance prompts him to shore up his ever-waning authority.   
Her argument seems convincing, especially since the tensions between the guide 
and the pilgrim are quite real; Vergil’s authority indeed diminishes throughout 
purgatory, culminating in his sudden departure after which the pilgrim must 
continue without him.  Therefore might Vergil’s claim here (and in Inf. 23) 
represent a sort of dramatic irony that in fact broadcasts his inability to know 
Dante’s thoughts, and hence the truth?  Perhaps, but judgments confined to the 
narrative drama do not do justice to the philosophical richness of this passage, nor 
do they contextualize the episode with other relevant passages, particularly the 
vision in Purg. 19, that challenge Scancarelli Seem’s conclusion.  Indeed, the only 
way to make definitive arguments for or against Vergil’s supernatural powers is to 
underscore certain episodes while ignoring others. 
 I believe there is more going on in canto 15 than simply the gap between 
Vergil’s diminishing authority and the pilgrim’s growing knowledge.  The scene 
enacts profound epistemological complexity by insisting on truth in a context of 
occlusion and misunderstanding.  Dante declares his access to truth, to the things 
that are real, through his famous revelation of “non falsi errori” (not false errors). 
Vergil then questions his sluggishness, leading the pilgrim to explain himself, which 
                                                
interview Dante in the heavens.”  Earlier commentators accept Vergil’s mind reading without 
question.  Nicola Fosca (2003-6) cites Hollander but does not believe that Vergil actively pretends, 
only that his knowledge is necessarily limited:  “Virgilio ovviamente non simula, ma la sua è una 
spiegazione generica, in quanto si limita a porre in contrapposizione pace al vizio di iracondia che si 
espia nel terzo girone, vizio che coinvolge anche il pellegrino” [Vergil obviously does not pretend, 
but his is a generic explanation, insofar as it is limited to opposing peace to the vice of wrath that is 
expiated on the third terrace, a vice that involves the pilgrim as well]. 
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in turn prompts Vergil to clarify his penetration of Dante’s thoughts.  But he does so 
precisely in terms of his own versions of occlusion, imagining the pilgrim’s 
concealed face as no obstacle to his discernment: “Se tu avessi cento larve / sovra la 
faccia, non mi sarian chiuse / le tue cogitazion, quantunque parve” (127-9).  Then he 
corrects the pilgrim’s misunderstanding of his query in a tercet whose meaning is 
not entirely clear: “Non dimandai ``Che hai?" per quel che face / chi guarda pur con 
l'occhio che non vede, / quando disanimato il corpo giace.”  Hollander, citing 
Cachey, documents three interpretive possibilities in the commentary tradition that 
assign the “disanimato corpo” either to Vergil or to Dante pilgrim.  The first and 
most common is that Vergil says he is unlike those who are fooled when they see 
someone faint without understanding the reason why; the second is that Vergil 
means that he does not see merely with mortal eyes that no longer function in death, 
and the third is that Vergil is referring to Dante’s physical state during his vision, 
i.e. he does not ask “what’s wrong” because he fails to understand Dante’s 
appearance but because he wishes to spur the pilgrim on. 24 The third possibility is 
attractive because, as Barolini points out, Vergil’s words evoke the condition of “the 
pilgrim’s visionary trance,” a condition defined by Augustine and other visionaries 
as the body that “lies apparently lifeless while the soul is rapt in contemplation” 
(152).25   
 Yet Vergil’s puzzling shift from the second to the impersonal third person in 
line 133 (which creates the interpretive ambiguity) alerts us to the potential of 
visionary experience in general, i.e. as an experience that not only Dante pilgrim 
has but that others have as well (“Non dimandai ``Che hai?" per quel che face / chi 
                                                
24 Hollander (following Scancarelli Seem) subscribes to the third possibility but remains focused on 
the narrative in arguing for these lines as further evidence of Vergil’s insincere justification. 
25 See chapter 7 of The Undivine Comedy, which also discusses further the implications of the phrase 
“non falsi errori.” 
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guarda pur con l'occhio che non vede”).  This contributes to my inclination to see 
Vergil’s words as part of a larger meditation on the problem of knowing itself, 
which we recognize only if we persist in questioning the poetic motivations for this 
lengthy exchange.  Indeed, why does Dante poet go to such unusual lengths, over 
eight tercets, to dramatize this confusion between the pilgrim and Vergil, and why 
does he do so in a manner that implicates the reader?26 These verses explore not 
only the question of Dante’s knowledge versus Vergil’s, but the problem of 
knowledge itself as one that cannot be experienced, or defined, according to 
absolute systems.  The more profound point seems to be precisely that truth and 
understanding, for Dante, Vergil, but also others including the reader, occur in the 
context of ambiguity, of “non falsi errori,” of a range of both human and 
supernatural exchanges that are always determined by privilege and subject to 
misunderstanding.  Whether Vergil’s claims are sincere or not, his knowledge is not 
meant to be encapsulated and dismissed but rather understood as part of a 
continuum in which all true knowledge reveals itself through, and perhaps only in 
the context of occlusion. 
 Supporting this reading is the second telepathic episode that occurs in the 
context of the pilgrim’s vision in Purgatorio 19, which takes place between the 
fourth and fifth terraces.  Here we find another exchange between Vergil and the 
pilgrim following the latter’s vision of the “antica strega”: 
 
     «Che hai che pur inver' la terra guati?», 
   la guida mia incominciò a dirmi, 
   poco amendue da l'angel sormontati. 
     E io: «Con tanta sospeccion fa irmi 
                                                
26 Hollander confirms that “On each terrace there is poetic space reserved for some sort of reaction 
on the part of the poet or protagonist (and, at times, his guide) to the experience of exemplarity.  Of 
the thirteen other passages devoted to these transitional moments…none is even nearly as lengthy as 
this one, twenty-four verses…It is clear that the poet wanted to direct our attention to the importance 
of this exchange between guide and protagonist.” 
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   novella visïon ch'a sé mi piega, 
   sì ch'io non posso dal pensar partirmi». 
     «Vedesti», disse, «quell'antica strega 
   che sola sovr' a noi omai si piagne; 
   vedesti come l'uom da lei si slega.  (Purg. 19.52-60).27 
Once again Vergil questions the pilgrim’s distracted affect,28 and once again the 
latter states that he has had a vision.  This time, however, the pilgrim states that the 
dream has beguiled him.  Vergil responds by not merely claiming to know what his 
charge has seen, but he recounts precisely the dream’s content as well as its utility.  
The commentary tradition supports Vergil’s telepathy in this passage, with the 
exception of Hollander, who links this episode to the vision in canto 15, believing 
that in both instances Vergil’s initial questions reflect his continued ignorance of 
what is going on.  He says that in canto 15 Vergil “seems to have insisted that he 
knew what he did not know” while in canto 19 he “seems to have intuited correctly 
what his charge was dreaming.”  Given that there is no good narrative explanation 
for such intuition, Hollander turns to a possible textual variant, noting (via 
Scartazzini’s gloss) that some texts have question marks following verses 59 and 60 
(si piagne” and “si slega”) that would transform Vergil’s statements into questions.  
This altered punctuation, he believes, would prove his point that Vergil is able to 
                                                
27 “’What makes you keep your eyes upon the ground?’ / my guide began to say to me when both / 
of us had climbed a little, past the angel. / And I: ‘What makes me move with such misgiving / is a 
new vision: it has so beguiled me / that I cannot relinquish thoughts of it.’ / ‘The one you saw,’ he 
said, ‘that ancient witch - / for her alone one must atone above; / you saw how man can free himself 
from her.” 
28 Vergil questions the pilgrim similarly at Inferno 10.125, not long after he claims to know Dante’s 
hidden desire at verse 18.  While the pilgrim silently ponders Farinata’s disturbing words, Vergil 
asks “Perché se’ tu sì smarrito” [Why are you so lost], knowing that the pilgrim is troubled yet not 
knowing why.  In this case, the pilgrim’s answer suggests that he truly supplies information to his 
guide.  Interestingly, commentators do not attempt to allegorize Vergil’s knowledge in this episode, 
but only Lodovico Castelvetro (1570), Francesco Torraca (1905), and Giovanni Fallani (1965) note 
that elsewhere Vergil reads the pilgrim’s mind while here he does not seem to do so.  Fallani 
attempts to smooth over the inconsistency by claiming that Vergil simply prefers that the pilgrim 
speak in this case so that he may relieve his inner tension. 
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guess the content of Dante’s dream.29 Hollander does not mention that Scartazzini 
nonetheless believes the verses to be statements, but in any case, transforming the 
verses into questions resolves little, for it does not explain how Vergil would know 
to ask about the “antica strega” in the first place.  It also would disrupt the sense of 
the passage, since Vergil’s explanation clarifies the pilgrim’s beguilement 
(“sospeccion”).  Vergil’s telepathy cannot be explained away either by narrative 
evidence or textual editing. 
 Critics want to define Vergil’s knowledge in absolute terms because, as 
mentioned above, they desire consistency, but they do so not only for narrative but 
also historical motives.  When Musa and Hollander frame Vergil’s knowledge in 
terms of his embodiment as human reason, they are in fact following the critical 
tradition of the early commentators who similarly allegorize Vergil’s role.  Just as 
Buti and Vellutello insist, on the basis of Vergil’s allegorical role, that he knows 
Dante’s thoughts even when the text suggests otherwise, so Musa and Hollander 
marshal the same strategy to insist on just the opposite – that Vergil does not know 
Dante’s thoughts even when there is strong evidence that he does.  Barolini, citing 
Nardi, frames a trend toward allegorization as a strategy to protect Dante from the 
charges of heresy that were leveled at him, such that from the very beginning critics 
quite deliberately downplayed the literal sense of the poetry precisely in order to 
make the Commedia more palatable to church authorities (Undivine Comedy 6).  For 
this reason, critics may have felt the need to overemphasize Vergil’s knowledge as 
representing reason.30 The earlier commentators allegorize Vergil in order to 
                                                
29 Hollander states that “Scartazzini (comm.. to verse 58) points out that some texts have question 
marks following the words ‘si piagne’ (verse 59) and ‘si slega’ (verse 60), making what Petrocchi’s 
text records as observations into questions.  Were we to know that such was indeed the punctuation 
used by Dante, the hypothesis outlined above would be supported, i.e.,Virgil did not ‘see’ Dante’s 
dream, but divined it from the situational context.”  
30 This does not mean, of course, that allegorical interpretations in general are necessarily 
inappropriate or that they only served historical purposes. 
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support his authority within rational limits, while the later ones invoke this tradition 
in an effort to interpret such authority as part of a narrative drama and to distinguish 
it from the telepathic powers of celestial souls.  Thus while not carrying out full-
fledged allegorical readings, the later commentators build on the allegorizers’ desire 
for consistency, casting Vergil in terms of sustained psychological development in 
ways not unlike characterizations found in the modern novel. 
 If we pay more attention to the literal sense of the mind reading passages, we 
can also begin to extricate our readings from the fictional limits that Dante creates.  
Interpretations that demand consistency, even where none exists, suffer from a 
reading of the poem that is determined by Dante’s ability to convince us to think 
within the fictional limits he creates rather than confronting what his poetics 
actually do.  The logical fallacy in this case suggests that because Vergil is damned, 
in the end he is absolutely separated from souls in heaven, and therefore so are his 
modes of knowing.  As a result, his telepathy must be construed as, in Musa’s 
words, “of course, human reason.”31 With this awareness, we can begin to think 
                                                
31 There has been a similar critical trend regarding Vergil’s relationship with magic in the poem.  As 
Domenico Comparetti and other scholars showed, there were many popular legends in the thirteenth 
century portraying Vergil as a magician.  In Inf. 20, Dante alters the story (recounted by Vergil) of 
Mantua’s founding by making Manto a virgin, whereas in the Aeneid she has a son who founds 
Mantua in her honor.  This revision, as well as Vergil’s criticism of the diviners, seems to be a 
condemnation of divination, and scholars such as Comparetti, Francesco D’Ovidio, and more 
recently Hollander have argued that Dante means to distance Vergil from the popular legends.  
Comparetti does not believe that Dante was concerned with disproving Vergil’s link to magic 
because he thinks Dante essentially ignored such legends, but he does believe that Vergil’s harsh 
condemnation of the diviners in Inf. 20 represents Dante’s reaction to magicians of his day.  
D’Ovidio, on the other hand, believes that Vergil’s portrayal is meant to reject the legends specific to 
him.  Comparetti displays a version of the collocation fallacy (defined by Barolini as “the set of 
assumptions that permit a critic to argue against a given point of view with regard to a particular soul 
on the basis of that soul’s collocation within the fictive possible world of the Commedia.  Thus 
reading X is not tenable with regard to character X because, if it were operative, character X would 
be located elsewhere; for example, Ulysses cannot be guilty of false discourse, because then he 
would be with Sinon among the falsifiers of words” 15) when he says “Had Dante thought of Vergil 
as a magician, he would have had to put him with Guido Bonatti, Asdente and the rest, to whom 
Vergil shows himself by no means partial” (218).  D’Ovidio displays the fallacy as well when he 
claims that “se gl’indovini fossero tacciati specialmente d’empietà, il loro posto sarebbe tra i violenti 
contro Dio, mentre sono tra i frodolenti, cioè son considerati propriamente come impostori” (“Dante 
e la magia” 121) [if the diviners had been accused particularly of impiety, their place would be 
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more critically about why Vergil’s knowledge is so variable.  For there are a number 
of instances in which Vergil’s telepathy is hard to confirm, a reality that in part has 
fueled some of the above interpretations.  In Inferno 12 he makes what may be an 
educated guess when he says to the thoughtful pilgrim as they move across the 
stones «Tu pensi / forse a questa ruina, ch'è guardata / da quell' ira bestial ch'i' ora 
spensi” (31-33).32 Likewise the pilgrim, speechless with pity for the masterfully 
eloquent Pier della Vigne in Inferno 13.82, asks Vergil to select a question that he 
believes will satisfy his desire, raising the possibility but offering no conclusive 
evidence for mind reading. 
 Many of these inconclusive episodes contextualize Vergil’s knowledge 
within a fascinating epistemology of body language.  These passages reveal how 
Dante imagined the physical interactions of his characters with a depth that is 
perhaps unparalleled.  Sometimes the language is general, as in Purg. 25.13-15 
when Dante describes his unspoken desire by saying that he makes a motion as one 
who is about to speak (“tal era io con voglia accesa e spenta / di dimandar, venendo 
infino a l’atto / che fa colui ch’a dicer s’argomenta”),33 to which Vergil responds by 
instructing him to voice his doubt.  More often the imagery captures Vergil’s 
                                                
among the violent toward God, while they are among the fraudulent, that is they are considered 
precisely as imposters].  Recently, Simon Gilson has argued convincingly that Vergil’s relationship 
to magic, magical lore, and demonic agency both in medieval Christian culture and in the Commedia 
are present in ways far more complex than had been previously understood and therefore should not 
be dismissed.  I do not see the Vergilian legends as a strong context for his telepathic powers 
because, as I argue further below, I believe they are more closely linked with mind reading in 
heaven.  Yet the issue of Vergil’s link to magic as well as magical lore in the poem in general are 
worth further critical attention.  Alison Cornish identifies another category of Vergil’s mysterious 
knowledge in that he somehow knows the position of the stars despite the fact that they are not 
discernible from hell.  She states that such knowledge may invoke the popular Vergilian legends but 
instead characterizes these powers as representing “limited, secular knowledge” (52).  Here too, the 
mechanism of Vergil’s knowledge remains an epistemological issue, and so his ability may be 
investigated as a cultural and philosophical problem, not only in terms of how it fits into the poem’s 
Christian hierarchy.  See chapter 3 for further discussion of the relationship between the Vergilian 
legends, demonic agency and mind reading in the Commedia. 
32 “You wonder, / perhaps, about that fallen mass, watched over / by the inhuman rage I have just 
quenched.” 
33 “so I, with my desire to question kindled / then spent, arrived as far as making ready / to speak.” 
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response to a specific corporeal sign.  One of the most interesting cases incorporates 
vision and appears in Purg. 19 just after the pilgrim’s dream of the “antica strega,” 
when the pilgrim and his guide meet the repenting avaricious souls.  Vergil asks 
directions to the next stairway, receives an answer, and then we witness the 
following interactions: 
 
     Così pregò 'l poeta, e sì risposto 
   poco dinanzi a noi ne fu; per ch'io 
   nel parlare avvisai l'altro nascosto, 
     e volsi li occhi a li occhi al segnor mio: 
   ond' elli m'assentì con lieto cenno 
   ciò che chiedea la vista del disio  (Purg. 19.82-87)34 
 The ambiguity of verse 84 has set off a storm of critical debate over the 
meaning of “l’altro nascosto.”  The soul who instructs Vergil and the pilgrim on the 
location of the next stairwell cannot be seen clearly because the avaricious lie 
prostrate.  Thus early critics including Benvenuto da Imola (1385-95) and Johannes 
de Serravalle (1416-17) believe that “l’altro nascosto” refers to the identity of the 
speaking soul, whom the pilgrim recognizes by his voice.  Vellutello (1544) 
considered that the phrase refers to the fact that the soul does not know whether 
Dante and Vergil are there to repent.  P. Pompeo Venturi (1732) disagreed, claiming 
instead that the soul does not know that Dante pilgrim is alive.  These latter two 
glosses in turn set off a wave of supporters and detractors.  In 1868 Brunone Bianchi 
argued that since the soul cannot see Dante and Vergil, he must assume they too are 
souls, since no living person had ever before visited. Further, since Vergil asks 
directions to the next girone, the soul must also assume they will not do penance for 
avarice but for some other sin.  He therefore concludes that the phrase refers to 
Dante’s recognition of the soul by the sound of his voice.  Subsequent to this gloss, 
                                                
34 “So did the poet ask, so did reply / come from a little way ahead; and I / through his speech 
detected the other hidden. / I turned my eyes to find my master’s eyes; / at this, with a glad sign, he 
ratified / that which the look of my desire asked.” 
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many commentators agreed that the phrase refers to the identity of the soul, but 
some believe the pilgrim recognizes him by the sound of his voice while others 
believe he does not.  A few, such as Francesco Torraca (1905), Attilio Momigliano 
(1946-51), and Nicola Fosca (2003-6) maintain that it pertains to some unexpressed 
doubt on the part of the soul, while Manfredi Porena (1946-8) believes the soul 
wants to know the identities of Dante and Vergil. 
 It is plausible that “l’altro nascosto” refers to the pilgrim’s realization that 
the voice has come from a soul, whose identity he does not recognize and therefore 
subsequently questions in line 93.  But more important is that Vergil’s corporeal 
understanding of the pilgrim’s desire occurs by means of vision (“volsi li occhi a li 
occhi al segnor mio”), and once again it occurs in a narrative context of occlusion, 
in this case also pointedly visual: Vergil understands Dante’s wish by looking into 
his eyes, while neither the speaking soul nor the travelers can see each other.  Yet 
here the concealment is not only narrative, recalling the similar episodes of Inf. 23, 
Purg. 13, 15, and earlier in 19, but also interpretive, since critics have focused 
exclusively (and without consensus), on the meaning of verse 84 but have not 
examined the epistemological context in which it appears.  As in Inf. 10, Dante once 
again conspicuously collapses form and content, although in Purg. 19 the corporeal 
mechanism of Vergil’s knowledge is more clear.35 
                                                
35 There are many other instances in which Vergil’s perception is contextualized in terms of body 
language.  See also Inf. 13.22-30 when the pilgrim halts abruptly, overwhelmed by the haunting cries 
of the suicides, to which Vergil responds by instructing him to pluck a branch so that “li pensier c’hai 
si faran tutti monchi” [the thoughts you have will also be cut off].  Likewise, in Inf. 26.43-48 Vergil 
perceives the pilgrim’s desire for an explanation as the latter leans over a bridge to get a better look 
at the souls imprisoned in the flames.  Via the pilgrim’s body, Vergil gains knowledge pertaining to 
bodies concealed in flames.  Giuseppe Mazzotta in fact defines rhetoric in the canto of Ulysses as 
based in “concealment and disclosure” (106).  Purg. 18.1-12 is another instance in which Vergil 
reads Dante’s thoughts by looking into his face, encouraging him to speak, after which the pilgrim 
declares that his vision has been made stronger by Vergil’s light.  Here too vision is the mechanism 
of knowledge both formally and narratively.  In Purg. 27.16-24 Vergil discerns and reassures the 
pilgrim’s fear, after he sees him bending forward anxiously over clasped hands to gaze at the fire 
whose flames he must undergo for his purification.  See chapter 5 for additional discussion of body 
language in mind-reading episodes. 
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 The spectrum outlined above shows that Vergil’s telepathic powers are far 
from uniform.  As we have seen, many of these passages also occur in narrative 
contexts of heightened epistemological drama, which in turn provoke analogous 
critical responses.  Acknowledging these layered ambiguities allows us to see 
surprisingly similar patterns in the Paradiso.  In fact, it is only by understanding the 
connections of telepathy across the three canticles that Vergil’s mind reading can be 
interpreted appropriately.  The body language of vision in Purg. 19.82-87 recurs in a 
similar episode in Paradiso 25 and 26.  At the end of 25, the pilgrim turns to gaze at 
Beatrice only to realize that he has been blinded by the presence of St. John:  “Ahi 
quanto ne la mente mi commossi, / quando mi volsi per veder Beatrice, / per non 
poter veder, benché io fossi / presso di lei, e nel mondo felice!” (136-39).36 At the 
beginning of canto 26, the saint reassures him, encouraging him to use his voice to 
compensate for his lack of vision so that he may undergo the examination on Love: 
 
     Mentr' io dubbiava per lo viso spento, 
   de la fulgida fiamma che lo spense 
   uscì un spiro che mi fece attento, 
     dicendo: «Intanto che tu ti risense 
   de la vista che haï in me consunta, 
   ben è che ragionando la compense. 
     Comincia dunque; e dì ove s'appunta 
   l'anima tua, e fa ragion che sia 
   la vista in te smarrita e non defunta: 
     perché la donna che per questa dia 
   regïon ti conduce, ha ne lo sguardo 
   la virtù ch'ebbe la man d'Anania»  (Par. 26.1-12).37 
                                                
36 “Ah, how disturbed I was within my mind, / when I turned round to look at Beatrice, / on finding 
that I could not see, though I / was close to her, and in the world of gladness!” 
37 “While I, with blinded eyes, was apprehensive, / from that bright flame which had consumed my 
vision, / there breathed a voice that centered my attention, / saying: ‘Until you have retrieved the 
power / of sight, which you consumed in me, it would / be best to compensate by colloquy. / Then do 
begin; declare the aim on which / your soul is set – and be assured of this: / your vision, though 
confounded, is not dead, / because the woman who conducts you through / this godly region has, 
within her gaze, / the force the hand of Ananias had.” 
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The contextual clue at the end of canto 25 makes it unclear whether St. John 
discerns the pilgrim’s apprehension telepathically or through clues provided by 
Dante’s body language as he turns to look at Beatrice.  As in the passages from the 
first two canticles, this episode is also structured through paradoxes of revelation 
and occlusion, in this case blindness and vision. We wonder precisely how St. John 
perceives the pilgrim’s inner state, as the latter turns to look at his guide and finds 
his “viso spento” by John’s light.  John reassures him that he will regain his vision 
and asks that he demonstrate his perception of love by speaking.  He further 
reassures the pilgrim that his blindness is only temporary, since Beatrice’s gaze 
bears the same power as did the hand of Christ’s disciple Ananias, who cured Saul 
of his blindness.  Thus John alters the biblical story to make the healing of Dante’s 
blindness, itself brought on by a prior act of vision, a visual rather than a manual 
transaction.  As in the case of Vergil’s perceptions in earlier episodes, the 
mechanism of John’s knowledge is implicated with corporeal signs and occurs in a 
narrative moment of intense uncertainty.  Nor is this the only instance of mind 
reading complicated by body language in the third canticle.  When Dante is 
overcome by the souls’ joyous outcry following Peter Damian’s monologue at the 
end of Par. 21, he turns anxiously for help (“oppresso di stupore”) to Beatrice, who 
comforts him like a mother at the opening of canto 22.  She may well judge his state 
of mind from the contextual clue of his corporeal posture rather than from any 
telepathic power of her own.38 
 Mind reading in paradise is implicated not only with body language but 
other types of rhetorical complications as well.  In the opening of Paradiso 14 
Beatrice speaks for Dante when asking Aquinas whether souls will retain their 
                                                
38 I have not found any commentaries that address the ambiguity of mind reading in the above 
passages from Paradiso 22 and 26, most likely because it is not an explicit part of these narrative 
moments. 
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radiance once they are united with their bodies and if so, whether such radiance will 
harm their vision.  The first three verses of her speech are the most important for our 
purposes: “«A costui fa mestieri, e nol vi dice / né con la voce né pensando ancora, / 
d'un altro vero andare a la radice” (10-12).39 Here Beatrice articulates a question that 
she says the pilgrim has not yet pronounced or even thought.  In Paradiso 15.61-63 
we learn from Cacciaguida that souls in heaven know human thoughts even before 
humans think them, so one could argue, as a few commentators do,40 that verses 10-
12 indicate such foreknowledge in which Beatrice refers to the pilgrim’s future 
thought, as “ancora” suggests.  Yet verse 10 complicates the issue, for when 
Beatrice says “A costui fa mestieri,” does she mean that Dante will think this 
thought, as suggested by “ancora” or merely that he should, or both?  If we give 
weight to “fa mestieri,” the passage stresses Beatrice’s authority over Dante’s 
because it suggests that rather than simply recognizing Dante’s future thought, she 
selects the next topic of discussion, guiding his reasoning as he learns to recognize 
what sort of questions he should prefer.  This reading implies a didactic moment 
that privileges her own divine status and authority.  Buti, in conventional 
allegorizing mode, argues that the thought has not occurred to Dante because his 
human reason is incapable of formulating it without Beatrice’s help.41 The 
twentieth-century commentator Ernesto Trucchi (1936) follows this tradition in 
                                                
39 “He does not tell you of it – not with speech / nor in his thoughts as yet – but this man needs / to 
reach the root of still another truth.” 
40 Including Giacomo Poletto, Francesco Torraca.  Other modern commentators such as Singleton, 
Sapegno, and Chiavacci Leonardi gloss the passage simply by paraphrasing it. 
41 “E che finga Beatrice muova lo dubbio e non l’autore, significa che questo era dubbio che non 
potrebbe cadere ne la mente umana per la ragione umana..” [And that it is supposed that Beatrice 
initiates the doubt and not the author signifies that this was a doubt that could not come to the human 
mind through human reason].  Vellutello argues along similar lines, saying “Ma Beat., ciò è, la 
theologia, ne la qual fra gli altri è contenuto questo dubio, conoscendo ‘l bisogno di Dante, mossa da 
carità, induce questi sacri Theologi suoi espositori a dichiararglielo dicendo…” [But Beatrice, that is 
theology, in which among others this doubt is contained, knowing Dante’s need, moved by charity, 
induces these sacred theologians to declare their explanations to him by saying…] 
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arguing that Beatrice does not read Dante’s mind but rather identifies something he 
needs to know.42 Di Salvo comes closest to acknowledging the authoritative tension:  
“Si svolge così al di sopra di Dante, ma sempre con Dante protagonista, un 
colloquio tra San Tommaso e Beatrice…” (254).43 “A costui fa mestieri,” then, 
makes unclear the extent to which Beatrice versus Dante directs the questioning and 
therefore makes it impossible to confirm the interaction as telepathic versus simply 
didactic.  In this way Beatrice’s rhetoric of authority disrupts the ideal of telepathy, 
which theoretically posits a pure sort of communication by which souls understand 
the pilgrim’s thoughts in a manner free of the ambiguities of human language.  Her 
speech creates a disjunction between theory and praxis. 
 A similar disjunction emerges in Paradiso 13 where the pilgrim is instructed 
by Aquinas on Solomon’s excellence in relation to Adam and Christ.  Aquinas 
begins discussion of the first question with a clear telepathic declaration of the 
pilgrim’s belief that Adam and Christ were unmatched in excellence: “Tu credi 
che…” (37).  He then proceeds with a lengthy philosophical explanation of creation 
as reflection of God’s idea with perfect versus imperfect results.  Once he affirms 
that Adam and Christ indeed represented the summit of human perfection, he 
anticipates Dante’s objection regarding Solomon in the following way:  “Or s'i' non 
procedesse avanti piùe, / `Dunque, come costui fu sanza pare?' / comincerebber le 
                                                
42 “Qui Beatrice non legge un dubbio nella mente di Dante, ma rivela una necessità della sua mente, 
con quella perfetta carità che precorre al bisogno, e lo soddisfa prima ancora che si manifesti; se 
dubbio vi fosse già stato in Dante, i Beati l’avrebbero letto in lui come Beatrice, nè questa avrebbe 
detto che costui ancora non pensa a ciò” [Here Beatrice does not read a doubt in Dante’s mind, but 
reveals a necessity of his mind, with that perfect charity that anticipates need, and she satisfies it 
before it is manifest; if the doubt had already been in Dante, the Blessed would have read it in him as 
Beatrice, nor would she have said that he still doesn’t think it].  Here we should note that Trucchi 
puts forth a rhetorical fallacy similar to the collocation fallacy, in which he imagines a narrative 
scenario based on the assumption of absolute poetic consistency, i.e. its mimetic power (“se dubbio 
vi fosse…”). 
43 “Thus a dialogue between St. Thomas and Beatrice unfolds beyond Dante, but always with Dante 
as protagonist.” 
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parole tue” (88-90).44 These words might seem to mark yet another instance of 
telepathy, but the conditional use of the verb “comincerebber” resists such a 
reading.  Does Aquinas claim to read the pilgrim’s thoughts, voicing what the 
pilgrim would say, or does he engage characteristically scholastic rhetoric to 
anticipate what he knows to be the most logical objection?  The vast majority of 
earlier commentators gloss the passage by paraphrasing it, ignoring Aquinas’ 
rhetoric and its relation to mind reading.  For the most part, modern commentators 
support anticipation rather than telepathy45 with the only exception being Luigi 
Pietrobono (1946) who suggests that Aquinas does indeed read the pilgrim’s mind.46 
Were the passage to appear in a different context, anticipation might be the only and 
obvious choice.  But mind reading in Dante’s heaven becomes a typical and 
therefore expected mode of interaction, and this new context puts the words of 
Aquinas in ambiguous light.  Just as Beatrice’s authoritative language undermines 
                                                
44 “Now if I said no more beyond this point, / your words might well begin, ‘How is it, then, / with 
your assertion of his matchless vision?” 
45 Singleton remains faithful to the conditional verb by translating the key phrase as “…would your 
words begin,” but his gloss emphasizes anticipation when he states that “Thomas Aquinas now 
anticipates an objection on Dante’s part.  If he did not proceed in his discourse, Dante might well put 
the question as phrased in vs. 89, having understood Aquinas to have affirmed absolutely that 
Solomon was ‘without peer’ in human nature.”  Mandelbaum’s translation supports anticipation even 
more strongly with “Now if I said no more beyond thid point, / your words might well begin” (88-9), 
and Sapegno agrees:  “se mi fermassi a questo punto, aversti ragione di chiedermi…” [if I stopped 
myself at this point, you would be right to ask me…].  Chiavacci Leonardi follows suit, noting that 
the terzina is “formulata in modo apertamente scolastico” [formulated in an explicitly scholastic 
manner].  Barolini too argues that Aquinas anticipates rather than reads the pilgrim’s mind, 
emphasizing the philosopher’s rhetoric as expressing particular narrative self-consciousness and an 
awareness of discourse as an “ongoing process,” as a “system of differences,” highly aware of its 
necessary existence in time (205).  She also links the episode back to Par. 5.109-11 when Dante poet 
makes a reminiscent statement about how the reader would desire if he were not to go on.  She 
concludes that Thomas imitates Dante as narrator (206). 
46 He implies this in the context of asserting his main point, which is that Aquinas deliberately 
prolongs and enjoys the pilgrim’s response: “Il ragionamento di Tommaso fin qui non ha che ribadito 
ciò che D. pensava; e il santo, che gli legge dentro come in un libro aperto, nel vederlo in quello stato 
di sospensione in cui lo ha condotto nascondendogli il punto a cui vuol riuscire, par che ne goda” 
[The reasoning of Thomas to this point has only reaffirmed what Dante was thinking; and the saint, 
who reads inside him as in an open book, on seeing him in that state of suspense in which he has led 
him by hiding from him the point at which he wants to conclude, seems to take pleasure in it.] 
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the ostensible purity of mind reading in canto 14, so does Aquinas’ scholastic 
rhetoric in canto 13.47 
 Aquinas’ presence both as mind reader and as scholastic thinker enacts a 
conflation of philosophical versus mystical experience.  This conflation implies a 
particular epistemological value, for through Aquinas’ telepathic-mystical 
intercourse with the pilgrim, the philosopher participates in a way of knowing that 
differs pointedly from the earthly mode in which he so excelled.  The key narrative 
analogue to this hybrid sort of rhetoric is the way that Aquinas validates a different 
way of knowing in his praise of St. Francis in Par. 11, while Bonaventure praises 
St. Dominic in canto 12.  As Barolini has shown, the poet in these cantos creates a 
community that values equally the seraphic love of Francis and the wisdom of 
Dominic, thereby emphasizing unity.  Both religious orders and, implicitly, their 
epistemological paradigms of scholasticism and mysticism serve God equally well.  
But the language of this praise is enacted through intense narrative and rhetorical 
differentiation.  In this way, the poem suggests that Aquinas’ and Dominic’s 
narratives enact the theme of sameness and difference, one of the Paradiso’s central 
theological and structuring principles.48 As outlined in the introduction to this 
dissertation, mind reading itself also enacts this principle, implying union 
conceptually while dramatizing difference rhetorically.  In Paradiso 13 Aquinas’ 
two-fold communication with the pilgrim enacts it at yet another level, as his mind 
reading implies unity while his anticipation of the pilgrim’s doubt implies the 
                                                
47 Another episode suggesting anticipation occurs in Par. 25.50, when Beatrice is said to anticipate 
Dante’s answer to St. James during the examination on hope: “E quella pia che guidò le penne / de le 
mie ali a così alto volo / a la risposta così mi prevenne” (49-51) [And she, compassionate, who was 
the guide / who led my feathered wings to such high flight, / did thus anticipate my own reply].  Her 
response merely affirms that Dante indeed possesses much hope, making it unclear whether she has 
truly penetrated the pilgrim’s thoughts and/or, as suggested by Chiavacci Leonardi and Sapegno, she 
speaks for the pilgrim to protect him from what might be regarded as lack of humility. 
48 See chapter 9 of Undivine Comedy for a rich analysis of these issues. 
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differentiation of scholastic discourse.  In this way the complexity of Aquinas’ mind 
reading complements the narrative issues of cantos 11 and 12.  The poetry rejects, 
both narratively and rhetorically, any single epistemology as privileged in the 
pursuit of truth. 
 The evidence outlined above shows that telepathic episodes in all three 
canticles are not consistently pure and transcendent in epistemological terms.  
Instead, they show that acts of knowing for all characters in the poem occur on a 
continuum that is deeply implicated with various contingencies, with signs of the 
body, with the rhetoric of didactic authority and of scholasticism.  Telepathic 
powers function ambiguously for Vergil but also for Beatrice, Aquinas, St. John, 
and other souls in heaven, showing that mind reading in heaven is not absolutely 
divine in opposition to the varieties found in the first two canticles.  Consequently, 
there are important ways in which Vergil’s telepathic abilities are not so different 
from those of his heavenly counterparts.  How, then, are we to characterize the 
epistemology of all mind reading in the poem?  Why does the poem persistently 
lead us to believe that the unsaved Vergil shares the privileges of heavenly souls?49 
The Commedia’s final mind reading episode in Paradiso 32 gives us a clue because 
it concerns the very question that ultimately explains why Vergil is excluded from 
heaven.  In this passage, when St. Bernard points out the unsaved babies in the 
celestial rose, he perceives via telepathy that once again the pilgrim is tormented by 
the idea of predestination:  “Or dubbi tu e dubitando sili; / ma io discioglierò 'l forte 
legame / in che ti stringon li pensier sottili” (49-51).50 For Dante, predestination 
seems to contradict reason, the very quality that defines human beings and for the 
                                                
49 By asking this question I do not wish to take up the issue of whether Vergil should or might be 
saved, and more importantly, why we are led to ask that question.  On this see the lively critical 
exchange between Barolini and Mowbray Allan.  
50 “But now you doubt and, doubting, do not speak; / yet I shall loose that knot; I can release / you 
from the bonds of subtle reasoning.” 
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abuse of which he reserves the most dreadful depths of hell.  Bernard answers his 
doubt by asserting that souls are not saved without cause, “sine causa” (59), but 
through eternal law, “etterna legge,” (55), raising the hope that God’s election of the 
saved is truly rational.  Yet he concludes with an astonishing about-face, saying that 
God bestows his grace diversely and chooses whom to save at his pleasure, indeed 
according to the color of one’s hair: 
 
     Lo rege per cui questo regno pausa 
   in tanto amore e in tanto diletto, 
   che nulla volontà è di più ausa, 
     le menti tutte nel suo lieto aspetto 
   creando, a suo piacer di grazia dota 
   diversamente; e qui basti l'effetto. 
     E ciò espresso e chiaro vi si nota 
   ne la Scrittura santa in quei gemelli 
   che ne la madre ebber l'ira commota. 
     Però, secondo il color d'i capelli, 
   di cotal grazia l'altissimo lume 
   degnamente convien che s'incappelli  (Par. 32.61-72).51 
When Dante places in heaven the pagans Trajan and Ripheus he also means to insist 
on and dramatize the random nature of predestination and his struggle with it.  The 
inclusion of these pagans stands solidly against the argument that Vergil’s lack of 
grace and consequent damnation may be explained simply by his pre-Christian 
status.52  
 But the key point is that Bernard’s telepathic perception of Dante’s anxiety 
is meant to recall both Vergil’s mind reading, which links him to heaven, and his 
lack of grace, which banishes him to hell.  This poetic recollection is analogous to 
                                                
51 “The King through whom this kingdom finds content / in so much love and so much joyousness / 
that no desire would dare to ask for more, / creating every mind in His glad sight, / bestows His grace 
diversely, at His pleasure - / and here the fact alone must be enough. / And this is clearly and 
expressly noted / for you in Holy Scripture, in those twins / who, in their mother’s womb, were 
moved to anger. / Thus, it is just for the celestial light / to grace their heads with a becoming crown, / 
according to the color of their hair.” 
52 For discussion of this see Kenelm Foster’s The Two Dantes and Other Studies. 
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Vergil’s absent presence in Purgatorio 30, where his poetry appears at the very 
moment that his character vanishes.53 And so even at the end of Dante’s journey, 
when the pilgrim is ostensibly free of earthly attachments, the reader is reminded 
once again of Vergil through his narrative absence and yet formal presence in the 
celestial rose.  Vergil’s telepathy is an intense sign of the dialectics woven into the 
problem of his authority, and for this reason, his powers should not be dismissed as 
extraordinarily sensitive human perception, astuteness or common sense.  He cannot 
see into the mirror of eternal knowledge, but we are meant to associate his telepathy 
with blessed souls for several reasons:  it heightens our emotional engagement with 
him and with the pilgrim’s urgent struggle, even at the moment of his final vision, to 
accept the difficult theology of God’s justice.   
 Further, as we have seen, mind reading throughout the poem is complicated 
by rhetoric and other poetic strategies that emphasize not silent unity but the 
languages of mysticism, scholasticism, common sense perception, and the body.  
Telepathy insists upon the differences in these languages in a way that resists 
definitions of mind reading as simply a topos of easily-assigned privilege, and 
indeed in some cases, resists our defining it at all.  In this way mind reading 
emerges as a sign system that emphasizes knowing as fragmented and immanent, as 
a process drawing extravagant attention to its unfolding in time.  On the one hand 
the telepathic ideal of communication as free of human error posits a fictional world 
of epistemological liberation, but practically telepathy demonstrates a world in 
which knowing occurs on a continuum for all, and is therefore a partial act defined 
                                                
53 The citations are well known.  As Beatrice appears, Dante poet cites the verse from Vergil’s 
Aeneid in reference to Marcellus “’Manibus, oh, date lilia plenis!” (Purg. 30.21).  Later, at the 
moment of Vergil’s disappearance, the pilgrim quotes Dido as he attempts to tell Vergil of his 
reaction to Beatrice’s presence: ‘Men che dramma / di sangue m’è rimaso che non tremi: / conosco i 
segni de l’antica fiamma’ (Purg 30.46-48) [‘I am left with less / than one drop of my blood that does 
not tremble: / I recognize the signs of the old flame’]. 
 61 
by ambiguities.  Because mind reading cannot perform as an uncomplicated medium 
of pure communication - because it cannot represent communication in the 
transcendent isolation of its idealized form, it is not a sign of grace.  
 Another way to view the competing claims of mind reading is through their 
emergence as a history within the text.  The Commedia historicizes as 
epistemological challenges the problem of Vergil’s authority long after Vergil is no 
longer a character, and it also historicizes telepathy itself in all three canticles.  Just 
as Vergil’s memory is invoked in Paradiso 32, so we continually wonder how (and 
sometimes whether) not only Vergil, but Beatrice, Aquinas, St. John, and others 
know the pilgrim’s thoughts.  As we have seen, Vergil’s memory in the Paradiso is 
further implicated with Dante’s ongoing struggle with predestination, which 
resurfaces until the very last moment.54 These appearances, questions, and 
ambiguities suggest patterns of repetition that may be described as circular;  as 
issues they emerge repeatedly rather than arising and resolving in chronological, 
linear fashion.  The metaphor of the circle is significant in that it recalls the models 
of historiography whose relevance for the Commedia has been explored by John 
Freccero.  He writes that in pagan antiquity the passing of time was regarded as 
circular, in which “civilizations, like men, succeeded one another according to the 
life cycle: a coming-to-be and a passing away to which all things were forever 
subject.  Time moved in an eternal circle, with repetition as its only rationale” (136).  
By contrast, for Augustine, the coming of Christ forever changed this circularity by 
introducing a fixed point that established a “linear progression toward that new and 
eternal event” (136).  He continues: 
 
                                                
54 In Par. 19.70-78 Dante pilgrim questions the eagle about the divine justice of predestination, in 
20.79 he expresses his shock at seeing the pagans Trajan and Ripheus in heaven, questions another 
soul about predestination at 21.78, and is again instructed by St. Bernard in canto 32 as discussed 
above. 
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  The coming of Christ wrought a change not only in  
  universal history, but in the history of the individual soul  
  as well, whose story could no longer be reduced to the  
  curve extending from birth through maturity to death, but  
  was rather a continuous trajectory toward the target: a death  
  that would give meaning to life.  It was this new linear  
  conception of time that some have claimed as the ancestor of  
  our own idea of progress. (136)55 
The literary form embodying the circular model of time is the epic, while the novel 
embodies the linear model.  Freccero suggests that the Commedia incorporates both 
models as Dante pilgrim’s progress to conversion may be viewed in terms of the 
Augustinian linear model, while his poetic first-person voice represents the circular 
model, since it is that voice that begins and completes the writing of the poem.56   
 If we understand as circular the unresolved patterns of telepathy described in 
this chapter, as well as the pattern of issues relating to Vergil’s authority, and of 
Dante’s struggle to accept predestination (and perhaps other patterns as well), we 
can see that their recapitulations resist the linear resolution of Augustinian time.  In 
this sense the narrative chronology does not contain these patterns, and they 
obstinately align with Dante poet and the circular model of time his position in part 
represents.  The patterns therefore historicize aspects of the poem in ways that work 
against the neat finality implied by the apparently fully historicized spiritual 
narrative.  The point of this is not to claim that telepathy or any other pattern 
undermines Dante’s claim to conversion.  Rather, these patterns in tension show that 
in the context of a spiritual journey the Commedia’s poetics enact histories that are 
more rich and complex than have been acknowledged.  Specifically, the above 
                                                
55 Lee Patterson also discusses these models of historiography in his analysis of Chaucer’s Troilus 
and Criseyde.  See chapter 2 of Chaucer and the Subject of History. 
56 Freccero outlines this view in the context of his chapter entitled “Dante’s Ulysses: From Epic to 
Novel.” 
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conclusions show how we may begin to think of mind reading as having a history 
within the poem that resists the historical trajectory of Christian narrative time.57   
 In the chapters that follow, I connect this textual history of mind reading 
with relevant narrative and philosophical histories outside the poem, not merely to 
trace sources but to demonstrate the poem in dialogue with larger contexts.  One 
such history is a narrative one involving the topos of epiphany, which evolves from 
a sign of faithlessness in Latin epic to a democratizing problem in Christianity, with 
crucial epistemological consequences.  It is to this fascinating and somewhat 
unexpected history that we now turn.
                                                
57 For a different treatment of this topic, see the appendix of Dante, Poet of the Desert, where 
Mazzotta argues that Dante synthesizes the circular and linear models of history through his 
representation of Fortune, an interpretation that is focused on reconciling historical tensions. 
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Chapter 2 
When Gods Appear:  Pagan and Christian Epiphany as a 
Context for Mind Reading in the Commedia 
 
 Through its claim of an omniscient God who also lived as a man on earth, 
the New Testament explicitly links mind reading and epiphany.  All four Gospels 
record Christ’s telepathy, with some differences in emphasis.1 Jesus often reads the 
minds of his enemies, the lawyers and the Pharisees, such as when the lawyers 
accuse him of blasphemy when he tells a man that his sins are forgiven, or when 
after driving out devils he knows that the Pharisees believe his authority derives 
from Beelzebub.2 He also discerns the thoughts of his disciples, correcting them in 
Mark 8:17 when they misinterpret his warning against the leaven of the Pharisees 
and at 9:34 when he knows of their debate over which of them is greatest.3 In John, 
among other instances, Jesus knows that his disciples are murmuring amongst 
themselves over his instructions to eat his flesh and blood and knows they wish to 
question him about his imminent departure.4   
 In this chapter I argue that pagan connections between epiphany and 
telepathy are implicit but evolve and flourish in Christian culture in a way that 
invites us to understand epiphany as a context for the Commedia’s mind reading.  
The human aspect of Christian epiphany encouraged a democratized culture in 
                                                
1 Matthew and Luke emphasize mind reading in a somewhat negative way as Jesus reads the minds 
of his enemies, while Mark and John show Jesus using telepathy to correct his disciples.  
2 The first episode is recorded in Matthew 9:4, Mark 2:8, and Luke 5:22.  The second is from 
Matthew 12:25 but also occurs at Luke 11:17 where it is the people rather than the Pharisees who 
believe this.  In Luke 15:3 Jesus reads the minds of lawyers and Pharisees who complain amongst 
themselves that Jesus welcomes sinners and eats with them, and in Luke 22:48 Jesus reads Judas’ 
mind when asking him whether he would betray the Son of Man with a kiss.  In John 6:43 Jesus tells 
the Jews to stop murmuring amongst themselves about his claim to have come down from heaven. 
3 The episode of Mark 8:17 also occurs at Matthew 16:8, while that of Mark 9:34 is also found at 
Luke 9:47. 
4 At 6:61 and 16:19, respectively.  See below for further discussion of Jesus’ mind-reading episodes.  
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which visionaries such as Dante could imagine spiritual events as personalized 
epiphanies.  Yet this democratization presents crises of epistemology and of 
authority because recognizing and validating holy figures becomes problematic in 
hagiographic narratives just as it is in the Bible.  These complications are in fact 
Christian manifestations of a parallel problem in the Latin epics of Vergil, Lucan, 
and Statius, where the topos of epiphany exposes a growing faithlessness in the 
pagan gods with unnerving epistemological consequences for human beings.  Dante 
deeply internalized the epistemological advantages and problems of epiphany found 
in pagan Latin epic and in some of the Christian narratives that inherited and 
transformed these problems.  In his initial creation of Beatrice as epiphanic medium 
in the Vita Nuova, Dante incorporates pagan motifs and Christian conventions that 
dramatize her role as a sign of sacred truth with astonishing new hopefulness, but 
also with ancient anxieties.  In the Commedia generally, we also find the pagan and 
Christian problems of recognizing and validating divine figures.  The poem itself 
consists of serial epiphany scenes of dead mortals, some of whose moral worth the 
pilgrim struggles to comprehend.  This structure, as I will show, rests upon the 
troubled epistemology of Latin epics that conspicuously privilege dead mortals over 
the gods as credible epiphanic actors.  
 More specifically, in demonstrating epiphany as a larger theme and 
organizing principle in the poem, I show how it becomes a context for mind reading, 
such that we may also describe telepathic episodes in terms of epiphany; that is, we 
may understand mind reading episodes in the poem as specific epiphanic 
encounters.  This is because telepathy and epiphany sometimes share key 
epistemological traits both functionally and historically, traits reflected powerfully 
in the poem.  In making these connections, I have found that as topoi, both epiphany 
and telepathy have sufficiently rich individual histories to merit separate chapters in 
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this study.  This chapter therefore focuses primarily on epiphany as an anchor for a 
narrative history, but this is because of its contextual relevance for the parallel 
philosophical and narrative histories of mind reading, which I address in chapter 3.  
Thus we may view this chapter as a prelude whose narrative focus complements and 
prepares us for the theoretical concerns addressed in the chapter that follows. 
 In order to understand the Commedia’s relationship to epiphany, we must 
begin with the pagan Latin epics of Vergil, Lucan, and Statius.  I have chosen these 
authors because they are among the key pagan poets for Dante and because 
epiphany scenes in their epics raise important philosophical questions.5 In this 
regard Vergil’s Aeneid is a logical starting point, but since this text responds very 
consciously to the Homeric model of epiphany scenes, we must first understand 
those patterns and motifs.  In his 2003 dissertation, Daniel Turkeltaub elaborates 
them as a detailed series of steps.  I outline them here briefly in order to understand 
the overall pattern to which Vergil responds.6 
 Homeric gods are not omniscient, and so they must become aware of the 
events leading to their appearances to mortals (19).  Once aware, they prepare for 
the appearance, and since they are also not ubiquitous, they must travel to reach the 
mortal (20).  The god disguises him or herself but also sends forth a hint of divinity 
to the mortal, so that the latter suspects a divine presence (22).  The god and mortal 
converse, at which point the god provides a false biography (24).  The mortal then 
offers ironic treatment of the god, either by honoring him appropriately without 
                                                
5 Ovid’s Metamorphoses represents epiphanies, such as in Book 6 when Athena, scorned by 
Arachne, disguises herself as an old woman, but the undisguised gods also frequently interact with 
mortals.  Jove’s disguises for the purpose of seducing various nymphs may suggest a mockery of the 
traditional Homeric epiphany (explained in the pages following), when he reveals himself through 
his kiss with the Arcadian nymph in Book 2 and when he disguises himself as a bull when seducing 
Europa.  The world of the Metamorphoses is one that assumes ambiguous knowledge of the gods, but 
this ambiguity is never framed in a context that presents epiphany as philosophically significant. 
6 There are certain steps in the pattern, such as dramatic isolation, that I have omitted in this review 
because they are pertinent to Turkeltaub’s study but not to this one. 
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realizing it or by offending the god’s divinity (26).  The god provides instructions 
and inspires power so that the mortal may carry them out (27).  In many Homeric 
scenes, there is physical contact between mortal and god, followed by a change in 
setting (28-9).  At this point, the god reveals him or herself so that the mortal 
recognizes the divine presence in what Turkeltaub calls an epiphanic moment (29-
30).  The mortal reacts to the epiphanic moment with an intense emotional response 
(32).  Then the mortal and god converse once again; the god now announces his/her 
name, insults the mortal, and affirms his/her own divine nature (33).  The mortal 
will often express concern that encountering the god will prevent a normal life in the 
future (33).  The god assuages the mortal’s worries, utters a prophecy, and provides 
a second set of instructions that sometimes include a promise of a future epiphany.  
After these motifs have been carried out, the god departs (34). 
 The Homeric corpus is full of such scenes, but Turkeltaub’s discussion of 
the Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite exemplifies nicely the steps outlined above.  In the 
hymn, Aphrodite becomes aware of Anchises when she first sees him and feels lust 
that has been inspired by Zeus (53).  She prepares for their encounter by traveling to 
Cyprus to beautify herself (54).  She then goes to Mt. Ida and travels on foot to 
Anchises’ hut (56).  When she arrives, she disguises herself as a young virgin who 
has been kidnapped by Hermes and brought to a foreign land so that he may marry 
her.  Anchises suspects her divine nature and responds by worshipping and praying 
to her (59-60).  She instructs, or rather begs Anchises instead to take her as his bride 
and inspires lust in him (61-2).  Anchises announces that he will sleep with her, at 
which point the setting changes and the physical contact occurs (64).  The epiphanic 
moment immediately follows their sexual encounter, when Aphrodite insults 
Anchises, who turns his eyes away and hides in terror under his blanket (68).  When 
he begs her to allow him to lead a normal life in the future, she assuages his fear and 
 68 
prophesies that he will have a son named Aeneas, who will continue his line 
eternally (69).  Before departing, she instructs Anchises not to reveal the true 
identity of Aeneas’ mother, so that she may avoid the disgrace on earth (which she 
cannot escape among the gods) of having coupled with a mortal. 
 Mind reading is not explicitly part of this scene or other Homeric epiphany 
scenes, but the gods’ appearances are enacted through the theme of concealment, 
and they implicitly raise epistemological questions for the mortal.  The mortal may 
question how the god has learned of earthly events, and may question the god’s 
identity and how the divine inspiration should be understood.  Further, the purpose 
of the god’s disguise and of the epiphany itself are frequently unclear.  Turkeltaub 
points out that when the god is revealed to the mortal “these forms are not 
necessarily the ‘true forms’ of the gods, simply the forms they assume to make 
themselves recognizable to mortals” (30).  He further cites Schrade “who asserts 
that since gods are elemental forces, any human form they take must ipso facto be a 
dissimulation” (13).  Thus the extent to which the gods reveal themselves in 
epiphanies is questionable, since it seems that they “merely appear in graduated 
levels of disguise” (13).  Given that even at the epiphanic moment some sort of 
disguise appears to be necessary so that mortals may recognize the god, the god 
therefore does not use the initial disguise to be comprehensible to the mortal’s 
senses.7 
 Given that there is a certain level of disguise even in the god’s revelation, 
conceptually these epiphany scenes enact occlusion and revelation in ways that 
invite us to seek their justification at the philosophical and ideological level, rather 
                                                
7 Turkeltaub notes other types of unnecessary disguises, such as in Book 13 of the Odyssey in 
Athena’s epiphany to Odysseus.  She disguises Ithaca by covering it with fog, which is superfluous 
because “the uninhabited nature of the shore already precludes external intrusion, and Odysseus’ 
long absence already prevents him from recognizing the land” (245). 
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than simply at the level of narrative logic.  Turkeltaub observes that in some cases, 
there is no clear reason for the epiphany even at the narrative level, such as in the 
Hymn to Dionysus (109).8 He concludes that the function of the scenes overall is to 
assert the gods’ power over mortals.  The gods are “veiled and half-hidden figures, 
constantly dissembling to ensure that some distance, some gap of perception, always 
separates them from the mortals” (237).  The effect of their epiphanies, in 
“combination with their often licentious and ‘immoral’ behavior” indicates “the 
unpredictability and apparent capriciousness of the natural world expressed through 
the gods” (325).  This suggests that the purpose of the disguise and the epiphany 
itself is to highlight the flawed epistemology of mortals versus gods, an interesting 
motivation in a universe of gods who are not omniscient.  We might say that it is 
precisely the gods’ limited knowledge that provokes epistemologically-charged 
encounters with mortals in which they continually assert their powers, if not of 
omniscience, then at least of dissembling and metamorphosis. 
 This is not to say that Homeric epiphany impugns the gods’ religious status.  
Turkeltaub in fact believes that epiphanies validate the religious role of the gods.  
This belief, however, is much harder to support in the Latin epics that we will 
examine – texts that were central to Dante’s intellectual and imaginative training.  
The most important of these is, of course, Vergil’s Aeneid.  This text shows that the 
Roman poet had thoroughly internalized the epiphany topos of Homeric literature, 
yet his poem abandons the Homeric model in a manner that casts serious doubt on 
the power of the gods to do anything other than deceive.  Vergil does this most 
conspicuously by abandoning Homer’s structure; there is exactly one epiphany 
                                                
8 He states “the poem provides no reason for the epiphany; there is no divine purpose that can be 
detected beyond the farce generated by the sequence of events.  We do not know why Dionysus 
subjects himself to this abuse and then exacts his revenge, unless it is because the story is amusing 
and corresponds to many other stories about this god” (109). 
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scene in the whole Aeneid that even approaches the full sequence of motifs 
elaborated by Turkeltaub.  This occurs in Book 1 when Venus appears to Aeneas 
disguised as a huntress seeking her sisters. The event is structured in layers of 
revelation and occlusion, creating uncertainty not only for Aeneas but for the reader.  
We do not know how Venus becomes aware of the events when she appears to 
Aeneas.9 She is presented already disguised and pretending to look for her sisters, 
but Aeneas suspects she is a goddess and asks where he and his crew have landed.  
In this exchange, Vergil emphasizes the irony of the mother-son interaction, lacking 
in familial intimacy, with the phrase “Sic Venus, et Veneris contra sic filius orsus” 
(325).10 He also underlines Aeneas’ attempts to identify his mother with “namque 
haud tibi vultus / mortalis, nec vox hominem sonat; o, dea certe / (an Phoebi soror? 
an Nympharum sanguinis una?)” (327-9), resorting to the indefinite “quaecumque” 
in the following line.11 Venus denies that she is a goddess, but then gives a true 
history of Dido, itself a story of secrecy and revelation.  Dido’s brother Pygmalion 
conceals his murderous deeds that, along with the whereabouts of the buried 
treasure, are revealed to Dido when her dead husband Sychaeus appears to her in a 
dream epiphany.12 She then leaves Tyre in secret with her company.  After this bit 
of truth, Venus pretends not to know who Aeneas is and asks where he plans to go.  
Aeneas addresses her as goddess but is still unaware of her identity.  He begins his 
story, which Venus interrupts to tell him that all is well with his ships and crew, and 
instructs him to go forth without worry.  The epiphanic moment comes as she turns 
                                                
9 How gods become aware of what mortals are doing is somewhat mysterious in other instances as 
well.  Book 1 introduces Juno as lamenting while the Trojans journey over the seas.  Neptune 
becomes aware of the storm by its noise.  Zeus learns of the situation when “Libyae defixit lumina 
regnis” [he fixed his gaze on the kingdom of Libya] (226).  All quotations from the Aeneid are from 
the text of R.D. Williams.  Translations are mine. 
10 “Thus Venus (spoke), and the son of Venus began to speak in reply.” 
11 “By no means is your face mortal, nor does the voice sound human.  O certainly a goddess, the 
sister of Phoebus?  Or one of the race of nymphs” and then “whoever you are.” 
12 Dead mortals in the context of epiphany will be discussed further below. 
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away, revealing her true identity through her “rosea cervice” (402),13 the ambrosial 
fragrance of her hair, her step and her flowing gown.  The scene concludes with yet 
another act of concealment when Venus shrouds Aeneas and Achates in mist to 
insure their safe entry into the city. 
 The episode is structured in alternating moments of truth and falsity, which 
both Aeneas and the reader must negotiate to varying degrees, as the goddess 
provides her own false history, Dido’s true one, pretends not to know her son’s 
identity and then reports truthfully on the condition of his crew and ships, finally 
literally cloaking the two men in a protective gesture.  Both Aeneas and the reader 
wonder what the purpose of Venus’ disguise might be.  Aeneas’ intense emotional 
response suggests a history in which Venus enjoys tricking her son: “quid natum 
totiens, crudelis tu quoque, falsis / ludis imaginibus? cur dextrae iungere dextram / 
non datur ac veras audire et reddere voces?” (407-9).14 Yet this protest does not 
result in a change.  Venus’ final cloaking of the two men suggests that Aeneas’ 
complaint has been ignored as she sustains a pattern in which “falsis imaginibus” 
are the reigning ideology.  Philosophically, then, the scene dramatizes an experience 
in which revelation and dissembling are intertwined.  This is Vergil’s version of the 
idea that truth is implicated in acts of occlusion, an idea that, as we have seen, Dante 
internalized and incorporated in the context of the Commedia’s telepathic episodes. 
 Venus’ epiphany might seem to confirm her power as goddess, as 
Turkeltaub believes is the case in Homer’s Hymn to Aphrodite and in Homeric 
epiphany generally.15 Yet her appearance to Aeneas in Book 1 occurs in a larger 
context of her behavior that undermines rather than affirms her divine status.  Her 
                                                
13 “the rosy nape of her neck.” 
14 “You, cruel too!  Why do you deceive your son so often with false images?  Why may we not join 
hands and speak and hear true things?” 
15 Turkeltaub acknowledges that Aphrodite seems to be mocked rather than venerated in her hymn 
but he ultimately concludes that the hymn affirms her power (74-8). 
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assertion of power over her son is a noteworthy contrast to her prior encounter with 
Juppiter in the same book, where she is the tearfully plaintive child begging for 
reassurance that Aeneas’ destiny will be fulfilled.  These episodes together suggest 
Venus’ epiphany not as an affirmation but rather a denial of her knowledge and 
power.  Further, Vergil extends and intensifies this denial toward all of the gods as 
the poem progresses.  One way he carries this out is through direct and undisguised 
appearances of gods, essentially eliminating most of the Homeric epiphany structure 
so that the gods function more as privileged messengers than divine beings.  Such 
appearances occur in Book 2 when Venus prevents Aeneas from killing Helen in a 
fit of rage,16 in Book 4 when Mercury urges Aeneas to leave Carthage, and in Book 
8 when the river god Tiber appears to Aeneas in a dream, encouraging him not to 
give up and providing instructions on an alliance with the Arcadians and on 
placating Juno.  Venus appears in this fashion again late in Book 8 to deliver the 
armor that she has persuaded Vulcan to forge for Aeneas. 
 In contrast to these less majestic divine appearances, Vergil exalts dead 
mortals, who appear in a number of non-divine epiphany scenes.17 These scenes also 
lack much of the structure of the topos (i.e. there are no disguises or false 
biography) but the mortals present forthright advice and/or instructions along with 
deeply moving words and images that prompt Aeneas’ intense emotional reaction.  
In Book 2 Aeneas has a dream in which Hector appears, weeping, torn and bloody 
as on the day of his death.  He tells Aeneas that the city is falling and urges him to 
leave, prophesying that Aeneas will establish his household gods amidst great walls 
after he has wandered the sea.  His appearance prompts Aeneas’ profound grief:  
ultro flens ipse videbar / compellare virum et maestas expromere voces” (279-80).18 
                                                
16 This episode, however, is believed to be inauthentic. 
17 For a discussion of mortals in Homeric epiphany scenes, see Turkeltaub beginning on page 297. 
18 “I, weeping myself, seemed to call upon the man and to reveal grieving speech.” 
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Book 2 concludes with the appearance of Creusa’s ghost as Aeneas returns to the 
city to search for her.  She urges Aeneas to contain his grief and then also 
prophesies that he will establish a kingdom after long exile.  Her final words attempt 
to comfort him through the consolation that she will not become a slave to the 
Greeks, and she reminds him to cherish their son.  Again Aeneas is moved to tears: 
“haec ubi dicta dedit, lacrimantem et multa volentem / dicere deseruit, tenuisque 
recessit in auras” (790-1).19 After the Trojan women attempt to burn the ships in 
Book 5, Anchises appears to Aeneas, instructing him to leave behind those who 
wish to end their journey and take the rest to Italy.  He also instructs Aeneas to visit 
him in the underworld.  At his departure, Aeneas protests that his father has left 
before he has had a chance to embrace him.”20 
 Telepathy is implicit in all of these episodes, since the interventions of both 
gods and dead mortals imply that they somehow know Aeneas’ state of mind.  The 
appearances of the dead mortals are thus particularly important precursors of mind 
reading in the Commedia; they are souls separated from the body who know 
Aeneas’ thoughts and actions, while he does not know theirs.  Also crucial within 
the context of the Aeneid is the sincerity of the interactions between Aeneas and the 
dead mortals.  While the dead mortals may refer in their speech to their divinely-
authorized deaths and subsequent epiphanies, their tenderness and respect for 
Aeneas lends them an emotional credibility that is conspicuously lacking in Venus’ 
epiphany in Book 1 and in other appearances of the gods. 
 Disguised appearances of the gods emerge once again in Books 5 and 9 and 
increase significantly at the end of the poem in Book 12.  Yet the absence of 
                                                
19 “Once she had said these things, she left me weeping, an wanting to say so much, and she departed 
in the tenuous air.” 
20 “Aeneas ‘quo deinde ruis? Quo proripis?’ inquit, / ‘quem fugis? aut quis te nostris complexibus 
arcet” (741-2) [Aeneas said “where are you hurrying to, where are you rushing off to?  Are you 
fleeing from someone?  Who keeps you from my embraces?”]. 
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epiphanic moments and the increasingly corrupt motivations for the appearances 
undermine seriously the gods’ authority, provoking a different sort of uncertainty 
for mortal characters.  Sent by Juno, Iris appears in Book 5 disguised as one of the 
Trojan women, inciting the others to burn the ships.  She is recognized by Pyrgo as 
a goddess, but there is no epiphanic moment as Iris simply departs into the sky 
leaving the sign of her rainbow, after which the bewildered women attack the ships.  
She appears again at the opening of Book 9, again sent by Juno in order to incite 
Turnus to war.  Here she is not disguised, but upon her departure Turnus questions 
the authority behind her words:  “quis te mihi nubibus actam / detulit in terras?” 
(18-19)21 and yet promises to obey:  “sequor omina tanta, / quisquis in arma vocas” 
(21-22).22  His words are grim evidence that mortals question their knowledge of 
divine messages and that despite their ignorance they are driven to obey.23 
 By Book 12 the gods’ appearances degenerate into disguise for the sake of 
stealth.  The relentless Juno convinces Juturna, Turnus’ immortal sister who is a 
nymph of ponds and streams, to disguise herself as the officer Camers and incite the 
Latins to resume battle.  Later Venus veils her face in a dark cloud while delivering 
a healing poultice for her wounded son and is recognized by Iapyx only as a god 
who has revived Aeneas.  Juturna disguises herself once again as Turnus’ charioteer, 
Metiscus, and steers him away from the battle, but eventually her brother exposes 
her.  As in Book 9, he asks which god has incited her disguise, but he also declares 
that since his defeat is inevitable, it is better to fight than flee.  Again, there is no 
epiphanic moment in these scenes, and so the mortals are left to question and 
                                                
21 “Who sent you to me from clouds to earth?” 
22 “I will follow omens so great, whoever you are who call me to arms.” 
23 Also in Book 9 beginning at line 638, from a cloud Apollo praises Ascanius after he casts his first 
arrow in war, but then he descends, disguises himself as Butes, the armor-bearer and door-keeper of 
Anchises and instructs Aeneas’ son not to continue fighting.  He disappears quickly, but the Dardan 
captains perceive his true identity. 
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discover the disguises, or not.  In the absence of divine revelation for the sake of the 
gods’ power and majesty, the burden is placed on humans to reveal what turns out to 
be the gods’ desperate and ineffectual behavior.  Experiencing the divine is 
unpredictable but also fruitless. 
 Amazingly, Turnus’ discovery of his sister’s disguise has no effect whatever, 
since in line 784 she disguises herself as Metiscus once again in order to return her 
brother’s sword.  The final disguise in the poem is particularly significant.  After 
Juppiter finally puts an end to Juno’s desperate attempts to alter fate, he sends as a 
portent one of the Dirae disguised as an owl who screeches in Turnus’ face.  At this, 
Juturna speaks to the uselessness of immortality, withdrawing in despair: 
  ‘quid nunc te tua, Turne, potest germana iuvare? 
  aut quid iam durae superat mihi?  qua tibi lucem 
  arte moror?  talin possum me opponere monstro? 
  iam iam linquo acies.  ne me terrete timentem, 
  obscenae volucres: alarum verbera nosco 
  letalemque sonum, nec fallunt iussa superba 
  magnanimi Iovis.  haec pro virginitate reponit? 
  quo vitam dedit aeternam?  cur mortis adempta est 
  condicio?  possem tantos finire dolores 
  nunc certe, et misero fratri comes ire per umbras! 
  immortalis ego?  aut quicquam mihi dulce meorum 
  te sine, frater, erit?  o quae satis ima dehiscat 
  terra mihi, manisque deam demittat ad imos?’ 
  tantum effata caput glauco contexit amictu 
  multa gemens et se fluvio dea condidit alto (Aeneid 12.872-86).24 
For Juturna, immortality has brought no power or knowledge, and so she longs for 
death.  Her parting speech presents a world in which the gods have become useless.  
                                                
24 “’How can your sister help you now, Turnus?  Or what prevails over me, although I am hard?  By 
what art may I hold light for you?  Can I oppose myself to this portent?  Now I leave the battle.  Foul 
birds, do not terrify me, who am afraid.  I know the beating of your wings and the deadly sound, nor 
do the proud commands of great-hearted Jove deceive.  Does he return these things for my virginity?  
Why did he give eternal life?  Why has mortality been taken?  Now certainly I could end sorrows so 
great, and go as companion to my wretched brother among the shades.  I immortal?  Or what of mine 
will be sweet to me without you, brother?  Or what earth would gape open wide enough for me, and 
send me, though a goddess, down to the shades below?  She uttered so much, covered her head with 
her blue-green cloak, groaning deeply, and the goddess hid herself in the river’s depth.” 
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Their interactions with mortals cannot even pretend to affirm divine power.  Rather 
than communicating greatness and majesty, their presence simply suspends the 
inevitable but does so in a way that also suspends human comprehension of the 
divine.  The point seems to be to drive home the erratic complexity of such 
understanding, as even divine figures themselves come to devalue their immortality 
but also their own divine knowledge: at times Venus, Juno, and Juturna behave so 
desperately that they seem to have forgotten their knowledge of fate.25 
 Through his rejection of Homeric epiphany scenes, Vergil develops by the 
end of his poem an increasingly grim philosophical outlook through a denial of the 
gods’ power and knowledge.  Epistemological experience for mortal characters 
remains deeply unresolved but also increasingly hopeless.  Humans are left to 
wonder what divine forces intervene in their affairs, how they do so and how to 
attain knowledge of the interventions.  Yet if knowledge of the divine is hopeless in 
the Aeneid, the struggle with it appears to be inevitable as the gods cannot keep 
themselves from intervening in ways that become ever more desperate and 
destructive.  With this outlook Vergil complicates human and divine knowledge in 
radically new ways. 
 In their epic poems, Lucan and Statius offer their own versions of Vergil’s 
pessimistic portrayal of the gods.  The gods do not figure at all in Lucan’s 
Pharsalia, written between 61-5 A.D., and consequently there is not a single 
epiphany scene in the whole poem.  The absence of the gods all but announces an 
unequivocal failure of faith in the importance and effectiveness of divine agency.  
                                                
25 Venus’ tearful encounter with Juppiter in Book 1 is an example of this.  In Book 12 Juno says to 
Juturna “accelera et fratrem, si quis modus, eripe morti” (157) [hurry and snatch your brother from 
death, if there is a way], despite her pronouncement in Book 7 that she cannot change Aeneas’ 
destiny to marry Lavinia: “non dabitur regnis, esto, prohibere Latinis, / atque immota manet fatis 
Lavinia coniunx” (313-14) [it will not be granted – so be it – to keep (Aeneas) from Latin kingdoms, 
and by fate Lavinia remains unchanged, his bride]. 
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And yet the poem raises philosophical questions for the reader through the 
characters’ encounters with dead mortals and through Lucan’s horrific portrayal of 
witchcraft.  In Book 3, the ghost of Julia appears to Pompey in the guise of a Fury 
among the flames of her funeral pyre.  When she promises to haunt him and 
prophecies his death, he responds by considering whether her appearance might be a 
delusion:  “et ‘Quid’ ait ‘ vani terremur imagine visus? / Aut nihil est sensus animis 
a morte relictum / aut mors ipsa nihil’” (38-40).26 More significant is the lengthy 
episode in Book 6 in which the son of Pompey, Sextus, seeks a prophecy about the 
outcome of the war.  Yet he does not consult oracles, augurs, or any knowledge 
which “si quid tacitum, sed fas erat” (430).27 Instead he is said to be familiar with 
the mysteries of witchcraft: 
      Ille supernis 
  detestanda deis saevorum arcana magorum 
  noverat et tristis sacris feralibus aras, 
  umbrarum Ditisque fidem, miseroque liquebat 
  scire parum superos (Phars. 6.430-34).28 
While the next line states that Sextus’ belief is madness,29 Lucan affirms witchcraft 
in a lengthy passage beginning at line 440 by describing the witches’ power over 
nature, a power which the gods fearfully acknowledge.  He concludes by 
questioning why and in what manner the gods are bound by the witches’ 
dominance: 
  Quis labor hic superis cantus herbasque sequendi 
  spernendique timor? cuius commercia pacti 
                                                
26 “’And why,’ he said, ‘should I be terrified by the image of an empty vision?  Either there is no 
feeling left to souls in death or death itself is nothing.’”  All quotations from the Pharsalia are from 
the edition of Luca Canali.  Translations are mine. 
27 “although secret was allowed” 
28 “He knew the secrets of savage witches, detested by the gods, and the grim altars with funeral 
rites, the truth of shades and of Pluto, it was clear to the wretched man that the gods above know too 
little.” 
29 Vanum saevumque furorem / adiuvat ipse locus” (434-5) [the place itself supports this empty and 
cruel madness]. 
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  obstrictos habuere deos?  parere necesse est 
  an iuvat?  ignota tantum pietate merentur, 
  an tacitis valuere minis?  hoc iuris in omnes 
  est illis superos, an habent haec carmina certum 
  imperiosa deum, qui mundum cogere, quidquid 
  cogitur ipse, potest?  (Phars. 6.492-99)30 
Amazingly, he provides no answer but simply goes on to describe the witches’ 
control of the stars.  The passage thus conspicuously affirms the gods’ 
powerlessness and is part of Lucan’s extremely grim world vision.  Generally this 
vision seems far more directed toward painting an utterly wicked picture of the 
universe than toward provoking philosophical inquiry.  Yet Lucan’s unanswered 
questions nonetheless emphasize the philosophical crisis that his world view 
necessarily provokes for the ancient reader, for whom philosophical understanding 
was crucial for the good life.  Even if part of Lucan’s point is precisely that the good 
life is no longer possible in imperial Rome, the problem of the witches’ force over 
the diminished gods remains. 
 Following the description of the witches’ powers, Lucan introduces Erichtho 
at length, whom Sextus consults for her prophetic abilities and whose wickedness is 
said to be beyond even that of the Thessalian witches.  Twice she is said to possess 
powers of telepathic communication, in the initial description of her with “Coetus 
audire silentum, / nosse domos Stygias arcanaque Ditis operti / non superi, non vita 
vetat” (513-15),31 and during her spell when she revives and makes a recently dead 
corpse prophesy, she invokes Hecate “per quam / manibus et mihi sunt tacitae 
                                                
30 “Why are the gods concerned to follow these spells and herbs, and why are they afraid to scorn 
them?  What sort of mutual agreement keeps the gods constrained?  Is it necessary that they obey, or 
do they enjoy it?  Are (these agreements) earned by some unknown piety or do they prevail by silent 
threats?  Does this law exist for all the gods above or do these tyrannical spells hold a certain god, 
who is able to oppress the world with whatever he himself is oppressed?” 
31 “The gods do not, being alive does not prevent her from hearing silent encounters, or from 
knowing Stygian abodes and the secrets of hidden Pluto.” 
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commercia linguae” (700-1)).32 Thus it is precisely in the context of the 
frighteningly obscure hold of witchcraft over the universe that we find affirmation 
of telepathic exchange.  Part of Erictho’s inexplicable power is her ability to know 
the thoughts of the shades, an epistemologically significant contrast that is part of 
Lucan’s pointed response to Vergil’s portrayal of the gods. 
 Statius’ Thebaid, responding to both Vergil and Lucan, also diminishes the 
gods, but in a way that raises moral rather than philosophical questions.  The poem 
contains no epiphanies of the Homeric sort, but the gods occasionally appear to 
mortals, sometimes in disguise, in a manner recalling their reduced role in the 
Aeneid.33 As in Vergil’s poem, the role of dead mortals is affirmed, as in Book 2 
when the ghost of Laius appears to his grandson Eteocles in a dream in order to 
warn him of his fate.  In the epiphany he is disguised as Tiresias in order not to 
                                                
32 “because of whom there are exchanges of silent language between the dead and me.” Erichtho’s 
words may well be a perversion of an ancient belief in the telepathic powers of the gods.  In Cicero’s 
De Divinatione  I, 129 there are echoes of the idea of “tacitae linguae” in a passage that notes the 
gods’ powers in the context of asserting the visionary experience of humans:  “ut enim deorum animi 
sine oculis, sine auribus, sine lingua sentient inter se, quid quisque sentiat (ex quo fit, ut homines, 
etiam cum taciti optent quid aut voveant, non dubitent, quin di illud exaudiant), sic animi hominum, 
cum aut somno soluti vacant corpore aut mente permoti per se ipsi liberi incitati moventur, cernunt 
ea quae permixti cum corpore animi videre non possunt” (325-6) [for as the souls of the gods, 
without eyes, without ears, without tongue understand each other and what each one thinks (such that 
men, even when they silently desire or pray for something do not doubt that the gods hear it), so the 
souls of men, when either released in sleep they depart from the body or inspired in soul they, driven, 
move freely by themselves, perceive things which they cannot see when the soul is mingled with the 
body].  Latin text quoted from the edition of Arthur Stanley Pease.  Translation is mine.  See the 
beginning of chapter 3 for further discussion of ancient beliefs on the telepathic powers of gods. 
33 The examples are fairly unremarkable.  As in the Aeneid, disguises function to persuade and/or 
deceive.  Bacchus appears undisguised to Hypsipyle in Book 5.271-84, telling her to take her father 
away to protect him from the raging women.  In Book 7.738, in a scene clearly recalling Aeneid 12 
when Juturna disguises herself as Metiscus, Apollo disguises himself as a charioteer, Haliacmom, in 
order to protect Amphiaraus, who ultimately is taken into a chasm in the earth that opens up for him.  
Diana disguises herself as Dorceus in order to subdue Parthenopeaus in Book 9.811, only to have 
Mars run her off the battlefield.  There are personified virtues who appear in disguise, for example in 
Book 10 when Virtus disguises herself as Manto and approaches Menoeceus to persuade him to 
commit suicide (639), and when Piety disguises herself as a warrior in order to attempt to restore 
peace (discussed below). These disguised personifications should not be viewed as interchangeable 
with the gods, however; Winthrop Wetherbee argues in chapter 6 of The Ancient Flame that the 
presence of the virtues represents a “new order of values” (166) in which “virtuous action can attain 
a spiritual reward” (173). 
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seem a false night vision (94).  In Book 4 in an episode that clearly recalls Book 6 
of the Pharsalia, Laius appears again, this time revived by Tiresias in order to make 
him prophesy.  During this episode Tiresias himself wonders whether he is 
possessed by Apollo or by a ghost: “Umbrisne an supero dimissus Apolline complet 
/ spiritus?” (586-87)34 Statius also portrays the gods’ weakness in other ways.  In 
Book 3, Juppiter delivers a speech to all the gods, inciting violence and declaring 
the war to be fated, and threatening to destroy Thebes if any of the other gods 
interfere.  The latter, astonished at his threats, are said to resemble mortals in their 
silence:  Dixit, et attoniti iussis - mortalia credas / pectora - sic cuncti vocemque 
animosque tenebant” (253-4).35 These episodes emphasize a world in which the 
divine entities have come to be seen as extremely limited in the scope of their 
power. 
 Overall, however, the Thebaid does not leave the issue of divine knowledge 
and power unresolved in the manner of Vergil’s and Lucan’s epics, since over and 
over fate and Tisiphone are shown to be dominant.  Throughout the poem, there is a 
sustained recognition of the power of fate over that of the gods who (along with 
other characters) explicitly name its dominance as part of the world order.36 The 
Fury Tisiphone is also prominent as she repeatedly inspires fear in the gods, and 
mortals turn to her rather than to traditional divine authorities.  The poem begins as 
Oedipus prays to Tisiphone to incite hatred between his sons Eteocles and 
Polynices, referring to her as the one on whom he has called so often:  “multumque 
                                                
34 “A spirit fills (me), sent by the shades or by Apollo above?” All citations of the Thebaid are from 
the edition of Roger Lesueur.  Translations are mine. 
35 “He spoke, and they were astonished at his commands.  You might have believed their hearts were 
mortal, as they all held back their voice and minds.”   
36 At every turn, fate is mentioned as responsible for events.  In Book 3.242 Juppiter states the war is 
fated.  In Book 5 the seer Amphiaraus emphasizes that the fates control events at lines 735-40.  In 
Book 7 Juppiter says he is bound by the wheels of fate at lines 197-8, and in Book 9.653-4 when 
Apollo and Diana converse, he affirms their powerlessness in the face of fate. 
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mihi consueta vocari / adnue, Tisiphone” (58-9).37 The Fury also disguises herself in 
the manner of the Vergilian gods with no recognition or unveiling, for example in 
Book 9 when she adopts the aspect of Halys on the battlefield in order to incite 
Hippomedon away from Tydeus’ corpse (152).  In Book 11 Eteocles and Polynices 
decide to duel, at the instigation of Tisiphone and her sister Megaera, who disguises 
herself as Pherclus in order to inflame Polynices (197).  Once Juppiter is aware of 
the sisters’ dark work, he declares it to be too much even for the gods and orders 
them to avert their eyes (126).  Pallas and Mars, the gods of war, abandon the battle 
and are replaced by the sister Furies (414-15).  Tisiphone then drives away Piety, 
who has disguised herself as a warrior in order to calm the battle lines (483).  With 
these characterizations the text does not explicitly provoke the same sorts of 
epistemological issues as I have argued is the case in the Aeneid and the Pharsalia.  
What remains instead in the Thebaid is a moral quandary for humans brought about 
by living in a world in which dark forces seem to have overwhelmed the traditional 
gods.  Yet as Winthrop Wetherbee argues, the poem, in part through the figure 
Hypsipyle and through the personified virtues, also validates virtuous action as 
meaningful and deserving of spiritual reward.38 Consequently readers must wrestle 
not with the source of power but with the meaning of virtue and veiled forces of 
good that play no systematic roles. 
 Dante was keenly sensitive to the moral and epistemological problems raised 
in the context of epiphany in these post-Vergilian texts.  Whereas Statius advances 
the religious faithlessness of the Aeneid by diminishing the powers of the gods 
while offering glimmers of a new order, Lucan takes godlessness to a horrible 
extreme, affirming the inexplicable powers of witchcraft over the universe and 
                                                
37 “Tisiphone, accustomed to being called so often by me.” 
38 See chapter 6 of The Ancient Flame: Dante and the Poets. 
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exalting the telepathic figure of Erichtho, by whose power Vergil mysteriously 
claims in Inf. 9.22 to have been summoned to find a spirit in lower hell.39 Thus we 
will see that Dante’s handling of epiphany incorporates and transforms 
epistemological aspects of Vergil’s and Lucan’s portrayals but also Statius’ puzzling 
hopefulness.  Yet in order to understand better these transformations, we must first 
examine how Christian texts interpret the tradition of epiphany scenes inherited 
from the pagan world. 
 As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, the New Testament brings to 
light through the figure of Jesus the connection between epiphany and telepathy.  
What is noteworthy about some of Jesus’ mind reading episodes is their pedestrian 
nature:  in addition to the passages noted earlier, we find that in Matthew 22:18 
Jesus is aware of the Pharisees’ malicious intention when they ask him whether they 
should pay tax to the Roman emperor, and Luke 6:8 shows Jesus’ discernment when 
the lawyers and Pharisees wish to charge him for healing on the Sabbath.  Also in 
Luke 7:40 Jesus reads the mind of a Pharisee who silently judges him for allowing 
Mary Magdalen to wash his feet and in 11:39 when he knows that a Pharisee is 
surprised that Jesus has not washed before a meal.  In John 4:17 he declares that a 
woman tells the truth when she says her current partner is not her husband.  These 
episodes occur in the context of Jesus’ divine status and often pertain to it as well, 
but they also emphasize Jesus the man reading the minds of other human beings 
about entirely human matters. 
                                                
39 When the pilgrim asks whether anyone from the first circle has ever traveled through hell before, 
Vergil responds with “Ver è ch'altra fïata qua giù fui, / congiurato da quella Eritón cruda / che 
richiamava l'ombre a' corpi sui. / Di poco era di me la carne nuda, / ch'ella mi fece intrar dentr' a quel 
muro, / per trarne un spirto del cerchio di Giuda” (22-27) [But I, in truth, have been here once before: 
/ that savage witch Erichtho, she who called / the shades back to their bodies, summoned me. / My 
flesh had not been long stripped off when she / had me descend through all the rings of Hell, / to 
draw a spirit back from Judas’ circle]. 
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 This sort of mind reading, at once divine and profane, models a profoundly 
new order of religious significance that is rooted in the Christian idea of epiphany as 
embodied in Jesus the man.  The New Testament initiates this new order as it 
radically democratizes the philosophy and practice of epiphany as inherited from the 
pagan tradition.  In a fascinating study, Margaret Mitchell elaborates this 
democratization in the context of the Gospels and in Paul’s letters.  In these texts 
she finds an expanded notion of epiphany that she calls “epiphanic logic,” with 
which she reveals that early Christian writers used the idea of a mediated divine 
presence in remarkably flexible ways as they sought to establish their “missionary 
cult and its place in local and world history” (186).  Her first example is Paul, who 
did not use the term “epiphany,” but instead boldly claimed not only to have 
experienced epiphanies in which God revealed his son to him, but he also claimed to 
be a sort of epiphanic medium himself – someone who reveals Christ to others 
(188).  Paul’s declaration in Gal 2:19-20 represents well his astonishing new idea of 
himself as such a medium:  “ego enim per legem legi mortuus sum ut Deo vivam.  
Christo confixus sum cruci.  Vivo autem iam non ego vivit vero in me Christus.”40 
In Gal 3:1 Paul chastises the Galatians for not perceiving through his preaching 
Christ crucified on the cross right before their eyes:  “O insensati Galatae quis vos 
fascinavit ante quorum oculos Iesus Christus proscriptus est crucifixus,”41 and in 2 
Cor 2:15 he declares himself to be a sort of olfactory epiphany in saying that he is 
the good fragrance of Christ that belongs to God:  “Christi bonus odor sumus 
                                                
40 “For through the law I died to the law so that I might live for God.  I have been crucified with 
Christ on the cross.  Now I no longer live but Christ lives in me.”  Mitchell works with the Greek 
text, while citations here are from the Vulgate.  Translations are mine. 
41 “O foolish Galatians who have bewitched yourselves, before whose eyes Jesus Christ has been 
displayed.” 
 84 
Deo.”42 Mitchell demonstrates through these statements that “Paul saw himself as a 
one-man multi-media presentation of the gospel of Christ crucified” (189).43 
 Mark’s achievement according to Mitchell was to further expand the idea of 
epiphany by locating it in a written text that consequently could be accessed by 
readers at will.  He does this in his narrative chiefly through the use of irony, when 
Jesus is continually presented in epiphanic moments attended by large crowds, such 
as at his baptism (1:9), but only the reader recognizes him for who he really is.  This 
sort of dramatic irony privileges the reader’s viewpoint, creating what Mitchell calls 
a “textual epiphany” in which the reader shares knowledge with the deity (192-4).44 
Luke renders the Holy Spirit as yet another sort of epiphanic medium that makes the 
divine presence available to all Christians (195).  He achieves this effect by 
claiming that the resurrected Jesus appears in the form of the wayfaring stranger, 
through study of Scripture, and in the communal practice of breaking bread (24:13-
49).  Matthew finds epiphanic logic in practical ethics, i.e. acts of charity and good 
will (25:31-46), as a person in need of clothing or food “presents one with a secret 
epiphany of the Lord, to which one either responds with suitable action to meet their 
need, or risks eternal damnation for epiphanic obstinance and obstructionism” (196).  
In conclusion Mitchell writes that epiphanic media in early Christianity were 
  apostolic envoys and then texts, which they claimed 
  were the site where one could palpably encounter 
  the divine presence.  The epiphanic evolutions we 
  have traced in early Christian literary culture amount 
  to a media revolution by which trans-local, trans- 
  generational readers were placed in a privileged 
  position for a Christ-encounter of their own.  The 
 
                                                
42 “I am the good fragrance of Christ that belongs to God.” 
43 She also discusses Gal 1:12, 15-16 and 2 Cor 2:14-7:4. 
44 Mitchell points out that demons also know that Jesus is the son of God, as in Mark 5:6, 1:24, 34, 
39-45 and 3:11.  In the Vulgate these are called “spiritus inmundi (1:24, 3:11) and “daimonia” (1:34, 
39).  See chapter 3 for discussion of the role and knowledge of demons. 
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  eventual success of missionary Christianity was  
  ultimately dependent upon this bold move  (201). 
 Mitchell’s work shows how the Gospels radically altered the idea of 
epiphany to make it an experience accessible to all Christians.  Yet if this 
democratization of epiphany allowed Christianity to flourish as a personalized 
religious experience, it also brought a new character to the epistemological 
challenges that Christians inherited from the pagan tradition.  These challenges are 
especially vivid in hagiography, where both mind reading and epiphany become 
topoi early on.45 In order to illustrate the character of these topoi I have chosen three 
texts, the Life of Antony, written between 356-62 A.D., Gregory’s sixth-century 
Dialogues and the Golden Legend, dated about 1260.  I have chosen them not 
because they are particularly privileged as texts but because they are notable 
representatives of a body of popular belief about saints’ lives, and hence their 
theories and stories were probably known to Dante.  The hagiographic conventions 
themselves, rather than specific texts, are of greatest importance. 
 What these stories show is that saints read minds in the manner of Jesus, 
exposing the weaknesses of their adversaries and correcting their disciples and 
                                                
45 Franca Ela Consolino confirms telepathic episodes as a common theme in hagiographic texts (242) 
as well as epiphanies that saints experience and in which they appear to others (245).  There are other 
contexts for epiphany and telepathy in early Christian culture as well.  Einar Thomassen finds both in 
the revelation discourse of Gnostic texts, such as the Greek Corpus Hermeticum, in which instruction 
materials are framed as a dramatic discourse between a disciple and a teacher/revealer in the context 
of epiphany.  Thomassen notes in the epiphany of Poimandres that the revealer claims to know what 
his disciple wants (223).  I find in Brian Copehnhaver’s translation of the text another episode in 
which Poimandres knows that the disciple has seen an archetypal form in his mind (2).  This sort of 
text is another early source for the Commedia’s didactic discourse in which the fallen pilgrim is 
instructed on matters of philosophy and theology by various souls, who create epiphanic moments in 
their revealed presence but often through their telepathic abilities as well.  I do not find that telepathy 
is a topos in later medieval manifestations of this genre, such as Boethius’ Consolation of 
Philosophy.  There are, however, two indications of mind reading in Bernardus Silvestris’ twelfth 
century Cosmographia, when Urania is said to know by divine insight Nature and her wishes (97), 
and when the creation of the “genius” is described as a spirit who perceives hidden thoughts (107).  
Bernard’s idea of the telepathic “genius” originates in pagan theories of the daimon, which I address 
in chapter 3.  These scattered episodes of mind reading are significant but do not indicate a consistent 
topos and do not present epistemological issues relevant to this study. 
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companions.  But there is also an emphasis on a mundane sort of telepathy, in which 
the saint knows relatively unimportant details.  The Life of Antony emphasizes this 
latter sort, as the saint knows ahead of time when visitors are coming and the reason 
for their visit (183-91).  When standing in a crowd of monks, he demonstrates his 
telepathic ability by approaching immediately those monks that wish to see him 
(201).  Gregory’s Dialogues and the Golden Legend generally emphasize mind 
reading of the saint’s enemies and disciples/companions, with St. Benedict, St. 
Peter, and St. Francis represented as particularly gifted.  In the second dialogue, 
Benedict knows that some monks are lying about having taken food and drink 
outside the monastery (166), and both the Dialogues and the Golden Legend recount 
the story of Benedict chastising a monk whose prideful thoughts he has discerned as 
the monk resentfully serves him at table (178, 316).  The Golden Legend offers 
additional examples of Benedict’s clairvoyance: he knows that his enemies will try 
to poison him, that a young monk is drowning, that a loaf is poisoned, and that a boy 
hides a flask of wine from him (309-16).  Finally, also in the Golden Legend, St. 
Francis reads the minds of other friars in a didactic and sometimes generous 
manner, as he penetrates the mind of a friar who only seems upright, humbles 
himself at the prideful thoughts of his riding companion, and wills his cloak and a 
script in his handwriting to a friar who secretly desires them (1019, 1028).46 
 These mind reading episodes present their own epistemological challenges, 
which will be explored more fully in the next chapter.  What is important here is to 
document their presence in the context of epiphany, which inherits from the Latin 
                                                
46 The examples of knowing that a monk is drowning and that a loaf is poisoned may suggest 
clairvoyance, i.e. knowing the location/quality of an object or situation, rather than mind reading, 
which we may define as knowing the specific thoughts of another person.  But the categories may 
also overlap, and early Christian sources do not differentiate carefully between the two, with saints 
frequently displaying both clairvoyance and telepathy as examples of supernatural powers.  See 
chapter 3 for further discussion of this. 
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epic tradition the disguise motif and its philosophical ambiguities.47 As in the Latin 
texts, hagiographic epiphanies incorporating disguise do not always involve obvious 
epiphanic moments and they often lay the burden of discovery on the witness.  
Likewise, in hagiography, both forces of good and evil, divine and human figures 
enact epiphanies, but here it is angels, demons, saints, and Christ himself who 
populate the scenes.48 The Golden Legend reports in the life of St. Benedict an 
episode in which the devil appears disguised as a companion traveler to a virtuous 
layman on a journey to visit the saint.49 Three times the devil offers food and 
refreshment to the layman, who is in the habit of fasting along the journey.  The 
layman accepts the third time, only learning of the disguise after he has arrived and 
been enlightened by St. Benedict; he throws himself before the saint and laments his 
failure (315).  The forces of good also appear in disguise and without obvious 
revelation, as when after his death St. John appears disguised as a pilgrim to St. 
Edmund, the king of England.  He begs the king for alms, invoking his own name 
(as saint).  The king has nothing to give but a precious ring, which the pilgrim/saint 
receives and then departs.  It is not until some time later that an English soldier on 
overseas duty receives the same ring from the pilgrim and delivers it to the king 
with a message:  “Ille, cui et pro cuius amore annulum hunc dedisti tibi remandat” 
(96).50 
 Implicit in both these episodes is the idea that the Christian must merit the 
epiphanic moment, presumably by faith and/or good works.  This challenge to one’s 
                                                
47 Not all epiphanies in the hagiographic literature involve disguise; there are abundant examples of 
both types. 
48 One notable difference is that in hagiography mortals sometimes remain alive when they appear to 
others as epiphanies. 
49 Consolino confirms that demons appearing in disguise in order to tempt humans is a prevalent 
theme in hagiography (239). 
50 “He to whom and for whose love you gave this ring sends it back to you” (55).  Latin citations 
from the Legenda Aurea are from the Maggioni edition.  Translations are from William Granger 
Ryan, with italics indicating my changes. 
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personal faith further implies a certain anxiety for saints and for ordinary Christians, 
and it also accounts for the theoretical passages in all three of our texts concerning 
how to distinguish demons from angels.  Like the epiphanies themselves, these 
theories assign responsibility to the recipient of the epiphany, whose emotions and 
inner resources are said to be responsible for discerning good from evil apparitions.  
In a lengthy passage, the Life of Antony concedes that one may be fearful at visions 
of both demons and angels, since the latter often produce fear in the righteous.  But 
angels may be distinguished from demons in disguise according to the emotion they 
sustain in the Christian: 
  When, therefore, you see some apparitions, you become 
  fearful, but if the fear is immediately taken away and in  
  its place comes unutterable joy, along with tranquility 
  and confidence and renewed spirits and calm thoughts and 
  all the other things I have mentioned earlier, both courage 
  and love for God, be of good courage and pray.  For the 
  soul’s joy and its orderly condition demonstrate the  
  holiness of each person  (137).51 
Antony goes on to say that if the soul remains fearful, “enemies are present, for the 
demons do not remove fearfulness from such persons as the great archangel did for 
Mary and Zacharias and as the angel did who appeared to the women at the tomb” 
(139).  The Golden Legend echoes this idea in the story of the birth of John the 
Baptist, when it says the following of good angels: “Proprium est enim bonorum 
angelorum, secundum quod dicit Glossa, ex sua visione territos benigna 
exhortatione protinus consolari; econtra mali angeli se in lucis angelos 
transfigurantes si quos ex sui presentia territos senserint ampliori eos horrore 
                                                
51 Robin Lane Fox confirms, adding “the criterion has recurred frequently in Catholic theology, 
perhaps most famously in the trials of Joan of Arc” (416).  Citations from the Life of Antony are from 
Tim Vivian’s and Apostolos Athanassakis’ translation of the Greek and Coptic versions.  
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concutiunt” (541).52 Gregory discusses the issue in terms of dream, which he says in 
the fourth dialogue must be judged critically since their sources are numerous and 
include physical causes, illusions, and true revelations:53 
  Sed nimirum cum somnia tot rerum qualitatibus 
  alternant, tanto eis credi difficilius debet, quanto 
  et ex quo inpulsu veniant facilius non elucet. 
  Sancti autem viri inter inlusiones atque revelationes 
  ipsas visionum voces aut imagines quodam intimo 
  sapore discernunt, ut sciant vel quid a bono spiritu 
  percipiant, vel quid ab inlusione patiantur.  Nam si 
  erga haec mens cauta non fuerit, per deceptorum 
  spiritum multis se uanitatibus inmergit, qui 
  nonnumquam solet multa vera praedicere, ut ad 
  extremum valeat animam ex una aliqua falsitate 
  laqueare   (432-4).54 
 Yet the hagiographic stories sometimes reveal overconfidence in these 
theories.  Gregory’s second dialogue recounts an episode in which the devil 
disguises himself as a veterinarian and appears to Benedict who is on his way to the 
Chapel of St. John.  When Benedict asks him where he is going, the devil replies 
that he is bringing medicine to the brothers.  Benedict shows no sign of recognizing 
the disguise, allows the devil to proceed and continues on his way.  When he returns 
from his prayers he drives out the devil who has since entered one of the brothers 
(194).  Benedict is not said to have seen through the disguise and the text provides 
                                                
52 “It is the way of the good angels, according to the Gloss, to reassure by kindly words those who 
are alarmed at seeing them, whereas the bad angels transform themselves to look like angels of light, 
and, if they sense that anyone is terrified by the vision of them, they terrorize him still more” (329). 
53 Gregory enumerates six sources of dreams:  a full stomach or an empty one, illusions, thoughts 
mixed with illusions, revelations, and thoughts combined with revelations (432). 
54 “But since dreams may arise from such a variety of causes, one ought to be very reluctant to put 
one’s faith in them, since it is hard to tell from what source they come.  The saints, however, can 
distinguish true revelations from the voices and images of illusions through an inner sensitivity, so 
that they know whether they perceive that something is from a good spirit or whether they experience 
something from an illusion.  For if the mind is not on guard against these, it will plunge itself into 
many vanities through the master of deceit, who is accustomed to foretell many things that are true in 
order that he may finally capture the soul by but one falsehood” (262).  Latin citations from the 
Dialogues are from the Calati/Stendardi edition.  Translation based on Zimmerman with italics 
indicating my changes.  Robin Lane Fox confirms the Christian wariness of dreams (391). 
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no indication that he does.  The Golden Legend reports a remarkable example in the 
life of St. Dominic when he is confronted by a devil in disguise: 
  Quadam vice dum vir dei Dominicus apud Bononiam 
  constitutus in ecclesia pernoctaret, dyabolus in specie 
  fratris eidem apparuit.  Quem sanctus Dominicus 
  fratrem existimans ei innuebat ut cum ceteris ad 
  quiescendum pergeret.  Ille vero quasi deridendo 
  eisdem sibi nutibus respondebat.  Tunc sanctus 
  Dominicus quisnam esset qui sic eius mandatum 
  contempneret scire volens candelam ad lampadem 
  accendit et in faciem ipsum respiciens quod dyabolus 
  esset confestim cognovit    (735).55 
Far from any sort of “intimo sapore,” Dominic’s means of recognizing the devil are 
entirely mundane, as the discovery is a simple matter of improving the lighting.  
Thus while Dominic recognizes the devil, the episode does nothing to affirm any 
sort of privileged sensitivity in the saint.  These contradictions suggest that the 
theories function more as statements of piety rather than as proof of the saints’ 
extraordinary powers.  Declaring that saints have special power to distinguish angels 
from demons may primarily be assertions of faith and devotion. 
 What both the stories and the theories show is that the experience of 
telepathy for saints becomes particularly rich and complex in the Christian world.  
On the model of Paul, the saints are presented as epiphanic media for experiencing 
Christ, but their human status means that their worth as a channel of such 
knowledge must constantly be tested.  This is true even when they appear 
undisguised in epiphanies, as when the Golden Legend reports that Benedict appears 
undisguised to a monk in a dream and instructs him on how to build a certain 
monastery.  The monks put no faith in the vision and continue to await Benedict’s 
                                                
55 “One night while Dominic, the man of God, was praying in his church in Bologna, the devil 
appeared to him in the guise of a friar.  The saint, thinking that he was one of his brethren, nodded to 
him to go to his rest with the others; but the devil mocked him by making the same sign.  Then the 
saint, wishing to learn who it was that treated his orders so lightly, lit a candle at one of the lamps 
and, looking into the other’s face, recognized him as the evil spirit” (53-4). 
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arrival, prompting the saint to chastise them:  “Quare, fratres ista dicitis?  Numquid 
non vobis apparui et loca singula designavi?  Ite et sicut per visionem audistis omnia 
ordinate” (318).56 Yet if the saints’ claim to privileged value is tested, their personal 
experience of epiphany is also tested as they struggle to distinguish between visions 
of angels versus demons, prompting theories that appear more devout than 
convincing. 
 Dante absorbs both pagan and Christian traditions of epiphany with their 
epistemological issues, but he alters them in astonishingly new ways beginning in 
the Vita Nuova, where he immediately suggests an awareness of the pagan scenes.  
He introduces Beatrice and describes her effect on his youthful self in terms of the 
pagan motif of the “hint of divinity,” when he “quotes” Homer:  “onde ne la mia 
puerizia molte volte l’andai cercando, e vedeala di sì nobili e laudabili portamenti, 
che certo di lei si potea dire quella parola del poeta Omero: <<Ella non parea 
figliuola d’uomo mortale, ma di deo>>” (2.8).57 Of course, Dante had not read 
Homer, and De Robertis traces the Homeric reference to Albertus Magnus’ De 
intellectu et intelligibi.  Thus in part Dante may wish to showcase his knowledge of 
contemporary authors, but he also means to signal his awareness of the pagan 
epiphany scenes that he had read and his intention to respond to them through his 
presentation of a new divine being.  For in order to render faithfully the radically 
tense “newness” of Beatrice, Dante requires not only pagan and Christian motifs but 
also his own particular epiphanic forms that he has invented for her:  when she 
appears, undisguised in 3.1, Dante marks her divinity through numerology (she 
                                                
56 “Why do you say this, brothers?” he answered.  “Did I not appear to you and give you the ground 
plan?  Go now and carry out the design as you saw it in the visions” (191). 
57 “Thus I went seeking her many times in my childhood, and I saw her in such noble and 
praiseworthy bearing that certainly one would say of her the words of the poet Homer: ‘She seemed 
to be not a child of mortal man, but of god.’”  All citations from the Vita Nuova are from the De 
Robertis edition.  Translations are mine. 
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appears nine years after her first appearance, at the ninth hour of the day, and as one 
in a group of three women), through her pure white clothing, through his fearful 
state of mind, through her “ineffabile cortesia” which he says is rewarded now in 
heaven, and the effect of her virtuous greeting on him, “che me parve allora vedere 
tutti li termini de la beatitudine” (3.2).58 Yet this majestic appearance is immediately 
followed by Dante’s disturbing dream of the fearful figure who claims to be Dante’s 
lord.  In the figure’s arms lies the nude Beatrice, sleeping and wrapped lightly in a 
crimson cloth.  The mysterious figure awakens her, forcing her to eat Dante’s heart, 
which he holds in his hand.  After she does so reluctantly, the lord begins weeping 
bitterly and with Beatrice still in his arms ascends toward heaven.  This dream 
presents Beatrice in terms far more vulnerable and erotic than angelic, creating a 
marked contrast with the regal presentation that occurs just before.  Her appearance 
in a dream vision also creates doubts in the mind of the reader since, as Gregory’s 
Dialogues assert, dreams are suspect as sources of truth.  At this point in the 
narrative, then, the precise meaning of Beatrice in Dante’s imagination remains a 
mystery.  Like some of the pagan epiphany scenes, Beatrice’s early appearances 
raise deeply puzzling questions about how one can recognize a divine apparition. 
 Another vestige of the pagan scenes is Dante’s use of the disguise and 
instructions motifs, for example when Love appears in 9.3, dressed as a lowly 
pilgrim, and instructs Dante regarding the selection and use of his “donna schermo.”  
After Dante’s use of this new lady provokes gossip with the result that Beatrice 
denies Dante her greeting, Love appears to him again in 11.3, this time as a young 
man dressed in white, and announces that it is time to end the deception.  Love 
begins to weep and when questioned offers the cryptic “Ego tanquam centrum 
                                                
58 “that I then seemed to see all the limits of beatitude.” 
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circuli, cui simili modo se habent circumferentie partes; tu autem non sic.”59 When 
Dante asks the meaning of this, Love says that he should not ask more than is 
useful.  Love then explains why Beatrice has denied Dante her greeting and instructs 
him to write a poem in which he expresses his true feelings but says that he should 
not speak to Beatrice directly.  Remarkable in this second scene is Love’s oracle-
like declaration that requires interpretation but remains obscure.  Here too Dante 
transforms the motif in order to sustain the problem of how he may fully understand 
the instructions of Love. 
 Yet Dante also deeply internalized the epiphanic logic of the New 
Testament, particularly the constructions of writer and text as epiphanic media.  Just 
as Paul becomes an epiphanic medium when he claims that Christ lives in him, 
Love (not merely love) is living and discernable in Dante through his eyes:  “E chi 
avesse voluto conoscere Amore, fare lo potea mirando lo tremare de li occhi miei” 
(11.3).60 The text as epiphanic medium is implied late in the canzone Donne 
ch’avete intelletto d’amore, when Dante exercises the common courtly lyric 
convention of addressing the poem itself: 
         Canzone, io so che tu girai parlando 
   a donne assai, quand’io t’avrò avanzata. 
   Or t’ammonisco, perch’io t’ho allevata 
   per figliuola d’Amor giovane e piana, 
   che là ‘ve giugni tu diche pregando: 
   ‘Insegnatemi gir, ch’io son mandata 
   a quella di cui laude so’ adornata.’ 
   E se non vuoli andar sì come vana, 
   non restare ove sia gente villana: 
   ingegnati, se puoi, d’esser palese 
   solo con donne o con omo cortese, 
   che ti merranno là per via tostana. 
                                                
59 “I am like the center of a circle, to which all points of the circumference bear a similar relation; 
you however are not.”  Danuta Shanzer observes that this is related to the idea of God as the circle 
whose center is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere, attributed to Hermes Trismegistus. 
60 “And whoever wanted to know Love could do so by looking at the tremor in my eyes.” 
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   Tu troverai Amor con esso lei; 
   raccomandami a lui come tu dei (VN 19.13-14).61 
As offspring of Love, the personified poem also becomes an epiphanic medium.  It 
is cast as the immortal daughter of a god who is adorned with Beatrice’s praises and 
thus corporeally bears Dante’s experience of her miracle to others.  It also bears the 
revelation of Dante’s love, and is called upon to find Love himself with Beatrice.  
Thus Dante invokes the biblical tradition of text as epiphanic medium but in a far 
more dramatic and intimate way:  he imagines a text that lives and acts in a 
community of personal relationships with the beloved and with Love himself.  But 
this community is fraught with uncertainty, since the canzone depends on the 
knowledge of others in order to deliver herself (‘Insegnatemi gir, ch’io son mandata 
/ a quella di cui laude so’ adornata).  Further, Dante instructs the canzone to avoid 
the “gente villana” and to reveal its meaning only to those whom he deems capable 
of understanding.  Just as in the gospel of Mark crowds of people do not recognize 
Jesus for who he really is, Dante implies that most people will not understand the 
true meaning of his words.  In this way, Dante shows that words in their social 
context provoke a crisis of knowledge.  Knowing how to interpret, even for the one 
who bears the message, is a problem inherent to the production and reception of 
language.62 
 This interpretive problem also manifests itself in the dizzying array of roles 
that Dante assigns Love.  Beatrice carries Love in her eyes, creating an epiphany 
within an epiphany in the sonnet Ne li occhi porta la mia donna Amore.  The sonnet 
                                                
61 “Canzone, I know that you will go around speaking / to many ladies, when I will have sent you 
forth. / Now I admonish you, because I have raised you / as a daughter of Love young and forthright, 
/  that where you arrive you say beseeching: / ‘Teach me where to go, for I am sent / to her with 
whose praise I am adorned.’ / And if you do not want to go as an empty thing, / do not remain where 
the people are rude: / strive, if you can, to be open / only with courtly ladies and men, / who will 
guide you there by a quick way. / You will find Love with her; / commend me to him as you should.” 
62 See chapter 2 of Dante and the Making of a Modern Author, where Ascoli argues for a similar 
crisis in Convivio 1. 
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Voi che portate la sembianza umile bears the remarkable image of Beatrice bathing 
Love with her face of tears, since there she carries Love in her aspect:  “Vedeste voi 
nostra donna gentile / bagnar nel viso suo di pianto Amore?” (22.9).63 In 24, Dante 
has another epiphany of Love, who tells Dante that he should bless the day that 
Love took him.  Immediately following this, Beatrice and Love merge once again 
when Love declares that one would call Beatrice Love on account of her similarity 
to him.64 Yet as discussed above, Love is present in Dante’s eyes as well, and he 
appears numerous times as an epiphany in and of himself.  At 31.9 Love also 
becomes more like a human companion to Dante after Beatrice’s death in the 
canzone Li occhi dolente per pietà del core as the two are left to grieve her.65 
 It is perhaps this extreme variety that leads Dante to interrupt his narrative 
with a theoretical justification for his representation of Love.  In a long passage 
beginning at 25, he acknowledges that he writes of love as if it were a corporeal 
substance, and that this is technically false since love is an accident in a substance 
(“uno accidente in sustanzia”).  He defends this practice by arguing that poets are 
granted a greater license of expression than are prose writers, so that poets may 
speak to inanimate things and make them speak to each other, even in cases of non-
existent things, and they may treat accidents as substances and as human beings, as 
long as they have a valid reason that can be elaborated in prose.  But he is careful to 
point out that originally only educated poets (i.e. those who wrote in Latin) dealt 
with matters of love, and that only recently have vernacular versifiers begun to do 
so.  He then provides examples from Homer, Vergil, Lucan, Horace, and Ovid in 
order to defend the authority of vernacular poets using such figures as well, once 
                                                
63 “Have you seen our noble lady bathe Love with the tears of her face?” 
64 “E chi volesse sottilmente considerare, quella Beatrice chiamerebbe Amore per molta simiglianza 
che ha meco” (24.5) [And whoever wishes to consider subtly would call Beatrice Love on account of 
the great similarity that she bears to me]. 
65 “e ha lasciato Amor meco dolente” (14) [and she left Love grieving with me]. 
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again linking his knowledge and practice of epiphany to the pagan poets.  He 
concludes the interlude by emphasizing that Latin poets have always had a reason 
for writing as they did, and so too should vernacular poets: 
  però che grande vergogna sarebbe a colui che rimasse 
  cose sotto vesta di figura o di colore rettorico, e poscia 
  domandato, non sapesse denudare le sue parole da 
  cotale vesta, in guisa che avessero verace intendimento. 
  E questo mio primo amico e io ne sapemo bene di  
  quelli che così rimano stoltamente   (VN 25.10).66 
Dante in this passage does not address so much his variety of usage as he does the 
issue of misrepresenting the true nature of love.  Nonetheless, the tone of the 
conclusion is remarkable for its defensiveness, as Dante feels the need to distinguish 
himself from those vernacular poets who rhyme “stoltamente.”  Dante may have 
also sensed that his representations of Love threaten to lapse into meaninglessness, 
but rather than offer specific reasons for his renderings, he shifts into theoretical 
discourse in order to prove his philosophical understanding of love and his 
knowledge of classical poetry.  This move allows him to shore up his authority by 
displaying other knowledge as he speaks in general terms of prescription and 
admonishment rather than the specifics of his own practice.67 
 This is not to argue that Dante had no reasons for his various portrayals of 
Love.  But the passage offers further evidence that how one knows, depicts, and 
veils the truth is an issue in the Vita Nuova at multiple levels.  This is true for Dante 
as a man who loves Beatrice and is trying to understand how he should interact with 
                                                
66 “For it would be a great shame for someone to put things in rhyme under the veil of a figure or 
rhetorical color and then, when asked, not know how to unveil his words in such a way that would 
show their true meaning.  And this best friend of mine and I know well some people who rhyme so 
stupidly.” 
67 Ascoli (2008) also refers to this passage in the context of his argument concerning Dante’s self-
authorizing strategies (67-68).  As Wetherbee pointed out to me, this passage is also followed by the 
sonnet Tanto gentile in which Beatrice is “vestuta” in virtue and cannot be unveiled, and it is the only 
poem in the Vita Nuova that Dante does not analyze. 
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her.  But it is also true for all who encounter Love and Beatrice – the “gente villana” 
whom Dante does not trust will understand and those who are “gentile” and 
“cortese” whom Dante’s canzone needs to deliver her message.  It is true as well for 
Dante poet and indeed for all poets who are called upon to justify their uses of 
rhetoric, personification, or allegory.  And it is true, of course, for the reader.  These 
issues, that occur in the context of epiphany, are deeply informed by the pagan and 
Christian scenes.  Dante has sensed in the Latin epics a new pattern as they deny 
secure knowledge of the gods.  Beatrice’s epiphanies are entirely new in that Dante 
presents a historical woman who, like Christ, does represent the divine.  But since 
Beatrice is not a saint, her divine worth is particularly suspect.  Dante assigns her 
status based on merely a love for her that stems from the courtly model, which he 
manipulates to increase the interpretative tension surrounding her.  Where the pagan 
poets show doubt, anger, and rage at the failure of divine authority, Dante (perhaps 
with echoes of Statius) represents an audacious new hopefulness in Beatrice’s 
authority.  Perhaps most important is that the questions underlying the poetic 
impulses of Dante and the pagan poets are strikingly similar in that both provoke 
urgent new questions about how one can know the gods/God.  Dante also absorbs 
and radically transforms the ways in which saints and Christians are traditionally 
tested through epiphany in the hagiographic tradition.  In place of the challenge of 
distinguishing a demon from an angel is Dante’s implicit expectation of those who 
will and will not comprehend his new message.  But his own text shows that 
understanding cannot be divided so easily between the “villana” and the “cortese,” 
as Dante himself struggles to learn how to love, which for him includes 
understanding and representing both love and Love.  What is new in Dante’s 
portrayal of loving Beatrice in the Vita Nuova is that she is a new sort of epiphany 
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whose meaning is bound to provoke more questions than answers, just as do the 
epiphanies of Dante’s Christian and pagan predecessors. 
 I have discussed epiphany in the Vita Nuova at some length because it 
documents some of the crucial ways in which in his formative writing years Dante 
was influenced by the sources discussed above.  The Commedia dramatically 
transforms the epistemological tensions as they appear in all these sources, 
contextualizing them with epiphany in a number of ways.  Mitchell’s work on 
epiphany in the New Testament helps to explain how the articulation of Christ’s life 
encouraged a culture that allowed Dante to imagine and justify his experience of 
love as personalized epiphany, first in the Vita Nuova.  The Commedia deepens and 
emboldens Dante’s presentation of himself and his text as epiphanic media.  He 
experiences not only a representative of the divine, but the afterlife itself and, like 
Paul, he makes it manifest to others through his personal experience, recorded in 
poetic form that functions as a textual epiphany.  Beatrice’s status as donna 
angelicata in the Vita Nuova is elevated in the Commedia to that of an aspect of 
God.  Narratively, this exaltation diminishes the mystery of her meaning, since she 
is represented unequivocally as the divine vehicle of Dante’s journey and salvation.  
Doctrinally, however, her status as Dante’s personal and ultimate Christian 
epiphany is one of the poem’s claims that has made it unacceptable to believers and 
perhaps solidified its critical reception as poem rather than sacred Christian vision.  
In this sense, her status as epiphanic medium has intensified the interpretive tension 
surrounding her and the poem. 
 But it is important to understand that in the Commedia Beatrice and Love are 
no longer privileged in epiphany scenes, for in a sense the appearances of all 
characters function as epiphanies.  Epiphanic moments in fact comprise the structure 
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of the poem through serial presentations and recognitions of immortal characters.68 
One might doubt that epiphany in this sense raises issues in the poem since the 
status of all souls is so clearly demarcated by their placement in one of the three 
realms.  In Dante’s virtual reality there seems to be no doubt concerning who 
represents the divine and who does not.  But we must remember how extensively 
Dante dramatizes both his and our understanding of the characters’ moral standing, 
as well as his own worth.  He dramatizes his role as epiphanic medium through his 
fallen state at the journey’s beginning in Inferno 2.32 (“Io non Enea, io non Paulo 
sono”),69 claiming simultaneously to be unfit and yet privileged for the task at hand.  
He also dramatizes his profound identification with sinners such as Francesca da 
Rimini and Ulysses, with the latter becoming Dante’s alter ego in a way that some 
scholars believe he does not transcend.70 For Dante, this dramatization is partly the 
legacy of all three of the pagan poets’ obsession with dead mortals in scenes 
suggestive of epiphany.  This obsession also became Dante’s, for while faith in God 
generates much of his philosophical, and theological creativity, it is the appearance 
of once-human shades that propels much of the imaginative and affective power of 
his poem.  He channels the pagan concern with the power of shades versus gods into 
a Christian version of the same struggle:  his confusion over the moral worth of the 
souls he meets.  In this way, he recalls the pagan texts but also advances with 
astonishing subtlety the hagiographic tradition’s relatively banal problematic of 
recognizing demons versus angels:  disguise in the Commedia becomes internalized 
                                                
68 There is partial support for viewing all souls as participating in epiphany in Steven Botterill’s 
observation that loosely, all characters in the Paradiso can be called saints because they enjoy 
celestial beatitude as a reward and for this reason, Dante does not particularly privilege the saints in 
his representation of heaven (The Dante Encyclopedia p. 759).  I would extend the status of epiphany 
to all characters in the poem on the basis of the pagan epiphany scenes that include once-mortal 
shades, explained further below. 
69 “I am not Aeneas, I am not Paul.” 
70 See the introductory chapter for this discussion. 
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as part of the pilgrim’s struggle to recognize the moral worth of himself and others, 
in a way that begins to resemble a complex inner life. 
 Mind reading in the Commedia occurs in the context of epiphany, which the 
text enacts in the numerous ways defined above. Yet Mitchell’s elaboration of 
epiphany in the context of Jesus’ telepathic moments also invites us to describe 
some of the Commedia’s mind reading in terms of epiphany.  Just as Christian 
readers experience textual epiphanies when reading Jesus’ story, telepathy in the 
Commedia recalls Jesus’ mind reading powers in the Bible.  Further, mind reading 
engages God’s epistemology when heavenly souls experience his knowledge, and 
hence an aspect of his presence, when reading Dante pilgrim’s thoughts.  In this way 
we can understand certain mind reading episodes as epiphanic moments.  This is 
particularly evident in some of the episodes in the Paradiso where telepathy is 
presented in explicit terms of reflection, such as when Cacciaguida describes the 
process thus to his ancestor:  “ché i minori e ‘ grandi / di questa vita miran ne lo 
speglio / in che, prima che pensi, il pensier pandi” (15.61-63).71 God’s mirror is yet 
another epiphanic medium. 
 With this view, we can begin to deepen our understanding of how and why 
Dante problematizes telepathy throughout the poem.  The pagan and Christian 
traditions of epiphany in the sources above offer one view of how the Commedia 
historicizes its telepathic/epiphanic moments.  Dante does not diminish the divine in 
the manner of the pagan poets, but the Commedia assimilates the pagan and 
Christian problems of validating and recognizing divine figures in part through the 
motifs of revelation and occlusion that structure so many episodes of mind 
reading.72 The poem also participates in these sources and contexts through the 
                                                
71 “for the great and the small of this life gaze into the mirror in which, before you think, the thought 
is revealed.” 
72 See chapter 1. 
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problem of whether mind reading occurs, ambiguities not only embodied in the 
figure of Vergil.  Yet we can now see that Vergil’s ambiguous powers in the 
Commedia, besides raising the narrative and poetic problems discussed in chapter 1, 
also recall the unresolved epistemological issues brought forth through epiphany in 
the Aeneid, as well as in subsequent pagan and Christian sources.  We see the 
Christian influence at the narrative level when, for example, Dante resuscitates the 
vestiges of demon-versus-angel epiphany scenes from hagiography into the episode 
of Vergil’s deception by the devils in Inferno 21.  But perhaps most important is that 
the Commedia’s recapitulation of the epistemological issues in the popular and 
learned stories shows that these particular challenges and complexities exist as part 
of a narrative history.  Through its participation in this history, the Commedia, even 
while proclaiming faith in God’s truth, resists an obvious resolution of the 
epistemological issues that it inherits and performs. 
 In order to better understand this resistance, we must investigate the 
philosophical and narrative histories of mind reading itself.  For while mind reading 
functions within epiphany, it has a distinct history in the pagan and Christian 
traditions.  The following chapter explores this history and the Commedia’s rich 
performance of it.
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Chapter 3 
Angels and Demons:  Philosophical Contexts 
of Mind Reading in the Commedia 
 
 Like epiphany, mind reading in the Christian tradition becomes a 
problematic marker for the holy person’s claim to authority.  For just as 
distinguishing between good and evil epiphanies is a constant challenge for 
Christians, so is the distinction between the valid telepathy of holy beings and the 
worthless power of the demons.  This chapter investigates theories of mind reading 
in late antique and early medieval popular philosophy, hagiography, and later 
philosophical texts in order to reveal the Commedia’s transformation of this 
epistemological problem.  But the context is wider than this.  Examining the history 
of telepathy in its own right will help to gauge the relative importance of popular 
and learned/technical contexts, as well as the Neoplatonic versus Aristotelian roots 
of mind reading.  This in turn will orient more precisely the epistemological 
tensions of the poem and will shed new light on the issue of Vergil’s abilities and on 
Dante’s uses of both visual and non-visual modes of telepathy.  
 Accordingly, the chapter is divided into three parts:  the first section deals 
with popular philosophical and hagiographic sources, demonstrating the problems 
that Christian thinkers encountered in attempting to absorb pagan conceptions of 
mind reading.  The second section explores how later scholastic and other theorists 
attempted to respond to the issues raised by the earlier sources, and it begins to 
elaborate both early and later medieval influences in the poem.  The final segment 
explores the direct and visual modes of mind reading in the poem with particular 
attention to Dante’s epistemologically unique treatment of specular imagery. 
As E.R. Dodds points out, there were no ancient Greek or Latin words for 
 103 
telepathy, clairvoyance or extra-sensory perception, notions that were all embraced 
in the general term divinatio (367).  Thus in the pagan and early Christian texts that 
we will examine, notions of mind reading are not categorically distinct, so that 
relevant theories emerge in the context of discussions of dreams, prophesy, the 
human soul’s clairvoyance, demonology, as well as brief informal comments about 
angels.  Especially in early Christian texts, ideas of mind reading frequently come to 
light through passages on prophecy.  For this reason, the following discussion of 
pagan antiquity through the time of Augustine focuses mainly on demonology but 
also includes relevant evidence from other categories mentioned above.   
Ancient philosophical theories, mostly from Neoplatonists and their 
forerunners, locate telepathic abilities among the gods, daimones and humans.1 In 
his De divinatione Cicero reports that the Greek Stoic philosopher Posidonius (135-
51 B.C.) identifies three types of divinely-inspired dreams: foresight in humans due 
to shared ancestry with the gods, the air being "full of immortal minds in which 
clearly imprinted marks of truth are revealed," and the gods directly conversing with 
sleeping humans  (Brittain 1).2 Cicero also reports that Posidonius believed that the 
gods read each others' minds, and that humans are able to "discern things that they 
can't see while bound up with the body, when they are free from the body in the 
release of sleep or move under their own stimulus in [prophetic] states of 
disturbance" (Brittain 2).  Plutarch (46-120 A.D.) briefly defines the daimon,3 
suggests that its mind reading is intuitive and that the power of prophecy is 
universal.  He says the daimones (translated as demi-gods) are beings thought to be 
                                                
1 Special thanks to Professor Charles Brittain for his assistance in identifying pertinent sources from 
the ancient world. 
2 Brittain argues for a non-Platonist theory for Posidonius, thus rejecting a theory of innate 
knowledge in which the soul recollects "information it already possesses" (2). 
3 While discussing the daimon I also use the translated term “demon” with the understanding that I 
am referring to the pagan figure rather than the Christian idea of the demon, which is also discussed 
further below. 
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lower than gods but higher than mortals, and that many believe them to be in charge 
of the oracles (348).  He may recall Posidonius' second sort of dream when he says 
that these demi-gods inspire the priests and priestesses by a physical mechanism in 
which "souls meeting souls...create in them impressions of the future, exactly as we 
do not convey all our information to one another through the spoken word, but by 
writing also, or merely by a touch or a glance, we give much information about 
what has come to pass and intimation of what is to come" (463).  Plutarch explicitly 
states that it is unlikely that souls gain new powers once separated from the body; 
hence both souls severed from the body and souls in bodies prophesy, but souls in 
bodies exercise this power weakly on account of being "blinded by being combined 
and commingled with the mortal nature" (467).4 
In the De deo Socratis, Apuleius (123-180 A.D.) elaborates this theory of the 
nature and role of the daimon, categorizing it in a way that attests to a conceptual 
fluidity and variety in the ancient view.  He asserts the Platonic belief in an absolute 
division between men and gods, casting daimones as intermediary beings who 
communicate human desires and prayers and mediate activities such as prophecies, 
magic, and predictions (33-5).   It is logical, he says, for demons to function as go-
betweens because they occupy the tracts of air between earth and heaven, and 
because it would detract from the gods' majesty were the latter to interact directly 
with humans (37).  Physically, the demons possess bodies of air but have some 
weight, much like clouds.  Their intermediary position thus corresponds to their 
intermediary nature and role.  Like gods, they are immortal, but like humans, they 
feel passion and can be provoked to all the range of human emotions.  Thus they are 
animate beings, capable of reasoning, susceptible to emotions, made of air but 
                                                
4 Quotations from texts originally in Greek written by Plutarch, Plotinus, Porphyry, and also the Life 
of Antony are from English translations listed in the bibliography. 
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eternal (41-9). 
The philosophers, says Apuleius, have identified several classes of 
daimones.  In a certain sense, humans are a sort of demon because a good desiring 
in the soul is a type of good god, and thus a soul perfect in virtue can be called a 
good demon.   This demon can be called a genius, and although immortal, is 
generated within each person himself (51).  Another type of demon is the human 
soul once it has ended the service of life and given up its body.   These demons are 
called in the ancient Latin language Lemures (53).  Among these Lemures, those 
who care for their descendants, live peacefully and quietly in the house are called 
Lares familiares (55).  Those who are punished for weaknesses of their lives, who 
wander without a home, and who frighten and harm men are called Larvae.  When it 
is uncertain what lot has been assigned to them and is unclear whether one is a Lar 
or Larva, they are called di Manes, with the word "god" added for the sake of honor.  
But only those are called gods who belong to the Lemures, having lived with justice 
and prudence.  As examples of Lemures Apuleius cites Amphiaraus, Mopsus, Osiris, 
and Aesculapius.  All of these types of demons once dwelled in a human soul (55).   
Another class of demons, higher in rank, is not linked to a human body but 
has specific powers and functions akin to those of personifications.  Sleep and Love 
belong to this class.  Apuleius reports that according to Plato, from this group also 
come certain demons that are assigned to individual humans through the course of 
their life as witnesses and guardians (55).  Although they are invisible, they are 
always present and act as judges of the individual's actions but also thoughts.   At 
the end of life, the demon accompanies the individual to the divine judge to assist in 
his defense and confirm his case.   Therefore, humans hold nothing secret, since the 
demon sees and knows all.  Remarkably, Apuleius claims that if this demon is 
known and venerated by the mortal through a virtuous life, then it will act as 
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revealer of the future, protector from danger, helper, provider of useful dreams, 
teacher, corrector, and so on  (57-59).  It is no wonder, then, he asserts, that Socrates 
reaped such benefits from his daimon.  He concludes with an exhortation to 
cultivate the soul and mind through the sacred practice of philosophy, as did 
Socrates.  Notably, he cites examples from literature on the benefits of demons, 
saying that the poets mistakenly imagined some of the gods as experiencing earthly 
passions, which is why the gods hate and love certain men.  Instead, he says, it is the 
demons that have these emotions and characteristics.  Hence Ulysses was always 
accompanied by Minerva, who insured his successful endeavors (77). 
In Ennead 3.5.6, the Neoplatonist Plotinus (204-70 A.D.) echoes Apuleius in 
defining the daimones (whom he calls celestials) as intermediary beings who 
experience human emotions, and in saying that they are not gods but are often 
equated with them.  A celestial, he says, is “the representative generated by each 
Soul when it enters the Cosmos” (181).5 In Ennead 4.3.18, he specifies one of their 
functions as giving heed to human petitioners, yet he does not mention mind reading 
specifically when discussing the celestials (330).  Instead, he comes closest to 
affirming the existence of telepathy when considering whether human souls 
separated from the body use deliberate reason:  
 
 We certainly cannot think of them, it seems to me,  
 as employing words when, though they may occupy  
 bodies in the heavenly region, they are essentially  
 in the Intellectual: and very surely the deliberation  
 of doubt and difficulty which they practise here must  
 be unknown to them There; all their act must fall  
 into place by sheer force of their nature; there can  
 be no question of commanding or of talking counsel;  
 they will know, each, what is to be communicated  
                                                
5 He also defines in vague terms other "spirit-beings" who "are for the direct service of the All, and 
administer particular things to the purpose of the Universe entire.  The Soul of the All must be 
adequate to all that is and therefore must bring into being spirit powers serviceable not merely in one 
function but to its entire charge" (181-82). 
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 from another, by present consciousness.  Even in  
 our own case here, eyes often know what is not  
 spoken; and There the whole body (the heaven) is  
 pure, and every being is, as it were, an eye, nothing  
 is concealed or sophisticated, there is no need of  
 speech, everything is seen and known.  As for the  
 Celestial (the Daimones) and souls in the air, they  
 may well use speech; for all such are simply  
 Animate-Beings (271). 
It is not entirely clear if Plotinus means to contrast the mind-reading ability of souls 
separated from the body with the inability of the demons, or simply to suggest that 
the latter may also use speech as an additional form of communication.  In any case 
this means of telepathy may be a key concept for later philosophers' ideas about 
angelic communication.  Dodds characterizes this telepathy as nonphysical, which 
he claims the Neoplatonists particularly favored (373).  But as we will discuss 
below, Brittain points out that Platonists including Plutarch and Augustine also 
supported theories of demonic or psychic telepathy that were based on reading the 
physical traces of others' thoughts (3).  
The next significant step for our history is found in a letter written around 
300 A.D.  The writer is the late third century Neoplatonist Porphyry, who addresses 
his wife Marcella.  In the letter, he encourages his wife to be virtuous in part by 
distinguishing between good and bad demons.  He speaks of God strengthening the 
doer of good deeds, "while a wicked daimon prepares the way for evil deeds" (61).  
He urges Marcella not to allow the intellect to be a "dwelling place of the wicked 
daimon" (63) and, "But the evil daimon must necessarily dwell wherever 
forgetfulness of God sneaks in, for, as you have learned, the soul is a dwelling place 
either of gods or daimons" (63).  He also says that "everything is known in advance 
by God, and...divine angels and good daimons are overseers of events, and it is 
impossible to elude them" (63-65).  This distinction between good and bad demons 
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certainly informed the Christian dichotomy, about which Augustine wrote 
extensively. 
Augustine's demonology is defined by his desire to refute paganism and 
coincided with anti-pagan legislation that peaked during his time under the 
emperors Theodosius and Honorius (Fiedrowicz 198).6 He was in part responding to 
the efforts of those like Porphyry who, in his De philosophia ex oraculis, used 
pagan oracular statements to refute Christianity and the claim of Jesus to be the 
Messiah (198).  Interestingly, however, Christians also used pagan oracles to 
attempt to validate their religion.  In the mid to late fourth century, there were 
oracles in which Apollo or Artemis announced the decline of pagan cults and the 
impending victory of Christianity (199).  Given this context it is perhaps not 
surprising to find a pervasive uncertainty in Augustine’s writings on the demons’ 
nature, their abilities, and how they are regarded by society.  In the De civitate dei 
he targets Apuleius when declaring that demons are already considered to be bad by 
all, thanks to the establishment of Christianity:  “Ita enim per sanam doctrinam, 
quae humanis rebus inluxit, omnes vel paene omnes daimonum nomen exhorrent, 
ut, quisquis ante disputationem Apulei, qua daemonum dignitas commendatur, 
titulum libri de daimone Socratis legeret, nequaquam illum hominem sanum fuisse 
sentiret” (231).7 Yet he also takes pains to argue why the demons are bad, which 
makes one wonder whether the demons might have been thought by some to be 
beneficent.  Again he takes aim at Apuleius in refuting the demons’ benign role 
                                                
6 Fiedrowicz’s introductory notes appear in the translated edition of Demonic Divination listed in the 
bibliography. 
7  Book 8, chap 14. “Fortunately, our sound philosophy has so illumined the world that nearly 
everyone now has a horror of the name, “demon,” so that anyone seeing the title, Concerning the 
Demon of Socrates, before reading Apuleius on the dignity of these spirits, would jump to the 
conclusion that Apuleius was insane” (165). Latin quotations of De civitate dei are from the Corpus 
Christianorum series.  English translations are from the Walsh, Zema, Monahan and Honan edition 
with italics (except for titles) indicating my changes. 
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given that they experience human emotions, which he sees as proof of their 
malignancy; the demons’ minds are tossed on a sea of passions and this makes it 
impossible for them to please the gods or to help men aim toward high standards. 
Those who are immortal and yet share the misery of men cannot offer a beatitude 
that they do not possess and are more likely to envy.  Therefore there is no such 
thing as a good demon; none should be honored as protectors but all are to be 
avoided as deceivers (230-33). 
Augustine adheres to a Christian understanding of pagan gods as demons 
and identifies the Platonists’ demons with the fallen angels (Fiedrowicz 210), but in 
doing so his ideas are partly informed by Apuleius and pagan writers.  In addition to 
accepting Apuleius’ idea that demons do indeed possess human emotions, 
Augustine’s description of their physical make-up is drawn from paganism.  In the 
De divinatione daemonum (406-11 A.D.), he echoes Apuleius’ description of the 
demons’ airy bodies which he says are endowed with "acrimonia sensus et celeritate 
motus”8 allowing them to foretell the future but also to carry out many wondrous 
things (603-4).  As for how the demons read minds, he initially claims in this text at 
V, 9 that they are able to read the thoughts of others by means of a sort of body 
language perceptible to them but not to humans: 
 
 aliquando et hominum dispositiones non solum voce  
 prolatas, verum etiam cogitatione conceptas, cum signa  
 quaedam ex animo exprimuntur in corpore, tota facilitate  
 perdiscunt atque hinc etiam multa futura praenuntiant,  
 aliis videlicet mira, qui ista disposita non nouerunt.   
 sicut enim adparet concitatior animi motus in uultu, 
 ut ab hominibus quoque aliquid forinsecus agnoscatur,  
 quod intrinsecus agitur, ita non debet esse incredibile,  
 si etiam leniores cogitationes dant aliqua signa per  
 
 
                                                
8 “keen sensitivity and rapid movement.” 
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 corpus, quae obtuso sensu hominum cognosci non  
 possunt, acuto autem daemonum possunt  (608).9 
Augustine later retracted the physically oriented mechanism for demonic mind 
reading, affirming their ability but maintaining that he does not know how they do 
it.  He states in the Retractiones 2.30 “Sed utrum signa quaedam dentur ex corpore 
cogitantium illis sensibilia, nos autem latentia, an alia vi et ea spirituali ista 
cognoscant, aut difficillime potest ab hominibus, aut omnino non potest inveniri.”10  
Also ambiguous is the problem of demonic prophecy, which parallels the 
saints’ difficulty with distinguishing the origin of epiphanic figures.  In the De 
divinatione daemonum Augustine is careful to distinguish the demons' sometimes 
mistaken prophecies from those of God's true angels and prophets.  Incorrect 
prophecies result when demons try unsuccessfully to deceive or when they 
themselves are deceived by one of God's true prophets who may alter the 
predictions of the future.  Nonetheless demons may prophesy correctly because they 
overhear true prophecies from the more reliable sources (608-9).  This fact, he says 
in book 12, chap 13 of De Genesi ad litteram, can make it difficult to discern 
whether a spirit possessing someone is good or evil.11 Thus while Augustine 
                                                
9 “Sometimes they also find it the easiest thing in the world to gain a thorough knowledge of 
people's plans when they have only been hatched in their thoughts, and before they are stated out 
loud in words, because they can read the signs by which 'body language' gives away the mind's 
intentions, and from this source of information too they forecast many future events, which amazes 
others who have no previous knowledge of these plans.  Just as a person's being deeply stirred in 
spirit will be revealed by the expression on his face, so that other people will be able to tell from the 
outside what is going on inside him, so in a similar way it should not be thought incredible if even 
calmer thoughts betray themselves through slight indications of 'body language,' which can be 
observed by the keen sensitivity of demons but not by the duller senses of human beings” (210-11).  
Latin quotations of De divinatione daemonum are from the Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum 
Latinorum series.  Translation is from Edmund Hill. 
10 “Whether certain sensible signs may be given from the body of those thinking to these ones (i.e. 
demons), but hidden to us, or whether they may know these things by another or spiritual force, can 
be discovered by men either with great difficulty, or it cannot be known at all." Translation is mine.  
In book 12 chap 17 of the De Genesi ad litteram, Augustine also states that it is difficult to know 
how demons are able to know our thoughts and to know why humans do not have this ability (403). 
11 “discretio sane difficillima est, cum spiritus malignus quasi tranquillius agit ac sine aliqua 
vexatione corporis adsumpto humano spiritu dicit quod potest.  Quando etiam vera dicit et utilia 
praedicat, transfigurans se, sicut scriptum est: velut angelum lucis, ad hoc, ut, cum illi in manifestis 
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declares in the De civitate dei at 9.22 that angelic prophecy is never mistaken, he 
offers no theoretical demonstration of the assertion (268-9), and the burden is placed 
on humans to identify the source and truth of prophetic encounters. 
Further, just as the mechanism of demonic telepathy and the source of 
prophetic spirits are unclear, so is the mechanism by which angels know humans’ 
thoughts.  In the De Genesi ad litteram Augustine begins to suggest a contrast 
between demonic and angelic telepathy.  He does so in the context of considering 
human mind readers, such as a man possessed by an unclean spirit who was able to 
tell the whereabouts of a priest along his journey to visit him (403-4), and other 
people who predict events as if by chance (412-13).  Yet in discussing how these 
things happen, Augustine simply declares angelic telepathy in a manner that raises 
more questions than it resolves: 
 
 Quonam modo haec visa in spiritum hominis veniant,  
 utrum ibi primitus formentur an formata ingerantur  
 et quadam coniunctione cernantur, ut sic hominibus  
 angeli ostendant cogitationes suas et corporalium  
 rerum similitudines, quas in suo spiritu futurorum 
 cognitione praeformant, quemadmodum et ipsi nostras 
 cogitationes non utique oculis, quia non corpore,  
 sed spiritu vident, verum hoc intersit, quod illi nostras,  
 etiam si nolimus, nouerunt, nos autem ipsorum, nisi  
 ostendantur, nosse non possumus…(414).12 
                                                
bonis creditum fuerit, seducat ad sua.  Hunc discerni non arbitror nisi dono illo, de quo ait apostolus, 
cum de diversis dei muneribus loqueretur: alii diiudicatio spirituum” (398) [The discernment of these 
experiences is certainly a most difficult task when the evil spirit acts in a seemingly peaceful manner 
and, without tormenting the body, possesses a man’s spirit and says what he is able, sometimes even 
speaking the truth and disclosing useful knowledge of the future.  In this case he transforms himself, 
according to Scripture, as if into an angel of light, in order that, once having gained his victim’s 
confidence in matters that are manifestly good, he may then lure his victim into his snares.  This 
spirit, so far as I know, cannot be recognized except by that gift mentioned by St. Paul, where he 
speaks of the different gifts of God: ..to another the distinguishing of spirits]. 
12 Book 12, chap 23. “How do these things enter the spirit of man?  Are they fashioned there? Or are 
they implanted fully formed and seen as a consequence of some sort of union, so that angels reveal to 
men their own thoughts and the likenesses of bodies which they fashion beforehand in their own 
spirit through their knowledge of future events?  In such a way angels see our thoughts; not, of 
course, with eyes, because they see not by body but by spirit.  But there is this difference: they know 
our thoughts whether we will it or not, whereas we cannot know theirs unless they reveal them” 
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Augustine's retraction notwithstanding, his writing suggests two sorts of 
telepathy that may be significant for philosophical theories that surfaced in the later 
Middle Ages. The angels are able to read minds by means of a non-physical method 
whereas according to the De divinatione daemonum, demons may literally enter the 
bodies of humans or pick up on a sort of body language indistinguishable to mortals.  
Thus we can identify a shaky outline of a mind reading in bono that is spiritually 
practiced by prophets and angels, and a mind reading in malo that is devalued as 
physically driven and belongs to the demons.   
 These examples reflect Augustine’s theoretical weaknesses, but an important 
example from the Contra academicos illustrates the confusion in the larger context 
of saints’ telepathy. Augustine discusses a man named Albicerius who is brought up 
in the dialogue in the context of the definition of wisdom.  The disreputable 
Albicerius is thought to be most unwise and yet performs divination:  he is a 
“finder,” able to locate a missing spoon and name its owner, he knows when a 
certain boy has stolen coins, he is able to describe the nature of a business 
transaction regarding the sale of a farm, and he is able to identify the precise line of 
Vergil's poetry that a certain man has in mind (14).  Augustine describes the latter 
feat as follows:  
 
  Quod autem dixit, quem versum volueret animo ille, a  
  quo consulebatur, neque hoc puto inter res nostras esse  
  numerandam, non quo negem honestissimas disciplinas  
  ad possessionem quondam nostri animi pertinere, sed  
  quia versum alienum etiam inperitissimis canere ac  
  pronuntiare concessum est.  Ideo talia cum in memoriam  
  nostram incurrerint, non mirum, si sentiri possunt ab  
  huius aeris animalibus quibusdam vilissimis, quos  
                                                
(211).  Latin quotations of De Genesi ad litteram are from the Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum 
Latinorum series.  Translation is from John Hammond Taylor.  Taylor glosses this passage by 
confirming Augustine's belief that good and bad angels read humans’ thoughts, but notes that fathers 
of the church held that angels could not read humans' secrets of the heart that pertain to our future 
free acts (309).  See below for further discussion of this point. 
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  daemonas vocant, a quibus nos superari acumine ac  
  subtilitate sensuum posse concedo, ratione autem nego,  
  atque id fieri nescio quo modo secretissimo atque a    
  nostris sensibus remotissimo (14).13 
Albicerius' telepathy is thus distinguished qualitatively from more valuable 
knowledge.  He is said to be ignorant of grammar, music, and geometry, and while 
he knows certain divine matters, they are not the important ones, i.e. those that are 
relevant to a happy life (22).  Most significant is that Albicerius’ mind reading is 
said to be inspired by demons, yet the sort of mundane knowledge he acquires is 
exactly of the order that we see among the more homely miracles of saints.  As 
outlined in the previous chapter, St. Benedict learns telepathically of monks who 
take food outside the monastery, the prideful thoughts of a server, that a boy hides a 
flask of wine, and so on.  Telepathy is not validated as holy by judging the 
knowledge gained but rather by evaluating the professed mind reader, whose worth 
has previously been established.  The truth or falsity of the clairvoyant’s powers 
functions simply to confirm what is generally believed about his or her character. 14 
 St. Antony further demonstrates that the quality, the mechanism, but also the 
extent of the demons’ ability is unclear.  As evidence of his holiness, Antony is able 
to predict days or months in advance when and why people come to visit him, yet in 
                                                
13  I, vii, 20. “Furthermore, I don’t think the fact that Albicerius told the man who consulted him what 
line of verse he was thinking to himself about should be counted among the things that are ours.  I 
don’t mean to deny that worthwhile studies are fit to be possessed by our mind in some fashion.  Yet 
we all admit that even ignorant people can recite and deliver other men's verses.  When such things 
come up in our memory, then, it's no surprise if they can be sensed by some vile animals of the air 
that are called 'demons.'  I don't know in what mysterious way, far beyond the reach of our senses, 
this happens.  I grant that demons can outstrip us in the keenness and subtlety of their senses, but I 
deny that they outstrip us in reason” (20).  Latin quotations from the Contra academicos are from the 
Corpus Christianorum series.  Translation is from Peter King. 
14 As in the examples of the saints mentioned above and in chapter 2, some of Albicerius’ powers 
seem to be oriented more toward clairvoyance (e.g. locating the missing spoon) whereas his ability to 
identify the line of poetry suggests mind reading, but in fact the distinction is not so clear.  It is 
possible that Albicerius knows the location of the spoon because he has read the thoughts of the 
person who hid or lost it, or that has a more generalized ability to know situations/objects.  
Augustine’s explanation does not distinguish the mechanism for Albicerius’ different types of 
knowledge. 
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dismissing demonic prophecy he uses precisely the example of predicting the arrival 
of travelers: 
  Why is it so remarkable if they, having bodies more  
  subtle than humans possess, see travelers setting out on a  
  journey and arrive ahead of them and report the event?   
  Someone riding a horse can ‘predict’ this ahead of someone  
  travelling on foot!  So we need not be amazed at them  
  because of this; they do not know in advance about events  
  that have not yet happened.  No, it is God alone who 
  knows events before they happen.  But the demons,  
  seeing these things, run ahead like thieves and make  
  their report.  To how many right now are they giving  
  signals about what we are doing, what we have gathered  
  together and are speaking against them, before one of  
  us goes away and reports it?  But any child who can run  
  swiftly can also do this.  He will arrive before someone  
  who takes his time!  (129). 
Antony reduces the idea of demonic prophecy to a simple physical advantage, 
invalidating the demons’ power without accounting for his own.  Yet soon after he 
implies that demons can read minds when he says “Whenever they come, they 
match the condition they find us in and pattern their thoughts on our own and so 
fashion their apparitions accordingly.  If they find us fearful and upset, then, like 
thieves, finding the place unguarded, they immediately set on us and do whatever 
we have in our thoughts – and much more! (149).15 
 In the Dialogues, Gregory too offers a complex picture of mind reading 
theory, stating in the second Dialogue that holy men are not consistently able to 
read minds or prophesy.  He cites the Prophet Nathan (2 Kings 7) who gave but then 
                                                
15 The Golden Legend reveals another relevant and amusing example in which St. Peter engages in a 
mind-reading duel with Simon Magus.  To prove to Nero that Simon’s claims of divinity are false, 
Peter challenges the magician to say what the saint is thinking.  Peter whispers to Nero to bring a 
loaf, which Peter blesses and hides in his sleeve.  When Peter commands Simon to say what has been 
said and done, Simon refuses and demands that instead Peter read his mind.  When Simon commands 
dogs to attack, Peter repels the animals with the blessed loaf, thus demonstrating his superior ability 
(Vol. 1, 564-65).  This story suggests that Simon has no power of telepathy but does not account for 
Peter’s ability.  As in the above examples, Peter’s mind reading serves more to confirm than prove 
his goodness. 
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had to withdraw his consent to King David’s request to build a temple, and Heliseus 
(4 Kings 4.27) who found a woman in tears without knowing why (180).  The 
reason for the inconsistency is that the Holy Spirit breathes when and where God 
pleases, thereby elevating the mind while safeguarding the prophet’s humility.  Holy 
men know the Lord’s thoughts only in so far as they are one with Him (“Occulta 
itaque Dei iudicia, in quantum coniuncti sunt, sciunt; in quantum disiuncti sunt, 
nesciunt” 174).16 In Dialogue 4.43,2 he affirms that humans are able to see each 
other’s thoughts minimally in this world, but in the afterlife “nostra in alterutrum 
corda conspicimus.” (418).17 Amazingly, however, he also echoes the ideas of 
Plutarch when he claims in the fourth Dialogue that souls may also prophesy 
through their own powers: “vis animae aliquando subtilitate sua ea quae sunt 
ventura cognoscit…”18 As evidence he mentions a lawyer named Cumquodeus who 
predicted that his body would be laid to rest in a certain church.  Upon dying, the 
lawyer was in fact laid there despite efforts to place the body elsewhere.  Gregory 
concludes by asking “Et cum eundem virum curis saecularibus obligatum lucrisque 
terrenis inhiantem fuisse nouerimus, unde hoc praedicere potuit, nisi quia id quod 
futurum erat eius corpori ipsa vis animae ac subtilitas praevidebat?” (376).19 
Gregory does not acknowledge his theory as a complicating factor for those 
                                                
16 “In so far as they are joined (to God) they know God’s hidden judgments; in so far as they are not 
joined, they do not know” (84). 
17 “in hoc cogitationes nostras vicissim minime videmus, in illo autem nostra in alterutrum corda 
conspicimus…” (418) [in this world we see each other’s thoughts very little but in the world to come 
we will see each other’s hearts].  This phrase is part of a rhetorical question by Gregory in which he 
proposes a metaphor of this world as night and the next as day.  Zimmerman translates this bit 
inadequately as “Is it not true that in this world it is impossible for us to see each other’s hearts?” 
(251).  Gregory in fact seems to be saying that we can see each other’s hearts in this world to a very 
small degree and that we will have this ability fully in the afterlife.  See below for fuller quotation of 
the passage. 
18 “Sometimes the power of the soul by its own subtlety knows what will happen…” (219). 
19 “And since we know that same man was engrossed in secular affairs and longing for earthly gain, 
how did he predict this unless that same power and subtlety of his soul foresaw what the future 
would be for his body?”(220). 
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attempting to distinguish the source of supernatural knowledge.  He simply presents 
it as an alternative to prophesy inspired by divine revelation.  According to Robin 
Lane Fox, most Christians did not believe that the soul had a natural power of 
divination (392).  Gregory’s belief can therefore be regarded as exceptional. 
 That the Christian Gregory incorporates this pagan belief is understandable 
in light of Peter Brown’s different but parallel scholarship on the origin of saints.  
Brown argues that that the idea of the patron saint was modeled on the client/patron 
relationship of Roman society but also on the role of the pagan daimon (62-3).  The 
patron saint fulfilled a need in newly Christian societies for friendship and 
protection at the human level in a “world so sternly organized around sin and 
justice” (65), and the client/patron relationship supplied a suitable model for 
conceptualizing this new form of piety.  But Brown also argues that Christians 
conceived of the saint as an invisible companion who took on the role of the pagan 
daimon.  Thus he links Paulinus of Nola’s poems on St. Felix to the idea of the 
pagan protector or the angel:  “Thus, when Paulinus writes about his relationship 
with Saint Felix, he pointedly and lovingly transfers to a dead human being all the 
sense of intimate involvement with an invisible companion that men in previous 
generations had looked for in a relationship with the non human figures of gods, 
daimones, or angels” (55). Brown’s history invites us to relate the mind-reading 
ability of saints not only to imitating Christ20 but to the pagan figure of the daimon.  
With this knowledge Gregory’s belief in the pagan notion of the human soul’s 
telepathic power can be seen as part of a larger pattern of origin; the Neoplatonic 
ideas of the soul’s telepathic powers and those of the daimon inform Christian 
notions of the human soul, demons, and saints.  The connection is found partly in 
Plutarch and Plotinus’ notions of the soul, in Apuleius’s definition of the soul as a 
                                                
20 See chapter 2 for discussion of Christ’s mind reading. 
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type of daimon, but also through a more direct transfer of the daimon’s function 
onto the role of Christian figures. 
 This pagan ancestry accounts compellingly for the confusion and 
contradictions that troubled the early Christian theorists of mind reading. The advent 
of the new religion brought an especially urgent need for Christian intellectuals and 
soul-savers to differentiate the powers of demons from those of angels and saints.  
Holy people in particular needed to show distinctive powers in order to prove to 
potential converts the credibility of the new Christian god - hence the attempted 
theoretical distinction between the spiritual mind reading of the holy man and the 
physical action of demons.  Yet all of the theories on how and to what extent mind 
reading occurs in humans, demons, and angels are striking for contradictions that 
betray more similarities than differences between the pagan and Christian sources.  
These similarities are most vivid in practice, where Christian demons read minds in 
the same manner as the saints.  They do so in part because both demons and saints 
are descendants of the pagan daimon.   
 This ancestry suggests ideas about the epistemological problems of Christian 
mind reading that are both parallel and new in relation to the complications of 
Christian epiphany that were explored in the previous chapter.  Christianity 
democratizes both epiphany and mind reading, granting to humans supernatural 
visions and powers that are ambiguous.  Christians must struggle to distinguish 
good from evil apparitions, but they also struggle to understand the differences 
among demonic, human, and angelic telepathy.  Like epiphany, mind reading is also 
a problematic marker for the holy person’s claim to authority because just as the 
Christian must merit the epiphanic moment, so Gregory asserts that the holy can 
prophesy only insofar as they are one with God.  Thus we can understand both 
telepathy and epiphany as encounters with unidentified supernatural forces in which 
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the burden of recognition is the responsibility of humans and becomes a sign of 
Christian worth.  Human beings’ participation as epiphanic media means that their 
credibility must be constantly tested, just as humans struggle to identify the source 
of personal epiphanies.  But the history of mind reading shows uniquely how 
Christian holy figures are descended from pagan ones.  The saintly human as mind 
reader creates the need for a conceptual distinction that is not sufficiently realized, 
in part because both demons and saints are descendants of the same pagan figure.  In 
this way theories and practices of epiphany and of mind reading function as 
statements of Christian piety rather than as proof of differentiated abilities and 
encounters.  It also makes sense to recall mind reading as a type of epiphany not 
only for the reasons discussed in the previous chapter, but because doing so implies 
a larger, profound, unresolved anxiety for Christians.  If mind reading for the saint 
implies an epiphanic moment of witnessing God’s knowledge (and hence an aspect 
of his presence), the history traced above shows that no essential difference between 
God and the demon vis-à-vis mind reading emerges reliably in early Christian 
sources. 
 This anxiety perhaps underlies Gregory’s extraordinary claims of heightened 
prophecy, which he believes to be driven by the imminent end of the world.  In 
Dialogue 4 Peter asks Gregory to explain why revelations and visions occur with 
greater frequency in current times, to which Gregory responds with a lovely 
metaphorical elaboration of 1 Corinthians 13:12 (“videmus nunc per speculum in 
enigmate tunc autem facie ad faciem; nunc cognosco ex parte tunc autem 
cognoscam sicut et cognitus sum”):21  
 
 
                                                
21 “Now we see through a mirror obscurely but then we will see face to face; now I know partially 
but then I will know as I am known.”  Latin quotations are from the Biblia Sacra Iuxta Vulgatam 
Versionem.  Translations are my own.   
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  Ita est.  Nam quantum praesens saeculum propinquat 
  ad finem, tantum futurum saeculum ipsa iam quasi 
  propinquitate tangitur et signis manifestioribus aperitur. 
  Quia enim in hoc cogitationes nostras vicissim minime  
  videmus, in illo autem nostra in alterutrum corda  
  conspicimus, quid hoc saeculum nisi noctem, et quid 
  venturum nisi diem dixerim?  Sed quemadmodum cum  
  nox finiri et dies incipit oriri, ante solis ortum simul  
  aliquo modo tenebrae cum luce conmixtae sunt,  
  quousque discedentis noctis reliquiae in luce diei  
  subsequentis perfecte vertantur, ita huius mundi  
  finis iam cum futuri saeculi exordio permiscetur,  
  atque ipsae reliquiarum eius tenebrae quadam iam  
  rerum spiritalium permixtione translucent.  Et quae  
  illius mundi sunt multa iam cernimus, sed necdum  
  perfecte cognoscimus, quia quasi in quodam mentis  
  crepusculo haec velut  ante solem videmus  (419-20).22 
Gregory elaborates the prospect of telepathy more fully than what 1 Corinthians 
implies, heightening the epistemological doubt generated by the biblical verse.  It is 
not just that we see imperfectly; we are beginning to see more and more, but still not 
all.  Every moment brings a greater degree of superhuman knowledge that yet 
remains incomplete. If the source and mechanism of divine revelation cannot be 
understood, Christians could at least believe that revelations and visions are on the 
increase; if nothing else, the visions’ frequency served to validate them.  In the 
context of the flawed theories examined above, this belief intensifies the 
philosophical urgency of prophetic/telepathic potential.  The faithful are left with the 
expectation of ever more divine revelation, but they cannot truly know how, from 
                                                
22 “That is right.  For, as the present world approaches its end, the world of eternity looms nearer, 
manifesting itself by ever clearer signs. In this world we see each other’s thoughts very little but in 
the world to come we will see each other’s hearts.  Therefore what should I call this world if not 
night and the world to come if not day? But just as when night begins to end and day to begin before 
the sun’s rising, in a certain way shadows are blended with light, until the remnants of departing 
night are perfectly transformed into the light of the coming day, so the end of this world merges with 
the beginning of eternal life, such that those very shadows of the night’s remains already are 
luminous through the mingling of spiritual matters.  And there are many things of that world that we 
already perceive, but we do not yet know perfectly because we see things as if in a certain twilight of 
the mind, as before dawn (419-20). I thank Professor Tom Hill for initially drawing my attention to 
this key passage. 
 120 
where, or to what extent these truths are made manifest.  
 With the advent of scholasticism in the later Middle Ages the philosophical 
sources attempt to categorize telepathy more specifically and with more precision.23  
They do so in part by narrowing the field of inquiry, rejecting the idea that angels 
can read humans’ minds and avoiding or denying the issue of demonic 
communication.   Nonetheless, they remain attached to the idea that angels, demons, 
and blessed souls can, in limited cases, know human thoughts, prayers, and actions, 
and many of their explanations rely on Augustine’s ambiguous distinctions.  As 
noted above, John Hammond Taylor states that most fathers of the church did not 
believe that angels could read humans’ minds.24 In the Sentences, Peter Lombard 
does not affirm powers of mind reading when discussing guardian or other types of 
angels.25 When explaining how angels and blessed souls hear our prayers, he says in 
Book IV, Dist. 45, chapter 6 that angels, saints, and glorified souls hear prayers by 
contemplating God’s light and his Word (“veri luminis illustratione” and “in Verbo 
Dei”) and he quotes Augustine who merely confirms his opinion without explaining 
the mechanism.26 One might well ask why, if angels hear our prayers by 
                                                
23 In the following pages I have necessarily limited the choice of philosophical sources that are most 
relevant to mind reading in the Commedia.  These are Peter Lombard, who set the standard for topics 
in his Sentences, and Aquinas and Bonaventure who commented on the Sentences but also offered 
other relevant evidence on the issue, much of which was likely known to Dante. 
24 See footnote above regarding Augustine’s affirmation of angelic telepathy in the De Genesi ad 
litteram. 
25 Book II, Dist. 11, chap 1.   
26 “Non est incredibile, animas Sanctorum, quae in abscondito faciei Dei veri luminis illustratione 
laetantur, in ipsius contemplatione eas quae foris aguntur, intelligere, quantum illis vel ad gaudium, 
vel nobis ad auxilium pertinet.  Sicut enim Angelis, ita et Sanctis, qui Deo assitunt, petitiones nostrae 
innotescunt in Verbo Dei, quod contemplantur.  Unde et dicuntur Angeli orationes et vota nostra 
offerre Deo, non quia eum doceant, sed quia eius voluntatem super eis consulunt.  Unde Augustinus: 
‘Angelis, qui sunt apud Deum, innotescunt petitiones nostrae, ut quodam modo eas offerant Deo et 
de his consultant, et quod, Deo iubente, implendum esse cognoverint, hoc nobis vel evidenter vel 
latenter reportent.  Unde et Angelus hominibus ait: Cum oraretis, orationem vestram obtuli Deo’” 
(1009-10). [It is not incredible that souls of the Saints who in the hidden face of God rejoice in the 
shining of true light, by its contemplation know what happens on the outside, in so far as it pertains 
to their joy or assistance to us.  Thus to the angels and saints who assist God, our petitions are known 
in the Word of God which they contemplate.  Whence angels are also said to offer our prayers and 
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contemplating God’s light, or “in Verbo Dei,” they shouldn’t be able to see other 
things (i.e. thoughts) the same way.  Lombard suggests a qualifying element for the 
kinds of things angels may know when he says their knowledge pertains to their joy 
or assistance to us (“quantum illis vel ad gaudium, vel nobis ad auxilium pertinet” ).  
In his commentary on this question, Aquinas confirms that angels and blessed souls, 
when looking into the divine essence, are allowed to know only that which pertains 
to their blessedness, which includes hearing the prayers of humans.27 It is 
noteworthy that both Lombard and Aquinas avoid specular imagery, instead naming 
the “Verbum” as that which angels contemplate.  Bonaventure’s commentary, in the 
context of asking whether saints pray for us, simply says that they do so because 
they see our need, but he does not specify how.28 All three of these authors thus 
appear to regard knowledge of human prayers as a category separate from knowing 
all thoughts. 
 When Peter Lombard addresses how evil angels know the truth of temporal 
things he quotes Augustine’s De Genesi ad litteram book 2.17.37 to justify the 
                                                
vows to God, not in order to inform him but because they consult his will concerning these things.  
Whence Augustine:  ‘Our petitions are known to the angels who are with God so that in some way 
they offer them to God and consult concerning these things and, once God has commanded, they 
know what should be fulfilled. They may report this to us either openly or in a hidden manner.   
Whence also the angel says to man:  When you prayed, I brought your prayer to God]. Latin 
quotations are from the 1916 edition Collegii S. Bonaventurae.  Translations from books I and II of 
the Sentences are from Giulio Silano while those from books III and IV are mine. One can imagine a 
response based on the idea of whether humans will the information to be heard.  
27 Book 4, Dist. 45, q.3, a.1.  “Hoc autem ad eorum gloriam pertinet quod auxilium indigentibus 
praebeant ad salutem; sic enim Dei cooperatores efficiuntur, quo nihil est divinius, ut Dionysius dicit, 
3 cap Eccles. Hierarch. (2). Unde patet quod sancti cognitionem habeant eorum quae ad hoc 
requiruntur; et sic manifestum est quod in Verbo cognoscunt vota et orationes et devotiones 
hominum qui ad eorum auxilium confugiunt” (348) [Now, it pertains to their glory to help the needy 
for their salvation; in so doing they become cooperators with God, than which there is nothing more 
divine, as Dionysus says in chapter 3 of the Ecclesiastical hierarchy (2).  Thus it is clear that the 
saints have knowledge of those things that are required for this; and thus it is clear that in the Word 
they know the vows, prayers, and devotions of people who ask for their help].  Latin text of Aquinas’ 
Commentary on the Sentences is from the PDUL Edizioni Studio Domenicano.  Translation is mine. 
28 Dist 45, art 3, q.2.  He simply says that saints pray for us for two reasons, one of which is “quia 
vident nostram necessitatem” (519) [because they see our need].  He also does not address the 
mechanism of angels’ knowledge in q.3 in which he asks whether it is useful for us to pray to saints.  
Latin text from A.C. Peltier edition.  Translation is mine.    
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demons’ knowledge on the basis of their subtle senses, their experience based on 
long lives, what they learn from holy angels, and on their predictions as mere 
declarations of what they themselves are planning to do.29 In his Commentary, in 
Dist. 8, Part 2. a. 1, q. 6 Bonaventure states explicitly that neither good nor bad 
angels can know humans’ thoughts but they may guess them through clues given by 
the body, although he emphasizes that this knowledge is not certain and purely 
based on conjecture (456).30 Similarly, Aquinas in the first part of the Summa in 
q.57, a. 4, again relying on Augustine, states that strictly speaking, angels cannot 
                                                
29  Book II, Dist. 7, chap 5.  He first quotes Isidore and then says “De hoc etiam Augustinus ait: 
‘Spiritus mali quaedam vera de temporalibus rebus noscere permittuntur, partim subtilitate sensus, 
partim experientia temporum callidiores propter tam magnam longitudinem vitae, partim sanctis 
Angelis, quod ipsi ab omnipotenti Dio discunt, iussu eius sibi revelantibus.  Aliquando autem iidem 
(sic) nefandi spiritus et quae ipsi acturi sunt, velut divinando, praedicunt” (336) [Concerning this, 
Augustine too says: “Evil spirits are allowed to know certain things about temporal matters, in part 
by the refinement of their sense, in part because they are made shrewder by their experience over the 
ages, which is due to such great length of life, in part because the holy angels at God’s command 
reveal to them what they have learned from God.  At times too, these same evil spirits foretell what 
they themselves are about to do, as though pretending to divine it]. Likewise in Book II, Dist. 7, chap 
6 Lombard relies on Augustine in claiming that whatever magical arts demons possess (again he does 
not mention mind reading) are given them by God (336-37).   
30 “Et ideo dico, quod nulla creatura, nec humana, neg angelica, potest conscientiae humanae nosse 
secreta, nisi per signa, vel conjecturas, vel nisi noverit Dei revelatione, aut hominis denuntiatione. Et 
quoniam pauca sint ita secreta, quin prodeant in opera exteriora, vel appareant per signa exteriora 
faciei, vel per signa cordis, quod movetur diversimode secundum diversitatem affectionum; hinc est 
quo multae cogitations et affetiones nostrae deprehendi possunt a malignis spiritibus, nisi arceantur 
Dei virtute; haec autem cognitio potius est conjecturae, quam certae scientiae: et ideo concedendae 
sunt rationes ostendentes quod angelus malus secreta conscientiae nostrae perscrutari non potest” 
(456) [And therefore I say that no creature, neither human, nor angelic, can know the secrets of 
human conscience, except through signs, or conjecture, or unless he will have known by God’s 
revelation, or by the denunciation of man.  And since few things are thus secret, indeed they may 
come forth in outer deeds, or they may appear through exterior signs of the face, or through signs of 
the heart, which is moved in different ways according to a diversity of feelings; thence it is that many 
of our thoughts and feelings can be perceived by evil spirits, unless they are prevented by God’s 
power; however this cognition is rather of conjecture than of certain knowledge: and therefore 
reasons showing that an evil angel cannot scrutinize the secrets of our conscience should be granted]. 
In Book 4, Dist. 50, part 2, a.1, q.2, Bonaventure considers whether separated souls can know of 
human affairs, stating that in certain cases they may be granted knowledge through revelation.  He 
quotes Augustine’s de Cura pro mortuis agenda which says that souls of the dead may know by 
God’s revelation certain things which is necessary for them to know regarding earthly matters, past, 
present, and future.  Neither Bonaventure nor Augustine specifies how they know.  Again, this seems 
to regard events rather than specifically thoughts, but it provides further evidence of Bonaventure’s 
desire to believe in supernatural knowledge.  In the same book in Dist 43, a. 3, q.2 Bonaventure 
states that only upon the Last Judgement will all be able to know others’ thoughts (469). 
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know the secret thoughts of humans, but he affirms that both humans and angels can 
know thoughts by their effects, such as through outward actions, but also through 
facial expressions and even taking one’s pulse:   
   
  Et multo magis angeli, vel etiam daemones, quanto  
  subtilius huiusmodi immutationes occultas corporales  
  perpendunt.  Unde Augustinus dicit in libro De Divinat.  
  Daemon. quod ‘aliquando hominum dispositiones, non  
  solum voce prolatas, verum etiam cogitatione conceptas,  
  cum signa quaedam in corpore exprimuntur ex animo,  
  tota facilitate perdiscunt’; quamvis in libro Retract. hoc  
  dicat non esse asserendum quomodo fiat” (348b).31   
Retraction notwithstanding, Aquinas accepts Augustine’s theory of good and bad 
angels’ clairvoyance based on an enhanced ability to read body language.  
Regarding demonic communication, Aquinas shows little interest in the matter, 
stating simply in q.109, a.3 that demons do not enlighten each other “sed unus alii 
suum conceptum per modum locutionis intimare potest” (656a).32   
 These theorists from the later Middle Ages thus retain a fair bit of 
epistemological confusion as they attempt to make finer distinctions among 
categories of knowledge.  Lombard, Aquinas, and Bonaventure all clearly reject the 
notion of angelic telepathy with humans, yet they affirm knowledge of human 
prayer and imply a lesser sort of clairvoyance on the basis of Augustinian theories of 
body language  - theories that Augustine himself eventually retracted.  One possible 
reason they do so is that the idea of full angelic knowledge of human thoughts could 
threaten the monotheistic, hierarchical structure of knowledge that defined medieval 
                                                
31 “Much more then can angels, or even demons, the more deeply they penetrate those occult bodily 
modifications. Hence Augustine says (De divin. daemon.) that demons "sometimes with the greatest 
faculty learn man's dispositions, not only when expressed by speech, but even when conceived in 
thought, when the soul expresses them by certain signs in the body"; although (Retract. ii, 30) he says 
"it cannot be asserted how this is done.” Latin quotations of the Summa Teologiae are from the 
Instituti Studiorum Medievalium Ottaviensis edition.  Translations are from 
http://www.newadvent.org/summa/. 
32 “one can make known his mental concept to another by way of speech.” 
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Christianity, in which only God is omniscient.  What remains lacking in these 
theories is a fuller account of the mechanism of angels’ knowledge of prayer and the 
extent of their abilities to know thoughts based on body language, as well as the role 
of human will in these processes. 
 The category in which later medieval philosophy more clearly affirms 
angelic telepathy concerns how angels communicate with each other.  Regarding 
such communication we have another Dantean text to consult in the De vulgari 
eloquentia.  Therefore the best way to trace the idea of angelic telepathy in the 
Commedia’s mind reading is to begin with what Dante writes in the DVE.  After 
first declaring that angels have no need to speak (“Non angelis, non inferioribus 
animalibus necessarium fuit loqui, sed nequicquam datum fuisset eis: quod nempe 
facere natura aborret.”33) Dante suggests at 1.2.3 a key distinction in the manner in 
which angels communicate: 
 
  Si etenim perspicaciter consideramus quid cum  
  loquimur intendamus, patet quod nichil aliud quam  
  nostre mentis enucleare aliis conceptum.  Cum igitur  
  angeli ad pandendas gloriosas eorum conceptiones  
  habeant promptissimam atque ineffabilem sufficientam  
  intellectus, qua vel alter alteri totaliter innotescit 
  per se, vel saltim per illud fulgentissimum Speculum  
  in quo cuncti representantur pulcerrimi atque avidissimi  
  speculantur, nullo signo locutionis indiguisse videntur  
        (DVE 1.2.3).34 
That Dante writes of two different modes of angelic communication is clear enough 
                                                
33 “It was not necessary that either angels or the lower animals should be able to speak; rather, this 
power would have been wasted on them, and nature, of course, hates to do anything superfluous” (5).  
Text and translation are from Steven Botterill with italics indicating my changes. 
34  “Now, if we wish to define with precision what our intention is when we speak, it is clearly 
nothing other than to expound to others the concepts formed in our minds.  Therefore, since the 
angels possess, in order to communicate their own glorious conceptions, a ready and ineffable 
sufficiency of intellect – through which either one becomes fully known to the other through 
themselves, or at least through that most resplendent Mirror in which all are reflected as most 
beautiful and in which all most eagerly gaze, they seem not to have needed signs to represent 
speech” (5).  Botterill interprets “cuncti…pulcerrimi atque avidissimi” as ablatives but it is more 
accurate to read them as nominative forms. 
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from the “vel…vel” structure; one mode involves an angel’s thoughts becoming 
“fully known to the other through themselves” (“alter alteri totaliter innotescit”) 
while the other mode names the “most resplendent Mirror” (“fulgentissimum 
Speculum”) in which the angels gaze.  Less clear, as Vincenzo Mengaldo points out, 
is the meaning of “saltim,” which could be interpreted to suggest uncertainty 
regarding which mode is dominant (195).  Later, in the context of discussing the 
human limitations in speech, Dante refers to the specular mode:  “Nec per 
spiritualem speculationem, ut angelum, alterum alterum introire contingit, cum 
grossitie atque opacitate mortalis corporis humanus spiritus sit obtectus” (1.3.1).35  
However, this does not mean that he necessarily intends to emphasize this method as 
the dominant one for angels because the passage is focused more on human 
limitations than on the specifics of angelic practice.  Mengaldo concedes that 
“saltim” in the DVE normally means “at least” but nonetheless suggests in this case 
(albeit without explanation) a more likely meaning of “perhaps” (195).   
 The Oxford Latin Dictionary clarifies that “saltem” means “At least, at all 
events, anyhow (passing from a wider to a narrower or more practicable idea, with 
the alternative either expressed or implicit),” with the second definition listing 
“even, so much as” for “negative or quasi-negative sentences” (1682).  What 
follows Dante’s “vel saltim” is the specular mode of communication, which is 
precisely regarded as the more narrow category of angelic mind reading according 
to thirteenth-century philosophical sources.  According to Mengaldo, numerous 
philosophers made the distinction between a direct mind reading practiced by all 
angels, and a more privileged specular mode practiced only by certain good angels.  
                                                
35  “Nor it is given to us to enter into each other’s minds by means of spiritual reflection, as the 
angels do, because the human spirit is so weighed down by the heaviness and density of the mortal 
body.”  Botterill chooses Marigo’s reading of “speculationem” over Mengaldo’s 1968 reading of 
“locutionem,” which the latter silently corrected in his 1979 edition (xxix).  
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Mengaldo identifies a key source in Vincent of Beauvais’ four-part encyclopedia 
Speculum maius (169-71).  Vincent discusses angelic mind reading in both the 
Speculum Naturale and the Speculum Historiale with the latter containing the 
following explanation: 
 
  Angelorum autem locutio spiritualis, qua sibi  
  invicem ostendunt affectus suos; & intellectus,  
  de his rebus quarum cognitio non era in eis a  
  principio duplex est.  Una secundum naturam suam,  
  in qua communicant boni, & mali Angeli, scilicet  
  cogitatio directa per voluntatem ostendendi alteri  
  ipsum cogitatum vel intentum, non enim in Angelo  
  loqui est cogitare tantum vel intelligere, sed cogitatum  
  vel intentum aliqua luminositate irradiante, alii  
  voluntarie exprimere, & quod uni exprimitur, non  
  semper ab aliis intelligitur, nisi ille velit qui loquitur.   
  Alia vero per gratiam scilicet secundum virtutem  
  speculi sive motoris supremi, in qua communicant  
  Angeli  boni tantum & animae sanctorum.  Unicuique  
  enim innotescit intellectus vel voluntas alterius  
  secundum speculi representationem, & ipsius motoris  
  supreme voluntatem, qui ostendit cui vult, & quantum  
  vult.  Non enim omnes Angeli omnia vident in speculo,  
  sed haec plena revelatio referuatur plenitudini gloriae,  
  qua consummabitur eorum praemium in futuro (6-7).36 
It is reasonable that Vincent’s “cogitatio directa” corresponds to Dante’s “alter alteri 
totaliter innotescit per se” while Dante’s “fulgentissimum Speculum” refers to the 
encyclopedist’s “speculi representationem.”  Given that Vincent explicitly states that 
                                                
36  From Cap. XV, Liber I.  “However the speech of angels is twofold: spiritual, by which they reveal 
their dispositions of mind to each other, and of the intellect, concerning those things of which there 
was no cognition in them from the beginning.  One (type), according to its nature, by which good and 
bad Angels communicate, is namely direct thought through the will of revealing to another that same 
thought or intention, for in the angel to speak is not so much to think or to understand, but to express 
willingly to another a thought or intention by means of some radiating luminosity, and what is 
expressed to one is not always understood by all unless the one speaking wishes.  But there is another 
(type), through grace, namely according to the power of the mirror or of the supreme mover, in 
which only good angels and the souls of the divine communicate.  For the intellect or will of one is 
made known to another according to a representation of a mirror and according to the will of the 
supreme mover himself, who shows to whom he wishes and how much he wishes.  For not all angels 
see all things in the mirror, but this full revelation will be represented in the plenitude of glory in 
which their reward will be perfected in the future.”  Translation is mine.  The Speculum Naturale 
contains the same information as the passage quoted above. 
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this mode occurs “per gratiam,” it is also reasonable in light of the OLD’s 
distinction to interpret Dante’s use of “saltim” not as indicating preference or 
uncertainty but as introducing the narrower specular category.  Thus in place of the 
mind reading in bono versus in malo suggested by earlier medieval sources, Vincent 
addresses the narrower category of angelic communication through a paradigm of 
common versus privileged ability. The idea that direct mind reading is common to 
all angels affirms its practice among demons, while the mechanism of the mirror 
attempts to distinguish the powers of a privileged class of good angels. 
 This distinction leaves unanswered the question of what sorts of things 
angels know according to one mode versus the other, and in what sorts of situations 
they communicate directly versus through the divine speculum.  Yet Vincent’s 
description is nonetheless important for several reasons:  besides helping to clarify 
the passage in the DVE, his two modes of mind reading may correspond to similar 
categories in the Commedia.37 In addition, two other characteristics of Vincent’s 
theory are especially salient.  The first is his claim that the privileged class of mind 
readers includes not only angels but the “animae sanctorum,” the souls of the saints.  
The second is his suggestion of a continuum of knowledge for both categories of 
communication; in the direct mode, the communicating angel determines whether 
all angels or only the recipient receive the message, whereas in the specular mode, 
the grace of God determines to whom and how much knowledge the mirror’s 
representation grants.  As will be discussed further below, Dante transforms and 
incorporates into the poem these features as well.  But the question remains whether 
the Speculum maius was Dante’s precise source.  Given the encyclopedic nature of 
this text, it is likely that Vincent reports rather than generates the theory.  Mengaldo 
                                                
37 Alessandro Raffi confirms that angelic mind reading corresponds to Dante’s representation in the 
Paradiso (133).   See below and the next chapter for further discussion of Raffi’s illuminating study 
of Dante’s angelology. 
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cites numerous twelfth and thirteenth century authors who write of the direct or 
specular mode of angelic communication, or both, including William of Auxerre (d. 
1231) in the Summa Aurea,38 Alexander of Hales (d. 1245) in his Commentary on 
the Libri Sententiarum and in his Summa,39 Albertus Magnus (d. 1280) in his 
Summa de creaturis and his Commentary on the Libri Sententiarum,40 as well as 
Hugh Ripelin of Strasburg (d. 1270) in his Compendium theologicae veritatis41 
(175-182).  All of these texts (except that of William of Auxerre) offer the basic idea 
of superior and inferior angels who possess corresponding modes of telepathic 
communication.  There may be others as well since Mengaldo admits that his 
investigation is not exhaustive (183).  Thus while declining to argue for Vincent’s 
encyclopedia as a direct and exclusive source of Dante’s passage in the DVE,42 
Mengaldo nonetheless believes that Dante probably knew of the passages on the 
basis of lexical similarities and the way both authors simplify the argument relative 
to the philosophers.43   
 Yet Mengaldo also argues on the basis of lexical similarities for Aquinas’ 
influence on Dante despite the fact that Aquinas’ theory of angelic communication 
differs in fundamental ways (194).  The key difference is that Aquinas emphasizes 
                                                
38 According to the passage 1. II, tr. V cited by Mengaldo, William does not precisely discuss two 
methods of angelic communication but does interchange the terms “verbum” and “speculum” (175).   
39 Mengaldo cites Alexander’s most direct statement of two methods of angelic communication in 
chapter 5 of his Summa (177). 
40 Mengaldo locates the most direct statement in book I of the Commentary, Dist. 9, a. 15 (181). 
41 At II 19.  This text is dated around 1265; thus Mengaldo believes it is not likely one of Vincent’s 
sources but was probably directly influenced by Albertus Magnus. 
42 Mengaldo declines even to privilege Vincent’s two parallel passages in the Speculum Naturale and 
in the Speculum Historiale. 
43 For example Vincent’s use of “secundum representationem speculi” and Dante’s “per…speculum” 
in quo “representantur” (185).  Simon Gilson, in Medieval Optics and Theories of Light in the Works 
of Dante, mentions the Speculum maius as an important source that contains “a considerable body of 
optical lore,” and “Although it is extremely difficult to establish whether Dante knew these works, it 
is well worth making reference to them, since they indicate what was known and available in more 
general sources after 1250” (31).  Gilson also states in a footnote that “Dante’s own intellectual 
formation has often been related to medieval encyclopedias and specula” and provides 
bibliographical support (31). 
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the importance of the angel’s will, whereas Dante stresses the divine speculum 
which reflects all independent of the angel’s will (163).  In the ST q.107, a.1 
Aquinas indeed affirms that angels speak to each other, not as humans do but in a 
way moved by the angel’s will,44 and in ST q.57, a.5 in the context of discussing 
whether angels know all mysteries of grace, Aquinas says angels cannot simply read 
each other’s minds because this depends on an act of will.45 Likewise in the De 
Veritate q.9, a.4 he argues that angels do not require speech to know each other’s 
natures but they do need it to discern specific thoughts because such specific 
knowledge depends upon an act of the will.46 It is in the objections to this latter 
quaestio that Mengaldo traces Dante’s claim concerning the lack of angelic speech.  
                                                
44 “Quando autem mens convertit se ad actu considerandum quod habet in habitu, loquitur aliquis 
sibi ipsi; nam ipse conceptus mentis interius verbum vocatur.  Ex hoc vero quod conceptus mentis 
angelicae ordinatur ad manifestandum alteri per voluntatem ipsius angeli, conceptus mentis unius 
angeli innotescit alteri; et sic loquitur unus angelus alteri.  Nihil est enim aliud loqui ad alterum quam 
conceptum mentis alteri manifestare (639b) [Now when a mind turns itself to the actual consideration 
of any habitual knowledge, then a person speaks to himself; for the concept of the mind is called ‘the 
interior word.’  And by the fact that the concept of the angelic mind is ordered to be made known to 
another by the will of the angel himself, the concept of one angel is made known to another; and in 
this way one angel speaks to another; for to speak to another only means to make known the mental 
concept to another].  Aquinas also says in article 5 of the same question that one angel may speak to 
another without other angels knowing what is communicated because something can be ordered by 
the will toward one thing and not another (642a).  
45  “Haec enim mysteria ex pura Dei voluntate dependent; si enim unus angelus non potest 
cognoscere cogitationes alterius ex voluntate eius dependentes, multo minus potest cognoscere ea 
quae ex sola Dei voluntate dependent “ (349b) [For these mysteries depend upon the pure will of 
God: and if an angel cannot learn the thoughts of another angel, which depend upon the will of such 
angel, much less can he ascertain what depends entirely upon God's will]. 
46  In reply to objection 11 Aquinas says “Ad undecimum dicendum, quod unus angelus cognitionem 
alterius cognoscit per speciem innatam per quam alium angelum cognoscit, quia per eamdem 
cognoscit omne quod cognoscit in alio angelo.  Unde quam cito angelus se ordinat ad alium angelum 
secundum actum alicuius formae, ille angelus dependent ex voluntate angeli.  Sed cognoscibilitas 
naturae angelicae non dependet ex voluntate angeli:  et ideo non requiritur locutio in angelis ad 
cognoscendum naturam, sed ad cognoscendum cogitationem tantum” (1867) [One angel knows the 
thought of another through the innate species by which he knows that other angel, because through 
this same species he knows all that he knows about  the other angel.  Consequently, as soon as one 
angel relates himself to another angel according to an act of some form, the other angel knows his 
thought; and this depends on the will of the first angel.  But the knowability of the angelic nature 
does not depend on the will of the angel.  Therefore, angels do not need speech to know the nature of 
other angels but only to know their thoughts] (427).  Latin text of the DV is from the Spiazzi edition.  
Translation is from McGlynn.  I had previously independently discussed most of the above citations 
from Aquinas in an early draft of this paper.  Mengaldo addresses most of the same passages.  
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Mengaldo thus concludes that Aquinas is a source in letter rather than in spirit (191-
2).  Additional sources may well remain to be identified, but most significant for this 
study is that Mengaldo shows that the idea of two modes of angelic communication 
was widespread enough to appear in Vincent’s encyclopedia, demonstrating a 
philosophical context likely to have been known to Dante, either through Vincent 
himself or through one of the encyclopedist’s numerous sources. 
 This context is likely to have provided Dante with the two primary modes of 
mind reading in the Commedia.  But we should note Dante’s transference of these 
modes onto a very different situation; mind reading is practiced not by angels 
communicating but by souls separated from the body who read Dante pilgrim’s 
mind, while he cannot reciprocate.47 Vincent’s claim that the “animae sanctorum” 
also gaze into the divine speculum appears not to be an unusual belief.  Aquinas says 
in DV q.19, a.1 that disembodied souls know in the same way as angels do.48 Thus 
the idea of souls able to communicate with one another via mind reading is 
consistent with major philosophical sources, while the souls’ ability to read a living 
human’s thoughts contradicts those sources.  
 I believe the specifics of the Commedia’s mind reading are drawn from both 
the later technical philosophical theories and the earlier medieval sources, including 
                                                
47 Alessandro Raffi states that Dante pilgrim’s inability to read minds is consistent with Aquinas’ 
emphasis on the separation between man and angels (36), but denying telepathic powers to Dante 
pilgrim may have been a choice driven more by the narrative exigencies of the poem than by 
philosophy; it would not make sense for Dante pilgrim to read souls’ minds. Perhaps more 
importantly it would diminish the tension of silence vs. speech that Dante poet manipulates so 
enthusiastically. 
48 “Sed quando habebit esse a corpore absolutum, tunc recipient influentiam intellectualis cognitionis 
hoc modo quo angeli recipiunt sine aliquo ordine ad corpus, ut scilicet species rerum ab ipso Deo 
recipiat, ne oporteat ad intelligendum in actu per has species, vel per eas quas prius acquisivit, ad 
aliqua phantasmata converti “ (359) [But, when it will have its being free of the body, then it will 
receive the influx of intellectual knowledge in the way in which angels receive it, without any 
ordination to the body.  Thus it will receive species of things from God himself, in order not to have 
to turn to any phantasms actually to know through these species or through those which it acquired 
previously] (390).  In ST q.89, a.2 
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the popular theories of demonic mind reading and the saints’ telepathy in 
hagiographic legends.  Taken together, both the technical and popular sources 
provide compelling evidence for better understanding some of the puzzling features 
in the Commedia’s representation of mind reading.  One of these is the issue of 
Vergil’s abilities.  The technical sources affirm a direct mode of telepathy practiced 
by angels both good and bad, which proves that not only the specular mode is valid 
and suggests one possible category for Vergil’s mind reading given that his 
telepathic episodes are described as occurring directly.  Yet it is in the popular 
theories and hagiographic legends that we find not only a more definitive model for 
both people and angels/demons knowing the thoughts of human beings but also the 
origin of the epistemological uncertainty that Dante incorporated into his poem.  As 
guide, Vergil’s role descends not only from other guides in the vision tradition,49 but 
from the idea of the pagan daimon, whose telepathic abilities emerge in early 
Christian notions of the demon, but also the angel and the saint.50 While some might 
doubt a relationship between Vergil’s abilities and these contexts, there are two 
strong reasons to argue for it.  One involves precedent:  Dante’s unique practices of 
including pagan figures and ideas.  The other involves the specifics of Vergil’s mind 
reading in the poem, which incorporates details and strikingly similar patterns of 
ambiguity from the early theories.   
 Stephen Bemrose speaks to Dante’s use of pagan figures in his study of 
angelic intelligences.  Bemrose is primarily concerned to explore Dante’s particular 
                                                
49 See the introduction for discussion of mind-reading guides in earlier visions.   
50 Zaleski confirms a general link between the guide and the daimon: “As protector and guardian 
angel, the guide figure is related to Greek and Roman ideas of the personal daimon or tutelary 
genius” (54).  See also Simon Gilson’s excellent article “Medieval Magical Lore and Dante’s 
Commedia:  Divination and Demonic Agency,” in which the author demonstrates convincingly the 
way in which Dante believed in a reality of demonic agency as part of the natural order and the 
astonishingly eclectic way in which the poet incorporates elements from popular and intellectual 
sources. 
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treatment of the way in which Aristotle’s separated motor substances became 
associated with angels in the Christian west.51 But he also demonstrates as original 
Dante’s treatment of the pagan gods, associating them in some cases with God’s 
justice and in other cases with angels.  Readers of the Commedia may be aware that 
Dante includes pagan figures in a manner that does not conform to medieval 
tradition.52 Bemrose, however, shows the remarkable extent of Dante’s respect for 
the meaning of pagan myths on their own terms, such as in Inf. 14.51-60 when the 
blasphemous pagan Capaneus recounts how Jove struck him dead (127).  Capaneus 
mentions Jove’s name as the one whom he has offended in line 52: “Se Giove 
stanchi ‘l suo fabbro da cui / crucciato prese la folgore aguta / onde l’ultimo dì 
percosso fui…” (52-54)53 While many medieval Christian writers would celebrate 
blasphemy against a pagan deity, Dante instead makes Jove’s authority embody that 
of the Christian God (128).54 Likewise in Inf. 31 the pilgrim and Vergil meet biblical 
giants as well as pagan ones.  Ephialtes rebelled against “il sommo Giove” (92), and 
in Purg 12 the pagan giant Briareus is represented as struck by Jupiter’s thunderbolt 
as the second exemplum of pride, while the third represents the victorious 
Olympians (Pallas and Mars “intorno al padre loro”) gazing down at the defeated 
Titans (129).  These classical examples gain religious significance by the fact that 
they are framed in parallel fashion with biblical ones:  Inf. 31 shows Nimrod with 
Ephialtes and the Purg. 12 passage displays Lucifer cast out of heaven as the first 
                                                
51 He mentions without comment Dante’s DVE passage regarding angelic communication (73). 
52 For example Bemrose claims that whereas in the Middle Ages, there was a tendency to demonize 
classical myth, Dante demonizes only the pagans’ inferi and associates Apollo, Venus, and Minerva 
with angelic intelligences (151). 
53 “Though Jove wear out the smith from whom he took, / in wrath, the keen-edged thunderbolt with 
which / on my last day I was to be transfixed…” 
54 Dante, of course, includes many pagans in hell because they have transgressed against what 
Bemrose calls “universal human standards.”  Thus Alexander is damned for being a tyrant and 
Cassius for being a traitor.  The example of Capaneus and others cited above are exceptional because 
their offenses regard the supernatural order, and it is the pagan aspect of this realm that Dante 
preserves to a remarkable degree by including them in the manner that he does (127-28). 
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exemplum.55 Bemrose concludes that Dante intends to present the Titans as 
analogous to the rebel angels and Jupiter and other Olympians as analogous to God 
and the good angels (129).  The poet’s purpose in doing so is to “expose the spiritual 
realities which the myths disguise, and this concern is a significant illustration of the 
seriousness with which he regarded what we may call the ‘doctrinal content’ of 
classical literature” (155).  Specifically, for Dante the origin of Graeco-Roman 
polytheism could be “found in the Intelligences’ operations in our world (and not in 
some mendacious fable whispered by evil spirits to, say, the priests of Delphi)” 
(156). 
 Whereas Dante more frequently interprets pagan figures in terms of 
Christian angelology, Bemrose claims that he does the reverse in the case of the 
mysterious messo celeste in Inf. 9.64-103, the celestial messenger who arrives to 
admit the travelers into Dis after the demons bar their entry.  The identity of this 
figure has received much attention from scholars, who have noted similarities to the 
pagan winged Mercury, especially the little wand (“verghetta”) of line 89 carried by 
the messo.56 Here Bemrose believes that Dante “has deliberately chosen to endow 
with the characteristics of a pagan god an angelic being entirely of his own 
invention, an invention occasioned by the narrative exigencies of the poem” (142).  
This reversal also reinforces the notion of a shared identity between the Christian 
God’s angels and pagan deities.   
 These examples show Dante’s originality in including (not merely 
allegorizing) pagan figures and characteristics in a Christian universe.  This pattern 
supports the idea of Vergil’s telepathy as rooted in popular pagan notions of the 
daimon as filtered through Christianity.  We have seen how Gregory followed 
                                                
55 See Bemrose pages 130 and following for additional examples of Dante’s representation of pagan 
gods in the role of angels. 
56 See S. Pasquazi’s entry ‘Messo celeste’ in the Enciclopedia Dantesca. 
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Plutarch in professing the human soul’s telepathic ability, and how Brown links the 
role of the patron saint to that of the pagan daimon.  However, I do not intend on 
this basis to argue that Vergil should be defined wholly in terms of the daimon, the 
saint, or guardian angel.  But it is in these early popular figures, in clear contrast to 
later medieval philosophy, that we find the particular characteristic of a guardian 
figure knowing a human being’s thoughts.  The Commedia incorporates this feature 
in its portrayal of mind reading, including in Vergil’s case.57 
 Lending even greater weight to this theory is that the poem also incorporates 
features of the shaky epistemological ground on which early Christian theories of 
mind reading rest.  Just as the early stories and theories reveal inconsistencies about 
how, when, and whether humans, demons, and angels read minds, the Commedia 
reflects strikingly similar problems.  As discussed in chapter 1, one of these involves 
knowledge intuited through body language versus true mind reading.  Augustine 
                                                
57 The issue of Vergil’s supernatural knowledge in the medieval Vergilian legends should here be 
mentioned.  Domenico Comparetti, when speaking of Vergil’s omniscience in the Commedia, does 
not include or even mention mind reading as part of Vergil’s knowledge, perhaps because the 
author’s principal goal is to distance Dante from the popular legends, insisting “The purely popular 
reputation of a literary man could not be of any account to one who held art so high as Dante did and 
had so lofty a conception of the ancient poets.  In matters of art and intellect Dante is an intense 
aristocrat” (219). He attributes Vergil’s omniscience to Dante’s participation in the medieval belief in 
the ancient poets as scholars and philosophers with encyclopedic knowledge (224).  The legends 
mostly present Vergil as having magic powers, such as when he is said to construct a bronze horse 
that protects horses from breaking their backs, or a bronze fly that keeps flies out of the city of 
Naples, or a butcher’s block that keeps meat fresh for six weeks, or baths that cure myriad illnesses, 
and so on (259).  The one legend in which Vergil appears to have mind reading abilities is the so-
called “bocca della verità” (mouth of truth) in which Vergil is said to have built at Rome a marble 
head with the mouth open.  Women whose chastity was in doubt were required to swear with their 
hands in the mouth of the marble head; if they swore falsely, the mouth shut, cutting off or injuring 
the hand.  A particular woman outsmarts the head by having her lover disguise himself as a madman 
and embrace her before her husband’s eyes.  She then swears that the only men whom she has 
embraced include her husband and the madman and thus she withdraws her hand unharmed: 
“Thereupon Vergil, who in his omniscience was aware of the deception, was forced to confess that 
even he was no match for a woman” (337). While I have no interest in distancing the Commedia 
from the Vergilian legends, the legends mostly emphasize magical powers and not telepathy per se, 
and so I do not here address them as a context for Vergil’s telepathy in the poem.  Further, as argued 
in chapter 1, Dante represents Vergil’s knowledge in terms of epistemological ambiguity, not 
omniscience.  A possible link between the Vergilian legends and the pagan figure of the daimon 
merits further attention but is, obviously, beyond the scope of this study, 
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asserted demonic knowledge on the basis of enhanced power to read body language 
only to retract this theory and confess ignorance, nonetheless maintaining his belief 
in demonic and angelic powers.  Antony both reduced the demons’ abilities to a 
simple physical advantage only to turn around and affirm their supernatural power.  
This is not to say that Dante deliberately imported these contradictions, but chapter 
1 demonstrates the poem’s brilliant epistemology of body language, making it hard 
to know whether Vergil but also Beatrice and other blessed souls know Dante’s 
thoughts via mind reading or a natural sort of perception. That both the theories and 
Dante fail to offer definitive answers is part of the point.  Consciously or not, Dante 
internalized an uncertain epistemological history vis-à-vis supernatural knowledge – 
a history that his poem reenacts in its treatment of telepathy.   
 Another characteristic of this history is the notion of partial knowledge.  As 
discussed in chapter 1, the Commedia repeatedly elaborates thematically the 
revelation of truth in the context of occlusion during telepathic exchanges.  This 
pattern of intensification echoes Gregory’s declaration in Dialogue 4 of heightened 
prophecy due to the world’s imminent end; the Commedia’s mind reading 
problematizes the promise of pure knowledge, analogous to the promise of ever-
greater prophesy in an imperfect world.  Further, the poem’s theme of a continuum 
of knowledge recalls even more clearly Gregory’s statement in the second Dialogue 
concerning the prophets’ inconsistent abilities, which are based on the extent to 
which they are one with God.  The idea of the continuum suggests another layer of 
epistemological complexity in the Commedia that has to do with the distinction 
between the direct and specular modes of mind reading, bringing us back to the 
technical philosophical sources of the later Middle Ages.  As noted above, these 
sources distinguish the two modes in the context of angelic communication, 
suggesting a continuum with the specular mode as a special privilege granted to 
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angels through the grace of God.   
 Understanding why the mirror image became such an appealing metaphor 
throughout the Middle Ages will frame our discussion of specular mind reading in 
the poem.  The metaphor of specular knowledge in particular was extremely 
widespread.58 Anna Torti explains lucidly how the function of the mirror made it 
especially suitable as a metaphor that would fascinate medieval thinkers.  The 
process of reflection is based on an analogical relationship between the original 
image and its reflection, producing a likeness.  This replication entails two key 
properties.  The first is the transitory and ahistorical nature of the fleeting image.  
Yet is it precisely this transitoriness that creates the second property: the atemporal 
and metaphysical potential of the image, which refers back to an ideal (i.e. real) 
image.  These qualities generate a paradox in meaning of the reflected image, as 
transitory and local versus eternal and ideal (14).  Maurizio Calvesi further states 
that these atemporal and metaphysical characteristics make the mirror an ideal 
instrument for representing what transcends the limits of space and time.  Thus it is 
easy to understand the mirror’s potential as a symbol of human imagination, the 
mind, and the soul, as well as an instrument/symbol of knowledge and of the truth.  
Knowledge resides in the mind as a sort of reflection in a mirror – hence the 
metaphor that knowledge is realized through a process of speculation and reflection.   
 A fundamental ontological reality of the Middle Ages is its specular self 
definition through the relationship between macrocosm and microcosm.  The 
metaphor of the mirror was perfect for illuminating the way in which these 
                                                
58 The following review of the mirror metaphor in the Middle Ages and Dante’s use of it in the 
Commedia is partly drawn from my thesis “L’immagine dello specchio nella Commedia e nel 
pensiero medievale,” [Mirror Imagery in the Commedia and in Medieval Thought] presented for the 
M.A. degree in Italian literature at Middlebury College in 2006.  
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dimensions (like space and time) intersected and reflected each other (33).59 Based 
on the mirror’s transitory and yet atemporal and ideal characteristics, numerous 
scholars60 define a dichotomy in the tradition of specular symbology in which the 
mirror can play a positive or negative role.  It becomes a symbol of prudence but 
also of vanity, of knowledge of the truth but also ignorance and falsity, of virtues 
and of vices.61 Hence the Christian tradition deploys the metaphor to represent both 
divine knowledge and lack thereof, as in 1 Cor. 13:12: “videmus nunc per speculum 
in enigmate tunc autem facie ad faciem; nunc cognosco ex parte tunc autem 
cognoscam sicut et cognitus sum.”62 
 Dante’s use of mirror imagery with respect to mind reading in the Paradiso 
conforms neither to the simplistic moral opposition of speculum in bono/in malo nor 
to the philosophical dichotomy of knowledge obtained directly or through the 
speculum, with the latter indicating holy privilege.  The visual mode of telepathy is 
                                                
59 Montanari comments that in medieval Latin the word “speculum” gained a level of prestige equal 
to other words such as “Imago, potestas, ordo, expositio, commentarium, breviarium, repertorium, 
summa, rationale, exemplum, contemplatio, quodlibetum, quaestio, tabula, scriptorium” and others 
(85-86). 
60 Including Torti, Calvesi, Cardini, Baltrusaitis, and Gabriele. 
61 As Gabriele states “è proprio la medesima inafferrabilità dell’immagine riflessa” (37) that 
paradoxically underlies both the “speculum stultitiae and the speculum sapentiae” [it is precisely the 
same elusiveness of the reflected image ….. mirror of ignorance and the mirror of wisdom].  
According to Baltrusaitis (64) and Cacciari (“Narciso o della pittura” in Fallit imago) this binary 
opposition is rooted in Greek myths of Dionysius and Narcissus. 
62 “Now we see through a mirror obscurely but then we will see face to face; now I know partially 
but then I will know as I am known.”  The verse is famous for interpretive problems, due to the 
prepositions “per” and “in” which raise the question of what it means to see “per speculum in 
enigmate.”  Peter Nolan rejects the possibility of conclusive interpretation, while other scholars 
taking a more philological approach, including Barret, Hugedé and Jónsson, affirm that Paul 
expresses humans’ inadequate knowledge of God. Hugedé gives particular attention to “videmus in 
enigmate” given that an enigma is normally found in a verbal rather than visual metaphor:  
traditionally one speaks in enigma, but one does not see in enigma.  He specifies that in Greek, 
however, “enigma” can signify an image or illustration, thus concluding that seeing in the speculum 
is synonymous with seeing in enigma:  “sont pratiquement equivalents, en ce qu’elles désignent l’une 
et l’autre une réalité indirectement saisie” (148) [they are practically equivalent since one and the 
other designate a reality known indirectly].  See also his discussion of mirror imagery in 2 Cor. 3:18 
which he likewise interprets as indicating indirect knowledge of the divine.  See also Baltrusaitis and 
Massimo Cacciari for the origins in Greek mythology of the speculum in bono/in malo, rooted in the 
figures of Dionysius and Narcissus. 
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not even dominant in the third canticle.63 Of the 38 episodes of mind reading in that 
canticle, 18, or slightly less than half, occur in the visual mode, while 20 occur 
directly.64 One common way in which direct episodes unfold is when souls simply 
declare what Dante pilgrim wishes to know, as in 9.112 when Folchetto di Marsiglia 
says “Tu vuo’ saper chi è in questa lumera / che qui appresso me così scintilla / 
come raggio di sole in acqua mera” (112-14).65 At other times the soul answers 
Dante in a way indicating knowledge of his thoughts, as in 18.5, when Dante 
silently considers the bittersweet implications of Cacciaguida’s prophesy, to which 
Beatrice responds with “Muta pensier; pensa ch’i’ sono / presso a colui ch’ogne 
torto disgrava.”66 This is the mode seen in many of Vergil’s mind reading episodes, 
as in Purg. 13.76 when he perceives that Dante wishes to speak to the envious souls 
and thus immediately instructs him to speak (“Ben sapev’ ei che volea dir lo muto; / 
e però non attese mia dimanda, / ma disse: ‘Parla, e sie breve e arguto.’”), or in 
Purg. 19.58 when Vergil reports what Dante has seen in his vision of the antica 
                                                
63 In the first version of this chapter I stated that the visual mode is dominant in the third canticle but 
have since found this not to be the case.  The direct and visual modes each comprise roughly half of 
the episodes in the Paradiso. 
64 I am including in this calculation any and all episodes that suggest knowledge based on silent 
communication, including some instances that I discuss in chapter 1 as possible examples of 
communication via body language, episodes complicated by various sorts of rhetoric, etc.  Direct 
episodes include cantos 2.25, 4.91, 7.121, 9.112, 10.58, 10.91, 13.37, 13.88, 14.10, 17.4, 18.4, 19.31, 
19.69, 22.1, 22.25, 24.7, 25.50, 26.4, 30.70, 32.49.  Visually-oriented episodes include cantos 1.82, 
4.7, 7.10, 7.52, 8.85, 9.16, 9.73, 11.19, 15.55, 20.79, 21.45, 24.40, 26.94, 26.103, 27.103, 28.40, 
28.97, 29.10. 
65 “You wish to know who is within / the light that here beside me sparkles so, / as a ray of sun in 
limpid water.”   
66 “Shift your thoughts: remember – I am close / to Him who lightens every unjust hurt.”  A slightly 
more ambiguous example appears at 10.59-61, when Dante ascends to the heaven of the sun and 
becomes so rapt in God’s love as to eclipse Beatrice:  “e sì tutto ‘l mio amore in lui si mise, / che 
Beatrice eclissò ne l’oblio. / Non le dispiacque, ma sì se ne rise,…”  [and all my love / was so intent 
on Him that Beatrice / was then eclipsed within forgetfulness. / But not displeased by this, she 
smiled…].  In this instance Dante assumes that Beatrice’s smile is in reaction to her eclipse in his 
memory, which may be read as parallel to episodes in which Dante pilgrim assumes or states that 
Vergil knows his thoughts, without other confirmation, as in Inf. 19.39 when Dante declares his will 
to be one with Vergil’s adding “e sai quel che si tace” [you know what is unspoken]. 
 139 
strega (“’Vedesti,’ disse, ‘quell’antica strega …”).67 
 The first example of mind reading in the Paradiso occurs in the visual mode 
but is not especially marked as a new or privileged form of communication.  It is 
found at 1.82 when Dante feels intense desire to know the origin of the light and 
sound he experiences, to which Beatrice responds:  “Ond' ella, che vedea me sì com' 
io, / a quïetarmi l'animo commosso, / pria ch'io a dimandar, la bocca aprio / e 
cominciò:” (84-8).68 Mandelbaum translates the first verse as “And she who read me 
as I read myself,” presumably to emphasize Beatrice’s act of telepathy, which might 
otherwise go unnoticed.  Perhaps Dante does not introduce this event as unusual or 
limited to heaven because it is not the first example of visually-oriented mind 
reading in the poem.  Vergil’s mind reading is represented in visual terms in Inf. 
23.25 and in Purg. 15.127.69 Further, in a manner that goes beyond the scolding of 
Dante for his lack of comprehension,70 Beatrice in Purg. 33.73 claims to see into 
Dante’s confused intellect as she delivers her allegorical lecture:  
 
     Ma perch' io veggio te ne lo 'ntelletto  
   fatto di pietra e, impetrato, tinto,  
   sì che t'abbaglia il lume del mio detto,  
     voglio anco, e se non scritto, almen dipinto,  
   che 'l te ne porti dentro a te per quello  
   che si reca il bordon di palma cinto» (Purg. 33.73-78).71 
This pattern of souls telling Dante that they see his thoughts is often how the 
                                                
67 Canto 13.76: [He knew quite well what I, though mute, had meant; / and thus he did not wait for 
my request, / but said: ‘Speak, and be brief and to the point.’]  Canto 19.58: [You saw, he said, that 
ancient witch…].  Chapter 1 mentions canto 13 and discusses in depth the episode in canto 19. 
68  “And she who saw me as I see myself, / to quiet the commotion in my mind, / opened her lips 
before I could ask / and she began.”   
69 The episode in Purg. 15.127 is discussed in chapter 1.  See below for discussion of Inf. 23.25.  An 
episode that suggests intuition based on body language (and thus may or may not be an example of 
mind reading) in Purg. 19.86 is also visually oriented. 
70 For examples lines 33, and 64, 67-70.  
71  “But since I see your intellect is made / of stone and, petrified, grown so opaque - / the light of 
what I saw has left you dazed - / I’d also have you bear my words within you - / if not inscribed, at 
least outlined – just as / the pilgrim’s staff is brought back wreathed with palm.” 
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visually oriented episodes occur in the Paradiso.  Beatrice tells Dante in 4.16 that 
she sees that he is torn between two thoughts,72 and in 7.52 that she sees his mind 
entangled73, and so on. 
 There are two important points to note about episodes in the visual mode.  
First is that they do not signal a privileged form of communication among souls in 
heaven.  That is, while the visual mode occurs more often in the third canticle than 
in the first two canticles, I find no pattern of differentiation between heavenly souls 
who use the direct mode versus those who carry out the visual mode in general.  I 
also find no spiritual differentiation by topic in the use of the two modes:  souls 
reading Dante’s mind in the visual mode do not discuss matters that especially 
imply God’s grace.  The second point is that the visually oriented episodes imply 
looking into God’s mirror but rarely refer to this mechanism and only mention the 
mirror explicitly in two instances.  Yet there is an interesting differential pattern 
when the mirror is either suggested or named.  The more closely Dante hints at the 
speculum of God or actually names it, the more he celebrates language, poetry, and 
human relationships.  In cantos 8 and 9, the poet encounters three souls in the sphere 
of Venus, all of secular origin, and he suggests in each meeting the act of mind 
reading by means of reflection.  Yet each episode in different ways emphasizes not 
transcendent knowledge but transient joy.  The first, at canto 8.85, is Dante’s 
affectionate response to Charles Martel’s history of his brief reign on earth.   
 
     «Però ch'i' credo che l'alta letizia 
   che 'l tuo parlar m'infonde, segnor mio,  
   là 've ogne ben si termina e s'inizia,  
                                                
72 “Io veggio ben come ti tira / uno e altro disio, sì che tua cura / sé stessa lega sì che fuor non spira” 
(16-18) [I see well how both desires draw you, / so that your anxiousness to know is self- / entangled 
and cannot express itself]. 
73  “Ma io veggi' or la tua mente ristretta / di pensiero in pensier dentro ad un nodo, / del qual con 
gran disio solver s'aspetta” (52-4) [ But I now see your understanding tangled / by thought on thought 
into a knot, from which / with much desire, your mind awaits release]. 
 141 
     per te si veggia come la vegg' io,  
   grata m'è più; e anco quest' ho caro  
   perché 'l discerni rimirando in Dio  (Par. 8.85-90).74 
The source of Dante’s joy is Martel’s “parlar,” a joy that is increased perhaps 
mainly by the fact that Martel and Dante share the experience of perceiving it (“per 
te si veggia come la vegg’io) rather than the mechanism.  The subsequent statement 
in lines 89-90 appears subordinate in comparison:  Dante is also glad that Martel 
discerns it by gazing at God, but this is the additional “caro” reason for his joy, not 
the primary one of “alta letizia.”  Dante thus conspicuously celebrates human 
speech that is pointedly about human history, in a manner that values human 
connection and diminishes by comparison the divine mechanism of knowing by 
gazing into God’s mirror, or in this case God himself. 
 The next two instances are both in canto 9, with the first at line 19 after 
Dante receives permission from Beatrice to address the soul that has brightened 
before him:  “Deh, metti al mio voler tosto compenso, / beato spirto,” dissi, “e 
fammi prova / ch’I’ possa in te refletter quell ch’io penso!” (19-21).75 Here Dante 
represents mind reading as something of a delightful game, as he asks Cunizza to 
prove that she can discern his thoughts.  Yet he places emphasis on his agency, by 
asking her to provide proof not that she can perceive, but that he can reflect in her 
his thoughts (ch’I’ possa in te refletter).  Mind reading affords an opportunity for 
playful social interaction with a soul who on earth was a notoriously amorous lady.76 
Upon seeing the light of Folchetto di Marsiglia, Dante intensifies his focus on love 
                                                
74   In this case I follow Singleton’s more accurate translation with a few alterations.  “Because I 
believe that the deep joy / that your words infuse in me is, / even as I see it, seen by you, my lord, / 
there where every good begins and ends, /  it (i.e. the joy) is more welcome to me, and I also hold 
this dear / because you discern it by gazing upon God.” 
75 “’Pray, blessed spirit, may you remedy - / quickly – my wish to know,’ I said, ‘give me / proof 
that what I think I can reflect in you.” 
76 According to the commentaries of both Singleton (164) and Sapegno (115) who cite numerous 
other commentators as well. 
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of spiritual and physical union but also love of language, both spoken and poetic.  
 
     «Dio vede tutto, e tuo veder s'inluia»,  
   diss' io, «beato spirto, sì che nulla  
   voglia di sé a te puot' esser fuia.  
     Dunque la voce tua, che 'l ciel trastulla  
   sempre col canto di quei fuochi pii  
   che di sei ali facen la coculla,  
     perché non satisface a' miei disii?  
   Già non attendere' io tua dimanda,  
   s'io m'intuassi, come tu t'inmii»  (Par. 9.73-81).77 
It is Folchetto’s voice that gladdens the heavens, and the lush neologisms “inluia,” 
“m’intuassi” and “t’inmii” convey to the reader an extravagant desire for the 
temporal.  Dante’s love of the new comes out most forcefully in these made-up 
words, de-emphasizing the notion of silent union they attempt to express.  
Contributing to this effect is the words’ intensely physical, and perhaps even erotic 
suggestiveness; in line 73 Dante describes Folchetto’s vision as entering God.  
Mandelbaum softens the corporeal nuance of “s’inluia” with the translation “your 
vision is contained in him,” presumably to avoid the potentially disturbing notion 
that one’s vision can penetrate on equal terms God himself.  But that is 
Mandelbaum’s interpretation of an invented word that does not obviously indicate 
such a hierarchy.  In line 81 the physical implication is unavoidable as Dante 
pointedly does not convey reflection through the divine but implies direct 
penetration, further suggesting his wish to participate by declaring how he would 
respond to Folchetto.  The point is not to reduce or deny Dante’s spiritual intention 
but to engage the effect of his words – words that convey most prominently love of 
speech, poetry, and social connection.78 
                                                
77 “’God sees all, I said, ‘and, blessed spirit, / your vision enters him, so that / no wish can ever hide 
itself from you. / Your voice has always made the heavens glad, / as has the singing of the pious fires 
/ that make themselves a cowl of their six wings: / I would not have to wait for your request / if I 
could enter you as you do me.” 
78 There is one mind reading passage that also emphasizes love of language but does not hint at or 
name the mirror, which is 7.10-16 when Dante’s desire for language is so intense that it prevents him 
 143 
 The expression of these values reaches its summit in canto 15 when Dante 
first names the mirror in a mind reading encounter with his ancestor Cacciaguida.  
In Dante’s stunning description of the cross formed by luminous souls, Cacciaguida 
emerges as a shooting star, drawn to his progeny as Anchises to Aeneas (25), and 
likening Dante to Saint Paul when he says “«O sanguis meus, o superinfusa / gratïa 
Deï, sicut tibi cui / bis unquam celi ianüa reclusa?».79 At this Dante is stupefied, 
(“stupefatto” 33), turning to Beatrice for reassurance, and when Cacciaguida 
continues speaking the profundity of his words makes them initially 
incomprehensible to Dante.  His speech eventually descends to the realm of mortal 
sense, at which point  
 
     la prima cosa che per me s'intese,   
   «Benedetto sia tu», fu, «trino e uno,  
   che nel mio seme se' tanto cortese!». 
     E seguì: «Grato e lontano digiuno, 
   tratto leggendo del magno volume  
   du' non si muta mai bianco né bruno,  
     solvuto hai, figlio, dentro a questo lume  
   in ch'io ti parlo, mercè di colei  
   ch'a l'alto volo ti vestì le piume.  
     Tu credi che a me tuo pensier mei  
   da quel ch'è primo, così come raia  
   da l'un, se si conosce, il cinque e 'l sei;  
     e però ch'io mi sia e perch' io paia  
   più gaudïoso a te, non mi domandi,  
   che alcun altro in questa turba gaia.  
     ‘Tu credi 'l vero; ché i minori e ' grandi  
   di questa vita miran ne lo speglio  
   in che, prima che pensi, il pensier pandi;  
     ma perché 'l sacro amore in che io veglio  
                                                
from voicing it:  “Io dubitava e dicea `Dille, dille!' / fra me, `dille' dicea, `a la mia donna / che mi 
diseta con le dolci stille'. / Ma quella reverenza che s'indonna / di tutto me, pur per Be e per ice, mi 
richinava come l'uom ch'assonna [I was perplexed, and to myself, I said: / ‘Tell her!  Tell her!  Tell 
her, the lady who / can slake my thirst with her sweet drops’; and yet / the reverence that possesses 
all of me, / even on hearing only Be and ice, / had bowed my head – I seemed a man asleep.]  See 
chapter 5 for further discussion of this passage. 
79 “O blood of mine – o the celestial grace / bestowed beyond all measure – unto whom / as unto you 
was Heaven’s gate twice opened?” 
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   con perpetüa vista e che m'asseta  
   di dolce disïar, s'adempia meglio,  
     la voce tua sicura, balda e lieta 
   suoni la volontà, suoni 'l disio,  
   a che la mia risposta è già decreta!» (Par. 15.46-69).80 
The speech is framed with corporeal metaphors of hunger and thirst:  Dante’s 
appearance has broken the “grato e lontano digiuno” (49) of his ancestor, whose 
desire to hear the pilgrim’s voice still fuels the love that makes him thirst (“e che 
m’asseta / di dolce disiar” 67).  Further, the desire that Cacciaguida wishes to hear 
Dante express concerns the former’s identity and the reason for his remarkable joy – 
in other words their historical lineage on earth.  This history is figured with nearly 
overwhelming richness, through the chronology implied by numbers in lines 47 
(“trino e uno”) and 57 (“così come raia /da l'un, se si conosce, il cinque e 'l sei), 
through the adjective “cortese” in line 48 which indicates God’s generosity but also 
recalls the nobility of family, and through textual imagery and allusions.  In addition 
to the references to Aeneas and St. Paul in the lines just preceding the speech, Dante 
figures universal history as contained in the “magno volume,” only to recall in 
“l’alto volo” of line 54 both Icarus and the “folle volo” (mad flight) of Ulysses in 
Inf. 26.125.  All of the values in the mind reading passages discussed above are 
crystallized here: physical longing, family and social relationship and identity, 
literary and biblical history, love of speech and poetry.  In this context, the “speglio” 
                                                
80 “these were the first words where I caught the sense: / ‘Blessed be you, both Three and One, who 
show / such favor to my seed.’  And he continued: / ‘The long and happy hungering I drew / from 
reading that great volume where both black / and white are never changed, you – son – have now / 
appeased within this light in which I speak / to you; for this, I owe my gratitude / to her who gave 
you wings for your high flight. / You think your thoughts flow into me from Him / who is the First – 
as from the number one, / the five and six derive, if one is known - / and so you do not ask me who I 
am / and why I seem more joyous to you than / all other spirits in this festive throng. / Your thought 
is true, for both the small and great / of this life gaze into that mirror where, / before you think, your 
thoughts have been displayed. / But that the sacred love in which I keep / my vigil with unending 
watchfulness, / the love that makes me thirst with sweet desire, / be better satisfied, let your voice 
bold, / assured, and glad – proclaim your will and longing, / to which my answer is decreed 
already.’”  Readers should consult this translation for the words and phrases from this passage that 
are repeated below. 
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named in line 62 as Cacciaguida explains the mechanism of telepathy signifies more 
than simply a transcendent privilege for knowing Dante’s thoughts.  Dante enacts it 
for the first time in the Paradiso as an elaborate reflection of his own history at its 
most deeply personal and profound. 
 What these passages show is that Dante entirely ignores the binary 
continuum of knowledge that philosophical sources assign to the mirror.  For him, 
the mirror signals history that privileges the temporal and personal.  The second 
mind reading passage in which the mirror is named appears at canto 26 when Dante 
meets another earthly “padre antico” (92)81. I refer, of course, to Adam who declares 
that he knows the pilgrim’s thoughts “perch' io la veggio nel verace speglio / che fa 
di sé pareglio a l'altre cose, / e nulla face lui di sé pareglio” (106-8).82 All of Dante’s 
thoughts that Adam perceives pertain to the first man’s existence on earth.  He 
wishes to know how much time has passed since Adam was placed in the earthly 
paradise, how long he was there, the true cause of his expulsion, and last but not 
least, the language that he spoke.  In both cantos 15 and 26 Dante presents the 
speglio in terms of his earthly family, contextualizing the usage of the mirror in 
metaphors of knowledge that are pointedly temporal.   
 This fact might tempt one to conclude that Dante manipulates the mirror in a 
narcissistic way and therefore erroneously falls into engaging the speculum in 
malo.83 Yet I believe that his use of the mirror is better described as polyvalent.  In 
                                                
81 “ancient father.” 
82 “for I can see it in the Truthful Mirror / that perfectly reflects all else, while no / thing can reflect 
that Mirror perfectly.” 
83 The poem contains the following references and allusions to Narcissus in the context of mirrors.  
The first is at Inf. 30.128 when Master Adam insults Sinon by referring to water as “lo specchio di 
Narciso.”  In Purg.26.69 Dante sees himself in the water of the earthly paradise, perhaps 
foreshadowing Beatrice’s reproach.  In Par. 3.17-18 Dante sees real figures and believes them to be 
images, contrasting his mistake to that of Narcissus, who believed his image to be a real person.  
R.A. Shoaf interprets these passages to argue that Dante eventually overcomes the danger of using 
language in a self-referential, narcissistic way.  As I discuss in my master’s thesis, I find Dante’s use 
of the Narcissus myth to be less clearly progressive.  The myth is a point of reference for ideas that 
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fact, mirror imagery abounds throughout Dante’s encounter with Cacciaguida in a 
way that resists reductive meaning.  In the Commedia, the mirror appears as an 
image or idea 33 times, with five instances concentrated in Dante’s encounter with 
Cacciaguida.84 Also in canto 15 when Cacciaguida nostalgically recounts better ages 
gone by, he refers to the virtuous wife who “venir da lo specchio” with unpainted 
face (113), and in canto 17.41 he uses the verb “specchiare” in a simile explaining 
how God knows all yet does not direct free will:  God knowing the course of events 
does not imply their necessity any more than the reflection of a ship’s course in 
one’s eyes determines that course (necessità però quindi non prende / se non come 
dal viso in che si specchia / nave che per torrente giù discende).85 In the final two 
instances, Cacciaguida himself is figured as a mirror, first at the end of canto 17 in 
response to Dante’s fear regarding his poetic mission affirmed by his ancestor:  “La 
luce in che rideva il mio tesoro / ch'io trovai lì, si fé prima corusca, / quale a raggio 
di sole specchio d'oro” (121-23).86 Immediately after at the beginning of canto 18, 
the poet reflects on his ancestor’s words:  ‘Già si godeva solo del suo verbo / quello 
specchio beato, e io gustava / lo mio, temprando col dolce l'acerbo;” (1-3).87 
 These examples offer a useful representative sampling of Dante’s 
remarkably varied use of the mirror in the poem as a whole.88 In order to understand 
                                                
are sometimes positive, sometimes negative, or ambivalent.  Likewise I believe Dante’s continued 
focus on himself in the context of specular mind reading passages in the third canticle resists the idea 
of a transcendent path to spiritual understanding.  
84 According to Wilkins’ and Bergin’s A Concordance to the Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri.  
Data was also confirmed in the ARTFL database. 
85 “but this does not imply necessity, / just as a ship that sails downstream is not / determined by the 
eye in which it is reflected.” 
86 “The light in which there smiled the treasure I / had found within it, first began to dazzle, / as 
would a golden mirror in the sun,” 
87 “By now that blessed mirror was delighting / in its own inner words; I, tasting mine, / was 
tempering the bitter with the sweet.” 
88 Indeed in the Dantean corpus we find the image used to figure characters, angels, water, the sun, 
Rome, human conscience, divine knowledge but also lack of knowledge, the eyes of Beatrice but 
also Dante’s eyes, and it appears as a scientific instrument independent of primarily moral 
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how this variety intersects with Dante’s use of imagery in telepathic episodes, we 
must turn to Einar Már Jónsson’s excellent study Le miroir: naissance d'un genre 
littéraire.89 Jónsson declares as incomplete the simple dichotomy of the speculum in 
bono/in malo, noting medieval titles that go beyond it, such as Le miroir des temps 
futures (10).90 There was, in fact, a more complex understanding and use of mirror 
imagery in the Middle Ages – a complexity that Dante perceived and nurtured in his 
poem.  He did so in part by incorporating and developing many of the specular topoi 
that had developed throughout the centuries.  One of the most common is the idea of 
the mirror of creation.  This topos has two sub-categories, in which writers conceive 
of all creation as a mirror of the creator, or of God himself as a mirror in which all 
creation is reflected (140).  The mirror of creation is of Neoplatonic origin, found in 
Plutarch’s idea of the sun as mirror of God, and later developed by Macrobius, and 
Pseudo-Dionysius, who introduced the idea of the angel as mirror reflecting divine 
light (142). 91 The visual mode of telepathy in the Commedia engages both 
                                                
significance. I discussed this in detail in my master’s thesis.  My comments here are necessarily 
limited to the scope of this project. 
89 I offer a partial review of this thorough study for its points relevant to our purposes.  Simon Gilson 
discusses medieval optics and theories of light more specifically in reference to Dante, but his study 
is mostly not relevant to mind reading.  One of Gilson’s main objectives is to show that Dante relied 
on general medieval sources and was not “at the forefront of thirteenth-century thought on optics and 
light” (2).  His chapter on “Light Reflection, Mirrors, and Meteorological Optics in the Comedy” is 
primarily concerned with Dante’s assimilation of laws of optical doctrine.  In a footnote, he 
categorizes images drawn from reflected light mainly as “souls as light reflectors, … planets and 
stars,.. angels,… Dante’s eye-mirrors,… and Beatrice reflecting divine light” (120), which represents 
part but not all of the complexity of Dante’s engagement of the image. 
90 Franco Cardini notes the myth of Perseus who defeats Medusa by means of a magical mirror, 
which may also be seen as evidence of a mirror signifying outside of the binary structure. 
91 Alessandro Raffi confirms this (15). I do not find other relevant information on telepathy in 
Pseudo-Dionysius’ De caelesti hierarchia as it is not an epistemological text.  The author is primarily 
concerned not with how angels know or how they communicate but rather with their names, 
ordering, and grouping, and generally with the manner in which their powers emanate hierarchically.  
See also Bemrose for further discussion of Dante’s angelology.  James L. Miller discusses the mirror 
of creation, arguing that Dante in the third canticle journeys from the mirror of creation to the mirror 
of God, but that his poetics also reflect this spiritual improvement (272).  I find this thesis to be 
lacking in that it does not account for the variety or the tension that Dante incorporates into his use of 
the mirror image. Monica Rutledge asserts an idea of “unease” in the elaboration of Dantean mirror 
imagery but never defines this unease or explains why it occurs. 
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categories of this topos, as it figures souls looking into the mirror of God, or in some 
cases God himself, and souls as reflections of God.  When Cacciaguida explains 
how he knows his ancestor’s thoughts in Par. 15.62 and when he is himself called a 
mirror at canto 18.2, Dante is engaging both sides of the mirror of creation.  When 
Adam explains how he knows the pilgrim’s thoughts at 26.106 (quoted above), he 
explains the relationship between creation as mirror of God and God as mirror of 
creation precisely in terms of a continuum:  God as mirror reflects all perfectly but 
every creature reflects God imperfectly.  Dante is intensely interested in exploring 
this continuum elsewhere in the poem, as in canto 29.136-45 when he represents 
angels as “speculi” in the context of Beatrice’s explanation of why they reflect 
God’s greatness in varying degrees.92 In canto 21.16, Beatrice instructs Dante to 
make eyes of his mirrors in order to reflect his understanding of another mirror, 93 
while in canto 30.85 the pilgrim gazes into the celestial rose, desiring to make his 
eyes better mirrors to reflect better his comprehension.94 
 Alessandro Raffi links his discussion of Dante’s philosophical views on 
humans in relation to beasts and angels in Convivio III, vii, 6-7 to Dante’s 
                                                
92 “La prima luce, che tutta la raia, / per tanti modi in essa si recepe, / quanti son li splendori a chi 
s'appaia. / Onde, però che a l'atto che concepe / segue l'affetto, d'amar la dolcezza / diversamente in 
essa ferve e tepe. / Vedi l'eccelso omai e la larghezza / de l'etterno valor, poscia che tanti / speculi 
fatti s'ha in che si spezza, / uno manendo in sé come davanti»” [The First Light reaches them in ways 
as many / as are the angels to which It conjoins / Itself, as It illumines all of them; / and this is why 
(because affection follows / the act of knowledge) the intensity / of love’s sweetness appears 
unequally. / By now you see the height, you see the breadth, / of the Eternal Goodness; It has made / 
so many mirrors, which divide Its light, / but, as before, Its own Self still is One].  See also canto 
9.61-3 in which Cunizza affirms her prophesy by referring to the celestial intelligences as mirror and 
canto 13.59 in which Aquinas explains the wisdom of Adam and Christ by referring to the idea of 
God’s light that is distributed in mirrored fashion in 9 substances. 
93 “Ficca di retro a li occhi tuoi la mente, / e fa di quelli specchi a la figura / che 'n questo specchio ti 
sarà parvente»” [ Let your mind follow where your eyes have led, / and let your eyes be mirrors for 
the figure / that will appear to you within this mirror] (16-18). 
94 “Non è fantin che sì sùbito rua / col volto verso il latte, se si svegli / molto tardato da l'usanza sua, 
/ come fec' io, per far migliori spegli / ancor de li occhi, chinandomi a l'onda / che si deriva perché vi 
s'immegli;” [No infant who awakes long after his / usual hour would turn his face toward milk / as 
quickly as I hurried toward that stream; / to make still finer mirrors of my eyes, / I bent down toward 
the waters which flow there / that we, in them, may find our betterment] (82-7). 
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conception of souls in the Commedia, describing the latter precisely in terms of a 
continuum of mirrors.  According to Raffi, human beings are more or less receptive 
to God’s light, such that   
 
  alla possibilità di nobilitarsi verso l’utopia dell’angelo,  
  specchio della Sapienza infinita, corrisponde la possible   
  degradazione verso la distopia della bestia, specchio  
  oscuro della materia.  L’intero impianto della Commedia 
  può essere considerato a partire da questa concezione:  
  se l’Inferno, dominio della gente grossa e bestiale,  
  dispiega la fenomenologia della degradazione umana,  
  il Paradiso percorre la scala opposta mostrando tutti  
  i gradi del <<trasumanar>> verso beatitudini sempre  
  maggiori” (52).95 
The idea of souls on a continuum is nothing new, but the specular link is key.  For 
Dante, the mirror’s capacity varies just as does the capacity of souls to reflect God’s 
light.  Yet this variety operates far more widely than simple capacity to reflect divine 
light.  In the example quoted above at Par. 15.113 when Cacciaguida describes the 
virtuous wife who leaves her mirror with unpainted face, Dante contradicts the 
negative medieval stereotype of the vain lady at her mirror,96 but in this case the 
“specchio” does not really signify spiritual knowledge as much as it does an 
everyday object whose use here displays virtue rather than vanity.97 Likewise, when 
Cacciaguida explains God’s omniscience in relation to free will in canto 17, the 
                                                
95 “The possible degradation toward the dystopia of the beast, obscure mirror of matter, corresponds 
to the possibility of ennobling oneself toward the utopia of the angel, mirror of infinite Wisdom.  The 
entire structure of the Commedia can be considered to begin from this concept: if the Inferno, domain 
of uncomprehending and bestial people, manifests the phenomenology of human degradation, the 
Paradiso traverses the opposite scale, showing all the levels of ‘going beyond the human’ toward 
ever greater blessedness.”  Translation is mine. 
96 Jónsson discusses the medieval topos that signals the vain female preoccupied with her mirror, 
while tracing the development of this image into a positive genre in the later Middle Ages (196). 
97 The idea of gazing at oneself in a mirror involved another common medieval topos that Jónsson 
identifies as the mirror of the soul (146). The mirror of the soul signifies the reflection of God or of 
the Trinity at the bottom of the human soul, which allows knowledge of divine reality through 
introspection.  This topos is Neoplatonic and Augustinian in origin and develops a positive as well as 
negative line;  spiritual knowledge is countered by the allegorized understanding of Narcissus, whose 
gaze brings only delusion (146).  A clear example of this topos is found in Purg. 27.100 when Leah 
describes her and Rachel’s active and contemplative lives vis-à-vis the mirror.   
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mirror (indicated through the verb “specchiare” in line 41) appears in terms entirely 
technical and without moral import.  As part of a simile, it serves to define precisely 
the relationship between a ship and the eye that reflects its course, in order to 
understand better the analogous theological point.98  
 These examples show that the mirror’s continuum throughout the poem 
operates not only quantitatively but qualitatively.  It signifies the degree to which 
one reflects divine light, but poetically it also reflects other values and functions.  
The nuances of the mirror’s capacity depend on the context.  It is with this 
knowledge that we can perhaps approach the single specular episode of Vergil’s 
mind reading that occurs at Inf. 23.25, when Vergil reassures the pilgrim as the two 
escape from the Malebranche:99  
 
     E quei:  “S’i’ fossi di piombato vetro, 
 l’imagine di fuor tua non trarrei 
 più tosto a me, che quella dentro ‘mpetro. 
   Pur mo venieno i tuo pensier tra miei, 
 con simile atto e con simile faccia, 
 sì che d’intrambi un sol consiglio fei” (Inf. 23.21-30)100 
 The “piombato vetro” is strikingly, and deliberately, different from the “speglio” 
found in the third canticle.  Vergil does not say that he sees Dante’s thoughts in a 
mirror but rather that he knows his inner thoughts as quickly as he would if, as a 
mirror, he were to reflect Dante’s outer image.  His self-comparison to the mirror is 
meant to confirm his ability to know Dante pilgrim’s thoughts precisely in a direct 
manner.  In this way the “piombato vetro” functions as an ordinary object used to 
                                                
98 There are other passages in the poem in which Dante refers to mirrors in entirely technical terms, 
most notably Par. 2.97 when Beatrice describes the experiment using mirrors to clarify the problem 
of the moon spots, and Purg. 15.16-24 when the poet uses the mirror image to describe the pilgrim’s 
disorientation at seeing reflected light. 
99 See chapter 1 for discussion of the interpretive history of this passage. 
100 “And he to me:  ‘Were I a leaded mirror, / I could not gather in your outer image / more quickly 
than I have received your inner. / For even now your thoughts have joined my own; in both our acts 
and aspects we are kin – with both our minds I’ve come to one decision.’” 
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indicate extraordinary knowledge. The episode thus appears to be specular in 
rhetorical terms only, but reading the comparison literally, we see that Dante poet 
gains something more from figuring Vergil as a mirror.  It is quite simply that in 
seeing Vergil as a mirror, Dante sees Vergil as part of himself.  The suggestion of 
telepathy here performs a social function through its claim of unity and agreement.  
It is entirely appropriate that we find the mirror in this telepathic episode because it 
links Dante with his third beloved “padre antico,” the ancient father and pagan poet 
who, for Dante, signifies history perhaps most poignantly. 
 Suggesting or naming the mirror in telepathic episodes enacts Dante’s 
profound need to record, indeed to voice his personal loves and personal history at 
moments that most ingeniously imply silence.  These mind reading encounters 
overflow with such values in part because the Commedia as a whole is explicitly 
ambitious in its self-definition as mirror of Dante’s personal history, but also 
universal history.  This definition of poem as mirror participates in another major 
specular topos of the Middle Ages, which Jónsson calls the mirror of Scripture 
(149).  Rooted in Augustine, the mirror of Scripture presents the Bible as an 
instrument for knowledge of the self and one’s personal situation (153).  It is partly 
in the tradition of the mirror of Scripture that Dante presents himself as scriba dei 
and his Commedia as poema sacro (Par. 25.1-3); his journey of self knowledge 
becomes a mirror claiming to reflect divine truth for all.  This idea recapitulates the 
notion of the Commedia as epiphanic medium (introduced in chapter 2).  But the 
characterization of specular telepathy in this chapter begins to shift the idea of mind 
reading as a specific epiphanic moment toward a new kind of experience rooted in 
human rather than divine presence; specular telepathy in the Commedia suggests 
that personal history is not merely a necessary aspect of universal history but a 
privileged narrative in and of itself.  As I argue further in chapter 5, this privileging 
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of personal history goes far beyond the idea of representing the afterlife as mere 
fulfillment of the individual’s earthly history.101 This is because Dante dramatizes 
his personal history not merely to reflect but as a way of responding to and altering 
certain narratives of earthly history, and his dramatizations imply important social 
and historical details of his experience on earth.  This wider context will allow us to 
understand better why it is that with respect to mirror imagery, Dante’s 
epistemology of mind reading in the Paradiso does not simply point, in Raffi’s 
words, “verso beatitudini sempre maggiori.”102   
 On the continuum of knowledge, the Commedia’s telepathic mirror is 
epistemologically significant qualitatively rather than quantitatively.  It can indicate 
how much or little one knows, as when Adam declares God’s perfect vs. humans’ 
imperfect reflections.  Yet more prominently the mirror shows that the most 
privileged spiritual act of knowing is implicated with and privileges other kinds of 
knowledge.  It is in this sense that specular mind reading in the poem represents 
knowing as complex, ambivalent, varied, and inconsistent.  The attempt to know is 
not transcendent.  Finally it is immanent – a conclusion that brings us now to the 
issue of the influence of Aristotelianism versus Neoplatonism on the Commedia’s 
mind reading.  The following chapter explores this question, but it does so in part to 
introduce a different philosophical context of Dantean mind reading.  For I believe 
that the most salient epistemological issue for telepathy may be less tied up with 
Dante’s purported debt to Neoplatonic versus Aristotelian models and more related 
to the extent to which mind reading becomes a sign of the Commedia’s historical 
awareness and engagement in epistemological crisis, past and present.  The next 
chapter will therefore explore a philosophical context from Dante’s lifetime that, 
                                                
101 See Erich Auerbach’s Dante: Poet of the Secular World for the idea of the afterlife as fulfillment 
of the individual’s earthly history. 
102 “toward ever-greater blessedness.” 
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like mind reading in the Commedia, reflects a sensibility moving beyond traditional 
debates and into later fourteenth-century frameworks that provoked radical 
epistemological doubts.
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Chapter 4 
New Epistemology in Dante’s Time: 
Beyond the Aristotelian-Neoplatonic Model 
 
 The Commedia’s performance of mind reading raises the question of its debt 
to Aristotelian versus Neoplatonic ideas, yet it also exists as part of another 
epistemological debate that was shifting the philosophical climate of Dante’s time 
away from the Aristotelian-Neoplatonic paradigm.  These, very generally, are the 
two points of investigation in this chapter.  I begin by suggesting some of the 
different ways in which scholars have argued the Aristotelian-Neoplatonic problem 
as a way of framing my assessment of how mind reading participates in this binary 
model.  Then I suggest not a source but rather a context for the Commedia’s mind 
reading in theories of cognition proposed by Peter John Olivi, a philosopher who 
was Dante’s contemporary and whose thinking is known to have shaped the 
Commedia’s apocalyptic pronouncements.  Olivi was one of the first philosophers to 
challenge theories of cognition that had been espoused by Roger Bacon, Aquinas, 
and others.  These challenges inaugurated what became a crucial problem in 
philosophy that remained unresolved throughout Dante’s life and after his death.  As 
I discuss below, it is not yet clear whether Dante’s representations of cognition 
actively incorporate Olivi’s specific challenges.  Yet Olivi’s work presents an 
epistemological context that, albeit concerned with a topic entirely different from 
mind reading, elaborates strikingly similar doubts:  just as Dante’s poem dramatizes 
epistemological crisis through its presentation of mind reading, Olivi’s challenge to 
the role of species in conventional theories of cognition reflects urgent concern with 
how human beings know, not merely in theoretical but practical terms.  Within this 
framework, we can view telepathy, with its complicated attention to mechanisms of 
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knowledge and its resulting ambiguities, as part of the cultural soil that Olivi’s work 
on cognition helped to create.  In this way I regard mind reading as a poetic sign 
linked to a cultural-philosophical issue through a shared sense of epistemological 
urgency.  Exploring this link helps us see that the philosophical climate in which 
Dante lived was not simply defined by a binary structure of Aristotelian thinkers 
and those defending a more traditional biblical-symbolic exegesis.  Further, it helps 
us to historicize the philosophical and cultural milieu in which the Commedia’s 
mind reading lives. 
 Use of the words “Aristotelianism” and “Neoplatonism” in Dante studies 
varies and therefore requires some explanation of how some of the most important 
studies have mobilized these terms.  The relatively scant philosophical scholarship 
on the Commedia has often focused on the extent to which Dante’s handling of 
particular issues derives from Aristotelian versus Neoplatonic sources.  On the basis 
of such findings about particular issues, some scholars have gone further to 
generalize about Dante’s philosophical orientation as being fundamentally one or 
the other.  Thus earlier in the twentieth century, Bruno Nardi argued that Dante 
incorporated Neoplatonic ideas more than had been previously thought in key 
issues, for example Beatrice’s explanation of the moon spots in Par. 2.1  Nardi, 
while not positing Dante as consistently Neoplatonic in orientation, thus refuted 
scholars such as Busnelli, who had emphasized Dante as an Aristotelian in general.2 
 As Kenelm Foster explains lucidly in his 1977 monograph The Two Dantes 
and Other Studies, the desire to generalize about Dante’s philosophical allegiance 
                                                
1 See “La dottrina delle macchie lunari nel secondo canto del Paradiso” in Saggi di filosofia 
dantesca. 
2 See “Il tomismo di Dante e il P. Busnelli” in Saggi di filosofia dantesca.  In other articles, such as 
“Il linguaggio” in Dante e la cultura medievale Nardi, argues for the Aristotelian source (and against 
Neoplatonism) of Dante’s phrase “nomina sunt consequentia rerum” [names are the consequences of 
things] in the Vita Nuova 13.4. 
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stems in part from the Dantean corpus itself, which dramatically reflects the 
radically transformative discoveries of Aristotelian texts that occurred in the west 
during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.  Consequently in Dante’s thought we 
sometimes find two lines of intellectual influence in tension.  Especially in the 
Convivio, Dante does not integrate the notion of intellect as participation in the 
“divine” with the Aristotelian idea of the moral life on earth as achievable through 
philosophical reason alone  (159-60).  Thus Foster writes that in the Convivio there 
is 
  a certain indifference to theological considerations; 
  one of its more striking differences from the Comedy. 
  Certainly the writer is a Catholic Christian, but he 
  is evidently far more concerned to draw out certain 
  cherished philosophical insights than to anticipate 
  possible objections from the side of the theologians 
  (some of whom were no mean philosophers).  Thus 
  we see Dante in the Convivio coming out with ideas 
  about the perfectibility of man in this life, and of  
  the soul in the next, without its apparently crossing 
  his mind that he was begging the question (from the 
  standpoint of Orthodox Christianity) as to whether 
  man could reach perfection, here or hereafter,  
  unassisted by divine grace.  In the Convivio the  
  Christian doctrine of grace – and so of man’s 
  de facto inherent sinfulness and natural incapacity 
  to bring himself, by his own effort, to union with  
  God – is virtually ignored (159). 
The Commedia’s obvious recognition of the need for grace, in Foster’s words “its 
stress on the soul’s need for help and guidance, through life and death, from higher 
powers” (162) nonetheless heightens philosophical tension due to the poem’s 
astonishingly complex incorporation both of theological (sometimes called too 
generally “Neoplatonic”) and philosophical (i.e. “Aristotelian”) elements.  Foster 
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himself supports Nardi’s refutation of Dante as primarily Thomist, arguing for “a 
rather uneasy synthesis of Neoplatonist and Aristotelian elements” (57).3 
 While some recent scholars continue to define the Commedia primarily in 
terms of one tradition or the other,4 others have followed Foster in arguing for a 
synthesis, showing the complexity and variety with which Dante incorporates both 
traditions.  In her 1994 dissertation, Rosine Vance Turner argues that Dante 
dramatizes in Inferno 14-26 a crisis regarding his experimentation with 
Aristotelianism, concluding that he resolves this crisis in such a way as to 
incorporate rather than reject Aristotelian rationalism.5 Manuele Gragnolati, in 
exploring Dante’s handling of the thirteenth-century debate on the body and soul in 
Statius’ theory of embryology in Purgatorio 25, concludes that it incorporates both 
Aquinas’ and Bonaventure’s thinking and does not fully endorse Thomism as a 
number of scholars had claimed.  He shows impressively just how subtly one must 
read to pick up on Dante’s complex blending of philosophical threads.6  
  “Aristotelian” and “Neoplatonic” as descriptors are also found in reference 
to the Commedia’s poetics.  Foster helps us to understand this wider usage by 
                                                
3 Foster cites specific differences between Aquinas and Dante: “differences in cosmogony – 
regarding, especially, the creation of matter, and the role of the angels in the formation of the 
sublunary world and their relation to the heavenly bodies; and differences in anthropology touching 
the soul-body relationship, and the process of human generation, and the ‘end’ of human life 
considered as mortal and terrestrial” (57). 
4 Both Patrick Boyde and Zygmunt Baranski have argued for the Commedia as primarily oriented 
toward Neoplatonism. 
5 Turner also finds epistemological significance in the physical landscape of all three canticles.  Her 
argument contributes relevant new ideas but is somewhat hard to follow because it is not 
contextualized well enough within the scholarship, nor does she lay out her reading and methodology 
optimally in order to follow the line of argument. 
6 Gragnolati addresses the issue in his article “From Plurality to (Near) Unicity of Forms: 
Embryology in Purgatory 25” in Dante for the New Millenium, eds. Teodolinda Barolini and H. 
Wayne Storey, and contextualizes it more fully in his 2005 monograph Experiencing the Afterlife: 
Soul and Body in Dante and Medieval Culture.  The latter also explores the body-soul issue by 
contextualizing the Commedia’s treatment within the poetry of Uguccione da Lodi, Giacomino da 
Verona, and Bonvesin de la Riva.  He gives particular attention to Bonvesin’s Book of the Three 
Scriptures, showing how the author’s use of the passion in his poem shapes Dante’s portrayal of 
purgatory, whereas previous scholars had emphasized the differences between the two texts. 
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stating that Dante in fact associated Aristotle and Aquinas with the idea of 
difference because he had studied Aristotle “with and through the commentaries – 
or, better, ‘expositions’ – of Aquinas” (61) and in the Convivio associated the latter 
“in a special way with discrimination, conceived as a quality both intellectual and 
moral though rooted specifically in the human reason whose task it is to ‘discern the 
relations between things’” (63).  Thus in Undivine Comedy, Barolini, in addition to 
using the terms “Aristotelian” and “Neoplatonic” in reference to specific 
philosophical issues in the Commedia,7 employs them to describe larger thematic 
and stylistic movements of the Paradiso.  When discussing the problem Dante faces 
in attempting to represent heaven, a realm that is beyond time, through the 
necessarily temporal medium of narrative, she frames the problem in part as a 
paradox of unity and difference:  “If time is difference, and if language is a function 
of time, then language is a differential medium, unable to express simultaneity” 
(167).  Dante’s solution, Barolini argues, is to embrace the paradox and alternately 
privilege sameness and difference, and with rich analysis she shows how profoundly 
the poet executes the paradox lexically, thematically, and structurally throughout the 
third canticle.8 She incorporates the key terms when she writes of the Paradiso’s 
“paradox and tension deriving from Dante’s double allegiance: his desire to 
synthesize Aristotelian sympathy for difference with the Neoplatonic One” (173).9 
A good example of this in practice regards cantos 11 and 12, which I touched upon 
in chapter 1.  Briefly, Barolini demonstrates that in these cantos Dante emphasizes 
unity through his appreciation of Dominic’s scholasticism and Francis’ mysticism, 
                                                
7 For example in writing that in Par. 4.40-42 “Dante follows Aristotle and Aquinas in his belief that 
all knowledge comes through the senses, that images are based on empirical reality…” (153). 
8 See chapters 8, 9, and 10 of Undivine Comedy: Detheologizing Dante.   
9 Later in the same chapter she writes of Dante’s program in the third canticle “whereby he 
alternatingly privileges unity and privileges difference, in his quest to encompass both horns of his 
dilemma, both the Neoplatonic/Augustinian One and the Aristotelian/Thomistic Many” (192).  
 159 
but that he does so with language enacting intense narrative and rhetorical 
differentiation.  When Dante claims at 11.40-41 that in praising one saint he speaks 
of both (“De l’un dirò, però che d’amendue / si dice l’un pregiando”),10 Barolini 
argues that here the poet suggests the saints’ oneness and equality, that the verses 
are “not simply…courteous hyperbole but…a bold attempt to deny the Aristotelian 
precept that ‘to be diverse necessarily means to be unequal’” (195).  Yet Dante then 
goes on to dramatize the differences between the saints by insisting on telling both 
their stories  (195).  In this way, such wider usages of “Aristotelian” and 
“Neoplatonic” may be valid descriptors of Dante’s poetic attempts to represent 
fundamental philosophical concepts underlying his vision.  
 The different uses of these terms help to orient the Commedia’s mind 
reading, which I characterize as conceptually Neoplatonic and yet deeply 
Aristotelian in its poetic articulation.  As chapter 3 demonstrates, the late antique 
and early medieval roots of mind reading theory are found in Neoplatonic authors, 
as is the notion of angels and souls as mirrors reflecting the divine.11 Yet I would 
not argue on this basis that Dante’s inclusion of mind reading implies a tendency 
toward Neoplatonic epistemology in the poem as a whole.  Indeed, Aquinas also 
incorporates the Neoplatonic mirror into his epistemological theory in ST q.56, a.3 
when he defines the angels’ knowledge of God insofar as they are a kind of mirror 
representing the image of God, but they cannot see God’s essence directly.12 
Similarly, in the DV q.12, a.6 he considers whether prophets see in the mirror of 
eternity, explaining that the divine mind is described metaphorically as the mirror of 
                                                
10 “I shall devote my tale to one, because / in praising either prince one praises both.” 
11 This is not to say, however, that all the theories represent Platonic thought.  As discussed in 
chapter 3, some of the theories concerning demonic mind reading are based on materialist or 
naturalistic ideas, i.e. the demons run faster or have enhanced capacity to read body language. 
12 “ipsa natura angelica est quoddam speculum divinam similitudinem repraesentans” (343b) [the 
angelic nature is itself a kind of mirror representing the Divine image]. 
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eternity because it is eternal and through it, “omnes rerum rationes relucent” (248) 
[all the intelligible characters of things shine forth] (135).  Use of a Neoplatonic 
image or idea does not define a text or author as such.   
 This is especially true of mind reading given what I have argued in chapters 
1 through 3 and what I will argue perhaps most forcefully of all in chapter 5:  mind 
reading in the Commedia enacts, dramatizes, draws attention to, insists relentlessly 
upon acts of differentiation.  It promises unity but performs multiplicity.  We see 
this in chapter 1 in the notion of mind reading as reflecting a continuum of 
knowledge and as implicated with rhetorical contingencies, and in chapters 2 and 3 
in the deeply ambiguous histories of narrative epiphany and mind reading theory, 
histories that dramatize sustained problems of differentiation.  In this sense mind 
reading synthesizes Aristotelian difference with Neoplatonism, an analysis that 
supports other recent studies that have argued for different versions of synthesis.  It 
could be argued that in stressing the ideas of history and difference in the poem, my 
thesis in fact claims, or at least implies an Aristotelian orientation of the Commedia 
in general.  But again, mind reading as one historicizing characteristic cannot and 
should not translate into a way of defining the epistemology of the poem as a whole.   
 This is particularly the case given the indications during Dante’s lifetime 
that epistemological debate was beginning to move away from the traditional binary 
Aristotelian-Neoplatonic framework.  I will now explore one such debate 
concerning cognition and the extent to which mind reading in the Commedia may 
participate in it through shared philosophical concerns.  The key figure in this 
debate is the Franciscan philosopher Peter John Olivi and his pioneering work on 
theories of cognition, the value of which has only recently been brought to light.  I 
begin with a short biography of Olivi and what scholars have established concerning 
his other influences on the Commedia. 
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 Olivi was a Spiritual Franciscan whose work was at the forefront of 
epistemological change that was beginning to flower in late thirteenth century 
thought.  He had entered the Franciscan order in 1259 or 1260 and studied in Paris 
with the Bonaventurians Guglielmo de la Mare, Giovanni Peckham and Matteo 
d’Acquasparta, from whom he developed a deep devotion to Bonaventure.13 His 
writings on poverty and the apocalypse were seminal in forming the agenda for the 
Spiritual Franciscans during Dante’s time.  These texts included Quaestiones de 
perfectione evangelica, Tractatus de usu paupere, and his Apocalypse commentary, 
Lectura super apocalypsim.14 In 1282, seven masters accused Olivi of unorthodoxy 
in a wide range of his doctrines, and in 1283 he was censured by a Franciscan 
commission.  Given that intense debates between Thomists and Bonaventurians 
provided common topics for discussion among theologians, it is believed that 
Olivi’s persecution was motivated at least in part by his strict interpretation of the 
rule of living for the brothers.  In 1287, Olivi was rehabilitated and assigned a 
teaching post at the Franciscan school of Santa Croce in Florence until 1289, when 
he was transferred to Montpellier.  Despite the confiscation of Olivi’s work, Santa 
Croce remained from the late thirteenth into the fifteenth centuries an important 
center of transmission for his texts, which were transcribed and passed on despite 
threats and warnings from the Franciscan order. 
 As Charles Davis points out, Dante, Olivi, and his pupil Ubertino da Casale 
were all in Florence from 1287-89, where it is likely that Dante became acquainted 
with their teachings (241).15 Dante knew of the Franciscan school because he 
mentions two of its known figures, Ubertino da Casale and Pietro Pettinaio.  He 
                                                
13 The following history is found in the Enciclopedia dantesca, Vol. 4, pp. 135-36 as well as the 
English Dante Encyclopedia pp. 659-60. 
14 Unfortunately there is no dating and thus no chronology for the texts of Olivi, who died in 1298. 
15 From Dante and the Idea of Rome. 
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never mentions Olivi, possibly because of the latter’s controversial standing.  
Despite his rehabilitation, the philosopher’s memory was defamed in the early 
1300s when his writings were condemned and destroyed, and his followers in 
Southern France dispersed.  Yet as Davis points out, ideas from Olivi’s commentary 
on the Apocalypse have been clearly identified in the Commedia’s apocalyptic 
representations, especially its conception of church history.  In particular, the image 
of the meretrix magna, the great prostitute, applied specifically to Christian Rome 
(not merely pagan Rome as in the Apocalypse), is likely a direct link between 
Olivi’s and Dante’s thinking (227).16 We see this image in passages such as Inf. 19 
in the context of Dante’s invective against simoniacal popes and again in Purg. 32 
in the allegorical drama of the chariot, which transforms into a beast upon which the 
magna meretrix sits.17 Other similarities include several of Dante’s antipapal 
pronouncements, the ideas that the office of Peter had been abandoned, and that 
soon the church would be liberated from the adulterer, all of which were developed 
by Olivi.18 
                                                
16 According to the Enciclopedia Dantesca, San Bernardino of Siena also adopted the works of Olivi 
in his preachings but never mentioned him (136). 
17 The Inf. 19 passage reads “Di voi pastor s'accorse il Vangelista, /quando colei che siede sopra 
l'acque / puttaneggiar coi regi a lui fu vista; / quella che con le sette teste nacque, / e da le diece corna 
ebbe argomento, / fin che virtute al suo marito piacque” (106-111) [You, shepherds, the Evangelist 
had noticed / when he saw her who sits upon the waters, / and realized she fornicates with kings, / 
she who was born with seven heads and had / the power and support of the ten horns, / as long as 
virtue was her husband’s pleasure].  In Purg. 32 we find “Sicura, quasi rocca in alto monte, / seder 
sovresso una puttana sciolta / m'apparve con le ciglia intorno pronte; / e come perché non li fosse 
tolta, / vidi di costa a lei dritto un gigante; / e basciavansi insieme alcuna volta” (148-53) [Just like a 
fortress set on a steep slope, / securely seated there, ungirt, a whore, / whose eyes were quick to rove, 
appeared to me; / and I saw at her side, erect, a giant, / who seemed to serve as her custodian; / and 
they – again, again – embraced each other]. 
18 Regarding the Spiritual Franciscans’ possible influence on the poem’s prophecies, Davis writes 
“Less demonstrable, although very possible, is the hypothesis that the various prophecies in the 
Commedia are coloured by the Spiritual Franciscan hopes of a new era, to be ushered in by the 
victory of a poor and dedicated monasticism.  The Veltro whom Virgil prophesies in the first canto of 
Inferno will pay no regard to land or money, but to sapienza, amore e virtute, which are precisely the 
attributes of Deity, and which Francis, in his emulation of Christ, was supposed to have embodied so 
successfully” (229-30). 
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 Twentieth-century scholarship on the Olivi-Dante connection has focused on 
whether the former may be viewed as a reliable source.  Thus Davis refutes the view 
of Michele Barbi, who had rejected Dante’s familiarity with Olivi and Ubertino 
because Dante says in Convivio 2.12 that he began to frequent schools of philosophy 
only after Beatrice’s death in 1290, after these men had left Florence.  Yet Davis 
notes that Dante could still have known of their teachings since Ubertino’s sermons 
were directed to a wider audience, stating that Dante may in fact have known Olivi 
personally (242).19 In his 1972 dissertation, Warren Lewis is more skeptical about a 
link between Olivi and Dante in the absence of “some historical text to support the 
likelihood indicated by the similarities in the Dantean and Olivi concept of Rome” 
(p. 352 n. 138).  Yet, as Nardi suggested in the mid twentieth century, the key point 
is not pinning down Olivi as a source but rather recognizing the confluences 
between Dante’s representations and those of the Spiritual Franciscans:   
 
  Conoscesse o no Dante gli scritti dell’Olivi e di  
  Ubertino, è comunque evidente che dagli ambienti  
  gioachimiti francescani deriva al poeta l’idea che, dopo  
  la donazione di Costantino, la chiesa, dominata  
  dall’ingordigia di beni terreni e dalla simonia, s’è  
  trasformata nel mostro dell’Apocalisse, sul quale siede  
  la grande meretrice che puttaneggia coi re della  
  terra  (346).20 
The Commedia’s textual echoes are themselves adequate evidence of a cultural 
dialogue. 
                                                
19 The Enciclopedia Dantesca also says that it is “impossible pensare che D. abbia potuto trascurare 
o addirittura ignorare la presenza dell’O nella sua Firenze” (136) [it is impossible to think that Dante 
could have neglected or even ignored Olivi’s presence in his Florence].  Translation is mine. 
20 From “Dante Profeta” in Dante e la cultura medievale.  “Whether Dante knew the writings of 
Olivi and Ubertino or not, it is nevertheless evident that the poet derives from the Joachimite-
Franciscan scene the idea that, after Constantine’s gift, the church, overwhelmed by greed for earthly 
goods and by simony, was transformed into the monster of the Apocalypse, upon which sits the great 
prostitute who fornicates with lords of the earth.”  Translation is mine. 
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 Dantean epistemology may be contextualized similarly within Olivi’s most 
polished philosophical treatise, his commentary on the Sentences. The significance 
of this text has only recently been explored and much work remains to be done, in 
part because it is only partially edited.21 In Book II Olivi addresses at length 
questions of cognition, and according to philosophers Katherine Tachau and Robert 
Pasnau, Olivi’s chief contribution is that he was the first to challenge systematically 
the role of species in the Aristotelian theory of cognition that was set forth by Roger 
Bacon and supported by Aquinas.22 The notion of the role of species in cognition 
originates in Aristotle’s De Anima in Book I where he says “An alternative to 
‘forms’ is ‘species,’ which signifies the sensible or knowable objects as existing in 
the soul and not in the things themselves” (180).  As an example: “The stone is a 
composite of matter and form, and it is certainly not in the soul.  Further, it is not 
the stone’s form as such which is in the soul, but a likeness of it” (180).  The late 
medieval Aristotelian theory of species thus held that humans may only cognize 
something by taking in the form, or species of the thing to be cognized.  As Gyula 
Klima outlines, this act of taking in the form became one of many steps in an 
extremely complex chain.23 Further, as Pasnau discusses, it was not exactly clear 
                                                
21 Olivi does not address mind reading or angelic communication in any of the edited texts that we 
have, including Jansen’s edition of Book II, Emmen’s and Stadter’s edition of Book III, and the bits 
of Book IV edited by Maranesi.  Parts of Olivi’s Book IV remain unedited but could be relevant 
since, as discussed in chapter 3, Lombard addresses the possibility of angels reading humans’ minds 
in his Book IV.  In the fragments of Book IV that are edited, Olivi’s interest in separated souls 
regards whether such souls may perceive corporeal sensations (q.7 and 8, and whether they may 
move (q.9) or reoccupy (q.10) bodies.  Also of interest is q.11 where he wonders whether souls in 
purgatory could doubt whether they are saved or damned. 
22 Thus Katherine Tachau corrects a common misconception by stating that Aquinas had inherited 
rather than originated the account of cognition that was critiqued by Ockham.  She states “Among 
the ‘perspectivists,’ as they were known to their late medieval readers, Roger Bacon (ca. 1220-1292) 
was most responsible for elaborating the doctrine of the ‘multiplication of species’ that was at the 
core of what became the standard explanation of perception and cognition based on perception” (4). 
23 In his article “The Medieval Problem of Universals,” posted online in The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy (SEP), Klima explains, with a helpful diagram, the function of species in cognition and 
their relation to universals according to this theory as follows:  “In the first place, the sensory 
information collected by the single senses is distinguished, synthesized, and collated by the higher 
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how to define the species, which was supposed to be some sort of representation of 
the thing cognized, but philosophers resisted such a literal interpretation.  Aquinas 
denied that species were literal likenesses of the things they represented in part 
because he did not believe that any natural resemblance was required for cognition.  
Yet Pasnau argues that at times Aquinas’ arguments in fact implied such a 
resemblance (196).  Thus the nature of species was a problem much debated and 
remained unresolved.  Later Scholastics were unconvinced that Aquinas could 
support his account of species without resorting to representationalism, according to 
which species are a sort of internal object that we apprehend in order to have 
knowledge of the external world.  (220). 
 This ambiguous nature of species implies a troubling role in cognition, 
provoking a more significant objection.  For it seemed to Olivi, and later Ockham, 
that species were superfluous because they effected an unnecessary and indeed 
                                                
sensory faculties of the common sense [sensus communis] and the so-called cogitative power [vis 
cogitativa], to be stored in sensory memory as phantasms, the sensory representations of singulars in 
their singularity.  The active intellect [intellectus agens] uses this sensory information to extract its 
intelligible content and produce the intelligible species [species intelligibiles], the universal 
representations of several individuals in their various degrees of formal unity, disregarding their 
distinctive features and individuating conditions in the process of abstraction.  The intelligible 
species are stored in the intellectual memory of the potential intellect [intellectus possibilis], which 
can then use them to form the corresponding concept in an act of thought, for example, in forming a 
judgment.  The intelligible species and the concepts themselves, being formed by individual human 
minds, are individual in their being, insofar as they pertain to this or that human mind.  However, 
since they are the result of abstraction, in their information content they are universal.  Now insofar 
as this universal information content is common to all minds that form these concepts at all, and 
therefore it is a common intelligible content gained by these minds from their objects insofar as they 
are conceived by these minds in a universal manner, later scholastic thinkers refer to it as the 
objective concept [conceptus obiectivus], distinguishing it from the formal or subjective concepts 
[conceptus formales seu subiectivi], which are the individual acts of individual minds carrying this 
information (just as the individual copies of a book carry the information content of the book).  It is 
this objective concept that is identified as the universal of the human mind (distinguished from the 
universals of the divine mind), namely, a species, a genus, a difference, a property, or an accident. 
(Note that these are only the simple concepts.  Complex concepts, such as those corresponding to 
complex terms and propositions are the products of the potential intellect using these concepts in its 
further operations)”. Klima also confirms that it is this account of the role of species that Olivi 
disputed. 
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troubling distance between the percipient and the thing cognized.  Tachau states the 
problem (again in terms of Bacon’s account that Aquinas inherited) as follows: 
  …if species are representations, and if a chain of 
  species is generated between the sensible object 
  and the sense, then the final species in this chain 
  when received in the sense would first, most 
  strongly, and most properly represent to the eye 
  the species from which it had been multiplied, 
  rather than the object.  In other words, although  
  the Baconian account purports to provide real and 
  direct contact with extramental objects, in fact the 
  direct contact is only with the final mediator in a  
  chain of mediators  (44). 
Olivi objected that species, as the first objects of cognition, could easily be mistaken 
for the objects themselves, with the result that species would become objects of 
cognition rather than intermediary forms.  Further, Olivi argued that if it is true that 
we perceive internal species, then we cannot also perceive the external world but 
only images of it.24 With these concerns, Olivi and other philosophers believed that 
the Aristotelian theory of species cast doubt on whether one can have knowledge at 
all.  For if we do not actually cognize anything but only as our species represent it to 
us, in Pasnau’s words “We seem to have lost touch with the world outside us” (220-
21).  Aristotelian theories of cognition that incorporated the traditional account of 
species, then, appeared to encourage skepticism.  Olivi was the first to initiate these 
criticisms in the late thirteenth century, and by the early fourteenth century, they 
were common epistemological worries (220). 
 According to Pasnau, Olivi did not conclude that skepticism was inevitable 
but instead was the first to propose a serious alternative theory in which cognition is 
both more direct and more active.  The conventional view held that a cognitive 
power passively receives sensible or intelligible species from the world.  In quaestio 
                                                
24 This point is found in Pasnau’s article "Peter John Olivi" posted online in the SEP. 
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74 Olivi claims that a species cannot represent an object to a percipient unless the 
percipient attends to the species, and that this attending to signifies an active focus 
on the cognitive object (273).  He calls this active focus “virtual attention.”  
Percipients obtain information about the external world not by receiving physical 
impressions through the sense organs but by virtually extending the soul’s cognitive 
attention to particular features of the external environment (169): 
  Tertio, quia non exigitur ad repraesentandum obiectum,  
  et tamen hoc est illud pro quo magis videbatur exigi. 
  Quod autem ad hoc non exigatur probatur.  Primo, quia 
  obiectum praesens aspectui in ipsum converso et intento 
  sufficienter se praesentat ei per semetipsum, immo et 
  melius, quam per aliquam speciem creatam ab eius  
  solida entitate et propria veritate deficientem, obiectum  
  vero absens sufficienter repraesentatur aspectui per  
  specium memorialem.  Secundo, quia frustra ponitur  
  species repraesentans obiectum aspectui, nisi aspectus  
  intendat in ipsam, intendere autem in ipsam est idem  
  quod aspicere eam tanquam obiectum primum.  Quod  
  respectu actus cognitivi potius habet rationem termini  
  seu terminativi quam principii effectivi  (122-23).25 
One consequence of this argument is that the object itself does not function as a 
cause; the agency resides entirely in the cognitive power.  Further, Olivi (and later 
Ockham) also deny that there are species in the senses or intellect that could be 
likenesses, but instead claims that the act of cognition is itself a likeness of external 
                                                
25 Citations from Olivi’s text are from the Jansen edition, where Olivi’s quaestiones are simply 
numbered with no further subdivisions according to article or paragraph.  Translation is from 
paragraph 68 of quaestio 74 in Pasnau’s online translation at 
http://spot.colorado.edu/~pasnau/research/.  Pasnau thus assigns paragraph numbers whereas the 
Latin text does not.  “Third, because a species is not needed to represent an object, even though this 
is what it seemed most needed for.  But that it is not needed for this is proved:  First, because when 
an object is present to an attention that is turned toward it and intent on it, then that object 
sufficiently presents itself to that attention through its very self – and indeed presents itself even 
better than through any species created by its solid being and lacking proper truth.  An absent object, 
on the other hand, is sufficiently represented to the attention through a memory species.  Second, 
because it is pointless to postulate a species representing the object to the attention, unless the 
attention tends toward the species.  To tend toward it, however, is the same as to attend to it as a first 
object,which (with respect to a cognitive act) is characteristic of a terminus or terminative principle 
rather than an effective one.” 
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objects.  Thus he identifies the very act of cognition with mental representations 
themselves.  This is to say, for instance, that “tasting an apple is like an apple,” a 
conclusion whose obvious problems Pasnau explores (122).  Pasnau also notes that 
Olivi’s theory of direct cognition (which he calls direct realism) runs into trouble 
when we consider abstract thinking:  “what are we directly in touch with when our 
intellect thinks abstractly or propositionally? One answer to this question is 
Platonism: universals and/or propositions have some kind of abstract mode of 
existence, independently of the human mind.”26 And yet like most scholastics, Olivi 
rejected this solution without offering any other.27  
 It is important to understand that, while Olivi is arguing against the 
Aristotelian theory of species, he is not rejecting it entirely, nor is he supporting 
anything that could be regarded as a Platonic solution.  As seen in the above citation 
from quaestio 74, for example, Olivi does not reject memory species; he simply 
denies that species are the effective cause of cognition.28 Thus in his theory he does 
not reject the Aristotelian concept or existence of species but rather its specific role. 
Nor, as Pasnau notes, is Olivi interested in a Platonic solution; he rejects the role of 
species whether it is understood as existing in the human mind or outside of it.  
                                                
26 From Pasnua’s online entry on Olivi at SEP.  In his entry “The Medieval Problem of Universals,” 
Klima quotes Boethius to distinguish between the Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of species:  
“Plato thinks that genera and species and the rest are not only understood as universals, but also exist 
and subsist apart from bodies.  Aristotle, however, thinks that they are understood as incorporeal and 
universal, but subsist in sensibles.”   
27 Tachau notes that the role of species provided an advantage precisely as a referent in the absence 
of objects:  “Yet if the ability of the species in the soul (in anima) to endure in the absence of their 
causative objects is potentially problematic in epistemology, that very capacity is an advantage in 
semantics, for by serving as a referent, on the species of objects no longer extant can be constructed 
an account of the meaning (and truth condition) of statements concerning objects once cognized, but 
no longer existing.  By the end of the thirteenth century, this consideration was among those 
buttressing efforts to resolve the epistemological concerns raised by the presence of species in 
cognition, and standing against their rejection” (24). 
28 Both Tachau (49) and Pasnau (169) confirm that Olivi accepts memory species and species in 
medio, (defined by Pasnau in his Stanford Encyclopedia entry above as “sensible qualities that fill the 
air between the senses and their objects”). 
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Because his argument is focused to a remarkable degree on human cognition as 
active, it does not fit neatly into Aristotelian or Neoplatonic categories.  Instead, it 
suggests an entirely new direction that in part anticipates Ockham, who radically 
simplified his theory of cognition in part by eliminating the role of species as it had 
been understood and formulated a new understanding of universals.  While Pasnau 
concludes that neither Olivi nor Ockham were able to account sufficiently for the 
difficulties in their theories of cognition, he believes that their proposals both reflect 
considerable insight into the development of alternatives. 29 Olivi in particular had 
not been previously recognized for his role in initiating such a theory and therefore 
for raising crucial epistemological concerns in the later thirteenth century that many 
have assumed only began in the later fourteenth century with Ockham.30 
 In the remainder of this chapter I will relate Olivi’s achievements with 
Dante’s work in two ways.  First, I will evaluate the claims of Stan Scott, who 
argues that passages from the Convivio, Monarchia, and the Commedia show that 
Dante had in fact begun to absorb some of the challenges to theories of cognition 
that were going on during his lifetime.  Second, I will link the practical 
epistemological concerns that Olivi reflects in his theories to what I see as broadly 
similar issues in the Commedia’s mind reading. 
 With regards to the first goal, Dante elaborates no theory of cognition 
systematically in his texts but does offer significant representations.  When he uses 
                                                
29 Pasnau in fact concludes that species do not exist independently and that one cannot really talk 
about eliminating species from cognition, just as one cannot talk about eliminating shapes or sizes 
from objects (192)  I leave aside further discussion of this point for now. 
30 Pasnau reminds us that while the similarities between the work of Olivi and Ockham are striking, 
Olivi’s work was confiscated and therefore it is not known to what extent Ockham had access (25).  
Pasnau also believes that neither Olivi’s nor Ockham’s theories have been sufficiently recognized as 
challenging act-object doctrine and representationalism, which he says are still considered mistakes 
that philosophy of mind is trying to overcome.  Because Ockham’s work was also censured, few 
philosophers followed either thinker’s ideas but also may not have understood what was important in 
the rejection of species (290).  
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the term “species,” he usually does so in the sense of  “real” species that exist 
objectively in the external world, writing of the human species, plant and animal 
species, or species as a more abstract “kind” of something.31 He expresses 
awareness of the link between species and universals in Convivio 2.4.4-5 in the 
context of defining what philosophers have posited about the Angelic Intelligences.  
After writing that Aristotle in the Metaphysics states that there are as many 
Intelligences as there are circular movements in heaven, Dante states that others 
such as Plato, by contrast, posited as many Intelligences as there are species of 
things.  He goes on to link these species with the Platonic notion of universal forms 
and ideas: “E volsero che, sì come le Intelligenze delli cieli sono generatrici di 
quelli, ciascuna del suo, così queste fossero generatrici dell'altre cose ed essempli, 
ciascuna della sua spezie; e chiamale Plato "idee", che tanto è a dire quanto forme e 
nature universali.”32 The second passage is from Monarchia 1.3.9 where Dante 
more directly addresses the role of intelligible species in cognition when he asserts 
the intellectual potentiality of man as not merely concerned with universal forms or 
species, but singulars:  “Potentia etiam intellectiva, de qua loquor, non solum est ad 
formas universales aut speties, sed etiam per quandam extensionem ad particulares: 
unde solet dici quod intellectus speculativus extensione fit practicus, cuius finis est 
                                                
31 I find the term “species” with its variations in Convivio 2.4.4; 2.4.5; 3.7.7; 3.11.11; 4.4.6; 4.14.9; 
4.15.6; 4.16.9; Monarchia 1.3.5; 1.3.7; 1.3.9; 1.15.2; 1.15.7; 3.12.1; 3.12.3; 3.12.5; 3.12.7; 3.12.8; 
3.12.9; De Vulgari Eloquentia 1.2.5; 1.3.1; 1.16.3; 2.1.6; Epistole 3.2; Questio de acqua et terra 4; 
Commedia in Par. 7.28-30, 13.70-72, 32.121-23.  
32 “They held that just as the Intelligences of the heavens brought them into being, each its own, so 
other Intelligences brought into being all other things and exemplars, each its own species; and Plato 
called them ‘ideas,’ which is as much to say universal forms and natures.”  See Bemrose’s Dante’s 
Angelic Intelligences:  Their Importance in the Cosmos and in Pre-Christian Religion, chapter 5 for 
his interesting argument on Dante’s association of the pagan idea of Intelligences with Christian 
angels.  See also chapter 3 for my discussion of Bemrose’s arguments on pagan figures in the 
Commedia. Citations from the Convivio are from the Società Dantesca Italiana edition (edited by 
Ageno) posted on the Princeton Dante Project website.  Translation is from Richard Lansing. 
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agere atque facere.”33 The significance of this statement about singulars will be 
further explored below. 
 Dante was thus clearly aware of the role of species in cognition, but Scott 
claims that Dante’s representations of cognition suggest a somewhat inconsistent 
picture of this role (440).  In a passage from Convivio 3.9, Dante affirms the role of 
species in the context of glossing the final part of Amor che ne la mente mi ragiona.  
Here, the poet concedes that he calls his lady humble whereas a previous canzone 
had criticized her as proud, explaining the prior “mistake” by means of a simile:  
even though the sky is always clear, our eyes sometimes see a star as shadowed.34 
This prompts an explanation of the visual process, which, as Simon Gilson points 
out, was linked in Aristotelian thought with the process of intellection (16).35 Thus 
in 3.9.7 we find the sensible species when Dante describes how visible things enter 
the eye:  “Queste cose visibili, sì le propie come le comuni in quanto sono visibili, 
vengono dentro all'occhio - non dico le cose, ma le forme loro - per lo mezzo 
diafano, non realmente ma intenzionalmente, sì quasi come in vetro transparente.”36 
Yet, after further describing the course of the visible things toward the eye’s pupil, 
                                                
33 “Now the intellectual potentiality of which I am speaking is not only concerned with universal 
ideas or species, but also by a certain extension with particulars; and so it is often said that the 
theoretical intellect by extension becomes practical, its goal then being doing and making.”  Citations 
from the Monarchia are from the Società Dantesca Italiana edition on the Princeton Dante Project 
website.  Translation is from Prue Shaw. 
34 “Tu sai che ‘l ciel sempre’è lucente e chiaro, / e quanto in sé, non si turba già mai; / ma li nostri 
occhi, per cagioni assai, / chiaman la stella talor tenebrosa” [You know the sky is always bright and 
clear, / and of itself is never clouded. / And yet our eyes, for many reasons, / Sometimes say a star is 
dim]. 
35 All documentation of Gilson in this chapter refers to his 2000 monograph Medieval Optics and 
Theories of Light in the Works of Dante. 
36 “These visible things, the proper as well as the common, insofar as they are visible, enter into the 
eye--I do not mean the things themselves but their forms--through the diaphanous medium, not as 
matter but as an image, just as through transparent glass.” Gilson confirms that Dante is referring to 
species when he writes of “le forme loro” but argues that Dante relies indirectly on Arabic sources 
for his use of “intenzionalmente” (62). Gilson, as well as commentators such as Charles Singleton 
and Anna Maria Chiavacci Leonardi further link this passage in their commentaries to one in Purg. 
18, discussed below.   
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he goes on to say in 3.9.9 that the visual spirit immediately reproduces the form, 
without any lapse of time:  “Di questa pupilla lo spirito visivo, che si continua da 
essa alla parte del cerebro dinanzi dov'è la sensibile vertude sì come in principio 
fontale, [quivi] subitamente sanza tempo la ripresenta, e così vedemo.”37 He then 
stipulates that the medium through which the form enters the eye must be colorless 
if we are to see the thing exactly as it is:  “Per che, acciò che la visione sia verace, 
cioè cotale qual è la cosa visibile in sé, conviene che lo mezzo per lo quale 
all'occhio viene la forma sia sanza ogni colore, e l'acqua della pupilla similemente; 
altrimenti si macolerebbe la forma visibile del color del mezzo e di quello della 
pupilla.”38   
 Scott claims that the ideas of immediate reproduction of forms, and of seeing 
something exactly as it is emphasize a directness and immediacy of sense perception 
that presumably would undermine the role of species:   
 
  Dante elsewhere stresses the immediacy and accuracy  
  of sense perceptions, transmitted as through a diaphanous  
  medium with no time lapse, “subito sanza tempo,”  
  reaching the anterior brain “cotale qual’è la cosa visibile  
  in sè”, and apparently subject only to the occasional  
  rectifications of the “estimativa” or discernment (440-41).39  
Yet there are alternative possibilities for the ideas of representation “sanza tempo” 
and the vision of something as precisely “verace.”  Dante introduces his discussion 
of vision in this section (in 3.9.6) by stating that only color and light are properly 
visible, as Aristotle states in the second book of De Anima.40 This means that 
                                                
37 “The visual spirit, which passes from the pupil to the front part of the brain where the principal 
source of the sensitive power resides, instantaneously reproduces the form, without any lapse of time, 
and thus we see.” 
38 “And so for vision to be true (that is to say, to be able to see a thing precisely as it is in itself), the 
medium through which the form reaches the eye must be colorless, and so too the water of the eye; 
otherwise the visible form would be tinged with the color of the medium as well as that of the pupil.” 
39 The “estimativa” refers to Par. 26.75, on which more below. 
40 Gilson states that in fact Aristotle “argues that it is only colour which sets the transparent medium 
in motion and become the direct object of vision,” and that Dante had absorbed Averroës’ idea of 
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characteristics of an image other than light and color (such as shape, size, number, 
movement, etc.) are perceived not through vision but through the other senses.  
Patrick Boyde notes the Aristotelian idea that light has no contrary – darkness is 
simply an absence of light, which means “there is therefore nothing to resist the 
communication of light” (64).  For this reason, illumination is immediate, whereas 
other processes of perception are not.  Gilson further states in a footnote that “In 
contrast to the ‘perspectivists,’ Dante does not include details of the optical 
transmission of images after sensation” (69), which may also account for the sense 
of immediacy noticed by Scott.41 As for the stipulation on seeing a thing precisely as 
it is when the medium through which the form reaches the eye is colorless, Franca 
Brambilla Ageno, in her edition of the Convivio, traces this idea as originating again 
in Aristotle’s second book of De Anima, as well as the commentary of Albertus 
Magnus (208). Thus Dante’s representation of the immediacy and precision of 
visual perception may in fact be attributed to his beliefs in Aristotelian properties of 
light and color. 
 Scott finds a similar contrast between the role of species and a direct sort of 
cognition in representations of Purgatorio 18 and Paradiso 26.  We find the former 
passage in the context of the pilgrim’s request for Vergil to define love.  Vergil 
begins by saying that the soul is created ready to love and to move toward whatever 
pleases it, and then explains how the soul recognizes the pleasing thing:  “Vostra 
apprensiva da esser verace / tragge intenzione, e dentro a voi la spiega, / sì che 
                                                
light as inherently visible through the commentaries of Albert and Aquinas who followed Averroës 
on this point (59-61). 
41 On the perspectivists, Tachau states “The ‘perspectivists’ or practitioners of perspectiva (the 
science of optics) included in the thirteenth century Roger Bacon, John Pecham, and Witelo, all of 
whom were indebted to Alhazen” (3).  Gilson writes that the perspectivists formulated theories of 
optics “using the geometric principles of perspectiva to analyse all physical phenomena” and they 
conceived of optics as the primary natural science, in opposition to the Aristotelian commentaries of 
Avveroes, Albert, and Aquinas where one finds “optics as a scientia media, a composite science 
which is more concerned with the physical than the mathematical” (47-48). 
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l'animo ad essa volger face” (22-24).42 Scott argues, correctly, that Vergil implies 
the role of species in cognition when he names the apprehensive power of the soul 
as drawing an “intenzione” from a real object.  According to Pasnau, Aquinas 
believed that species had intentional existence (65), which accounts for Dante’s use 
of the term.43 Mandelbaum’s translation of “intenzione” as “image” suggests a 
species but also reflects the ambiguity in philosophy about what such an 
“intenzione” might be.  In contrast, Scott believes that Dante once again implies 
cognitive immediacy in Paradiso 26.  Here Dante pilgrim, upon responding 
successfully in his examination on love, regains his eyesight.  The poet describes 
this restoration by means of a simile representing the confusion of being awakened 
by a bright light: 
 
     E come a lume acuto si disonna 
   per lo spirto visivo che ricorre 
   a lo splendor che va di gonna in gonna, 
     e lo svegliato ciò che vede aborre, 
   sì nescïa è la sùbita vigilia 
   fin che la stimativa non soccorre; 
     così de li occhi miei ogne quisquilia 
 
                                                
42 “Your apprehension draws an image from / a real object and expands upon / that object until the 
soul has turned toward it.” 
43 The commentary tradition overwhelmingly confirms that Dante’s use of “intenzione” does indeed 
refer to species.  Benvenuto da Imola (1375-80) first implies the process of cognition, with numerous 
others following with explanations.  Singleton and Chiavacci Leonardi link this passage to the one 
discussed above in Convivio 3.9.7. Nicola Fosca (2003-2006), however, distinguishes between 
“intenzioni” and sensible forms, i.e. species: “Le ‘intenzioni’ dell'oggetto (cfr. Conv. III.ix.7), 
recepite dall'esterno, non coincidono a rigore con le “immagini” (o forme sensibili) depositate nella 
“fantasia”, poiché consistono sì in quelle immagini, ma in quanto stimate o “buone” o “cattive” ed in 
tale veste conservate (in modo più accurato) nella memoria” [The “intentions” of the object, received 
from the outside, do not coincide exactly with the “images,” (or sensible forms) deposited in the 
“fantasy,” since they consist in those images but insofar as they are judged “good” or “bad” and in 
such guise conserved (in a more accurate way) in the memory].  Gilson states that “the word intentio, 
which Arabo-Latin translators used to render the Arabic ma’na, is one of the most problematic in 
scholastic vocabulary.  Both the Arabic and Latin terms have a number of meanings which vary 
according to specific usage in technical contexts” (62).  He goes on to exemplify various meanings, 
acknowledging in the work of Avicenna the meaning to which Fosca refers, but claiming that in the 
case of Purg. 18.22-24 we find a different sense, i.e. “the notion of a ‘first intention’ as a replica of a 
sense object, which, as a potential species cognoscibilis, permits one to know this object” (63). 
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   fugò Beatrice col raggio d'i suoi, 
   che rifulgea da più di mille milia   (70-78).44 
As in Convivio 3.9.9, we find the “spirito visivo,” here a personified visual spirit 
that runs to meet the light’s brightness.  Sapegno (as well as other commentators) 
notes that Dante uses the verb “correre” in Convivio 2.9.5 where he refers to the 
“nerve along which the visual spirit runs” (“l nervo per lo quale corre lo spirito 
visivo”).  The immediacy and directness of the visual process in Par. 26 may 
therefore be accounted for as it is in the Convivio. 
 Instead, Boyde finds remarkable in these passages Dante’s emphasis on the 
active role of the percipient in the visual process (72).  We note that in the Convivio, 
the active subject in 3.9.7 is the “cose visibili” the visible things whose forms enter 
the eye, while in 3.9.9, the active agent is “lo spirito visivo,” the visual spirit that 
reproduces the form.  Boyde remarks that it is significant that Dante “shifts the 
emphasis away from the role of the external agent to that of the percipient” (72).  
Likewise, Boyde points out that in Par. 26 Dante attributes the act of waking to the 
“spirto visivo” rather than the light, emphasizing once again the active percipient in 
this cognitive process.45 Might Dante’s emphasis reflect the growing interest in the 
active role of the percipient in Olivi’s theory (and later theories) of cognition?  
Unfortunately Boyde provides no philosophical context for his comments.  Rather, 
                                                
44 “And just as a sharp light will startle us / from sleep because the spirit of eyesight / races to meet 
the brightness that proceeds / from layer to layer in the eye, and he / who wakens is confused by what 
he sees, / awaking suddenly, and knows no thing / until his judgment helps him; even so / did 
Beatrice dispel, with her eyes’ rays, / which shone more than a thousand miles, the chaff / from my 
eyes.” 
45 Boyde states “Even in this internal phase, and even with regard to the events that take place 
between the eye and the brain, Dante gives due prominence to the external cause.  But the simile is 
so worded that the action of waking is attributed to the ‘spirito visivo’ rather than to the light; and the 
following terzina serves to underline the importance of the percipient himself and of the internal 
organs” (75). Also of interest is Boyde’s statement that while Dante was interested in what and how 
we see, “he was even more keenly interested in why we sometimes fail to see, or why the 
apprehended image does not correspond in colour, shape or size to the corpus coloratum from which 
it derives” (75). 
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he suggests that Dante poet wishes to link the percipient’s active role in the 
representation of forms to the artist’s process of representing nature (72).46  
 In his more philosophically rigorous study, Simon Gilson traces the notion 
of “visual spirits” to a medical tradition of optics established by Galen (c. 130-201 
A.D.), who believed that “the nerves that led from the brain were filled with a 
luminous and highly active spirit (pneuma psychikon) which flowed into the 
crystalline humour of each eye”(19).  This idea reached Dante through the Arabic 
optician and physicist Alhazen (965-1039), who synthesized geometrical, physical, 
and medical traditions into a coherent theory of vision (26).47 Gilson acknowledges 
Dante’s use of the Galenic notion of visual spirits but never indicates that such use 
represents particular affirmation or departure from standard optical theories (51, 68), 
nor does he comment at all on Boyde’s earlier characterizations.  Therefore more 
precise philosophical implications of Dante’s emphasis on the active percipient by 
means of the “spirito visivo” await further research.  
 The final passage regarding species that Scott finds relevant is the one 
quoted above from Monarchia 1.3.9.  First, it should be stated that this passage 
immediately follows one whose meaning has provoked enormous debate and 
controversy.  The context is Dante’s definition of the highest human power as the 
ability to understand by means of the possible intellect, which he calls the “potentia 
intellectiva.”  Dante asserts in 1.3.8, the necessity of a multitude in order for this 
potentiality to be actualized, just as a multitude of things that may be generated is 
necessary for prime matter to be fully actualized.  Without this, one would claim 
                                                
46 “Dante here implies that the representative or mimetic skills of the painter – or of the poet as 
painter in words – are instances of the truth that ‘art imitates nature’ not only in the objects depicted, 
but in the very process of ‘re-presentation’ itself” (72). 
47 Alhazen’s principal text, according to Gilson, is the Kitab al-manazir and was translated into Latin 
around the end of the twelfth century.  The Latin titles were De aspectibus, Optica, and Perspectiva 
(28).  
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incorrectly that potentiality exists separately from actualization.  Dante then states 
that Averroës in his commentary on De anima agrees with this position.  These 
statements have been understood by some as Dante’s claim that the possible 
intellect can only be actualized by the entire human race, therefore positing a single 
intellect for all humankind.  I think it has been sufficiently proven that Dante is not 
in fact making this claim, but I leave aside further details of this controversy, which 
are not immediately relevant. 48 
 As stated above, Dante then states that the intellectual potentiality of man is 
concerned with, or directs itself toward not only universal forms or species but also 
particular things:  “Potentia etiam intellectiva, de qua loquor, non solum est ad 
formas universales aut speties, sed etiam per quandam extensionem ad particulares: 
unde solet dici quod intellectus speculativus extensione fit practicus, cuius finis est 
agere atque facere.”49 Boyde explains that Dante believed in a hierarchical 
relationship between the speculative and practical intellect:  the practical intellect 
“takes …’universal forms’ as its principia – its ‘points of departure’ – and it returns 
step by step towards the concrete world with the intention of working on particular 
bodies in a particular place and time, either by ‘making’ or by ‘doing’ (faciendo vel 
agendo)” (183).50 This hierarchy is based on traditional Thomistic thinking, 
                                                
48 For details of this controversy, readers should consult the commentaries of Nardi, pp. 298-303, 
Richard Kay, pp. 18-23, and Anthony Cassell’s The Monarchia Controversy, pp. 55-58. 
49 “Now the intellectual potentiality of which I am speaking is not only concerned with universal 
ideas or species, but also by a certain extension with particulars; and so it is often said that the 
theoretical intellect by extension becomes practical, its goal then being doing and making.”   
50 Dante states the relationship between practical and speculative intellect later in 1.14.7 where Shaw 
writes that he states the “relationship of the monarch to lesser princes is analogous to that of 
theoretical intellect to practical intellect, inasmuch as each supplies the general (universal) principle 
which is applied to particular circumstances and then acted on”: Dante writes “…intellectus practicus 
ad conclusionem operativam recipit maiorem propositionem ab intellectu speculativo, et sub illa 
particularem, que proprie sua est, assummit et particulariter ad operationem concludit” [the practical 
intellect, in order to proceed to action, receives the minor premises from the theoretical intellect, and 
then derives the minor premises appropriate to its own particular case, and then proceeds to the 
action in question] (38-39). 
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according to which the intellect could know particulars only indirectly, by 
apprehending a universal form, which it could know directly.51  
 Scott takes issue with Dante’s use of “per quandam extensionem,” arguing 
that it suggests a direct knowledge of particulars:  
  The possible intellect is thus directed not only towards 
  the universals but also by a certain extension to  
  particulars and singulars.  Is the vague “per quandam 
  extensionem” – where one might have expected “per 
  reflexionem” – intended to sum up the Thomistic view 
  according to which the intellect in its “conversion” to  
  the phantasms obtains an indirect, reflexive knowledge 
  of the particular?  Since no such corroboration can be 
  found in Dante’s works, it seems more likely that, 
  whether consciously or not, he is reflecting the changed 
  climate of contemporary thought.  He passes almost 
  unwittingly from the speculative to the pragmatic 
  intellect, from its subjective to its objective operations, 
  from the universal to the particular, with a precipitancy 
  observable in other thinkers of his time.   
Regarding Dante’s use of “extensionem,” Nardi, in the context of glossing 1.4.1, 
where Dante appears to reaffirm the hierarchy,52 states that there was indeed debate 
about the meaning of this word.  For Aristotelians, the word signified the speculative 
and practical intellects as being two distinct moments of a single intellectual 
potentiality, which is directed in the first moment to the discovery of what is true 
(speculative intellect) and in the second moment to the desired goal by means of 
action (practical intellect).  However, Nardi reports that others, such as John of 
Jandun, claimed that the speculative and practical were in fact two different 
                                                
51 According to both Richard Kay (22) and Nardi (301), however, Dante’s statement that the 
speculative intellect is made practical (“unde solet dici quod intellectus speculativus extensione fit 
practicus”) is based on a mistranslation of Aristotle. 
52 “Satis igitur declaratum est quod proprium opus humani generis totaliter accepti est actuare 
semper totam potentiam intellectus possibilis, per prius ad speculandum et secundario propter hoc ad 
operandum per suam extensionem” [Now it has been sufficiently explained that the activity proper to 
mankind considered as a whole is constantly to actualise the full intellectual potential of humanity, 
primarily through thought and secondarily through action (as a function and extension of thought)]. 
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potentialities.53 This latter meaning may be what Scott has in mind when he suggests 
that Dante, while not necessarily aware of changes that philosophers proposed in 
their theories of cognition (Scott wrote in 1969 before Olivi’s contribution had been 
recognized), “appears nevertheless to share their view, adumbrating even that of the 
Ockhamists, that the intellect somehow knows intuitively what is sensibly 
apprehended, and that, in short, the individual is intelligible” (443).54 
 In analyzing this evidence, it is clear that more work remains in order to 
determine the extent to which Dante’s representations may indeed adumbrate new 
theories of cognition.55 My sense of the passages above from Dante’s texts is that on 
the one hand, they do support the Aristotelian role of species in cognition as well as 
the hierarchical relationship between the speculative and practical intellects, and 
Gilson signals nothing unusual in Dante’s use of the “spirito visivo.” On the other 
hand, I have tried to show that other scholars confirm in these passages problems 
that warrant further investigation.  This is especially true given that Gilson, in 
arguing that Dante did not follow the “perspectivists” but rather more general 
sources (i.e. commentaries on Aristotle and possibly encyclopedias), never 
                                                
53 Nardi’s full gloss: “L’espressione è usata con particolare significato dagli aristotelici che 
dell’intelletto speculativo e di quello pratico fanno due momenti di una sola potenza conoscitiva 
rivolta, nel primo momento, alla scoperta del vero, e nel secondo momento al fine che si vuol 
raggiungere con l’operare, cioè l’utile e l’onesto.  Ma l’averroista Giovanni di Jandun (De anima, III, 
q.35) pretendeva di farne due potenze diverse” (303) [The expression is used with particular 
significance by Aristotelians who make of the speculative intellect and the practical intellect two 
moments of a single intellectual potentiality that is directed, in the first moment, to the discovery of 
what is true, and in the second moment to the goal that one desires to reach through action, that is 
what is useful and honest.  But the Averroist John of Jandun…claimed to make two distinct 
potentialities of it].  Nardi also cites, in a footnote on page 301, Duns Scotus as having discussed the 
meaning of “extensionem” in Scotus’ Opera Omnia, Città del Vaticano, I, 1950, pp. 153, 159-70; 
XVI, 1960, pp. 46-51. 
54 Pasnau confirms that Olivi’s critique of the species theory indeed concerns what Ockham called 
intuitive cognition (169). 
55 In Perception and Passion in Dante’s Comedy, Boyde does not in fact argue philosophically that 
Dante’s representations of the active role of the “spirito visivo” contradict specific theories.  Further, 
Scott’s observations, while perceptive and relevant, are not thoroughly contextualized within Dante’s 
work or within the philosophical tradition upon which Dante drew. 
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considers whether Dante’s representations incorporate ideas of thinkers, such as 
Olivi, who argued against fundamental concepts supported both by the 
“perspectivists” and the more general sources.56 We should also note, however, that 
Scott does not claim that Dante consciously did or attempt to incorporate avant-
garde theories.  Rather, Scott suggests that certain key passages in the Dantean 
corpus foreshadow later fourteenth-century philosophical thought, but that they do 
so perhaps unconsciously, and that they are always expressed “in the categories of 
traditional philosophy.” (444).  For these reasons the passages explored above merit 
further attention that is beyond the scope of this present chapter.  At this juncture, 
however, we can say that these preliminary observations invite further 
investigations on the possible connections between the theories of Olivi and the 
representations of Dante.   
 It remains now to explore the epistemological link between Olivi’s concerns 
and the Commedia’s performance of mind reading, a connection that I locate most 
strongly in a deeply shared engagement of practical philosophy with a focus on 
human agency.57 Particularly intriguing is the way in which Olivi found urgent 
epistemological issues at stake in his rejection of the species theory – issues that 
were especially practical for a Christian’s life.  I offer a few brief examples.  In 
quaestio 74 he argues against species because he worries that one’s intellect could 
                                                
56 Thus when Gilson states that Dante, unlike the “perspectivists,” omits details of optical 
transmission of images after sensation (see above), we do not really know whether such an omission 
represents lack of awareness or a more active rejection of perspectivist theory, or whether it 
represents incorporation of new ideas.  Even if Dante did not incorporate perspectivist theory, he 
may follow ideas that opposed such theories, or he may simply be working with more general 
Aristotelian sources, as Gilson argues.  Until Olivi’s work on cognition is fully investigated as a 
possible context for Dante’s representations of vision and cognition, this question awaits definitive 
resolution. 
57 I do not find a strict conceptual relationship between direct vs. visual/specular modes of mind 
reading and Olivi’s idea of direct cognition vs. the more traditional role of species, since mind 
reading regards abstract knowledge that is obtained supernaturally.  Thus while mind reading implies 
a process of cognition, its complications concern access to non-sensible thoughts, whereas the 
problems of ordinary human cognition concern how one perceives sensible objects.   
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not unite with God without first producing a species of God, which he believes to be 
absurd.58 He also believed that if the cognitive powers were proved to be passive, 
then so too could the human will, which would therefore destroy the idea of free 
will.  Indeed Tachau claims that Olivi was not interested in “natural cognition for its 
own sake” but for this particular issue.  She says “above all else he considered it 
crucial to support the active nature of the cognitive powers because if they were 
shown to be passive, so too by extension the will could be demonstrated to be 
passive in operation:  a position Olivi eschewed as endangering the will” (40).59 
Finally, Pasnau reports that Olivi argued that the species account would allow God 
to deceive humans, because God might present a species to a human when the 
object itself does not exist or is absent, but the human would be unaware of this and 
mistake the species for the thing itself.  Pasnau easily rejects this, pointing out that 
an omnipotent God would be able to deceive humans in the case of any theory of 
cognition (292).  On the one hand, Olivi’s error seems curiously elementary:  we 
would expect a competent philosopher to account in his theories for the fundamental 
nature of God as commonly understood.  Yet the mistake is historically revealing.  
Olivi’s doubts about the security of human-divine interactions are indeed 
                                                
58 “Quarto, quia secundum hoc intellectus per habitum gloriae Deo unitus generaret primo in se 
quondam speciem Dei, ut postmodum per eam produceret actum videndi.  Quod est valde absurdum” 
(120) [Fourth, because according to this an intellect united to God through a habit of glory would 
first generate in itself a certain species of God, so that afterwards through that it would produce the 
act of seeing.  This is completely absurd]. 
59 Olivi considers this point when he says “Sextum autem, quod scilicet actus cognitivus efficiatur ab 
ipsa potentia tanquam a vi activa, probatur.  Primo, eisdem rationibus quibus probatur quod voluntas 
est potentia activa.  Nam et principales rationes, quibus philosophantes conantur probare potentias 
cognitivas non esse activas sed passivas, non minus probant hoc de voluntate.  Et tamen ex hoc 
sequitur destructio libertatis ac per consequens et omnis boni moralis, sicut satis in sua materia est 
probatum” (124) [The sixth thesis – namely that a cognitive act is brought about by the power itself 
as by an active force – is proved:  First, through the same arguments by which it is proved that the 
will is an active power.  For the principal arguments by which philosophers try to prove that 
cognitive powers are passive and not active prove this no less in the case of the will.  But from this 
follows the destruction of freedom and consequently also of every moral good, as has been proved 
enough in its proper context]. 
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remarkable evidence of the metaphysical and practical urgency that he attached to 
theories of cognition and to his own understanding therein.  To qualify God’s 
omnipotence suggests a changing conception of human and divine nature, in which 
the possibility of human agency is elevated while God’s potential powers to deceive 
are considered to be dependent upon a particular human theory.  Such an account 
implies that God’s powers are not absolute, but contingent upon human 
understanding and agency. 
 Scott likewise emphasizes Dante’s interest in practical philosophy when he 
speaks of Dante’s “habit of cultivating philosophy less for itself than for its 
contributions to the cause of temporal human happiness,” by which he “marks an 
important transition to the practical ethics and politics of the late Middle Ages” 
(443-44).60 Dante indeed shares Olivi’s practical concerns as well as emphasis on 
human agency when, in Paradiso 4, the pilgrim perceives a contradiction in 
Piccarda’s words about Costanza’s will.  In canto 3, Piccarda had said that although 
Costanza was forced to leave the convent against her will, she remained inwardly 
steadfast:  “non fu dal vel del cor già mai disciolta” (117).61 Yet Beatrice, at 4.73-
84, says that if one gives into force, as did Piccarda and Costanza (rather than return 
to the convent), merit is diminished and results in a lower degree of blessedness.  
Consequently Dante questions Piccarda’s assertion and, implicitly, Beatrice’s 
promise at 3.32 on the truthfulness of heavenly souls.62 Beatrice introduces the 
pilgrim’s question as follows: 
 
 
                                                
60 Scott, writing in 1969, also anticipated Mazzotta’s point in 1979 regarding Dante’s rejection of 
abstract philosophy for its own sake.  See the Introduction for discussion of Mazzotta. 
61 “she never betrayed her heart’s veil.” 
62 At 3.31-33 Beatrice encourages the pilgrim to speak with the blessed souls, whose word can be 
trusted: “Però parla con esse e odi e credi; / ché la verace luce che le appaga / da sé non lascia lor 
torcer li piedi»” [Thus, speak and listen; trust what they will say: / the truthful light in which they 
find their peace / will not allow their steps to turn astray]. 
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     Ma or ti s'attraversa un altro passo 
   dinanzi a li occhi, tal che per te stesso 
   non usciresti: pria saresti lasso. 
     Io t'ho per certo ne la mente messo 
   ch'alma beata non poria mentire, 
   però ch'è sempre al primo vero appresso; 
     e poi potesti da Piccarda udire 
   che l'affezion del vel Costanza tenne; 
   sì ch'ella par qui meco contradire   (Par. 4.91-99).63 
That Beatrice discerns this doubt telepathically enacts yet another moment of 
ostensibly perfect knowledge implicated in anxiety that is markedly 
epistemological:  Beatrice’s reference to the honesty of souls implies that Dante 
questions not simply the logic of God’s justice but how we understand and practice 
justice within human communities. 
 This intense focus on the practical agency of the individual underlies both 
Olivi’s doubts in his theories of cognition and the uncertainties of mind reading in 
the Commedia.  This focus, I believe, demonstrates a shifting of the philosophical 
and historical climate in which Dante wrote and helps to orient the complexity of 
the telepathy topos.  For attention to Olivi’s work allows us to see that mind reading 
participates not only in prior philosophical and narrative histories; the Commedia’s 
telepathy shares and perhaps anticipates epistemological concerns that were at the 
forefront of fourteenth-century philosophy.64 
                                                
63 “But now another obstacle obstructs / your sight; you cannot overcome it by / yourself – it is too 
wearying to try. / I’ve set it in your mind as something certain / that souls in blessedness can never 
lie, / since they are always near the Primal Truth. / But from Piccarda you were also able / to hear 
how Constance kept her love of the veil: / and here Piccarda seems to contradict me.” 
64 Scott states “…there is impropriety in the historian’s habit of casting Dante’s thought into the 
ideological moulds of the mid-thirteenth century.  His theory of knowledge and his artistic practice 
alike rather illustrate that critical phase in the transformation of late medieval sensibility, when, 
especially during the first decades of the fourteenth, individuality – of created things or reflecting 
minds – is acknowledged to be immediately intelligible and expressible.  If, as in the final cantos of 
the Commedia, the individual intellect still surrenders wholly to the mysteries of divine grace, and 
comes to rest in the ultimate Wisdom like some wild thing in its den, its apotheosis is at least 
incipient, and its indestructibility as an artistic value assured” (446).  See also the very engaging 
work on Dante’s angelology by Alessandro Raffi, who argues that Dante’s thesis in Convivio 4 for 
the superiority of man over angels in certain respects defines what Raffi calls a radical 
anthropological humanism (121). 
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 The concern with human agency and practical epistemology in Paradiso 4 is 
necessarily social; Dante’s doubt stems from and is partially about speech 
exchanged in a community. This social context suggests another contemporary 
historical lens through which we may view the poem’s mind reading.  Telepathy, 
while pretending to transcend the social conventions driving the norms of human 
speech, in fact performs profound anxiety concerning many such conventions and 
histories, including aspects of Dante’s personal history.  The next chapter 
demonstrates how we may reveal these astonishing performances, and the histories 
they imply, by thinking of mind reading as a speech act.
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Chapter 5 
Mind Reading as Speech Act: 
Social Context as History in the Commedia 
 
 The Commedia quietly yet insistently declares the historicity of signs as the 
crux of their ungovernable power to make reality.  We can see this in Purgatorio 21 
when the pilgrim, Vergil, and Statius communicate primarily through signs of the 
body.  Statius initiates a corporeal lexicon in declaring Vergil’s Aeneid to be his 
poetic mother:  “de l’Eneïda dico, la qual mamma / fummi, e fummi nutrice, 
poetando: / sanz’essa non fermai peso di dramma” (97-99).1 Allen Mandelbaum 
disrupts the corporeal metaphor by changing the grammatical subject of “fermai” to 
“my work,” rendering line 99 as “my work, without it, would not weigh an ounce.”  
But the nuance of the first-person “fermai” shows that Statius figures his writing as 
the necessary connection between a mother’s nourishment and the substantiality of 
her child’s body.  His physical emphasis thus creates a fascinating paradox of verbal 
inspiration figured in terms of a pre-verbal relationship.   
 The ensuing conversation evolves the logic of the maternal metaphor 
precisely through an exchange of verbal and non-verbal signs.  Statius says he 
would gladly purge his sins for another year if he could have lived in the time of 
Vergil, prompting the latter’s response: 
 
     Volser Virgilio a me queste parole 
   con viso che, tacendo, disse ‘Taci’; 
   ma non può tutto la virtù che vuole; 
     ché riso e pianto son tanto seguaci 
   a la passion di che ciascun si spicca, 
   che men seguon voler ne’ più veraci. 
     Io pur sorrisi come l’uom ch’ammicca; 
                                                
1 “I speak of the Aeneid; when I wrote / verse, it was mother to me, it was nurse; / without it I would 
not weigh an ounce.” 
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   per che l’ombra si tacque, e riguardommi 
   ne li occhi ove ‘l sembiante più si ficca; 
     e «Se tanto labore in bene assommi», 
   disse, «perché la tua faccia testeso 
   un lampeggiar di riso dimostrommi?». 
     Or son io d'una parte e d'altra preso: 
   l'una mi fa tacer, l'altra scongiura 
   ch'io dica; ond' io sospiro, e sono inteso 
     dal mio maestro, e «Non aver paura», 
   mi dice, «di parlar; ma parla e digli 
   quel ch'e' dimanda con cotanta cura»  (Purg. 21.103-20).2 
Here Dante elaborates with great intensity the body’s potential to signify.  Through 
the repetition of “tacendo…Taci” in line 104, the poet cleverly collapses Vergil’s 
linguistic form and content to privilege a nonverbal sign; Vergil’s face silently 
commands Dante’s silence.  The poet conflates facial signs in line 106 as Dante 
pilgrim smiles like a man “ch’ammicca,” which indicates signaling not with the lips 
but with the eyes.  In response Statius falls silent and gazes into the pilgrim’s eyes, 
ove ‘l sembiante più si ficca,” finally questioning the pilgrim’s “riso.”  The pilgrim 
is torn between Vergil’s command to refrain and his own desire to speak, prompting 
his sigh, which his guide interprets correctly, finally granting permission for words.  
When the pilgrim finally names his guide, Statius responds in line 130 by trying to 
embrace the bodiless Vergil.  These dynamic physical exchanges infuse the entire 
episode with a riveting narrative force that makes the spoken dialogue pale in 
comparison. 
                                                
2 “These words made Virgil turn to me, / with a face that, through silence, said “Be silent’ / but the 
power that wills cannot do all / for smiles and tears are such close followers / on the emotion from 
which each springs / that in the most truthful they least follow the will. / I only smiled like a man 
whose eyes signal; / at this the shade was silent, and he stared / where sentiment is clearest – at my 
eyes - / and said: ‘So may your trying labor end / successfully, do tell me why – just now – your face 
showed me the flashing of a smile.’ / Now I am held by one side and the other: / one keeps me silent, 
the other conjures me / to speak; therefore I sigh, and I am understood / by my master, and he tells 
me ‘Do not be afraid / to speak, but speak and answer what he has / asked you to tell him with such 
earnestness.’”  I have adopted Singleton’s more literal translation of lines 106-8, with italics 
indicating my changes. 
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 Part of this force comes from the poet’s comment in lines 105-8 that signs 
can slip out of one’s control: the power that wills cannot do all, and in fact the tears 
and smiles that follow passion so faithfully are even more likely to disobey the will 
and burst forth in those who are honest.  Dante’s involuntary smile refuses Vergil’s 
command, and his own will, to remain silent.  Through his smile, he insists on 
communicating, and what he communicates is his awareness of irony: the Vergil for 
whom Statius still longs is in fact present.  But in signaling Vergil’s presence, 
Dante’s smile also indicates various histories – the shared history of Dante’s and 
Vergil’s journey through hell and purgatory and the shared love and knowledge of 
Vergil as prophetic sign and indeed, as poet of history.  Refusing Vergil’s 
command, the smile summons Vergil’s history in a way that Dante knows is beyond 
his control. 
 Even more, the force of body language in this wonderful passage illustrates 
vividly the social extent of signs.  Because the gestures of body language are easily 
discernible as actions, they allow us to see what I believe Dante knew to be true of 
all signs – that both verbal and non-verbal signs not only describe but perform 
actions.  Vergil’s silent face commands Dante’s silence, Dante’s smile prompts 
Statius’ silence and invites his question, which leads to Dante’s sigh declaring his 
dilemma, and so on. 
 Purg. 21 thus shows that signs as originating in the body are inextricably 
historical, potentially involuntary, and capable of effecting social change.  As such, 
the episode encapsulates what I will argue in this concluding chapter:  like the rich 
exchange of signs among the three poets, mind reading episodes may be read as 
speech acts that invoke conventions and histories, sometimes in ways that may be 
involuntary on the part of Dante poet.  The benefits of this critical approach are 
several:  by thinking of telepathic episodes as speech acts we can deepen the 
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conclusions of previous chapters by showing more forcefully and more fully what 
the language of mind reading does, which is often at odds with what it says it is 
doing at the narrative level.  Speech-act theory will further allow us to unravel 
Dante’s masterful poetics in certain episodes that have otherwise remained puzzling.  
In other cases this approach affords a great deal of insight into the social and 
historical contexts to which mind reading episodes point, in particular the social 
conventions and historical contingencies of speech.  I begin with the necessary 
theoretical background on speech-act theory itself. 
 Speech-act theory was first defined by J.L. Austin in a series of lectures in 
the early 1960s, in the first of which he distinguishes “constatives,” i.e. statements 
that merely describe or report, from “utterances” that carry out an action.  Calling 
these utterances “performatives,” he offered examples that include stating “I do” in 
a marriage ceremony, the naming of a ship, a verbal bet, and the written act of 
bequeathing property (5).  Although the title “speech-act theory” implies words, 
gestures and other nonverbal signs may also function as speech acts.3 Austin 
categorized speech acts threefold, as “locution,” which refers to the sense and 
reference of an utterance, “roughly equivalent to ‘meaning’ in the traditional sense,” 
“illocution,” as an utterance bearing conventional force, such as “informing, 
ordering, warning, undertaking,” and “perlocution,” defined as “what we bring 
about or achieve by saying something, such as convincing, persuading, deterring, 
and even, say, surprising or misleading” (108).  Most of the lectures focus on the 
social context of illocution as essential for constructing performative utterances. 
 In his 1990 monograph Speech Acts and Literary Theory, Sandy Petrey 
advances the work that Austin began, drawing out and in some cases challenging the 
                                                
3  Mitchell Green confirms this as well in his article “Speech Acts” posted online in the SEP.  The 
website contains a wealth of useful information on speech-act theory. 
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implications of Austinian definitions.  Especially important is Petrey’s claim that the 
emphasis on social context is what differentiates speech-act theory from other 
linguistic schools.  Whereas other philosophies focus on the formal structure of 
language, i.e. the locution itself, speech-act theory focuses on the illocution, which 
is “rather language’s productive force, which depends entirely on where and when 
it’s used.  Other linguistic schools address the structure of language in itself; speech-
act theory examines the power of language in communities” (2).4 To understand 
what words do, one must necessarily look at both the words and their users.  Social 
context entirely determines meaning:  “Insults, suggestions, threats, demands, and 
other performatives are defined by the community in which the action is 
accomplished, not by some universal and eternal idea of what the action is” (15).  
Hence proclaiming in public three times “I divorce you” has a different meaning 
and effect depending on the time and place in which it is uttered (10).  In the 
example of the will, the successful act of bequeathing property depends on the legal 
and social context in which the written will is executed, not the one in which it is 
written (78). 
 The emphasis on contextual rather than universal meaning leads Petrey to 
argue that distinguishing constative from performative utterances is far more 
                                                
4 Petrey focuses in chapters 8 and 9 on the similarities and differences between speech-act theory and 
deconstruction:  “The encounter between speech-act theory and deconstruction is of such interest 
because their disagreements over how language performs take off from the same constant awareness 
that it performs” (133).  In explaining the differences in performance, he writes “The two interpretive 
methods share the determination to erase the boundary lines between literary and non-literary 
utterance, but the erasures have different motivations.  Deconstruction foregrounds the locutionary 
perplexities common to literary and non-literary utterances, speech-act theory their common 
illocutionary activity.  One method concentrates on the things language does by virtue of its nature, 
the other on the things it does by virtue of its conventional context (164).  And “For Austin, the 
conventions that matter – those that allow speech to act – are always socially specific and historically 
constituted.  For Derrida, the conventions that matter apply to the units of every signifying form and 
thus inhere in the nature of the mark.  Since conventions inherent in the mark are obviously trans-
historical and universal, Derrida’s conventions are independent of context whereas Austin’s are 
coterminous with it” (138-39).  This is why “Derrida attributes language’s transformation to its 
triumphant transcendence of context whereas Austin attributes them to its inevitable articulation with 
context” (132). 
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difficult than Austin claims in his first lecture, though Petrey also believes that 
Austin came to recognize this problem in the course of subsequent lectures (26).  An 
utterance that appears to be merely descriptive “has in many cases overpowering 
impact on the situation in which it’s made” (27).  One of Petrey’s many examples is 
the seemingly innocuous “the cat is on the mat” exemplified variously by Austin 
throughout the lectures.  The meaning of this statement depends on the location of 
the cat but more importantly on the relationship between speaker and listener.  The 
statement can warn someone who is about to step on the cat, or it can reassure 
someone who has lost sight of the cat, or it can delight a child who is learning to 
rhyme.  In any case, it possesses performative force by nature of the context in 
which it is uttered, and according to the Austinian perspective of language, context 
is always present (30).  Petrey goes beyond simply emphasizing context to make the 
deeper point that communal performance of language determines what is perceived 
to be true even in the face of contradictory facts.  As evidence he enlists the fable of 
the emperor’s new clothes.  In this story “the straight facts aren’t operative” because 
the emperor’s referential status remains the same throughout:  he lacks clothing both 
before the child declares his nakedness as well as after (38).  It is the child’s 
(apparently constative) utterance that performs communal understanding of the 
emperor. 
 
  So long as his subjects refuse to say that the Emperor 
  is naked for fear of appearing to lack the virtue required 
  to see his clothes, the referential fact of his nudity is 
  collectively non-existent.  Life goes on as if the 
  Emperor were majestically attired; all the conventions 
  of his reign are observed and respected.  His clothes 
  are performed by a community willing to speak and act 
  as if he were actually wearing them.  Moreover, when  
  the little child says “But he has nothing on!” and the 
  citizenry uproariously concurs, the fable doesn’t simply 
  represent a population’s progress from illusion to reality. 
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  It shows the Emperor’s nudity being performed just like 
  his clothes, by utterance of a statement communally 
  affirmed as the truth (37-38). 
 This fictional example leads us to Petrey’s crucial advancement of speech-
act theory in literary criticism, a use of the theory that Austin had unfortunately 
rejected.  The latter excluded literary and artistic contexts as valid environments in 
which speech acts operate, calling language in such contexts “parasitic upon its 
normal use” (22).  He somehow did not consider literary language to belong to what 
he called the ordinary use of language.  On the one hand, the wrongness of this view 
seems too obvious to merit correction.  Yet Austin’s proscription has been taken 
seriously in criticism,5 and Petrey’s argument for the status of literary language is 
eloquent and important not least for how he shows the extent to which Austin 
himself relies on literary examples and techniques throughout the lectures.6 Petrey 
agrees with Austin on the illegitimacy of trying to separate language from its users, 
rightly concluding that the only way to oppose speech acts and texts is to separate 
texts from readers, an action that consistent Austinian theory would reject (51).  In 
this way Petrey ignores the letter but respects the spirit of Austin’s writing (53).  
That spirit, he claims, “highlights the multiple interactions between language and 
society, interactions that contest formalist concepts of the literary text as strongly as 
formalist concepts of the linguistic utterance” (53).  Just as social processes of non-
                                                
5 In his 1993 study of Romanesque portal inscriptions, Calvin Kendall argues for reading the 
inscriptions as performative utterances, but he takes seriously Austin’s proscription of literary 
language as speech acts and therefore gets bogged down in looking for ways that inscriptions might 
have performative power rather than exploring more fully the nature of the performances the portals 
imply as communal artifact bearing deeply conventional force.  Because of this limitation, he is able 
to conclude only that the messages of the portals might have been “successfully effected” if personal 
transformation took place in the worshipers passing through (124).  Given that the Latin messages of 
portals, albeit difficult to see and read, were likely known to communities through guides and 
translators, we can imagine all sorts of other ways that communities performed their messages, but 
we can only do so if we fully accept their status as speech acts.  Kendall mentions the Commedia’s 
gates of hell to make the point that Dante had thoroughly absorbed the architectural convention of 
portal inscriptions, but again, Kendall does not and cannot interpret the performative force of the 
gates because he adheres to Austin’s theoretical limitations. 
6 I leave aside this engaging but (for our purposes) not essential point covered by Petrey in chapter 3. 
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literary language lead us to enact certain performatives, literature operates in the 
context of different social conventions that invite us to interpret.  Literature bears 
illocutionary force even if that force is dramatically different from that of other 
speech acts.  We see collective enactment of a text in the especially dramatic case of 
Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses, in which the novel as speech act was directly 
connected to the Ayatollah Khomeini’s horrific interpretation of it – his call for 
Rushdie’s death had sufficient collective success to require the author to go into 
hiding under heavy protection (54).  The performative differences between Iranian 
communities and Western readers show incontestably the force of convention:  
freedom of expression is in fact a convention of the West, not an essential, universal 
view of literature:  “like all utterances, the literary text becomes what collectivities 
make of it” (55). 
 Unlike the example of Rushdie, however, most texts do not enact such 
dramatic or clearly discernible collective performances.  How might we define the 
social conventions of literary speech acts, specifically in Dante’s Commedia?  I 
answer this question first by making the case for the appropriateness of speech-act 
theory for medieval culture, given that according to many (conventional) accounts, 
its most important linguistic convention rejects categorically the idea of social 
performance of meaning.  The Christian Middle Ages located its origins and 
significance through the monotheistically-generated Word, which is represented as 
entirely asocial.  An utterance such as “let there be light” is presented as effected by 
a single God who is by definition outside of community.  For this reason, Petrey 
believes speech-act theory to be irrelevant in the case of divine utterances:  “God 
stands outside those (i.e. human) communities, conventions are radically 
inapplicable to Him or Her, the norms of social interaction fail to reach heaven.  
‘Let there be light’ and a human sentence that also does what it says have nothing 
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else in common” (63) and later in chapter 6 he proclaims “Where God is, speech-act 
theory has nothing to say” (100).  This is a curious move for a number of reasons.7 
First, Petrey argues in chapter 5 for the complete irrelevance of the speaker.  It is not 
the speaker’s presence or intention that matter, but the conventions that enact his or 
her speech.  If God’s pronouncements lack the normal social conventions among 
human beings necessary for recognizing His words as a valid speech act, one could 
argue that his words are nonetheless received and enacted entirely according to 
social convention.  “Let there be light” enacts communal performance of belief by 
millions of Christians and Jews around the world about the origin of the universe 
and the spiritual significance of light.  Yet it is also important to understand that the 
supposed lack of social context of divine utterances is itself a kind of communally 
enacted performance.  Speech-act theory has much to say about God’s language if 
we adhere to the Austinian principle that social context is omnipresent. 
 With this in mind, speech-act theory is in fact highly relevant for medieval 
Christian texts precisely because of a spiritually-based communal belief in language 
as contingent.  On the one hand, Christians believed that because of original sin, 
language was corrupted and therefore subject to the processes of human social 
convention.  On the other hand Christians defined their salvation through the Word 
made flesh.  God alone effected the Word made flesh, but it is precisely through the 
story of Christ’s life that Christians came to understand their communal power to 
effect the divine meaning of that life.  The point of Christ’s presence on earth was 
precisely to grant humans the freedom to decide the identity and meaning of Christ 
the man.  The compelling drama of Christ’s life is his defeat in death that came to be 
communally performed as the triumph of his salvation, which in turn performs the 
                                                
7 My argument for the relevance of speech-act theory in Christian conventions of the Word 
represents a late scholastic perspective based in philosophical categories rather than in philosophical 
theories on the Word of Scripture. 
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salvation of all who choose to believe.  The Word made flesh refers to the presence 
of Christ as a social, historical being, and to the idea that the Word’s meaning is, in 
fact, effected communally, through Christ’s life, death, and identity as divine that 
was performed by enough people to eventually establish a conventional belief 
system.  Medieval Christians understood that Christ can only signify socially.  It is 
this understanding that also informed their belief in the power of communities to 
effect the Eucharist, to proclaim the wafer as the body of Christ and wine as his 
blood in the act of communion.  Indeed, the very word “communion” reflects 
understanding of the social nature of the word’s performance as speech act.  
Medieval Christians thus possessed a keen sense of communal power to perform the 
meaning of language.  This suggests, however, neither a relativized nor a deeply 
historicized understanding.  Rather, it implies an awareness of the historical 
contingency of language within the economy of Christian history. 
 Some of the cultural assumptions about language under which Dante wrote 
were therefore highly amenable to the socially-driven principles of speech-act 
theory.  Yet the Commedia resists mightily any discernible signs of vulnerability to 
social convention at all.  Part of this has to do with the conventions of poetry itself 
and the way in which Dante manipulates them masterfully.  Petrey defines one of 
the social conventions of poetic texts as a deliberate separation from nonliterary 
language:  “Because the devices traditionally enshrined as poetic are always already 
social as well, no student of poetry should ignore the conventions that make them 
work even when part of the work they do is remove themselves from the 
conventions applying elsewhere” (111).  Part of what constitutes the modern 
“convention of poetic separateness” is the use of language that seems to exist in 
isolation.  Metaphor in particular appears to be autonomous and cut off from reality, 
but it too is a speech act “very much like stating or commanding…we can no more 
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see metaphor as autonomous because it cuts itself off from a referent than we can 
see a command as magic because it moves an army.  In both cases, the force is 
conventionally not internally generated” (111).  The Commedia projects 
separateness through its poetic form, but also in the narrative, which represents a 
journey through the afterlife – a place that, even as it represents the fulfillment of 
earthly history, is also presented as external to human social conventions.  Further, 
we have given attention to how Dante’s rhetoric expertly persuades readers to 
disengage the meaning of his words from their action:  whereas speech-act theory 
asks that we always distinguish between what language states and what it does, the 
Commedia is especially adept at commanding readers to do exactly the opposite, to 
believe what it says and ignore what it does.  In all these ways the Commedia 
ingeniously capitalizes on the social convention of separateness operative in poetry 
itself. 
 As a narrative topos and a poetic strategy, mind reading emerges as one of 
Dante’s specific techniques of social resistance:  it represents communication as 
silent and thus appears to resist the conventions of language.  As a communicative 
feature of an otherworldly setting, it claims to exist outside of the social conventions 
operative in earthly history.  Speech-act theory therefore offers incisive tools for 
historicizing this feature in a poem that works hard to resist such critical attempts.  
These tools ask that we take account of the operative conventions, including 
assumptions, historical background, social norms, and so on, that make possible a 
particular utterance.  For if we emphasize language and texts as social instruments 
by nature, we must also consider the societies from which they come and in which 
they circulate.  These requirements present a particular challenge for scholars of 
pre-modern texts, given the massive cultural and temporal gaps between the 
productive environments of authors and the performative environments of readers.  
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In previous chapters I have approached this task by locating narrative and 
philosophical contexts and conventions in order to construct some of the histories 
that make possible the Commedia’s epistemologically fraught performance of mind 
reading.  These findings provide a foundation for the methodology of this chapter, 
where I return to Dante’s text with the added perspective of speech-act theory to 
read telepathic episodes through a sharper historical lens.  This method may work in 
something of a reverse pattern from what one might expect; rather than trace further 
histories outside of the poem in order to identify the social conventions and 
assumptions under which Dante wrote, I use the tools of reading language as 
performative utterance to discover internally historical evidence that Dante’s 
performance of mind reading implies.  Reading the episodes as speech acts, as 
language that carries out action, in fact brings to light important clues from 
telepathic vocabulary and narrative contexts – clues that deepen the findings in 
previous chapters but also suggest surprising new points of contact. 
 If we ask in terms of speech-act theory what mind reading does, we can see 
in new ways that it performs urgent concern with histories and social conventions of 
all sorts.  It does so by directing readers how to read, by declaring the historical 
contingencies of various discourses, by privileging the body’s power to authorize 
language, by revealing the conventional role of Christian and political belief in 
Dante’s relationship with Vergil, by pronouncing over and over the myriad social 
conventions of speech itself, and by suggesting the psychosocial consequences of 
Dante’s exile from his native city.  As this list suggests, one of the new and 
unexpected findings in this chapter is Dante’s obsession with the social norms of 
speech, an obsession that I trace partly to his personal history of social and political 
exile.  It is important to include Dante’s personal history in order to understand the 
depth of the Commedia’s performance of epistemological uncertainty because the 
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personal crisis that Dante lived also makes possible the poem’s philosophical and 
linguistic acts in ways that have not been explored.  Along with the histories 
explored in previous chapters, the events of Dante’s life help us both to historicize 
his poetic performance and to grasp the depth of that history.  For I believe that in 
the episode of Purg. 21 with which I began this chapter, as well as in mind reading 
passages, we see an epistemological focus on the historicity of language that is far 
richer and more complex than what either Christian history or the 
Aristotelian/Neoplatonic framework circumscribe.  
 As explained in the introduction, in attempting to historicize aspects of the 
poem in this way, I offer readings that resist Dante’s specific strategies of historical 
transcendence.  This chapter thus aims to contribute to the efforts begun by Barolini 
and others such as Albert Ascoli.  In his 1997 study of Dante’s use of palinode, 
Ascoli notes that many scholars have described palinodic moments in Dante’s work 
precisely in the terms that those works construct as ideal to the author’s self-
construction (25).  Ascoli, however, sees Dante’s use of palinode as a rhetorical 
device rather than as a “true expression of Dante’s experience,” and he examines 
“the question of how an unfolding set of historical events and circumstances made 
Dante and his representations possible in the first place – how history implies, 
subsumes, and as it were, transcends the Dantean oeuvre, just as much as the other 
way around” (26).  I cannot here do full justice to Ascoli’s argument, but among his 
many compelling points is that Dante changes the definition of nobility from the 
Convivio to Monarchia based on the conceptual exigencies of each treatise, in other 
words, for “strategic, that is, for contingent, rhetorical, and historical, reasons” (32).  
Further, he argues that Dante fails to mention Frederick II in the Monarchia because 
(if we accept a later dating of the text) Frederick’s corruption, warfare, faithlessness, 
i.e. his “historical existence, his empirical occupancy of the imperial throne, 
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constitutes a virtual point-by-point refutation of Dante’s logical arguments in 
Monarchia” (35).  By contrast, Dante poet is able to confront Frederick’s corruption 
in the Commedia precisely because the poet presents his perspective as above 
history, directly informed by the divine will (38). 
 Similarly, I interpret mind reading episodes not only in terms of which 
historical contexts the episodes invoke and transform but in terms of how those 
histories make possible the poem, in particular how they, as socially-driven forces, 
compete with the astonishingly successful social resistance enacted by the poem in 
general and mind reading in particular.  Therefore my reading, while attempting to 
respect the poem’s cultural context, is by necessity not exclusively concerned with 
what Dante poet may have intended; I am interested not only in passages like Purg 
21 where Dante acknowledges that signs indicate history and can slip out of one’s 
control, but also in passages that demonstrate this although the poet may not have 
intended to do so.  By attempting to historicize from outside the economy of the 
poem’s parameters, I hope to model a use of speech-act theory in literary criticism 
for texts whose cultures (and social conventions enacting language) seem to be 
hopelessly lost to our understanding. 
 In returning to the Commedia, I begin by reevaluating some of the passages 
examined previously in order to show first that when we think of mind-reading 
episodes as speech acts, we can see the extent to which they draw attention to social 
context.  These first few examples will show the general relevance of this theory to 
the Commedia’s telepathic performances:  while sometimes hinting at specific 
histories, the passages mostly point to the importance of social and historical 
context.  That is, they aim to show that mind-reading episodes emphasize social 
context without yet highlighting specific conventions and histories therein.  Thus 
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while they function as something of a meta-commentary, they also provide a basis 
for understanding subsequent more specific examples.   
 In chapter 1 I presented as an example of rhetorical ambiguity the episode of 
Paradiso 13 in which Aquinas anticipates Dante’s objection regarding Solomon’s 
excellence in relation to Adam and Christ.8 Once Aquinas affirms that Adam and 
Christ indeed represented the summit of human perfection, he introduces Dante’s 
question as follows:  “Or s'i' non procedesse avanti piùe, / `Dunque, come costui fu 
sanza pare?' / comincerebber le parole tue.” (88-90).9 Does Aquinas claim to read 
the pilgrim’s thoughts, voicing what the pilgrim would say, or does he engage 
characteristically scholastic rhetoric to anticipate what he easily guesses to be the 
pilgrim’s most logical objection?  As I argue in chapter 1, the context of telepathy as 
a conventional mode of celestial communication in which Aquinas participates 
elsewhere (e.g. at line 37 of the same canto) here complicates his use of the 
conditional “comincerebber,” a word that would otherwise clearly signal the 
scholastic strategy of anticipation.  In this way Aquinas’ presence both as mind 
reader and as scholastic thinker enacts a conflation of philosophical and mystical 
experience.  This conflation implies a particular epistemological value, for through 
Aquinas’ telepathic-mystical intercourse with the pilgrim, the philosopher implicitly 
values a way of knowing that differs pointedly from the earthly mode in which he so 
excelled.10 But as speech act, Aquinas’ words go beyond invoking the different 
discourses of telepathy and scholastic argument in order to imply their 
epistemological value.  His words, which as a potential instance of mind reading 
                                                
8 In this example and the next from Paradiso 14 I repeat some of what appears in chapter 1 in order 
to reorient the reader.   
9 “Now if I said no more beyond this point, / your words might well begin, ‘How is it, then, / with 
your assertion of his matchless vision?” 
10 As I explore more fully in chapter one, the key narrative analogue to this hybrid sort of rhetoric is 
the way that Aquinas validates a different way of knowing in his praise of St. Francis in Par. 11 
while Bonaventure praises St. Dominic in canto 12. 
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would strategically resist historicity, are in fact made possible by the collision of 
two discourses whose identifiable characteristics are necessarily conventional and 
historical.  As speech act, Aquinas’ words broadcast the historical contingency of 
languages.  
 Also presented as a rhetorical complication in chapter 1 is the opening of 
Paradiso 14 when Beatrice voices Dante’s doubt for him, asking Aquinas whether 
souls will retain their radiance once they are united with their bodies and if so, 
whether such radiance will harm their vision.  The first three verses of her speech 
are key:  “«A costui fa mestieri, e nol vi dice / né con la voce né pensando ancora, /  
d'un altro vero andare a la radice” (10-12).11 Here Beatrice articulates a question that 
she says the pilgrim has not yet pronounced or even thought.  In Par. 15.61-63 we 
learn from Cacciaguida that souls in heaven know human thoughts even before 
humans think them, so one could argue that verses 10-12 exemplify foreknowledge 
in which Beatrice refers to the pilgrim’s future thought, as “ancora” implies.  Yet 
verse 10 complicates the issue, for when Beatrice says “A costui fa mestieri,” (“this 
man needs”) does she mean that Dante will think this thought, as suggested by 
“pensando ancora” or that he should, or both?12 If we give weight to “fa mestieri,” 
the passage privileges Beatrice’s authority over Dante’s.  By selecting his future 
thought as the next topic of discussion, she guides his reasoning as he learns to 
recognize what sort of questions he should prefer.  If we focus on “pensando 
ancora” we stress Dante pilgrim’s agency in directing the discussion.  The tension 
between these phrases forces the reader to confront the issue of whose thinking 
directs the questioning at least as much as it represents the unity of shared thought 
in heaven.  But as a speech act, this ambiguous passage insists on a simple but 
                                                
11 “He does not tell you of it – not with speech / nor in his thoughts as yet – but this man needs / to 
reach the root of still another truth.” 
12 See chapter 1 for discussion of critical responses to this passage. 
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crucial fact:  all communication entails transactions that occur among people, not 
disembodied souls, an observation that might certainly remain banal in another 
context but that here emerges as significant because it shows resistance to mind 
reading as a strategy of transcendence.  The episode declares all communication as 
social and therefore necessarily imperfect, which is to say that Beatrice’s words 
intimate telepathy yet resist telepathic ideals of purity and transcendence of the 
body.  
 Indeed, speech-act theory highlights the body’s prominence in mind-reading 
episodes.  In chapter 1 we saw how body language makes it difficult to define 
certain episodes as telepathic.  Yet even instances easily recognized as mind reading 
draw attention to the speaking body.  A simple example is the Paradiso’s first 
telepathic reference; after Beatrice discerns Dante’s inner commotion we find a 
physical emphasis on her act of speech:  “Ond' ella, che vedea me sì com' io, / a 
quïetarmi l'animo commosso, / pria ch'io a dimandar, la bocca aprio / e cominciò” 
(85-88).13 More interesting is the opening of Paradiso 4 where despite the fact that 
Beatrice apparently has no need of earthly signs in order to know the pilgrim’s 
doubt, Dante goes out of his way to set up a hierarchy of such signs:  he privileges 
the corporeal sign of his desire and his question as more “caldo assai” than speech:  
“Io mi tacea, ma 'l mio disir dipinto / m'era nel viso, e 'l dimandar con ello, / più 
caldo assai che per parlar distinto” (10-12).14 Some of these episodes go further and 
actually assert the body’s authority to verify mind reading.  In Paradiso 10 after 
Beatrice tells Dante to give thanks to God, she is eclipsed by God’s light in the 
pilgrim’s mind, and she is said to know this in the following way:   
    
                                                
13 “And she who saw me as I see myself / to quiet the commotion in my mind, / opened her lips 
before I could ask / and she began.” 
14 “I did not speak, but in my face were seen / longing and questioning, more ardent than / if spoken 
words had made them evident.” 
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     Cor di mortal non fu mai sì digesto 
   a divozione e a rendersi a Dio 
   con tutto 'l suo gradir cotanto presto, 
     come a quelle parole mi fec' io; 
   e sì tutto 'l mio amore in lui si mise, 
   che Bëatrice eclissò ne l'oblio. 
     Non le dispiacque; ma sì se ne rise, 
   che lo splendor de li occhi suoi ridenti 
   mia mente unita in più cose divise.  (Par. 10.55-63).15 
Like some of the episodes in the first two canticles, this one also exemplifies 
questionable signs underlying Dante’s belief that mind reading has occurred.  For 
Dante concludes solely from Beatrice’s smile her awareness of the displacement.  
As a speech act, then, this telepathic performance posits body language as proof that 
mind reading has taken place:  it declares that signs of the body possess the 
constative power to verify a supernatural transaction of knowledge.  In this case 
mind reading points to the historicity of communication by privileging corporeal 
power.16 
 I now turn to passages comprising histories that are more specific, beginning 
with the Commedia’s first instance of mind reading in Inferno 10 when Vergil 
answers the pilgrim’s questions concerning whether souls in the tombs may be seen:  
“Però a la dimanda che mi faci / quinc' entro satisfatto sarà tosto, / e al disio ancor 
                                                
15 “No mortal heart was ever so disposed / to worship, or so quick to yield itself / to God with all its 
gratefulness, as I / was when I heard those words, and all my love / was so intent on Him that 
Beatrice / was then eclipsed within forgetfulness. / But not displeased by this, she smiled such / that 
the splendor of her smiling eyes / divided upon many things my mind that had been united.” 
Mandelbaum’s translation of lines 61-63 depart from the original: “my / rapt mind was split:  I 
watched the sun – and I / watched, too, the splendor of her smiling eyes.” 
16 We see this also in Paradiso 15 after Cacciaguida describes at length his ability to see Dante 
pilgrim’s thoughts reflected in the divine “speglio” and commands his descendent to voice his 
question.  The pilgrim responds by waiting for Beatrice’s permission:  “Io mi volsi a Beatrice, e quell 
udio / pria ch’io parlassi, e arrisemi un cenno / che fece crescer l’ali al voler mio” (70-72) [I turned to 
Beatrice, and she heard me / before I spoke; and she smiled to me a sign / that made the wings of my 
desire grow].  I follow Singleton’s more literal translation of line 71.  The implication in this passage 
is that Beatrice’s smile indicates her knowledge and approval of Dante’s thought.  Her body language 
evidences a telepathic act and authorizes the pilgrim’s speech. 
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che tu mi taci»” (15-18). 17 In chapter 1 I addressed this passage primarily in terms 
of the history of its critical reception. I emphasized how Dante poet collapses form 
and content, leading commentators to read in reactionary ways to what I call the 
moral drama of heresy.  Rather than asking why the poet invites us to believe that 
Vergil knows the pilgrim’s thoughts at a precise moment – not adequately explained 
by Ciacco’s prophecy in canto 6 – critics focus on identifying the pilgrim’s thought 
itself.  They do so because Dante poet implicates us in not knowing the truth of the 
pilgrim’s desire precisely as we encounter the heretics, those who deviated from 
God’s truth, one consequence of which is their ignorance of the present.  As 
demonstrated in chapter 1, critics thus respond reactively by focusing on the 
narrative present, “discovering” the pilgrim’s wish by projecting onto the episode 
information that we learn only after the fact - that the pilgrim does speak with 
Farinata.   
 Thinking about this episode as a speech act means there is more to say about 
it, particularly what Dante poet gains but also what may be unintentional 
consequences of the language.  The critical reception shows well what Vergil’s 
statement does.  His words claim knowledge without demonstrating it, deeply 
implicating the reader into that claim, making us want to distinguish ourselves 
desperately from Cavalcanti and Farinata who, like us in this context, lack 
knowledge of the present.  As a speech act, Vergil’s words direct us to read in terms 
of the episode’s emotional and intellectual provocations rather than in terms of 
logic.  For Dante poet’s self-presentation as scriba dei, this represents an enormous 
gain.  Yet epistemologically, this canto is marked as particularly unstable.  For 
Inferno 10 introduces supernatural knowledge that is not a sign of grace, in the form 
                                                
17 “And so the question you have asked of me / will soon find satisfaction while we’re here, / as will 
the desire that you do not express to me.”   
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of Vergil’s mind reading but also in the inconsistent knowledge of the damned.  For 
parallel to the problem of Vergil’s knowledge, which many scholars attribute to 
Ciacco’s prophecy, is the fact that Ciacco himself also knows the present when 
according to Farinata’s reasoning, he should not.  When Dante pilgrim hears 
Cavalcanti’s ignorance of the present and Farinata’s prophecy, he asks about the 
souls’ inconsistent knowledge: 
     El par che voi veggiate, se ben odo,  
   dinanzi quel che 'l tempo seco adduce, 
   e nel presente tenete altro modo». 
     «Noi veggiam, come quei c'ha mala luce, 
   le cose», disse, «che ne son lontano; 
   cotanto ancor ne splende il sommo duce. 
     Quando s'appressano o son, tutto è vano 
   nostro intelletto; e s'altri non ci apporta, 
   nulla sapem di vostro stato umano. 
     Però comprender puoi che tutta morta 
   fia nostra conoscenza da quel punto 
   che del futuro fia chiusa la porta»  (Inf. 10.97-108).18  
Yet in canto 6, Ciacco’s prophecy includes statements about the present in line 73 
when he says there are two just Florentines to whom nobody listens (“Giusti son 
due, e non vi sono intesi”)19 and in line 69 when he indicates that the Black Guelphs 
will return to power “con la forza di tal che testé piaggia.”  I offer an unpoetic 
translation of this phrase, with its hard-to-translate word “piaggia,” as “with the 
power of one who now appears to be neutral.”20 The crucial “testé” (left out of 
                                                
18 “’It seems, if I hear right, that you can see / beforehand that which time is carrying, / but you have 
a differet way in the present.’ / ‘We see, like one who has dim light, / those things’ he said, ‘that are 
remote from us; / the Highest Lord still shines on us that much. / But when events draw near or are, 
our minds / are useless; were we not informed by others, / we should know nothing of your human 
state. / So you can understand that our knowledge / will die completely at the moment when / the 
portal of the future has been shut.’” 
19 “Two men are just, but no one listens to them.” 
20 In defining this interesting word, Boccaccio stresses the meaning as one who dissembles: “Dicesi 
appo i fiorentini colui piaggiare, il quale mostra di voler quello che egli non vuole, o di che egli non 
si cura che avvenga” [The Florentines say locally that one piaggiare who pretends to want something 
that he does not want, or that he does not care what happens].  Other scholars such as Francesco 
Mazzoni (1965-85) define it as simply to remain neutral:  “vale ‘tenersi in bilico,’ destreggiarsi,’ 
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Mandelbaum’s translation of “using the power of one who tacks his sails”) implies 
that this individual, who is generally believed to be Boniface VIII, dissembles 
currently, which means that Ciacco knows what is happening in the present.  In the 
commentary tradition, the few who mention this inconsistency claim that Ciacco has 
learned of present affairs from another soul recently arrived, a possibility allowed 
for in Farinata’s qualifying phrase “e s'altri non ci apporta.”21 While Farinata’s 
words theoretically allow this, we should note that critics apply it in the absence of 
any other evidence in the narrative, i.e. there is nothing in the story beyond 
Farinata’s words to suggest that any other soul has reported this information to 
Ciacco.  The episode is thus another example of critics resolving a narrative 
problem by treating Dante’s fictional terms as if they were operative in a 
nonfictional story. 
 The issue with Ciacco concerns knowledge of the present, but as Sapegno 
points out there are other passages in the Inferno that raise questions about the 
                                                
insomma ‘non prender posizione,’ in una manifesta riassunzione dell’imagine dei due piatti di 
bilancia (‘questa caggia…’l’altra sormonti) contenuta nella terzina” [it means ‘to hold in balance,’ 
‘proceed carefully,’ in sum ‘to not take a position,” in a clear invocation of the image of two plates of 
the balance contained in the terzina (“this one falls…the other prevails)].  
21 According to the DDP database, it is only beginning in the twentieth century that commentators 
even mention Ciacco as an example of inconsistency.  The first example there is by Enrico Mestica 
(1921).  Ernesto Trucchi (1936) sums up the opinion that Farinata’s words explain all cases:  “Così 
intesa la legge è amplissima, e serve a spiegare tutti i passi del Poema, anche le apparenti 
contraddizioni, come vedemmo a proposito della profezia di Ciacco; se i dannati non conoscono il 
presente, come il Cavalcanti, soggiaciono alla legge generale; se lo conoscono, come Ciacco, 
Maometto ecc. qualcuno l'avrà loro rivelato” [Thus understood the rule is very broad, and serves to 
explain all passages in the poem, even the apparent contradictions, as we saw in the prophecy of 
Ciacco; if the damned don’t know the present, like Cavalcanti, they are subject to the general rule; if 
they know it, as Ciacco, Mohammed, etc. someone will have revealed it to them].  Others including 
Giuseppe Giacalone (1968) and Singleton (1970-5) agree. Nicola Fosca (2003-6) notes this as a 
possibility but also suggests that Dante may have originally intended ignorance of the present only 
for the Epicureans and then subsequently extended the condition to all souls in hell.  Fosca also 
suggests that by excluding Ciacco from this ignorance, the poet may have wanted to separate upper 
from lower hell.  Siro Chimenz (1962) notes that Ciacco knows the present and sees this as an 
unresolvable contradiction, describing it simply:  “È questo uno dei casi in cui si può avvertire un 
momento del processo formativo della struttura del poema” [This is one of the cases in which we can 
perceive a moment of the creative process of the poem’s structure].  See below for discussion of the 
philosophical underpinnings of damned souls’ knowledge, as well as of Trucchi’s claim that 
Mohammed knows the present. 
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souls’ prophetic abilities.  The narrative function of the damned souls’ prophetic 
power is to dramatize ever-diminishing knowledge such that it becomes part of their 
punishment.  Epistemologically the prospect of shrinking knowledge is terrifying 
because it is not merely potential but personal:  things the sinners actually know and 
indeed foretell will eventually vanish from their minds.  Poetically, prophecy 
functions as another authenticating strategy by which Dante dramatizes what he 
presents as future political strife.  Most commentators, beginning with Pietro di 
Dante’s (1359-64) lengthy gloss, address the issue mainly by locating philosophical 
sources that explain and justify the infernal souls’ knowledge, showing that the rule 
laid out by Farinata is within the range of what was theoretically possible according 
to church fathers.22 Yet in some cases souls express doubts about their abilities, as in 
canto 19 when Pope Nicholas III mistakes Dante pilgrim for Boniface with the 
outburst “Ed el gridò: «Se' tu già costì ritto, / se' tu già costì ritto, Bonifazio? / Di 
parecchi anni mi mentì lo scritto” (52-54)23 and in canto 28 when Pier da Medicina 
offers a prophesy concerning Guido del Cassero and Angiolello di Carignano, 
commenting parenthetically “se l’antiveder qui non è vano” (78).24 While it makes a 
certain sense for these souls to doubt powers bestowed by a God in whom they have 
no faith, their words nonetheless perform epistemological uncertainty.   
                                                
22 As Pietro and subsequent commentators including Jacopo della Lana (1324-28), Ernesto Trucchi 
(1936), Singleton (1970-5), and Nicola Fosca (2003-6) make clear, the idea that damned souls can 
only know present affairs of the world if they are informed by other newly-arrived souls or demons is 
supported by Aquinas, Augustine, and Gregory.  As for their knowledge of the future, the same 
philosophers are cited as saying that damned souls can prophesy only by divine revelation or by 
knowing things according to their causes. Pietro, however, also mentions Augustine’s ambiguous 
ideas (discussed in chapter 3) about the demons’ power to foretell the future based on their greater 
experience, greater cognitive power due to their physiology, what they overhear from true prophets, 
and their enhanced ability to read body language.  
23 “Are you already standing, / already standing there, o Boniface? / The book has lied to me by 
several years.” 
24 “if the foresight we have here’s not vain.” 
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 Also in canto 28 is the very interesting case of Mohammed who, as noted 
above, is named by Trucchi as an example of another sinner knowing the present.  
This is because Mohammed offers what should be a prophecy in the form of advice 
when he tells Dante to report back to Dolcino Tornielli, leader of the heretical sect 
the Apostoli, to provision himself when in hiding with enough food if he wishes to 
avoid defeat:  
     «Or dì a fra Dolcin dunque che s'armi, 
   tu che forse vedra' il sole in breve, 
   s'ello non vuol qui tosto seguitarmi, 
     sì di vivanda, che stretta di neve 
   non rechi la vittoria al Noarese, 
   ch'altrimenti acquistar non saria leve» (Inf. 28.55-60).25 
Fra Dolcino’s capture by church authorities in fact occurred in 1307 when he was 
burned alive.  Since Mohammed presumably knows this outcome, why does he 
suggest the friar do something to prevent it?  One answer, supported by Singleton, is 
that he speaks ironically, taking malicious pleasure in the pretense of offering 
advice and in the knowledge of Dolcino’s true fate.  Yet I agree with Sapegno that 
Mohammed’s tone, rather than ironic, is “serio e angosciato, senz’ombra di 
malizia”.26 Another possibility is that knowledge notwithstanding, Mohammed, as a 
sower of scandal and schism, indeed speaks sincerely because he wishes to support 
a comrade in divisive efforts.  In any case, Mohammed in this episode clearly knows 
something about the future, but his words strongly imply that he offers advice for 
the present in order to potentially change the future.27 Like some of the ambiguous 
                                                
25 “’Then you, who will perhaps soon see the sun, / tell Fra Dolcino to provide himself / with food, if 
he has no desire to join me / here quickly, lest when snow besieges him, / it bring the Novarese the 
victory / that otherwise they would not find too easy.’” 
26 “serious and anguished, without a hint of malice.” 
27 According to Singleton’s commentary, fra Dolcino became leader of the sect in 1300, the fictional 
date of the pilgrim’s journey, but attacks on him and his followers began in 1305. 
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language in mind-reading passages examined in chapter 1, Mohammed’s rhetoric 
blurs the nature and limits of his knowledge.28  
  Keeping in mind the parallelisms between telepathy and the damned souls’ 
knowledge, I suggest that we view the issue of Ciacco in a wider epistemological 
frame that allows us to see it as part of a more comprehensive question.29 Why does 
Inferno 10 introduce both Vergil’s mysterious mind reading and Farinata’s account 
that forces us to notice epistemological inconsistency on the extent of the damned 
souls’ knowledge?  The idea of ever-lessening prophetic powers is an infernal 
inversion of Gregory’s declaration of ever-greater prophecy as the end of time 
approaches (see chapter 3).  But the inconsistency of the sinners’ knowledge in 
practice also invokes Gregory’s theories on the unpredictability of prophecy for the 
holy, and it recapitulates the instabilities of mind reading throughout the poem.  
Given that canto 10 invokes and indeed, is made possible by these histories, I 
believe that we find both Vergil’s claim of mind reading and the question of the 
sinners’ knowledge there because, on the one hand, it distinguishes Vergil from 
other infernal souls.  As Charles Davis has made clear, Dante followed medieval 
                                                
28 This may be especially significant given Mohammed’s identity as prophet of Islam, whose culture 
bore great significance for Dante’s in so many ways. 
29 There is evidence elsewhere in the poem for viewing mind reading and prophecy as overlapping 
phenomena.  In Paradiso 4.10, mentioned above in the discussion of body language, Dante poet 
strongly suggests a conceptual link between the two when he describes Beatrice’s telepathic act in 
terms of the prophet Daniel:  “Fé sì Beatrice qual fé Danïello, / Nabuccodonosor levando d'ira, / che 
l'avea fatto ingiustamente fello” (13-15) [“Then Beatrice did just as Daniel did, / when he appeased 
Nebuchadnezzar’s anger, / the rage that made the king unjustly fierce.”]. Leaving aside the question 
of Dante’s puzzling association of himself with the wrathful Nebuchadnezzar (see Hollander for a 
convincing explanation) we should note that here the poet figures mind reading not in terms of saints 
or of Christ but of Daniel’s prophetic understanding of King Nebuchadnezzar’s dream, recounted in 
the book of Daniel 2.1-46.  In that story, Daniel is not strictly represented as a mind reader.  He is 
said to ask King Nebuchadnezzar for time to discover the king’s dream and its meaning.  Daniel then 
urges his companions to pray to God so that he might be granted the knowledge, and finally the 
dream is revealed through a night vision: “tunc Daniheli per visionem nocte mysterium revelatum 
est” (1344) [then the mystery was revealed through a vision at night to Daniel].  For this Daniel 
thanks God.  Just as I argue in chapter 3 that mind reading is not categorically distinct from 
prophecy, dreams, etc. in pagan and early Christian texts, Dante’s simile invites us to believe that he 
conceives of telepathy and prophecy as somehow similar, which further supports treating them as 
philosophically related. 
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tradition in believing that Vergil in the fourth Eclogue had prophesied the coming of 
Christ, and Dante was also convinced by reading the Aeneid that Aeneas “came 
back to the land of his forefathers as the elect of God, chosen to found a race that 
would conquer the earth” (245).30 Because of this, Dante believed that Vergil, as 
bearer of this history, was also divinely inspired and possessed supernatural 
knowledge (246).  In the Commedia, then, Vergil’s knowledge is shown to surpass 
the punitive sort applied to the other damned.  His knowledge of the present, 
sometimes including Dante’s thoughts, differentiates him.  In this way Vergil’s 
words at 10.15-18 mark his separation from other souls.  Likewise, in canto 19, 
quoted above, just before Pope Nicholas III doubts his own telepathic power in line 
54, Dante pilgrim affirms Vergil’s mind-reading ability in line 39 when he says “sai 
quel che si tace.”31 As speech acts, these statements perform Vergil’s 
epistemological privilege. 
 On the other hand, the epistemology of Vergil’s knowledge is as mysterious 
as it is for the other denizens of hell, and as discussed in chapter 1 its enactment is 
likewise inconsistent.  In this sense, Dante aligns his guide with the other doomed 
souls.  This alignment makes further sense in the context of heresy itself, its odd 
placement in the structure of hell and Dante poet’s use of this particular 
transgression as part of his poetic strategies.  Canto 10 is the first to treat a sin that is 
not one of incontinence.  Rather, heresy deals with knowledge insofar as it is a 
rejection of established doctrine.  The circle of the heretics is a setting for souls 
whose spiritual relationship between knowledge and belief is unstable, ambiguous, 
and ultimately fatal.  But as demonstrated above, canto 10 also enacts this instability 
thematically, as it becomes a stage for the epistemological drama of how, why, and 
                                                
30 From “Dante’s Vision of History.” 
31 “you know what is unspoken.” 
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what characters know, and structurally, since Dante’s placement of heresy does not 
fit neatly in the Inferno’s scheme.  The canto further alerts us to the question of 
knowledge in Dante poet himself, given his heretical claims later in canto 13 
regarding the failure of suicides to reunite with their bodies at the end of time and in 
canto 33 when frate Alberigo claims that a devil currently inhabits his body on 
earth.32 In all these ways canto 10 becomes fertile ground for the emergence of what 
can be called the poem’s epistemological resistance to stable systems of knowledge.  
It is perhaps for these reasons that Vergil’s first claim of telepathy appears here and 
not earlier.  As speech acts, Vergil’s and Farinata’s words provoke epistemological 
resistance.  For Dante poet this resistance is not an advantage because instead of 
preserving the illusion of coherent systems of knowledge and justice, it encourages 
us to find epistemological discrepancies in God’s ostensibly rational order.  We can 
therefore define this resistance, which emerges from a reading attentive to 
conventions both rhetorical and historical, as a consequence both of and for Dante’s 
explicit poetic strategies. 
 The issue of what Dante believes about Vergil figures centrally in the line 
from the encounter with Pier della Vigna where Dante adopts rhetoric whose value 
has become the focus of commentators.  I refer to the confusion the pilgrim faces in 
Inferno 13 upon hearing voices without seeing anyone, which prompts the poet to 
state his belief that Vergil knows what he thinks, a belief that Vergil confirms: 
 
     Cred' ïo ch'ei credette ch'io credesse 
   che tante voci uscisser, tra quei bronchi, 
   da gente che per noi si nascondesse. 
     Però disse 'l maestro: «Se tu tronchi 
                                                
32 On Inferno 13 see Nicola Fosca (2003-6) who confirms that the poem’s representation departs 
from church doctrine and provides a useful review specifically of early commentators’ attempts to 
deal with the problem.  Likewise regarding Inferno 33 Fosca mentions that Dante’s invention 
provoked critical reactions from the beginning given that Christian doctrine allows the possibility of 
salvation up until the moment of death. 
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   qualche fraschetta d'una d'este piante, 
   li pensier c'hai si faran tutti monchi» (Inf. 13.25-30).33 
Commentators through the seventeenth century generally explain the literal sense of 
line 25, and it is only from the eighteenth century on that critics such as P. Pompeo 
Venturi disapprove of what they deem excessive rhetorical artifice.34 Commentaries 
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are thus entirely occupied with debating 
the aesthetics of the line, whereas in the twentieth century critics begin to suggest a 
link with Pier della Vigna’s rhetoric.35 Initially scholars argued that Dante adopts 
such rhetoric as a strategy of historical characterization for the suicide, but in 1946 
Leo Spitzer sought to explain why Dante uses this language also for the second 
suicide and for himself.  Spitzer refers to Dante pilgrim in calling line 25 “the 
‘onomatopoeic’ rendering of his mental state of estrangement and confusion,” 
indicated by the pilgrim’s smarrimento in the previous line, that brings about “the 
disruption of his mental communication with his master” (98).  Yet Gianfranco 
Contini argues, regarding Pier della Vigna’s rhetoric generally, that it is in fact not 
specific to the suicide because it is “la retorica generica d'ogni parlare ufficiale e 
festivo” (40),36 concluding that it is therefore the rhetoric of Dante poet.  Nicola 
Fosca (2003-6) directly refutes Spitzer, pointing out that Dante uses comparable 
rhetoric in situations in the Paradiso that are anything but disharmonious.37 
                                                
33 “I believe that he believed that I believed / that so many voices came forth among those trunks / 
from people who had been concealed from us. / Therefore my master said: ‘If you would tear / a little 
twig from any of these plants, / the thoughts you have will also be cut off.’” 
34 Venturi describes line 25 as a “scherzo poco degno d’imitazione” [silly expression unworthy of 
imitation].  Likewise Raffaello Andreoli (1856) comments “Così fatti giuochi di parole distraggono 
lo spirito e raffreddano il sentimento” [Plays on words carried out in this way diminish the spirit and 
dampen the sentiment]. 
35 For example Tommaso Casini and S. A. Barbi (1921), Carlo Steiner (1921),  Luigi Pietrobono 
(1946), Daniele Mattalia (1960),  Giovanni Fallani (1965), Giuseppe Giacalone (1968), Singleton 
(1970-75), Anna Maria Chiavacci Leonardi (1991-97), and others. 
36 “the generic rhetoric of all official and festive speech.” 
37  Fosca writes that Spitzer “ha sostenuto che il linguaggio involuto è dovuto all'intenzione di 
rendere col suono l'idea di scissione, sdoppiamento, confusione morale che, come attesta l'intrico 
stesso della selva, domina il canto. Solo che artifici del medesimo tenore sono utilizzati da Dante in 
situazioni non certo disarmoniche, ad es. nel corpo del Paradiso. È necessario quindi distinguere la 
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Giuseppe Giacalone (1968) advises us to distinguish between the poet’s rhetoric and 
that of his characters given the present tense “Cred’io” that begins line 25, which 
precisely underscores the difference between the narrative and poetic time frames 
and thus has the effect of diminishing the force of the narrative setting.38 
  Given that Dante indeed foregrounds his presence as poet in line 25, “Cred' 
ïo ch'ei credette ch'io credesse,” I interpret the verse as a speech act whose power 
lies in the repetition of “credere,” echoed thematically throughout the canto, as a 
restless meditation on the problem of belief.  On the one hand, canto 13 is saturated 
with words that attest to mistaken belief and failure of faith.  Pier della Vigna insists 
twice on his “fede,” boasting of having brought so much of it to his office that it 
weakened him, “fede portai al glorïoso offizio, / tanto ch'i' ne perde' li sonni e ' 
polsi,” (62-3).39 He then justifies his suicide precisely as his belief that it would 
bring escape and swears that he never broke faith with his lord, echoing line 25 with 
“credendo” in line 71:  
 
     L'animo mio, per disdegnoso gusto, 
   credendo col morir fuggir disdegno, 
   ingiusto fece me contra me giusto. 
     Per le nove radici d'esto legno  
 
 
 
 
                                                
”retorica“ del personaggio da quella dell'Autore” [has asserted that the intricate language is owed to 
the intention to render with sound the idea of fragmentation, division, moral confusion that, as the 
very tangle of the wood attests, dominates the canto.  Except that Dante uses artifices of the same 
tone in situations certainly not disharmonic, for example in the body of the Paradiso.  It is therefore 
necessary to distinguish the ‘rhetoric’ of the character from that of the author.] 
38 Giacalone writes that “D. nel credo mette in risalto il momento in cui scrive, e nel credesse mette 
in risalto il momento in cui Virg. era allora nel bosco con D., il tempo narrativo del poeta è 
differenziato dal tempo del personaggio D., e così anche dalla dimensione dell'eternità in cui si trova 
incarcerato Pier della Vigna” [Dante in “credo” emphasizes the moment in which he writes, and in 
“credesse” he emphasizes the moment in which Vergil was in the wood with Dante; the narrative 
time of the poet is differentiated from the time of Dante pilgrim, and thus also from the dimension of 
eternity in which we find the imprisoned Pier della Vigna]. 
39 “and I was faithful to my splendid office, / so faithful that I lost both sleep and strength.” 
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   vi giuro che già mai non ruppi fede  
   al mio segnor, che fu d'onor sì degno” (Inf. 13.70-5).40  
Parallel to these pronouncements is what Vergil says about the pilgrim’s disbelief.  
We see this first at line 21 when Vergil tells his charge that he will see things that 
will make his guide’s words seem incredible (“sì vederai /cose che torrien fede al 
mio sermone»”)41 and again with the well-known verses beginning at line 46 when 
Vergil justifies his harm to the suicide as necessary precisely due to Dante’s 
disbelief of Vergil’s “rima.” (“«S'elli avesse potuto creder prima» …etc.).42 This 
latter example is, of course, one of the poet’s authenticating strategies, by which he 
makes his own poetry appear more credible at the expense of Vergil’s.43 Here 
Vergil’s status as prophet extends only so far as is necessary to authorize Dante’s 
status as scriba dei. 
 It is precisely because Dante poet harnesses the lexicon of failed belief as a 
strategy to bolster his prophetic claims that we should not ignore the moments when 
he affirms belief in Vergil.  We see this not only at line 25 but again at line 83 
when, overcome with pity, he asks his guide to speak further, assuming that Vergil 
knows what will satisfy his curiosity:  “Ond' ïo a lui: «Domandal tu ancora / di quel 
                                                
40 “My mind, because of its disdainful temper, / believing it could flee disdain through death, / made 
me unjust against my own just self. / I swear to you by the peculiar roots / of this thornbush, I never 
broke faith / with him who was so worthy – with my lord.” 
41 “you’ll see such things / as would deprive my speech of all belief.” 
42 “«S'elli avesse potuto creder prima», / rispuose 'l savio mio, «anima lesa, / ciò c'ha veduto pur con 
la mia rima, / non averebbe in te la man distesa; / ma la cosa incredibile mi fece / indurlo ad ovra ch'a 
me stesso pesa” (46-51) [My sage said: “wounded soul, if, earlier, / he had been able to believe what 
he / had only glimpsed within my poetry, / then he would not have set his hand against you; / but its 
incredibility made me / urge him to do a deed that grieves me deeply.”  Dante pilgrim and Vergil are 
also joined in believing that Pier della Vigna wishes to say more at line 110 “Noi eravamo ancora al 
tronco attesi, / credendo ch’altro ne volesse dire, / quando noi fummo d’un romor sorpresi” [And we 
were still intent upon the trunk - / believing it had wanted to say more - / when we were overtaken by 
a roar].  This is not so much mistaken or failed belief as it is a belief that does not come to fruition 
because new characters arrive on the scene. 
43 As Barolini argues in Dante’s Poets: Textuality and Truth in the Comedy, p. 212. 
 214 
che credi ch'a me satisfaccia; / ch'i' non potrei, tanta pietà m'accora»” (82-4).44 
“Credere” and “fede” thus signal deep ambivalence in Dante’s relationship with 
Vergil.  The repeated use of these words suggest layers of history for the knowledge 
implied precisely because Dante marks his statements about Vergil’s knowledge as 
belief.  As shown in chapter 3, rational exposition does not uphold mind reading 
theory from the early Middle Ages on:  Augustine, Gregory and others attempt to 
understand how mind reading works through rational argument, in the failure of 
which their theories ultimately stand on faith.  Dante pilgrim’s belief that Vergil 
knows his thoughts also invokes the medieval history of belief in Vergil as having 
prophesied the coming of Christ and Dante’s belief in Vergil as divinely-sanctioned 
poet of Roman history.  Through this connection with Italian origins, “credere” and 
“fede” vis-à-vis Vergil also recapitulate the political history called forth by the faith 
upon which Pier della Vigna insists.  By linking the language of his belief with that 
of the suicide he encounters, Dante recognizes the danger of believing in the powers 
of a pagan poet to the extent that he does; he risks believing in Vergil too much and 
in the wrong ways, just as Pier did with Frederick II.  Excessive faith can lead to 
loss of authority and loss of identity, spiritual, political, and poetic. This in part 
accounts for Dante’s aggressive denial of Vergil’s poetry, the very poetry whose 
message he nonetheless regarded as divinely sanctioned history.  In this canto Dante 
negotiates faith and belief in Vergil for his own spiritual and poetic survival in a 
way that the egocentric and narcissistic Pier could not with Frederick.  In all these 
ways line 25 as speech act performs the ambivalences of Dante’s belief in Vergil, 
                                                
44 “’And I to him: “Do you continue; ask of him / whatever you believe will satisfy me: / I cannot, so 
much pity takes my heart.’” This verb also occurs in other mind-reading episodes, such as in the 
Paradiso in cantos 8.85 when the pilgrim encounters Charles Martel and in the Cacciaguida episode 
of 15.55. 
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performances that are implicated with specific political, philosophical, and poetic 
histories. 
 As in canto 13, Inferno 16 presents another mind-reading episode amidst an 
authenticating device that is also anchored in the problem of belief.  I refer to the 
moment when the travelers await the arrival of Geryon.  Just before the monster 
appears, Vergil throws a cord into the abyss, prompting Dante to “speak” to himself 
in excited anticipation of what will appear.  The poet then interrupts the narrative to 
advise caution with those who not only see actions but perceive thoughts as well.  
Vergil suggests that he indeed knows something about Dante’s thoughts as he 
promises the arrival of that which “il tuo pensier sogna” (your thought conjures).  
Following this is Dante poet’s authenticating device of swearing by his poem on its 
truth:  
 
     E' pur convien che novità risponda', 
   dicea fra me medesmo, `al novo cenno 
   che 'l maestro con l'occhio sì seconda'. 
     Ahi quanto cauti li uomini esser dienno 
   presso a color che non veggion pur l'ovra, 
   ma per entro i pensier miran col senno! 
     El disse a me: «Tosto verrà di sovra 
   ciò ch'io attendo e che il tuo pensier sogna; 
   tosto convien ch'al tuo viso si scovra». 
     Sempre a quel ver c'ha faccia di menzogna 
   de' l'uom chiuder le labbra fin ch'el puote, 
   però che sanza colpa fa vergogna; 
     ma qui tacer nol posso; e per le note 
   di questa comedìa, lettor, ti giuro, 
   s'elle non sien di lunga grazia vòte, 
     ch'i' vidi per quell' aere grosso e scuro 
   venir notando una figura in suso, 
   maravigliosa ad ogne cor sicuro, (Inf. 16.115-32)45 
                                                
45 “’And surely something strange must answer,’ /  I said to myself, ‘to this strange sign / that my 
master follows with his eye.’ / Ah, how cautious men should be / with those whose penetrating 
intellect / can see our thoughts – not just our outer act! / He said to me: ‘Now there will soon emerge 
/ what I await and what your thought has conjured: / it soon must be discovered to your sight.’ / 
Faced with that truth which seems a lie, a man / should always close his lips as long as he can - / to 
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Barolini has shown that this authenticating device, which she calls “outrageously 
paradoxical,” enacts a central moment in the poem (59).46 Beginning at line 124 
Dante interrupts the narrative with an assertion of poetic restraint and prudence:  he 
claims that he knows that some things are so unbelievable that they are better left 
unsaid if one wishes to avoid shame.  In this way he preempts our disbelief by 
pretending to share it and sets up the reader to view the monster Geryon as 
somehow particularly incredible with respect to his other inventions, which is itself 
an illusion.47 Further, in line 124 he calls the especially incredible thing that he 
cannot resist speaking about a “ver c'ha faccia di menzogna,” a truth that has the 
face of a lie.  What he is about to describe may seem like a “menzogna,” but he 
insists that his words are nonetheless true, and here Dante participates in a pattern of 
insisting most vehemently on his poem’s truth at narrative moments he asserts as 
least credible.  Further, Barolini notes that Dante in this phrase is referring to the 
false nature of all fiction: “By explicitly confronting the inauthenticity inherent in 
all narrative, Dante attempts to neutralize it with respect to his own narrative truth 
claims” (59).  In this way line 124 is emblematic for the Commedia as a whole.  
Dante stages the encounter with Geryon, who is himself an “image of 
representational fraud,” (61) while simultaneously insisting on his own status as 
prophet, as “one who transcends the mendacity of language” (67).  Thus “the 
                                                
tell it shames him, even though he’s blameless; / but here I can’t be silent; and by the notes / of this 
my Comedy, reader, I swear - / so may they not be empty of long grace / that through the dense and 
darkened air I saw / a figure come swimming upward / wondrous to the most secure heart.” 
46 In Undivine Comedy, chapter 3, pages 58-73. I necessarily sketch the outlines of Barolini’s rich 
argument, which readers should consult for full details. 
47 Barolini states “By urging us to identify heightened drama with decreased verisimilitude and 
credibility, Dante is subtly encouraging us to accept his text’s basic fictions and assumptions:  
sodomites dancing in a circle under a pouring rain of fire or usurers sitting on the edge of an abyss 
with purses around their necks (to mention just the groups of sinners who bracket Geryon’s arrival) 
are acceptable, but flying monsters are not and therefore require the author’s direct intervention.  In 
this way the poet becomes the arbiter of our skepticism, allowing it to blossom forth only in  
authorially-sanctioned moments of high drama” (61). 
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encounter with Geryon dramatizes the text’s confrontation with its own necessary 
representational fraud, and as such is the moment of maximum peril, when the text 
gambles all on being accepted as a ‘ver c'ha faccia di menzogna,’ a comedìa” (67).   
 Understanding the centrality of this moment for Dante’s poetics, I will now 
ask us to read as a speech act the second tercet, lines 118-20, where the poet advises 
caution in the face of those who know thoughts as well as deeds:  “Ahi quanto cauti 
li uomini esser dienno /presso a color che non veggion pur l'ovra, / ma per entro i 
pensier miran col senno!”48 My initial comments will build upon Barolini’s reading, 
and then I will argue for the issue of speech itself as central to this and other 
telepathic encounters.   
 The commentary tradition shows that scholars have read variously these 
somewhat puzzling lines, with interpretations ranging from a generalized 
admonition to be wise, to a focus on the social dynamics of the pilgrim’s 
questioning, to a link of the warning with the travelers’ proximity to the realm of 
fraud, to questions about the validity of Vergil’s telepathic abilities. 49 I am most 
interested in the commentaries that focus on the social conventions implied by 
Dante’s words.  The more general and least interesting of these argue that Dante is 
urging caution against asking questions about things the wise already know since 
                                                
48 “Ah, how cautious men should be / with those whose penetrating intellect / can see our thoughts – 
not just our outer act!” 
49 Several early commentators, including L’Ottimo Commento (1333), Boccaccio (1373-5), Chiose 
Vernon (1390?), and the Anonimo Fiorentino (1400?), interpret the lines simply as a general warning 
for men to be wise, to understand not only actions but the intentions behind them, while Benvenuto 
da Imola (1375-80) more precisely links the statement to Vergil’s knowledge of the pilgrim’s 
thoughts. Twentieth century scholars such as Luigi Pietrobono (1946) and Anna Maria Chiavacci 
Leonardi (1991-7) link the admonition with the travelers’ proximity to the realm of fraud.  Dante 
warns caution in the face of those who know our thoughts precisely because, in Chiavacci Leonardi’s 
words, “La frode è possibile infatti proprio perché in genere gli uomini vedono l'ovra, e non i 
pensieri degli altri” [Fraud is possible precisely because in general people see actions, and not the 
thoughts, of others]. Hollander (2000-7) and Nicola Fosca (2003-6) focus on whether Vergil is 
indeed telepathic, with both supporting Mark Musa’s 1977 article (for discussion of which see 
chapter 1). 
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they can read thoughts.50 Enrico Mestica (1921-22) and Dino Provenzal (1938) offer 
more specific variations on this, with the latter believing that Dante feels a bit of 
shame because he fears that his impatience to know the outcome would displease 
Vergil, and the former asserting that Dante reproves himself for not knowing from 
the beginning how to hold back appropriately in his questioning, as shown by 
Vergil’s reproof in canto 3 and the pilgrim’s defensiveness in canto 10 (on which 
more below).  Daniele Mattalia (1960) suggests that Dante feels he has been caught 
amidst some reservation or doubt about Vergil’s abilities based on the memory of 
the travelers’ obstacle at the city of Dis.   
 While there is no textual evidence that Dante pilgrim feels shame, reproves 
himself, or doubts Vergil’s ability at this point, I believe these critics are 
nonetheless right to sense a moment of self-awareness.  Yet I assign this moment 
not to the pilgrim but to the poet.  Why indeed should Dante poet feel the need to 
advise caution in the face of Vergil’s mind reading here, and why does he do so 
using the impersonal “uomini”?  Keeping in mind Barolini’s contribution, I propose 
reading this tercet as a prelude to line 124 where Dante introduces the “ver c'ha 
faccia di menzogna” that sets up the illusion of restraint.  Likewise, lines 118-20 as 
a speech act perform Dante poet’s caution, but they refer instead to Vergil’s 
knowledge of Dante’s thoughts and desires.  The pilgrim signals his desire in the 
repetition of “novità” and “novo”:  “E' pur convien che novità risponda', / dicea fra 
me medesmo, `al novo cenno / che 'l maestro con l'occhio sì seconda'” (115-17).51 In 
the “novo cenno” (“strange/new signal”) Dante is referring to the cord that he has 
handed to Vergil who has thrown it into the abyss to summon Geryon.  On 
                                                
50 Including the commentaries of Lodovico Castelveltro (1570), Giacomo Poletto (1894), and 
Tommaso Casini/S.A. Barbi (1921). 
51 “’And surely something strange must answer,’ /  I said to myself, ‘to this strange sign / that my 
master follows with his eye.’” 
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Barolini’s reading, the cord symbolizes the “deceit of language,” language as a 
medium used to “capture – eros” in the tradition of love poetry in which Dante 
began his poetic career (63).  When Dante hands the cord to Vergil, he enlarges his 
discourse from lyric to epic mode, which is necessary to bring forth his new poetics.  
The “novo cenno” represents a new language:  “The use of a novo cenno to elicit a 
novità is thus a paradigm for the writing of a new kind of poetry, a poetry founded 
on the poetics of the new” (63).  Especially significant for lines 115-17 is that Dante 
in canto 16 demonstrates a love-hate relationship with the new.  On the one hand, 
the excitement of this tercet hints at Dante’s insatiable desire for new things, which 
the poet also confirms elsewhere, such as in Purg.10 on the terrace of pride when he 
declares that his eyes desire to see new things.52 On the other hand, this love of the 
new is in marked contrast to Dante’s condemnation earlier in Inferno 16 of the 
“gente nuova” who have infected Florence with greed, pride, and excess.53 Thus 
when Dante “speaks” excitedly to himself in anticipation of the new creature that 
his new writing summons, followed by a warning of caution in the face of those 
who can perceive such thoughts, the warning has a twofold function.  As a speech 
act, it instructs us to view the poet as cautious and yet suggests his awareness of the 
illicit and complicated desire for the new that in part fuels his poetic transgression, 
of speaking of that which he should not, but does.   
                                                
52 As I discuss in a previous article on the adjective vago, “the pilgrim feasts his eyes on bas-relief 
carvings, the exempla of pride and humility represented as God’s work of art.  Here the imperfetto 
and the passato remoto render the pilgrim’s eyes drawn away from the exempla and toward new 
sights, but the poet veers into the present tense with a startling judgment of his occhi vaghi:  ‘Li 
occhi miei ch’a mirare eran contenti / per veder novitadi ond’e’ son vaghi, / volgendosi ver’ lui non 
furon lenti’ (103-5).  These lines momentarily and quite significantly collapse the requisite temporal 
distinctions that must be maintained in order to acknowledge successful conversion.  We learn that 
Dante was and still is desirous of seeing new things, such as God’s bas-reliefs, famously rendered by 
the poet as ‘visibile parlare’ (95).”  
53 When asked whether courtesy and valor still dwell in Florence, Dante rails that “«La gente nuova 
e i sùbiti guadagni / orgoglio e dismisura han generata, / Fiorenza, in te, sì che tu già ten piagni»” 
[New people and quick gains / have brought excess and arrogance to you, / o Florence, and you weep 
for it already!] 
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 Yet these same lines may also be directed to the reader, as early 
commentators believed, and as the impersonal “uomini” encourages.  But I believe 
they may function not as moralistic advice, but as a subliminal warning targeting the 
reader’s critical impulses.  The poet advises caution in the face of those who know 
our thoughts; following this he preempts our disbelief by staging it as his own, 
which as a strategy entails precisely anticipating and subverting the reader’s 
thoughts in the form of possible reactions and objections.  As speech act, Dante’s 
advice subtly warns the reader lest we question his strategic moves.   
 Contributing to this interpretation is that Dante figures this episode so 
heavily in terms of speech, despite the intensely self-conscious textuality of the 
passage as indicated by the poet’s repeated interruptions and his naming of the 
poem, and referring to the reader as such: “per le note / di questa comedìa, lettor, ti 
giuro” (127-8).54 Yet Dante also speaks in various ways throughout the episode in a 
way that privileges and finally directly addresses the reader.  He first “speaks” to 
himself when he says in lines 115-17 “E' pur convien che novità risponda', / dicea 
fra me medesmo, `al novo cenno / che 'l maestro con l'occhio sì seconda.'” One 
effect of this apparently self-directed speech is to make the reader feel like a 
privileged party in Dante’s thought, since the delay in Vergil’s response, which 
comes only at line 121, makes it appear as if the pilgrim speaks to us before his 
guide is aware of his thoughts.  The repeated offering of advice using the 
impersonal “uomini” at line 118 and “l’uom” at line 125, leading to the more 
personal address of “lettor, ti giuro” all contribute to a growing sense of authorial 
concern, that Dante “speaks” with our interest in mind and finally to us directly.  In 
                                                
54 Barolini discusses the significance of this moment as Dante’s first naming of his poem as 
“comedìa” in chapter 3, pages 59 and following of Undivine Comedy. 
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context, the advice of lines 118-20 is a speech act that both elevates the reader’s 
status and yet subtly circumscribes the reader’s critical field. 
 Beyond targeting the reader in this way, Dante figures his unspoken thought 
in terms of speech and signs when he says in lines 115-16 that something new must 
respond (“risponda”) to the new sign (“cenno”), and when he admonishes against 
broadcasting incredible things he does so with a labial image, advising man to close 
his lips: “de' l'uom chiuder le labbra.”  He follows this with the aural “tacer” of line 
127 in his confession that he cannot remain silent.  Along with a deeply self-
conscious textuality, then, this passage reflects an intense orientation toward speech 
and desire not just for language, but social interaction through language.  Hence 
commentators interpret the words of caution as concerned with the social 
conventions of speech between the pilgrim and Vergil.  As noted above, Mestica 
(1921-22) names cantos 3 and 10 as other examples of this; in canto 3 when the 
travelers reach the river Acheron, the pilgrim asks who the souls are that wait to 
cross, to which Vergil responds “Ed elli a me: «Le cose ti fier conte / quando noi 
fermerem li nostri passi / su la trista riviera d'Acheronte»” (76-78).”  Although 
Vergil gives no sign of disapproval here, the pilgrim fears that he has offended his 
guide:  Allor con li occhi vergognosi e bassi, / temendo no 'l mio dir li fosse grave, / 
infino al fiume del parlar mi trassi” (79-81).55  In the mind-reading episode of canto 
10, discussed above at length, Vergil’s announcement of mind reading prompts the 
pilgrim to justify his silence defensively:  “E io: «Buon duca, non tegno riposto / a 
te mio cuor se non per dicer poco, / e tu m'hai non pur mo a ciò disposto»” (19-
21).56 
                                                
55 “And he to me: ‘When we have stopped along / the melancholy shore of Acheron, / then all these 
matters will be plain to you.’ / At that, with eyes ashamed, downcast, and fearing / that what I said 
had given him offense, / I did not speak until we reached the river” (76-81). 
56 “And I: ‘ Good guide, the only reason I / have hid my heart was that I might speak briefly, / and 
you, long since, encouraged me in this.’” 
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 Yet the episode of canto 16 shows that Dante’s interest in the social 
conventions of speech go beyond the narrative relationship between the pilgrim and 
Vergil.  There, Dante as pilgrim and poet wants to speak, indeed feels compelled to 
speak to himself, to Vergil, and to the reader in the context of acknowledging 
speech as transgressive.  Nor is this urgency limited to Inferno 16.  Mind-reading 
episodes throughout the poem in fact reflect patterns of deep and conflicting 
interests in the social conventions of speech in ways that I believe reflect powerfully 
on the poem’s philosophy of language.   
 The remainder of this chapter will explore what these patterns suggest with 
the goal of defining histories that make possible the Commedia’s mind reading 
encounters as epistemologically fraught.  The first thing to notice is Dante’s 
tendency to describe telepathic episodes as thoughts either spoken or kept silent.  
The verb “tacere” creates the latter effect in Inferno 10 when Vergil describes 
Dante’s hidden thought (Però a la dimanda che mi faci / quinc' entro satisfatto sarà 
tosto, / e al disio ancor che tu mi taci»), and in Inferno 19.39 when the pilgrim tells 
his guide “sai quel che si tace.”57 Similarly, in Paradiso 32 St. Bernard says that 
Dante keeps silent regarding his doubt: “Or dubbi tu e dubitando sili; / ma io 
discioglierò 'l forte legame / in che ti stringon li pensier sottili” (49-51).58 Yet 
characters also describe the pilgrim’s silent thoughts as things that he says, as in 
Paradiso 7 when Beatrice twice signals her mind reading by introducing his doubt 
with “tu dici” at lines 55 and 124.59 In Paradiso 19 the eagle likewise engages a 
                                                
57 “And so the question you have asked of me / will soon find satisfaction while we’re here, / as will 
the desire that you do not express to me” and “you know what is unspoken.” 
58 “But now you doubt and, doubting, do not speak; / yet I shall loose that knot / in which subtle 
thoughts bind you.” 
59 At line 55 she says “Tu dici: ``Ben discerno ciò ch'i' odo; / ma perché Dio volesse, m'è occulto, / a 
nostra redenzion pur questo modo" [You say: ‘What I have heard is clear to me; / but this is hidden 
from – why God willed / precisely this pathway for our redemption].  At line 124 she says Tu dici: 
``Io veggio l'acqua, io veggio il foco, / l'aere e la terra e tutte lor misture…” [You say: ‘I see that 
water, see that fire / and air and earth and all that they compose…]. 
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metaphor of speech when reading the pilgrim’s thought that itself deals with social 
conventions that would challenge the validity of predestination, i.e. the eagle voices 
the pilgrim’s question on the justice of condemning a man who has never heard of 
Christ:  “ché tu dicevi: ``Un uom nasce a la riva / de l'Indo, e quivi non è chi ragioni 
/ di Cristo né chi legga né chi scriva…” (70-72).60 Here the poet’s metaphor of 
speech to render unspoken thoughts presents a social impulse that is parallel to the 
pilgrim’s social interest in those who have never heard of Christ. 
 These metaphors of speaking versus not speaking take on greater meaning 
given that so many mind-reading episodes are rooted in conventions of speech that 
reflect a great complexity of social motivations, ranging from fulfilling obligation to 
outright transgression.  I begin with the very interesting passage at the beginning of 
Paradiso 4, mentioned twice above in connection with body language and with the 
link between telepathy and prophecy.  In reference to the former, I noted the 
hierarchy of signs in which Dante privileges signs of the body when he calls the 
“disir dipinto” on his face as “più caldo assai” than speech (10-12).  Yet he does so 
in order to explain the reason for his silence.  Before the hierarchy of signs, Dante 
first describes through a series of revealing similes how he was unable to decide 
which of two equally important questions he should voice first:   
 
     Intra due cibi, distanti e moventi 
   d'un modo, prima si morria di fame, 
   che liber' omo l'un recasse ai denti; 
     sì si starebbe un agno intra due brame 
   di fieri lupi, igualmente temendo; 
   sì si starebbe un cane intra due dame: 
     per che, s'i' mi tacea, me non riprendo, 
 
 
 
                                                
60 “For you would say: ‘A man is born along / the shoreline of the Indus River; none / is there to 
speak or teach or write of Christ…” 
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   da li miei dubbi d'un modo sospinto, 
   poi ch'era necessario, né commendo  (Par. 4.1-9).61 
In the first tercet we find the metaphor of eating - the pilgrim’s doubts are two foods 
that he desires equally such that a “liber’omo” would die sooner than be able to 
choose one over the other.  The second tercet figures the doubts as hungry wolves, 
whereas the pilgrim is the lamb that fears each wolf equally, but then Dante reverses 
the pattern of aggression by suggesting the pilgrim as a dog presumably unable to 
decide which deer to attack first.  The metaphors serve to justify Dante’s silence; the 
pilgrim neither blames nor praises himself for not speaking because he is caught, 
just as the “liber’omo,” and the “agno” and the “cane” are caught between two 
objects.  As commentators have pointed out, Dante’s choice of the “liber’omo” in 
the first simile is significant given that both his questions regard free will, how 
someone whose good will endures can deserve less because of another’s violence, 
and second, given that the pilgrim has just encountered saved souls in the sphere of 
the moon, he wonders whether the Platonic doctrine stating that souls eventually 
return to the star to which they are assigned is true.  As Hollander’s useful review 
shows, commentators traced to Aquinas, and later Aristotle the hypothetical that a 
person with free will faced with two equal choices would be unable to decide, but 
Aquinas in fact refutes it as an objection when discussing the question of whether 
humans choose by necessity or free will.62 In this canto, Dante affirms the power of 
                                                
61 “Before a man bit into one of two / foods equally removed and tempting, he / would die of hunger 
if his choice were free; / so would a lamb stand motionless between / the cravings of two savage 
wolves, in fear / of both; so would a dog between two deer; / thus, I need neither blame nor praise 
myself / when both my doubts compelled me equally: / what kept me silent was necessity.” 
62 Hollander points out how some commentators also erred in tracing it to Buridan’s paradox which 
was posterior to the Commedia: “Bruno Nardi (Nel mondo di Dante [Rome: Edizioni di “Storia e 
Letteratura”], 1944, pp. 301-3), has argued that the widespread notion that these lines are a recasting 
of Buridan's famed paradox (starving donkey between two equally distant piles of straw) should be 
rejected. As Nardi and others have shown, the more certain source lies in the Summa theologica (I-II, 
q. 13, a. 6): “If any two things are absolutely equal, a man is not moved to the one more than to the 
other; just as a starving man, if he has food equally appetizing in different directions and at an equal 
distance, is not moved to the one more than to the other” (English text as found in Carroll's 
commentary to vv. 1-9). Further, and as Fallani (in his comm. to these verses) points out, Buridan's 
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the absolute will, so as Giuseppe Giacalone (1968) asks, why does Dante open the 
canto in which he affirms the force of the absolute will with a simile hypothetically 
exemplifying its limitations?63 Some scholars, such as Umberto Bosco and Giovanni 
Reggio (1979), focus solely on the philosophical orientation of the simile without 
explaining the competing claim that it articulates.  Citing Nardi, Bosco and Reggio 
argue that the simile in fact follows Averroes, by representing free will as free 
judgment of reason, not influenced by appetite,64 an opinion refuted byAnna Maria 
Chiavacci Leonardi who, I think rightly, sees the function of the simile as indicating 
a psychological condition.65 
                                                
ass was posterior to Dante's Paradiso. A rare early commentator who finds a source for this material 
locates it in Thomas's usual source, Aristotle (De caelo II.xiii.28); see Francesco da Buti (comm. to 
vv. 1-12). Beginning with Lombardi (comm. to this tercet) and continuing into the twentieth century, 
one finds insistence on Thomas as source, neglecting Aristotle (Tommaseo, Andreoli, Scartazzini, 
Poletto, and Carroll, among others. The first commentators to put the two together, as is in our day 
fairly commonplace (e.g., Mattalia, Singleton) were apparently Tozer in 1901 and Torraca in 1905, 
both in response to this tercet. However, if one reads further in Thomas's passage, it is striking, as 
Sapegno points out (comm. to vv. 1-9), citing Nardi (pp. 297-303), that Thomas has proposed this 
paradox only to refute its relationship to practical reality -- as might any sensible person. Zeno's 
arrow and Buridan's ass (and Thomas's starving man, as Thomas himself insists) are the sort of 
logically developed paradoxes that “philosophers” enjoy creating and that poets generally enjoy 
mocking. Here Thomas, Dante's “philosopher,” rejects philosophical nonsense while Dante, our poet, 
seems to sponsor it.” 
63 Giacalone, citing Cosmo, writes “Ma ne vien fuori subito una «stridente contradizione, che il 
canto il quale deve affermare la forza del volere si apre con una ipotetica limitazione di essa: 
limitazione che, quando fosse vera, proverebbe contro ogni ragion del poeta la pochezza della nostra 
energia volitiva. Per fortuna, più forte del Dante scolastico e rettorico era il Dante vissuto fra le 
tempeste della vita» (Cosmo, l.c. 44-45 {L'ultima ascesa, Firenze, 1965})” [Immediately there 
emerges a ‘glaring contradiction, because the canto that should affirm the force of the will opens 
with a hypothetical limitation of it, a limitation that if true would prove against all the poet’s 
arguments the paucity of our energy regarding the will. Fortunately, stronger than the scholastic or 
rhetorical Dante was the Dante who had lived through the tempests of life’].  
64 Bosco and Reggio write “ma qui Dante è più vicino agli averroisti, come spiegò il Nardi, perché è 
evidente che tale esempio vale proprio se si intende il libero arbitrio come «il libero giudizio della 
ragione, non prevenuta dall'appetito, intorno all'operare», cioè in altre parole se «l'azione umana è 
determinata unicamente dal libero giudizio della ragione»” [but here Dante is closer to the 
Averroists, as Nardi explained, because it is evident that such an example is valid precisely if one 
means free will as ‘the free judgment of reason, not informed by the appetite in its functioning,’ that 
is in other words if ‘human action is determined only by the free judgment of reason.’” 
65 Chiavacci Leonardi argues that Dante in fact follows Aquinas in his thinking on the will, a 
question that I leave aside. Regarding the function of the simile she writes “è questa la classica 
similitudine dantesca che mira a ritrarre un atteggiamento psicologico dell'uomo (cfr. Inf. I 55-60 e 
nota), usata in questo caso per introdurre le due diverse questioni trattate nel canto…” [this is the 
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 Following her indication, I propose a closer reading of the specific emotions 
that Dante invokes in relation to the conventional activities described in the three 
similes.66 As speech act, this episode in fact reveals much about social attitudes 
toward speech.  The pilgrim presents his justification as self-evaluation; he takes 
responsibility by acknowledging that he deserves no praise but he also defends 
himself from potential blame.  The need for justification is especially important 
because it attests to a convention, which is that speaking one’s doubt is a social 
obligation.  Yet it is an obligation impeded by visceral desires and fears that are 
themselves driven by the fundamental social conventions of eating and of hunting.  
The metaphor of pursuing knowledge as eating is, of course, nothing new for Dante, 
but here his desire for the two foods is destructive because it would prolong fatally 
rather than fulfill the hunger driving it.  The lamb between two wolves implies the 
pilgrim’s paralyzing fear in the face of his doubts, while the dog between two deer 
reverses the second simile’s pattern of aggression by making the pilgrim the attacker 
instead of his doubts.  In this context, mind reading as a speech act proclaims the 
voicing of one’s doubt as a social obligation that is blocked by dark emotions driven 
by equally essential social conventions.  This message becomes primary when we 
see the extent to which it overwhelms the narrative convention of mind reading 
itself.  Lines 1-9 all serve to introduce and explain why Beatrice reads the pilgrim’s 
mind, an explanation that is technically superfluous given telepathy as a 
                                                
classic Dantesque simile that aims to represent man’s psychological state …used in this case to 
introduce the two different questions dealt with in the canto]. 
66 Commentators have not significantly differentiated the three similes.  As Daniele Mattalia (1960) 
writes “Il triforme «exemplum» serve a Dante solo per chiarire analogicamente quanto accade nella 
sua mente la quale, avendo prodotto due quesiti che essa, per insufficiente riflessione, ritiene di 
uguale importanza, e non potendo fare appello ad altro-da-sé, resta in bilancia e incapace, sul 
momento, di muovere la volontà (di parlare)” [The threefold ‘exemplum’ serves Dante only to clarify 
analogically how it happens in his mind that, having produced two questions that it (i.e. the mind), 
through insufficient reflection, considers equally important and not being able to consult another, 
remains undecided and incapable at that moment of moving the will to speak]. 
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communicative norm in heaven.  There is no need to explain Beatrice’s mind 
reading as anything other than her telepathic ability, i.e. the way that heavenly souls 
interact with Dante and know his doubts.  Yet instead the narrative presents her 
mind reading as mobilized by the pilgrim’s struggle against the dynamics of social 
conventions and relationships, consequently foregrounding the struggle and the 
concerns they imply.  In this way, the prominent opening simile indeed resists the 
validation of free will that emerges later in the canto. 
 Emotions getting in the way of speech emerge as a persistent motive for acts 
of telepathy, as in Paradiso 7 when the pilgrim speaks to himself and to readers in a 
failed command to tell Beatrice of his doubt: 
 
     Io dubitava e dicea `Dille, dille!' 
   fra me, `dille' dicea, `a la mia donna 
   che mi diseta con le dolci stille'. 
     Ma quella reverenza che s'indonna 
   di tutto me, pur per Be e per ice, 
   mi richinava come l'uom ch'assonna  (Par. 7.10-15).67 
More than showcasing poetic fireworks, with the neologisms “s’indonna” and also 
“s’addua” earlier in line 6, this passage dramatizes the pilgrim’s desire as speech 
through direct discourse to himself.  More important is that like canto 4, it is not 
Beatrice’s ability but the pilgrim’s emotional reaction that prompts her mind reading 
– a reaction driven precisely by the sound of her name.  Desire to know elicits 
speech, while emotions surrounding the social conventions of speech restrain it and 
thus lead to mind reading.  In this context telepathy emerges as a compensation for 
the failed privilege of social interaction through speech.  In Dante’s encounter with 
Adam in Paradiso 26 (also discussed in chapter 3), desire to hear the speech of 
another trumps desire for knowledge when the pilgrim says that he does not voice 
                                                
67 “I was perplexed, and to myself, I said: / ‘Tell her!  Tell her!  Tell her, the lady who / can slake my 
thirst with her sweet drops’; and yet / the reverence that possesses all of me, / even on hearing only 
Be and ice, / had bowed my head – I seemed a man asleep.” 
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his questions precisely because he wants to hear Adam’s speech sooner than he 
otherwise would: “tu vedi mia voglia, / e per udirti tosto non la dico»” (95-6).68 
Here Dante refrains from speech not because he wants to hear the answers to his 
questions, but rather because he is anxious to hear the person speaking (“per udirti 
tosto”).  Again, mind reading as speech act directs lack of speech toward a social 
function, dramatizing desire for social intercourse and subtly privileging it over 
desire for knowledge. 
 Some episodes demonstrate the pilgrim’s misunderstanding of protocol, as in 
Paradiso 22 where his unfounded fear of asking too much likewise keeps him from 
questioning St. Benedict, who assures that Dante would speak if he could see the 
souls’ great charity.69 Similarly in Purgatorio 13 the pilgrim remains silent because 
he feels it is outrageous that he can see the envious while they cannot see him.  Here 
the focus is on vision but also speech as Dante says that Vergil knew what the 
pilgrim wanted to say:  “Ben sapev' ei che volea dir lo muto; / e però non attese mia 
dimanda, / ma disse: «Parla, e sie breve e arguto»” (76-78).70 In these cases 
telepathy performs social misapprehension as Dante does not speak although it is 
acceptable to do so.  The reverse occurs in the interesting case of Inferno 26 when 
the travelers discover Ulysses and Diomedes, with whom Dante wishes to speak but 
is discouraged by Vergil.  The latter, saying that he knows what Dante wants, 
                                                
68 “You see/ my wish; to hear you sooner, I do not / declare it.” 
69 “Io stava come quei che 'n sé repreme / la punta del disio, e non s'attenta / di domandar, sì del 
troppo si teme; / e la maggiore e la più luculenta / di quelle margherite innanzi fessi, / per far di sé la 
mia voglia contenta. / Poi dentro a lei udi': «Se tu vedessi / com' io la carità che tra noi arde, / li tuoi 
concetti sarebbero espressi. / Ma perché tu, aspettando, non tarde / a l'alto fine, io ti farò risposta / 
pur al pensier, da che sì ti riguarde” (25-36) [I stood as one who curbs within himself / the goad of 
longing and, in fear of being / too forward, does not dare to ask a question. / At this, the largest and 
most radiant / among those pearls moved forward that he might / appease my need to hear who he 
might be. / Then, in that light, I heard: ‘Were you to see, / even as I do see, the charity / that burns in 
us, your thoughts would have been uttered. / But lest, by waiting, you be slow to reach / the high goal 
of your seeking, I shall answer / what you were thinking when you curbed your speech’]. 
70 “He knew quite well what I, though mute, wanted to say, / and thus he did not wait for my request, 
/ but said: ‘Speak, and be brief and to the point.’” 
 229 
assigns himself as speaker because as Greeks, Ulysses and Diomedes would be 
disdainful of the pilgrim’s “detto”:   
     Ed elli a me: «La tua preghiera è degna 
   di molta loda, e io però l'accetto; 
   ma fa che la tua lingua si sostegna. 
     Lascia parlare a me, ch'i' ho concetto 
   ciò che tu vuoi; ch'ei sarebbero schivi, 
   perch' e' fuor greci, forse del tuo detto» (Inf. 26.70-75).71 
Before turning to the commentary tradition, we should note that in this case 
knowing thoughts without the need for speech is presented precisely in the context 
of emphasizing differences of “lingua.”  The sameness implied by telepathy is put in 
service of highlighting potential conflict in social interaction brought about by 
differences of language and culture.  As speech act, mind reading here privileges the 
social consequences of different languages as it aligns Vergil and Dante in contrast 
with Ulysses and Diomedes, in the sense that Vergil is clearly not disdainful of 
Dante’s “detto” while the two heroes might be.  Thus at some level it also suggests 
respect for historical and cultural differentiation as the origin of social boundaries. 
Encouraging this interpretation are Vergil’s words to the pigrlim in the next canto 
after Guido da Montefeltro has finished speaking, when Vergil allows the pilgrim to 
respond, citing linguistic commonality:  “«Parla tu; questi è latino»” (27.33).72
 Yet as Lodovico Castelveltro (1570) and other commentators subsequently 
pointed out, earlier in canto 27 Guido refers presumably to Vergil as having spoken 
Lombard dialect to the Greeks when he addresses the travelers:  “«O tu a cu' io 
drizzo / la voce e che parlavi mo lombardo, / dicendo ``Istra ten va, più non 
                                                
71 “And he to me: ‘Your request is worthy / of much praise, and therefore I accept it; / but hold back 
your speech. / Let me address them – I have understood / what you desire; Since they were Greek, / 
perhaps they’d be disdainful of your speech.” 
72 “You speak; he is Italian.” 
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t'adizzo" (19-21).73 Interestingly, we never directly witness the words in line 21 
spoken by anyone;  Guido’s “repetition” is in fact the first appearance of these 
words in the narrative, and so we are led to imagine that Vergil utters them to 
Ulysses at the conclusion of the latter’s tale, since Dante pilgrim never speaks 
during that encounter.  As such, Guido’s words (that bear no trace of irony) 
contradict Vergil’s insistence on linguistic protocol with the two Greek heroes.  In 
addition, the pilgrim elsewhere does not hesitate to accost speakers of different 
languages, such as Adam in heaven, even acknowledging the first man’s different 
tongue by asking about it.  Given these problems, it would seem that reading 
concern for history into this and other mind-reading episodes is at best inconsistent 
and possibly a mistake.  Why then does Vergil draw attention to differences of 
language?  
 The commentary tradition offers some especially creative solutions. Among 
early commentators, the most popular explanations are that Dante did not know 
Greek while Vergil did and that Greeks disdained other languages,74 but some also 
say that because Vergil wrote of (and lionized) Ulysses and Diomedes he is more 
suited to speak with them.75 Later scholars such as Bernardino Daniello (1547-68) 
hypothesized that the Greeks would disdain Dante’s Tuscan dialect.  Francesco da 
                                                
73 “’O you to whom I turn my voice, / who only now were talking Lombard, saying, / ‘Now you may 
leave – I’ll not provoke more speech,” Castelveltro wrote that Vergil “quantunque sapesse il 
linguaggio greco, non dimeno non parlò loro greco, anzi Lombardo, dicendo il Conte Guido da 
Montefeltro {Inf., XXVII, 19-21}: O tu, che parlavi mo Lombardo, Dicendo: ista ten va, più non 
t'aizzo?” [although he knew the Greek language, nonetheless he did not speak Greek to them, but 
rather Lombard, as Count Guido da Montefeltro says in Inf. 27.19-21]; see above for translation of 
the passage.  Later commentators including Niccolò Tommaseo (1837), Giuseppe Campi (1888-93), 
Giacomo Poletto (1894), Hollander (2000-7), and Nicola Fosca (2003-6) also note this contradiction. 
74 Many commentators offer more than one explanation for this problem.  Those asserting one or 
both of these reasons include Guido da Pisa (1327-28), L’Ottimo Commento (1338), Benvenuto da 
Imola (1375-80), Anonimo Fiorentino (1400, Alessandro Vellutello (1544), Hermann Oelsner 
(1899).  Nicola Fosca (2003-6) cites Augustine and the Bible to emphasize a link between Greek 
pride and language. 
75 Other supporters of this idea include Guglielmo Maramauro (1369-73) and Johannis de Serravalle 
(1416-17), 
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Buti (1385-95) and P. Gioachino Berthier (1892-97) unhelpfully de-emphasize 
language by arguing that Dante would be disdained because he is not Greek himself, 
with Benvenuto da Imola (1375-80), the Anonimo Fiorentino (1400), Johannis de 
Serravalle (1416-17) and others pointing out that Vergil is also not Greek.  The 
Chiose cagliaritane (1370) and later John S. Carroll (1904) argue that Dante is 
ultimately descended from the Trojans, who were enemies of the Greeks, while 
Vergil’s Mantua was founded by a Theban, i.e. not Greek enemies, therefore 
making Vergil less inimical than Dante.  Many scholars support some version of the 
idea that Vergil is a necessary mediator between the ancient and medieval worlds.76 
Giacomo Poletto (1894) argues that Vergil is here attempting to bolster his own 
fame as one who had depicted famous heroes, while Isidore del Lungo (1926) 
simply says that Vergil attempts to conquer the pride of the Greeks by asserting his 
own merits.  Finally, the wildest proposal, concocted by Tasso and supported to 
some degree by Giovani Fallani (1965), is that Vergil, appropriating the cunning 
strategies of the Greek heroes, deceives them by impersonating Homer.77 
  Nearly all the commentaries focus on the potential for social conflict, but the 
inventive impulse of more than a few is striking.  We see this not only among those, 
such as Poletto, whose gloss is directed toward resolving the problem created by 
Guido da Montefeltro’s comment in canto 27, but by commentators such as Fallani 
who were evidently unaware of the contradiction.  I submit that commentators fixate 
on social elements precisely because the passage performs possibility rather than 
                                                
76 Including Lodovico Castelvetro (1570), Francesco Torraca (1905), Enrico Mestica (1921-22), 
Manfredi Porena (1946-8), Daniele Mattalia (1960), Charles Singleton (1970-5). 
77 Fallani’s primary explanation is of Vergil as mediator between the ancient Greek world and that of 
Dante, but he does offer support for Tasso’s thesis as well when he says “Suggestiva, comunque, la 
sentenza del Tasso, ripresa ampiamente con nuovi argomenti dal Toffanin (Sette interpretazioni 
dantesche, Napoli 1947, pp. 5-18): «Virgilio adopera le stesse armi dei suoi avversari e, per tirare in 
discorso Ulisse, si camuffa da Omero»” [Striking, however, is Tasso’s judgment, taken up fully with 
new arguments by Toffanin (Seven Dantesque Interpretations, …) ‘Vergil adopts the same weapons 
of his adversaries, and in order to draw Ulysses into discourse, masquerades as Homer’]. 
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specificity.  As a speech act, Vergil’s words perform the potential for social 
problems implicated in speech rather than concern for the Greekness per se of 
Ulysses and Diomedes.  This reading allows for the narrative inconsistency brought 
forth by Guido’s comment and lends weight to my sense that these concerns are 
philosophical rather than strictly historical in nature.  In this way, mind reading as 
speech act in canto 26 carries out the social manifestations of a purported difference 
rather than cultural specificity. 
 While emotions and conventions implicate the pilgrim’s lack of speech, we 
also see the opposite, as in Paradiso 20 when the pilgrim’s shock at finding the 
pagans Trajan and Ripheus in heaven provokes an outburst.  Here, although his 
doubt is as discernible as color seen through glass, the pilgrim cannot remain silent. 
 
 
     E avvegna ch'io fossi al dubbiar mio 
   lì quasi vetro a lo color ch'el veste, 
   tempo aspettar tacendo non patio, 
     ma de la bocca, «Che cose son queste?», 
   mi pinse con la forza del suo peso: 
   per ch'io di coruscar vidi gran feste.  (Par. 20.79-84)78 
Here speech overpowers the revelation implied by telepathy.  The pilgrim’s outburst 
declares speech as an emotional and physically-based reaction (“ma de la bocca…”) 
that is involuntary (“tempo aspettar tacendo non patio”) and demands presence (“mi 
pinse con la forza del suo peso”).  Like the exchange of signs among Dante, Vergil, 
and Statius in Purgatorio 21 with which I opened this chapter, here the voicing of 
speech is physical, contingent, ultimately uncontrollable, and necessary, all of which 
is to say historical.  This is especially important given that, as in the episode of 
                                                
78 “And though the doubt within me was as plain / as any colored surface cloaked by glass, / it could 
not wait to voice itself, but with / the thrust and weight of urgency it forced / ‘Can such things be?’ 
out from my lips, at which / I saw lights flash – a vast festivity.” 
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Paradiso 19 with the eagle, the pilgrim’s speech regards his reaction to what he sees 
as a contradiction between history and divine justice. 
 Related to emotional outbursts is speech as an act of transgression that 
effectively privileges speaking over knowledge. We have already discussed the 
crucial moment in Inferno 16 where Dante links transgressive speech to the larger 
context of his poetic trangression.  In Paradiso 21 the pilgrim, prompted by the 
brightness of Peter Damian’s light, takes advantage of the latter’s ability to read his 
mind in order to “speak” to him before Beatrice grants permission: 
     E quel che presso più ci si ritenne, 
   si fé sì chiaro, ch'io dicea pensando: 
   `Io veggio ben l'amor che tu m'accenne. 
     Ma quella ond' io aspetto il come e 'l quando 
   del dire e del tacer, si sta; ond' io, 
   contra 'l disio, fo ben ch'io non dimando' (Par. 21.43-48).79 
Here Dante represents telepathy literally as speech with direct discourse, signaling 
in line 44 his conflation of thinking and speaking with “dicea pensando.”  His 
message to Peter makes explicit a social protocol that can only concern speech;  the 
pilgrim claims that although he would like to, he does not voice his doubt because 
he awaits Beatrice’s permission.  The implicit protocol is that Peter does not know 
Dante’s doubt until he speaks it.  This, of course, violates the Paradiso’s narrative 
terms and the logic of this particular interaction.  As a celestial soul, Peter, like 
Beatrice, ostensibly already knows the pilgrim’s desire, a fact to which the pilgrim’s 
faith that Peter understands his preface through “dicea pensando” attests, i.e. if Peter 
understands the pilgrim’s unspoken direct discourse of lines 45-48, then he also 
knows the pilgrim’s specific question.   
                                                
79 “The flame that halted nearest us became / so bright that I said, thinking: ‘I see / you clearly 
signaling to me your love. / But she from whom I wait the how and the when / of speaking and being 
silent, pauses; / thus against my desire I do well not to ask.’” 
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 This fact forces us to notice that the protocol regards not the desire itself but 
the voicing of it.  The pilgrim in fact awaits Beatrice’s permission not to introduce 
his question, but to speak it, a pattern that occurs in other episodes in the Paradiso 
with other souls who also presumably know Dante’s thoughts.80 Thus the pilgrim’s 
act of “dicea pensando,” in which he claims to wait for Beatrice’s permission, is in a 
performative sense transgressive.  By asserting Beatrice’s authority, these episodes 
actually undermine the ideology of telepathy in order to privilege the necessity and 
social constraints of speech over knowledge.  It might be tempting to dismiss the 
granting of permission to speak as an insignificant pattern or as meaningless 
rhetoric. But this narrative inconsistency is valuable precisely because it exposes the 
insistent presence of social convention in the poetics of mind reading, a strategy 
that, we must remember, would resist such convention.  It shows us that mind 
reading as a speech act performs the value of knowledge as dependent on the 
limitations and privileges of speech.  In the Commedia not merely language, but 
speech is potentially transgressive precisely because it is essential for knowledge to 
have value.   
 From the passages explored above some astonishing patterns come to light.  
Mind-reading episodes rehearse the pilgrim’s desire to speak as an emotional and 
social obligation that is privileged and yet caught up in the complications of other 
social conventions.  Sometimes the pilgrim’s desire to speak is frustrated by 
emotions or misapprehensions of social protocol as in Purgatorio 13, Paradiso 4, 7, 
and 22, but Paradiso 21 and 26 show that desire for social intercourse through 
speech is more important than knowledge itself, which in part explains the pilgrim’s 
outburst of Paradiso 20, the social concerns of Inferno 26, and the fascination with 
speech as transgression in Inferno 16 and Paradiso 21.  These conflicting forces are 
                                                
80 See for example episodes at 9.16-21 and 15.70. 
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especially discernible in Paradiso 4, where they show us that fundamental social 
conventions may work against each other to render an individual powerless.  By 
positing the absence of speech, telepathy more than anything asks us to imagine the 
possibility of social and epistemological crisis.  
 The episode that most explicitly links social loss, indeed social trauma, with 
speech, for Dante poet is found in Paradiso 17, where Cacciaguida prophesies his 
descendant’s fate. 81 Before turning directly to this canto, we should note that in the 
third canticle, Dante is often told to speak his doubt despite the fact that others 
already know it, in order to glorify the sound of speech itself, as in canto 15, or for 
spiritual reasons, as in canto 24 when Beatrice says that Dante should speak his faith 
to St. Peter in order to glorify it, or in canto 25 where she justifies the pilgrim’s 
speech about hope as an unnecessary but nonetheless rhetorically useful report to St. 
James on how much hope pleases the saint.82 By contrast, in canto 17, Beatrice tells 
                                                
81 The poem rehearses a different version of this theme in Inferno 13, as Leo Spitzer showed, where 
the poet repeatedly and graphically makes the act of speech an act of wounding, since the suicides 
can only speak when their tree-bodies are broken.  Spitzer points out Dante’s repeated linking of 
vocalizing and wounding in lines 43-44 with the singular “usciva” as verb for the dual subject of 
“parole e sangue”: “sì de la scheggia rotta usciva insieme / parole e sangue” [so from that broken 
stump issued together / both words and blood], at lines 100-2 when Pier della Vigna describes how 
the Harpies rend their bodies eternally but in doing so provide a vocal release for the pain: “Surge in 
vermena e in pianta silvestra: / l'Arpie, pascendo poi de le sue foglie, / fanno dolore, e al dolor 
fenestra” [It rises as a sapling, a wild plant; / and then the Harpies, feeding on its leaves, / cause pain 
and for that pain provide a vent], at lines 130-33 when Vergil takes the pilgrim to the Florentine 
suicide, described as a “cespuglio che piangea / per le rotture sanguinenti in vano.” [lacerated thorn / 
that wept in vain where it was bleeding], the guide says “«Chi fosti, che per tante punte / soffi con 
sangue doloroso sermo?»” [Who were you, who through many wounds / must breathe with blood 
your melancholy words?].  Spitzer interprets the linking of speech with wounds as the poet’s attempt 
to represent the suicides’ speech as a “purely physical process” (89), a “semi-human plant-like 
speech for his hybrid plant-souls” (91) as a gruesome part of their contrappasso. 
82 In the episode of Paradiso 15 (discussed at length in chapter 3) Cacciaguida expresses desire to 
hear the sound of Dante’s voice: “ma perché 'l sacro amore in che io veglio / con perpetüa vista e che 
m'asseta / di dolce disïar, s'adempia meglio, / la voce tua sicura, balda e lieta / suoni la volontà, suoni 
'l disio, / a che la mia risposta è già decreta!»” (64-9) [But that the sacred love in which I keep / my 
vigil with unending watchfulness, / the love that makes me thirst with sweet desire, / be better 
satisfied, let your voice – bold, / assured, and glad – proclaim your will and longing, / to which my 
answer it decreed already’”].  Beatrice says in Paradiso 24 “S'elli ama bene e bene spera e crede, / 
non t'è occulto, perché 'l viso hai quivi / dov' ogne cosa dipinta si vede; / ma perché questo regno ha 
fatto civi / per la verace fede, a glorïarla, / di lei parlare è ben ch'a lui arrivi»” (40-5) [That he loves 
well and hopes well and has faith / is not concealed from you: you see that Place / where everything 
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Dante to speak his desire for a different reason.  Dante first compares himself to 
Phaeton who went to his mother Clymene to verify that he was indeed Apollo’s son, 
which led to Apollo’s disastrous decision to allow Phaeton drive the chariot of the 
sun:   
     Qual venne a Climenè, per accertarsi 
   di ciò ch'avëa incontro a sé udito, 
   quei ch'ancor fa li padri ai figli scarsi; 
     tal era io, e tal era sentito 
   e da Beatrice e da la santa lampa 
   che pria per me avea mutato sito  (Par. 17.1-6).83 
Like Phaeton, Dante approaches a father-figure, Cacciaguida, who confirms the 
pilgrim’s disastrous exile, but as Barolini has pointed out, Phaeton is also a 
“surrogate” for Ulysses, representing Dante’s awareness of the potentially fatal 
danger in his act of poetic transgression (48).  In these ways the Ovidian allusion of 
the first two tercets immediately foreshadows the social consequences of speech that 
become explicit later in the canto.   
 Then, Beatrice tells Dante to voice his question not because she and 
Cacciaguida need to know it, but rather for reasons that point outside the fictive 
realm of heaven: 
     Per che mia donna «Manda fuor la vampa 
   del tuo disio», mi disse, «sì ch'ella esca 
   segnata bene de la interna stampa: 
     non perché nostra conoscenza cresca 
   per tuo parlare, ma perché t'ausi 
   a dir la sete, sì che l'uom ti mesca»  (Par. 17.7-12).84 
                                                
that happens is displayed. / But since this realm has gained its citizens / through the true faith, it 
rightly falls to him / to speak of faith, that he may glorify it’”].  In Paradiso 25 she says “Li altri due 
punti, che non per sapere / son dimandati, ma perch' ei rapporti / quanto questa virtù t'è in piacere, / a 
lui lasc' io…” (58-61) [The other two points of your question, which / were not asked so that you 
may know, but that / he may report how much you prize this virtue, / I leave to him…]. 
83 “Like the one who came to Clymene, to assure himself / of what he had heard about himself / the 
one who still makes fathers wary of sons; / such was I and such was I perceived to be / by Beatrice 
and by the holy lamp / that – earlier – had shifted place for me.” 
84 “Therefore my lady said to me: “Display / the flame of your desire, that it may / be seen well-
stamped with your internal seal, / not because our knowledge grows / by your speech, but so that you 
learn / to speak your thirst, so that man pours for you.’” 
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Again we see the convivial metaphor in service of the pursuit of knowledge in line 
12, but Beatrice invokes not supernatural or mystical communion but human 
exchange when she says that Dante should learn to “speak his thirst” so that “l’uom 
ti mesca,” so that “man may pour for you.”  She has already explicitly eliminated 
the present company from this “l’uom” such that she can only mean that Dante 
should speak in order to satisfy his desire not at that moment but later among 
humans.  As a speech act, this mind-reading episode commands that Dante speak so 
that he may habituate himself to a mode of discourse entirely rooted in the social 
contexts and conventions of mortals.  It therefore points explicitly away from the 
narrative and beyond the poem to the life Dante leads – a life that is inseparable 
from history.  That this moment privileges that history makes sense given that it is 
precisely Dante’s earthly history – “le cose contingenti” – that his question to 
Cacciaguida concerns in lines 13-27.  There, he asks his ancestor to explain the 
“parole gravi” (23) that other souls have suggested about his future.  Beatrice’s 
command to speak not only privileges human history but does so in the context of 
Dante’s particular political fate.  Her speech act therefore points very specifically to 
that history as well, asking us to understand Dante’s obligation to speak as part of 
his historical and political life. 
 In that life Dante suffered social trauma caused by the dislocation of exile, 
which meant loss of social familiarity and exchange in his native environment.  
This, of course, partly means losing the privilege of speech.  The rest of canto 17 
suggests the priority of these specific losses.  Cacciaguida tells Dante that he will 
have to leave the things most dear to him (“Tu lascerai ogne cosa diletta / più 
caramente”)85, but worse than tasting the salt of foreign bread or ascending and 
descending the stairs of another (loss of native food and of property, respectively) 
                                                
85 “You shall leave everything you love most dearly.” 
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will be precisely Dante’s social circle, the “malvagia e scempia” and 
“ingrata…matta ed empia” company that he will have to keep: 
 
     E quel che più ti graverà le spalle, 
   sarà la compagnia malvagia e scempia 
   con la qual tu cadrai in questa valle; 
     che tutta ingrata, tutta matta ed empia 
   si farà contr' a te; ma, poco appresso, 
   ella, non tu, n'avrà rossa la tempia. 
     Di sua bestialitate il suo processo 
   farà la prova; sì ch'a te fia bello 
   averti fatta parte per te stesso  (Par. 17.61-9).86 
Because their “bestialitate” will cause this company to suffer bloodshed, 
Cacciaguida advises Dante to isolate himself.  Here Dante’s need to speak indeed 
collides with the historical fate that makes him a party of one, “parte per te stesso,” 
a social condition denying speech.  In this context, Beatrice’s command broadcasts 
desire for speech as implied by social connection, but it also declares mourning for 
the loss of speech implied by a party of one.   
 The connection between language and exile was a theme in Dante’s 
imagination, since in the De vulgari eloquentia at 1.18.3 he personifies the ideal 
vernarcular as one who lacks a court and therefore must wander like a homeless 
stranger.87 This persistent link further supports the value and urgency of speech in 
the Commedia but also invites us to view the poem as Dante’s response and 
consolation, a testament that while suffering social isolation, he is not vanquished 
by silence.  Fascinating throughout the rest of Paradiso 17 is how insistently Dante 
renders his fears about writing the poem through words that imply speaking.  He 
                                                
86 “And what will be most hard for you to bear / will be the scheming, senseless company / that is to 
share your fall into this valley; / against you they will be insane, completely / ungrateful and profane; 
and yet, soon after, / not you but they will have their brows bloodred. / Of their insensate acts, the 
proof will be / in the effects; and thus, your honor will / be best kept if your party is your self.” 
87 “Hinc etiam est quod nostrum illustre velut acola peregrinatur et in humilibus hospitatur asilis, 
cum aula vacemus” [it is also why our illustrious vernacular wanders around like a homeless 
stranger, finding hospitality in more humble homes – because we have no court]. 
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juxtaposes his social loss with what he might save through his “carmi,” a word 
indicating poetry but etymologically rooted in the vocal “cantare” (“se loco m'è tolto 
più caro, / io non perdessi li altri per miei carmi”).88 In line 116 he worries that if he 
retells (“s'io ridico”) what he has seen in the afterlife, his words will be too bitter for 
many.  Cacciaguida says that consciences dark with shame will indeed find Dante’s 
“parola brusca” in line 26, but says that if Dante’s voice will at first be difficult, “se 
la voce tua sarà molesta / nel primo gusto…” (130-1),89 it will eventually nourish 
those who hear.  Finally, Cacciaguida says in line 133 that Dante’s “grido” will be 
as wind that strikes hardest at the highest peaks.  The emphasis on writing the poem 
as speaking is another historical signpost of desire for speech in part as a 
consequence of social isolation. 
 Bringing these patterns to light contributes to answering the question with 
which I began this dissertation, namely why Dante, unlike his visionary 
counterparts, makes mind reading in his vision a topos of epistemological crisis.  By 
approaching mind reading as speech acts, this chapter suggests some of the 
conventions that Dante creates in order to direct our readings, as well as the 
epistemological consequences of such creations.  It also suggests conventions that 
imply Dante himself as subject, both as pilgrim and poet, conventions partly 
informed by the social struggles of his personal history of exile.  With this 
understanding, we can say more about the specular mind-reading episodes explored 
in chapter 3.  As demonstrated, the specular episodes that most explicitly dramatize 
imminent silence are also those that perform Dante’s personal history.  We find this 
link because part of Dante’s social obligation is to restore an identity that had been 
deeply and humiliatingly defamed through exile.  While the silence of union with 
                                                
88 “If I lose the place most dear, I may / not lose the rest through my songs (poems).” 
89 “If your words upset / in the first taste…” 
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God ostensibly comes at the poem’s final tercet, Dante the man had long been 
silenced through social and political dislocation.  Dante would not have used the 
terminology of speech acts, but by calling forth the histories that it does his poem 
reflects deep awareness of how he himself had been performed as a speech act.  The 
poet’s exile radically transformed the constative meaning of “Dante” through a 
communal performance of his guilt by the victorious opposition.  This social reality 
of Dante’s history made him acutely (if not consciously) aware of the power of 
speech acts and hints at a personal epistemological crisis of identity.   
 How does the community identify a person in the face of such performance?  
This, Dante surely knew, could easily lead to profound questions about how one 
knows oneself.  Specular mind-reading episodes in particular work to recapitulate 
and recreate Dante’s temporal identity and history, but in doing so they also mark 
the personal epistemological crisis in which their insistent temporality is rooted.  
With this understanding, we can say more about the relationship between telepathy 
and the histories it invokes; mind reading as an epistemologically fraught topos in 
the Commedia is not only made possible by the poetic and philosophical histories 
explored in previous chapters;  I would argue that in light of Dante’s personal 
history, all of the evidence shows that as it is carried out, mind reading in the 
Commedia becomes a necessary performance of social and historical subjectivity. 
 To say that these histories make the Commedia’s mind reading possible and  
even necessary implies valuable critical insights.  First, tracing the histories of mind 
reading in and out of the poem reveals new specific evidence of how the Commedia, 
despite its explicit narrative and poetic claims, does not transcend but rather exists 
in history.  Dante’s departure from other visionaries in making telepathy a topos 
illustrates not historical isolation but rather that mind reading is very much a 
product of the epistemological histories we have examined: the narrative history of 
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epiphany, the philosophical and narrative histories of mind reading, Olivi’s debate 
concerning cognition in Dante’s time, and social conventions that dramatize what 
we may call Dante’s personal epistemological history.  These relationships, in turn, 
suggest in the poem not only awareness but an intriguing engagement with 
historicity that goes far beyond the Dante who obsessively and merely refers to and 
appropriates histories, far beyond the idea of Dante as theologian of history as 
informed primarily by the Augustinian model of Christian interpretation (and 
conversion).  While not explicitly participating in the deliberate historicizing 
methodology of Renaissance thinkers, the topos of mind reading shows how the 
Commedia necessarily and sometimes involuntarily historicizes in part because of 
the poem’s insistence on social, historical, cultural, and linguistic differentiation.90  
 Through the lens of epistemology, the focus on mind reading also helps to 
define the poem’s place in intellectual history by inviting us to re-evaluate our 
historical understanding of the poem’s philosophy of language, the topic that I 
addressed in the introduction as one of the primary motivations for the dissertation.  
For the topos of mind reading reveals a performance of language that seriously 
challenges Kurt Flasch and other scholars who assume the poem’s linguistic 
                                                
90 In Dante and the Making of a Modern Author, which I encountered after I had reached my own 
conclusions, Ascoli makes a similar claim about Dante’s relationship to authority, specifically 
through his understanding and use of the word “autore”:  “The word does have philologically 
derivable roots in a medieval etymological tradition.  But the tradition is plural, and, as Dante 
approaches it, hardly stable: he is, …drawing on all of the available meanings of the word, and is 
openly conditioning concepts of secular human authorship with the ideas of human authorship of the 
Bible and a divine Author of authors behind all of these.  When these multiple meanings are brought 
together sub specie aeternitatis, from the perspective of the Otherworld, they are, paradoxically, 
historicized, in the sense that their meaning begins to change – an author who both “binds words with 
musical art” and is “worthy of faith and obedience” is different from one who does or is either of 
these things separately.  From this perspective, the perceived anachronism of discussing Dante and 
his works in terms of a modern idea of originating authorship may not be as captious as it first 
seemed.  In the push of one medieval and Dantean meaning of autore against another, a new 
meaning, or meanings, begins to emerge, which anticipates, without being identical to, those current 
today.” (17). 
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transparency and efficacy.91 If, as Flasch and others assume, Dante claims to know 
who is damned or saved and therefore at some level positions language as 
unproblematically transparent, close attention to the Commedia’s linguistic practice 
reveals different and disquieting messages.  These tell us that language is 
contingent, that how and whether one understands cannot be taken for granted 
because signs have a life of their own, that interpretation is therefore risky and 
subject to misunderstanding.  Knowing is necessarily partial and immanent, not 
because it is an earthly compensation for divine truth, but because language and 
speech in particular are privileged social processes that are subject to specific 
histories.  If these findings are valid, then the Commedia’s epistemology of 
language does not remain in the static categories of easy accessibility and 
transparency, in stark contrast to later fourteenth-century writers, such as Chaucer 
and Boccaccio who are said to interrogate more discernibly the power of language 
to signify.  Instead, the poem points toward those later epistemological concerns by 
dramatizing its own versions of them.  Discovering these signposts in the Commedia 
requires new ways of reading, one of which I have tried to model in this chapter, 
because like some of its more complex historicizing impulses, the poem’s 
ambiguous epistemology of language is veiled in part by the poet’s strategies 
precisely targeted to obscure our view. 
 This implicit presentation recalls Gregory’s metaphor of the approaching 
dawn to figure the epistemological condition of the world as it nears the end of time.  
As discussed in chapter 3, in the fourth Dialogue Gregory explains that the ever-
greater frequency of visions correlates to the end of time looming ever more near.  
Consequently spiritual visions increasingly enlighten human understanding that 
nonetheless remains flawed by the illusions of this world, just as before dawn 
                                                
91 See the introduction for a review of the arguments of Flasch, et al. 
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shadows mingle with growing light.  Dante surely was familiar with this metaphor 
because he incorporates a stunning version of it in the final stages of his vision in 
Paradiso 30.76-78.  There Beatrice tells the pilgrim that the astonishingly beautiful 
images he sees, the river of light with gem-like souls that spark forth to flowers and 
back again to the light, are “umbriferi prefazi,” shadowy prefaces of the truth for 
Dante’s limited but ever-growing comprehension: “«Il fiume e li topazi / ch'entrano 
ed escono e 'l rider de l'erbe / son di lor vero umbriferi prefazi.”92 We may 
understand performances of mind reading as philosophical “umbriferi prefazi” 
marking the Commedia’s ambiguous place in epistemological history as the poem 
foreshadows questions about language that would become increasingly urgent 
throughout the trecento. 
                                                
92 “The river and the gems / of topaz entering and leaving, and / the grasses’ laughter – these are 
shadowy / prefaces of their truth.’ 
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